William Miller, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1321

William Miller,
Appellant,

vs.

Public Storage, a foreign Real Estate Investment Trust,
defendant and third-party plaintiff,
Respondent,

vs.

Penelope Isleman,
third-party defendant,
Appellant.

Filed May 24, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-18-3689

Edward F. Rooney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Abraham S. Kaplan, Jesse H. Kibort, Parker Daniels Kibort, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellants, a mother and her adult son, challenge the grant of summary judgment
dismissing his conversion and civil -theft claims and her fraud counterclaims against
respondent, owner of the storage facility in which mother had stored property that
respondent subsequently sold. Because we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact
preclude the summary judgment and that respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, we affirm.
FACTS

In January 2012, app ellant Penelope Isleman (P.I.) signe d a lease to rent a storage
space from respondent Public Storage. The lease identified her as “Occupant” and
respondent as “Owner” and provided in relevant part:
3(a). . . . UNDER MINNESOTA LAW , OWNER HAS A
LIEN UPON THE PROPERTY OR UPON THE PROCEEDS
OF THE PROPERTY STORED BY OCCUPANT AT THE
SELF-STORAGE FACILITY. THE LIEN COVERS
OVERDUE RENT . . . . IF THE RENT . . . REMAIN[S]
UNPAID FOR FIFTEEN (15) CONSECUTIVE DAYS,
OWNER HAS THE RIGHT . . . TO ENFORCE AND
SATISFY T HE LIEN BY SELLING THE PROPERTY
STORED BY OCCUPANT AT THE FACILITY. . . .

3(b). . . . Owner shall not be liable to Occupant or anyone else
for the removal or sale of personal property which is owned by
someone other than Occupant . . . unless Occupant had notified
owner that personal property in Occupant’s space was not
Occupant’s personal property. Occupant agrees to notify
owner, in writing, of any personal property stored in
Occupant’s space which is not the sole personal property of
Occupant and of the name of any person who has an interest in
the personal property. . . .

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. . . .

4. . . . The parties agree that in view of the limitations
of value of the stored goods as provided in paragraph 5
below and the limitations as to Owner’s liability as
provided in paragraph 7 below, the value of any claim
hereunder is limited to $5,000 . . . .

5. . . . Occupant shall store only personal property that
belongs to Occupant. Because the value of the personal
property may be difficult or impossible to ascertain, Occupant
agrees that under no circumstances will the to tal value of
all personal property s tored in the Premises exceed, or be
deemed to exceed, $5,000. Occupant acknowledges and
agrees that the Premises and the Property are not suitable
for the storage of heirlooms or precious, invaluable or
irreplaceable property . . . .

. . . .

7. . . . Owner and Owner’s A gents will have no
responsibility to Occupant or to any other person for any
loss, liability, claim, expense, damage to property or injury
to persons (“Loss”) from any cause, including w ithout
limitation, Owner’s and O wner’s Agents active or passive
acts, omissions, negligence or conversion, unless the Loss is
directly caused by Owner’s fraud, willful injury or willful
violation of law. Occupant shall indemnify and hold owner
and Owner’s Agents harmless from any los s incurred by
Owner and Owner’s A gents in any way arising out of
Occupant’s use of the Premises or the Property includin g,
but not limited to, claims of injury or loss by Occupant’s
visitors or i nvitees. Occupant agrees that O wner’s and
Owner’s Agents’ total responsibility for any Loss from any
cause whatsoever will not exceed a total of $5,000. . . .

. . . .

13(a). . . . In the event Occupant shall change Occupant’s
physical address or email address or alternate name and
address as set forth on this Lease/Rental Agreement, Occupant
shall give Owner written notice of such change sig ned by

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Occupant and specifying O ccupant’s current physical address
or email address and alternate name, address and telephone
number, within ten (10) days of the chang e; such notice to be
mailed to O wner by first class mail with proof of mailing.
Changes of addresses or telephone numbers cannot be effected
telephonically or through the listing of such information on
return envelopes or checks.

. . . .

