Venice Felice Walker, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0161

Venice Felice Walker, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 16, 2019
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CR-14-732

Charles F. Clippert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, David Hemming, Assistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of her request to withdraw
her guilty plea to murder in the third degree, arguing that the factual basis for her plea was

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inadequate because the record does not establish that she proximately caused the victim’s
death. We affirm.
FACTS
In early spring 2014, appellant Venice Felice Walker met Morgan Pavey at a
methadone clinic in Brooklyn Park. On four or five occasions, Walker traded her
methadone to Pavey in exchange for other drugs. Pavey then sold the methadone Walker
gave her to other individuals, including S.M. On June 30, 2014, S.M. died after using
methadone that he had purchased from Pavey.
Pavey was charged with murder in the third degree, and after a jury trial, wa s
convicted. Walker was also charged with murder in the third degree and pleaded guilty in
August 2016. In September, Walker was sentenced to 86 months in prison, stayed , and
placed on probation. She was also required to serve 365 days in the county jail as a
condition of the stayed sentence . In 2018, Walker petition ed for postconviction relief ,
seeking to withdraw her guilty plea on the ground that the plea was invalid. The
postconviction court denied Walker’s petition. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Walker contends that the postconviction court erred by denying her petition to
withdraw her guilty plea. A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty
plea. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But withdrawal must be permitted
if necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Id. Manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is
invalid. Id. at 94. A constitutionally valid plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.

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Id. The defendant bears the burden of showing that her plea was invalid. Id. The validity
of a guilty plea is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.
Walker challenges the accuracy of her plea. A plea must be supported by a proper
factual basis with “sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s
conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664
N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). We determine the sufficiency of the
factual basis for a plea from the r ecord made when the defendant entered it. State v.
Lillemo, 410 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Minn. App. 1987).
Walker pleaded guilty to third -degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.195(b) (2014), which provides “[w] hoever, without intent to cause death,
proximately causes the death of a human being by, directly or indirectly, unlawfully selling,
giving away, bartering, delivering, exchanging, distributing, or administering a controlled
substance classified in Schedule I or II, is guilty of murder in the third degree . . . .”
In this case, there is no dispute that S.M. is deceased. Nor does Walker dispute that
she directly or indirectly gave away, bartered, or exchanged her methadone to Pavey, or
that methadone is a Schedule II substance. The issue on appeal is whether there is a
sufficient factual basis to conclude that Walker proximately caused the death of S.M.
Proximate causation exists when a defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the death. 10 Minnesota Practice , CRIMJIG 11.40 (2018); Lubbers v.
Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995). 1 A defendant is “criminally liable for all

1 We apply the civil concept of proximate cause in criminal cases. State v. Nelson , 806
N.W.2d 558, 562 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 2012).

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the consequences of [her] actions that occur in the ordinary and natural course of events,
including those consequences brought about by one or more intervening causes, if such
intervening causes were the natural result of the defendant’s acts.” CRIMJIG 11.40.
At the plea hearing, Walker stated that she had traded her methadone to Pavey on
several occasions. When questioned by the prosecutor, Walker stated the following:
Q: And you’re aware that at least one of the bottles,
potentially two of those bottles, that you gave to Morgan
Pavey, ended up in the hands of a person by the name of
[S.M.]?
A: Yes.
Q: And you’re aware that two bottles, two empty bottles,
at least one with your name on it, your prescription label on it,
with your name, ended up in [S.M.]’s house?
A: Yes.
Q: And you’re aware that [S.M.] ultimately died after
taking methadone?
A: Yes.
Q: And the medical examiner did an autopsy and
concluded that the cause of death was, in fact, methadone?
A: Okay. Yes.
. . . .
Q: Okay. And you also agree that [S.M.] directly received
the methadone that killed him from Morgan Pavey?
A: Yes.
Q: And you’d agree that you gave that specific methadone
to Morgan Pavey?
A: Yes.
. . . .
Q: And by giving that methadone to Morgan Pavey that
was either directly or indirectly, but that was the cause of
[S.M.]’s death?
A: Yes.
Q: Your methadone was the pro bable cause of [S.M.]’s
death?
A: Yes.

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On appeal, Walker concedes that the methadone bottles found at S.M.’s home had
her name on them, but asserts that “[t]here is no evidence that the methadone from the two
bottles with [her] name on them were even involved” in the death of S.M. And despite her
admissions at the plea hearing, Walker now asserts that she had “no personal knowledge
of where S.M. got the methadone that caused his death.”
On appeal, we look to the record made at the time of the plea to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the plea. Lillemo, 410 N.W.2d at 69. Walker admitted
that she provided the methadone to Pavey, who sold it to S.M. And she admitted that the
methadone she had been prescribed was found in S.M.’s home, wh ere he died. While
Walker did not directly provide S.M. with the methadone, and may not have known where
S.M. had gotten it, Pavey’s sales of the traded methadone was a consequence that occurred
in the ordinary and natural course of events. Based on the record made at the time of the
plea, we conclude that there is a sufficient factual basis to support a conclusion that
Walker’s admitted conduct satisfied the elements of murder in the third degree.
Walker contends that Pavey’s sale of the methadone i s an intervening superseding
cause of S.M.’s death. An intervening cause must satisfy four elements to be considered
superseding. State v. Hofer , 614 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Minn. App. 2000) , review denied
(Minn. Aug. 15, 2000) . First, its harmful effects must occur after the initial negligence.
Id. Second, the cause must not have been brought about by the original negligence. Id.
Third, “it must have actively worked to bring about a result which would not otherwise
have followed from the original negligenc e.” Id. (quotation omitted). Fourth, it must not
have been reasonably foreseeable by the original actor. Id.

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Walker argues that Pavey’s sale of the methadone to S.M. “would not have followed
from Walker’s original negligence” and that S.M.’s overdose “was not reasonably
foreseeable.” Here, Pavey’s sale of the methadone followed directly from Walker’s
original negligence in trading a controlled substance because Pavey could not have sold
the methadone to S.M. if Walker had not provided it to her initially. While Walker argues
(and stated during the plea colloquy) that she believed that Pavey wanted the methadone
for personal use and was not selling it, we are unpersuaded. I t is reasonably foreseeable
that a person who traded one controlled substance for another may sell or trade the received
methadone. While Walker may not have known that Pavey intended to sell the methadone
to S.M., the plain language of the statu te makes clear that even “indirectly” transferring
controlled substances that results i n the death of another per son carries liability for third -
degree murder. Minn. Stat. § 609.195(b). This includes circumstances such as these,
where one person transfers drugs to another, who in turn, provides the drugs to someone
who fatally overdoses. Allowing Walker to escape liability for “indirectly” supplying the
drugs to S.M. is contrary to the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 609.195(b). Accordingly,
Walker’s intervening-superseding-cause argument lacks merit.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Walker’s guilty plea was
accurate because it was supported by a sufficient factual basis. Accordingly, we conclude
that the postconviction court did not err by denying her petition to withdraw her guilty plea.
Affirmed.