16. . . . This Lease/Rental Agreement and any w ritten
amendment or addenda exe cuted at the same time as this
Lease/Rental Agreement, and any notices pr ovided under
this agreement by Owner, set forth the entire agreement of
the parties with respect to the subj ect matter hereof and
supersede all prior agreements or understandings with
respect thereto. With the exception of posted rules and
regulations . . . there are no representations, warranties, or
agreements by or between the parties which are not fully
set forth herein and no representative of Owner or Owner’s
Agents is authorized to make any representations,
warranties, or agreements other than as expressly set forth
herein and, further, with the exception of any subsequent
notice from Owner to Occupant of adjustments [to monthly
rent, etc.] as provi ded in paragraph 2 above, this
Lease/Rental agreement may only be amended by a writing
signed by the parties.

P.I. placed items in the storage facility space owned by herself and by her mother,
Margaret Isleman (M.I.) , and items given to he r son, appellant William Mille r (Miller),
born in August 1997 and now age 23.
In 2013 P.I. moved to a different town. She called respondent and ask ed that M.I.
“take over the [space].” Respondent’s employee confirmed the monthly rate and payment
deadlines with M.I., who agreed to “ take over the payments.” M.I. made payments,
although she never received any notices, acknowledgments, or other mail from respondent.

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Respondent continued to send mail relevant to the storage space, including notice
of a rent increase, to P.I.’s old addr ess. Although the mail was returned as undeliverable
with a forwarding address that was entered into respondent’s software, respondent
continued to send mail only to P.I.’s old address.
In May 2015, rent payments became delinquent for a second time. After respondent
sent a Notice of Enforcement of Owner’s Lie n—Notice of Sale and a Balance D ue Letter
to P.I.’s old address, both of which were returned as undeliverable, a sale was held.
In March 2017, P.I. and M.I. brought an action against respondent, alleging that M.I.
had made the rent payments through June 2015. The district court denied P.I. and M.I.’s
motion to replead their consumer-fraud claim, granted summary judgment dismissing P.I.’s
conversion and civil -theft claims, granted summary judgment to respondent on M.I.’s
conversion and civil-theft claims because M.I. was not a party to the lease, and denied M.I.
and P.I.’s motion for leave to add a punitive -damages claim. This court affirmed those
decisions. Isleman v. Public Stor age, No. A20 -0092, 2020 WL 684635 2 (Minn. App.
Nov. 23, 2020), review denied (Minn. Feb. 16, 2021) (Isleman I).1
In June 2018 , Miller, whose request to intervene in Isleman I had been denied,
brought a separate action against respondent, alleging conve rsion and civil theft. The

1 The district court also determined that P.I. was e ntitled to partial summary judgment on
her claim that respondent violated the Minnesota Liens on Personal Pro perty in Self -
Storage Act , Minn. Stat. § § 514.970 -.979 (2020), specifically the provision that “[a]ny
notice the owner is required to mail to the occupant . . . shall be sent to the last known
mailing address of the occupant, if the last known mailing address differs from the mailing
address listed by the occupant in the rental agreement and the owner has reason to believe
that the last known mailing address is more current.” Minn. Stat. § 514.974(3). However,
that determination was not challenged on appeal, and this court did not address it.

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district court dismissed those claims under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e ) (failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted) ; this court reversed the dismissal and remanded the
claims. See Miller v. Public Storage, No. A18-2155 (Minn. App. June 24, 2019).
On remand in October 2020, the district court granted respondent’s motion for
summary judgment dismissing with prejudice Miller’s conversion and civil -theft claims,
denied Miller’s motion for partial summary ju dgment on collateral -estoppel grounds on
those claims, and dismissed P.I.’s consumer-fraud and false-advertising counterclaims as
barred by the statute of limitations. Appellants challenge these determinations.
DECISION
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, assessing
whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court misapplied
the law. Melrose Gates, LLC v. Moua , 875 N.W.2d 814, 819 (Minn. 2016). “We will
affirm the [grant of summary] judgment if it can be sustained on any grounds.” BFI Waste
Sys. LLC v. Bishop, 927 N.W.2d 314, 325 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted), review
denied (Minn. June 26, 2019). When considering a grant of summary judgment, we “need
not adopt the district court’s reasoning and may enter judgment on any appropriate legal
grounds.” Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012).
1. Summary Judgment on Miller’s Claims of Conversion and Civil Theft
On appeal, Miller argues that he is entitl ed to damages because respondent “could
not claim any lawful interest in [the] property at issue,” i.e., the property in P.I.’s unit. But
respondent had a lien on the property stored in P.I.’s unit under both Minn. Stat. § 514.972,
subd. 1, (“The owner . . . has a lien against the occupant o n the personal property stored

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under a rental agreement in a storage space . . . or on the proceeds of the personal property
subject to the defaulting occupant’s rental agreement in the owner’s possession .”) and
paragraph 3(a) of the lease; paragraph 3(b) obliged P.I. to notify respondent in writing if
the pr operty belonged to anyone else, and she did not do so. Miller’s argument that
respondent “could not claim any lawful interest” in the property is unpersuasive.
Miller also argues that he is entitled to damages because the fact that the property
was in the possession of P.I. and M.I., rather than of himself, “does not permit [respondent]
to escape liability for conversion and civil theft.” But respondent’s lien on the property
stored in P.I.’s space depended not on who possessed the property but rather on the
property’s location in one of respondent’s storag e spaces on which the rent payment was
overdue. The lease provided at paragraph 3(b) that respondent was “not . . . liable to [P.I.]
or anyone else for the removal or sale of personal property which [was] owned by someone
other than [P.I.]” unless P.I. had notified respondent in writing that someone else owned
the property, which P.I. had not done. The lease also provided at paragraph 16 that it “set
forth the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter [there]of,” i.e.,
the storage space and its contents, so no oral or other communication between P.I. and
anyone else could have altered or eliminated its provision. Respondent was therefore not
liable under the lease to Miller for the sale of t he property and was entitled to summary
judgment dismissing Miller’s claims.
The district court based its a ward of summary judgment dismissing Miller’s
conversion and civil -theft claims on the fact that, because Miller was a minor when the
property was sold, he had no enforceable ownership interest in it. See Minn. Stat. § 604.14,

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subd. 1 (2018) (“[A] person who steals personal property from another is civilly liable to
the owner of the property for its value . . . .”); Thomas B. Olson & Assocs. v. Leffert, Jay
& Polglaze, 756 N.W.2d 907, 920 (Minn. App. 2008) (“[L]ack of an enforceable interest
in the subject property is a complete defense against conversion.”) , review denied (Minn.
Jan. 20, 2009).
The district court concluded that Miller did not have an ownership interest in the
property because he had not acquired it through one of the means provided in the Minnesota
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 527.21-.44 (2020). Appellants argue that
this conclusion is “plainly at odds with American law” and support their argument with
caselaw from Wyoming, California, and Illinois. But whether the property belonged to
Miller, as he now claims it did, or to P.I. and M.I., as they previously claimed it did, s ee
generally Isleman I, 2020 WL 6486352, it is undisputed that, when the property was in
P.I.’s space and the rent on that space was overdue, respondent had a lien on the property
and is entitled to summary judgment on Miller’s conversion and civil-theft claims.
2. Denial of Miller’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
The district court in Isleman I determined that P.I. was entitled to partial summary
judgment on liability for her cl aim that respondent violated the Minnesota Liens on
Personal Property in Self -Service Storage Act, specific ally Minn. Stat. § 514.974 (3)
(providing that “[a]ny notice the owner is required to mail to the occupant . . . shall be sent
to the last known mailing address of the occupant, if the last known mailing address differs
from the mailing address listed by the occupant in the rental agreement and the owner h as
reason to believe that the last known mailing address is more current”). The district court

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reasoned that : (1) as of August 1, 2014, Minn. Stat. § 514.974 (3) went into effect;
(2) respondent increased P.I.’s rent after August 1, 2014, and was therefore obligated to
send a notice of the increase to her last known mailing addres s; (3) “[respondent’s]
employees repeatedly received returned mail with a forwarding address for P.I. and put
P.I.’s forwarding address in [respondent’s] software system”; and (4) respondent failed to
send the lien notice to P.I.’s last known address. 2 The district court concluded that
respondent was liable to P.I. for that violation and granted her partial summary judgment
on her statutory-violation claim.
Miller argues that this district court decision collaterally estopped the district court
in his case from deciding that respondent is not liable to Miller for that violation. Collateral
estoppel requires that : (1) the issue be identical to the issue previously litigated, (2) the
estopped party be a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, (3) there was
a final judgment on the merits, and (4) the estopped party had a full and fair opportunity to
be heard on the adjudicated issue. Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn.
2004).
Miller’s argument for collateral estoppel states that: (1) the decision that respondent
violated the statute was actually a decision that the foreclosure proceedings were illegal,
based on Minn. Stat. § 514.973, subd. 1 ( “An owner’s lien established under sections

2 Respondent did not challenge the summary judgment awarded to P.I. on respondent’s
liability for violation of the sta tute on appeal, and therefore this court did not address that
issue in Isleman I , merely noting that “[ t]he district court also granted [P.I.] summary
judgment on the issue of liability on her claim that respondent violated the Liens Storage
Act.” Isleman I, 2020 WL 6846352 at *3.

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514.970 to 514.979 for a claim that has become due must be enforced as p rovided in this
section.”); (2) Miller raised the issue of the legality of the foreclosure proce edings in this
action; (3) Miller is in privity with P.I. because, like her, he is claiming compensation for
respondent’s illegal sale of the property ; (4) the district court’s decision that respondent
was liable to P.I. for violating the statute “was clearly a final adjudication”; and
(5) respondent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate because it could have sought
appellate review of that decision. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.02, subd. 2. But
respondent’s duty to P.I. under Minn. Stat. § 514.974(3) was based solely on P.I.’s having
signed a lease as an occupant of a storage space ; Miller had not signed the lease and was
not an occupant. In regard to the lease on which the claim was based, there was no privity
between P.I., who sign ed the lease and became an occupant , and Miller, who did n either.
A court’s decision that an owner under a lease was liable to an occupant under that lease
does not entitle a nonparty to the lease to sue the owner and get the same result.
Moreover, the same decision that imposed liability for P.I.’s statutory -violation
claim on respondent denied all M.I.’s claims against respondent on the ground that she was
not a party to the lease. See Isleman I, 2020 WL 6846352 at *7-8. The denial of Miller’s
claim for partial summary judgment on liability for the statutory-violation claim was not
collaterally estopped by the decision that respondent was liable to P.I. on that claim.
The district court here denied Miller’s claim for partial summary judgment on
respondent’s liability for the statutory violation after concluding that the claims in this case
were brought by a m inor child and the claims in Isleman I were brought by an adult, so
“none of the factual findings in [that case] are applicable to this case and collateral estoppel

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does not apply” and quo ting from Kaiser v. N. States Power Co ., 353 N.W.2d 899, 907
(Minn. 1984) the principle that, “[a] basic prerequisite to the application of collateral
estoppel is that the issue now involved is identical to the one previously litigated.” We
affirm the denial based on a somewhat different but in no way conflicting perspective. See
Isleman I, 2020 WL 6846352 at *4 (citing Archdiocese, 817 N.W.2d at 163 , for the
proposition that this court “need not adopt the district court’s reasoning and may enter
judgment on any appropriate legal grounds”).
3. Statute of Limitations
P.I. brought two fraud counterclaims based on allegations that (1) before she read
or signed the lease, respondent’s television commercials had induced her to believe that
she was allowed to store both property belonging to others and property worth more than
$5,000 in her rental space , and (2) after she signed the lease, respondent’s employees
perpetuated the fraud by ma king statements contrary to th e lease provisions. But, absent
fraud or misrepresentation, “a person who signs a contract may not avoid it on the ground
that [s]he did not read it or thought its terms to be different.” Gartner v. Eikill, 319 N.W.2d
397, 398 (Minn. 1982).
The 6-year fraud statute of limitations [set out in Minn. Stat.
§ 541.05, subd. 1(6) (2020)] begins to run when the aggrieved
party discovers the facts constituting the fraud. We judge
discovery of the fraud under the reasonable person standard.
The facts constituting the fraud are deemed to have been
discovered when they were actually discovered or, by
reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.

Archdiocese, 817 N.W.2d at 172 (quotation and citations omitted).

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The district court noted that: (1) P.I. signed the lease after viewing the commercials,
(2) she did not assert that she had no opportunity or ability to read the lease before signing
it, and (3) the lease plainly stated the terms of the agreement, with the monetary limit on
stored property in boldface type. The district court then concluded that:
[a]ny alleged fraud in the television commercials viewed by
[P.I.] prior [to] her signing of the rental contract thus should
have been discovered upon reading the terms of the contract.
Accordingly, [P.I.], using reasonable dilig ence, should have
discovered any alleged fraud in the television commercials at
the time [she] signed the rental contract in January of 2012.

P.I. filed her counterclaims for fraud in September and November 2019, more than seven
years after January 2012 when she signed the leas e. Because the six -year statute of
limitations imposed by Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6), barred P.I.’s fraud claims,
respondent’s motion for summary judgment dismissing them was granted.
On appeal, P.I. argues first that the district court erred by concluding that P.I. should
have discovered the alleged fraud in January 2012 because “[respondent’s] wrongful
conduct on which [P.I.’s] counterclaim is based continued through October 2013, ” when
its employees allegedly provided her with “ deceptive assurances.” But the lease clearly
states in paragraph 16 that it “set forth the entire agreement of the parties” and that “no
representative of Owner or Owner’s Agents is authorized to make any
representations, warranties, or agreements other than expressly set forth herein.” P.I.
cannot avoid the lease by saying she thought it said something else. See Gartner, 319
N.W.2d at 398.

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P.I. also argues that her damages did not accrue when she signed the lease on
January 15, 2012, because sh e did not acquire standing to br ing a claim under the
consumer-fraud act when she signed the lease. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
“chose[n] the some damage rule as a middle ground between the ‘occurrence’ and
‘discovery’ rules of accrual.” Hansen v. U.S. Bank, 934 N.W.2d 319, 327-29 (Minn. 2019).
The “occurrence” rule states that the limitations period begins to run upon the occurrence
of the negligent act, even if there is no actual damage at the time, and the “discovery” rule
states that the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run only when
the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury. Id. at 329 n.5. “[S]ome damage may be
created either by financial liability or the loss of a legal right. . . . The exact amount of
financial loss need not be ascertainable for damage to have accrued.” Id. at 329.
Under the “some damage” rule, P.I.’s cause of action under the lease accrued when
she signed the lease, became liable for rent payments, and was restricted as to whose
property she could store an d how much that property could be worth. She could have
brought an action either to rescind the lease and reimburse her rent payment or to enjoin
enforcement of some of the lease’s terms at any time after signing the lease in January
2012.
Thunander v. Up onor, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 850 (D. Minn. 2012) , a nonbinding
federal district court case on which appellants rely to argue that P.I.’s cause of action did
not accrue when she signed the lease, is distinguishable. The plaintiffs in that case were
found to lack standing because their allegation of defects in the pipes in their home was
not based on any testing of their pipes but rather on a memorandum stating that other pipes

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from that manufacturer did not conform to a National Sanitation Foundation require ment.
Thunander, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 8 64-65. Here, P.I. claims to have been injured by the
discrepancy between the terms of respondent’s lease and the implications of respondent’s
television commercial; her realization of that injury would have occurred as soon as she
read the lease.3
The district court did not err in dismissing the fraud counterclaims as barred by the
statute of limitations.
Affirmed.

3 Finally, appellants argue that “provisions in consumer contracts that are contrary to the
representations or practices of the seller cannot serve as defenses to consumer fraud
claims.” Respondent asserts that this argument was never raised to the district court and is
therefore not properly before this court, see Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.
1988), and appellants do not oppose this assertion in their reply brief. Moreover, the
argument has nothing to do with whether the statute of limitations bars appellants’ claims.