State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1418

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael James Harlan,
Appellant.

Filed August 4, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-16535

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Michael James Harlan sold pills to a man who died of an overdose. After a
stipulated-evidence court trial, the district court found Harlan guilty of third-degree murder
and second-degree manslaughter. Harlan argues that , because he believed that the pills
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contained oxycodone and did not know that the pills contained fentanyl, the evidence is
insufficient to prove that he proximately caused the victim’s death. We conclude that the
evidence is sufficient to support the conviction of third-degree controlled-substance
murder. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On March 14, 2021, police officers found C.L. in his apartment in the city of Rogers,
deceased, with three pills on a table beside him. The pills had markings consistent with
oxycodone, but testing revealed that the pills contained fentanyl. An autopsy determined
that C.L.’s cause of death was “mixed ethanol and fentanyl toxicity.”
Further investigation revealed that, on the day before C.L.’s death, he had sent a text
message asking “Eric” whether he had any “blues,” which, the evidence shows, is a
common slang term for oxycodone. C.L. and Eric exchanged additional text messages to
arrange a meeting in St. Paul later that day . Cell-site-location information showed that
C.L. and Eric were in the same location in St. Paul for a short period of time that afternoon.
Investigating officers later learned that the cell-phone number for “ Eric” belonged
to Harlan. When Harlan was arrested in September 2021, he had in his possession a cell
phone with the telephone number that C.L. had messaged on March 13, 2021. After
waiving his Miranda rights, Harlan admitted that the cell phone belonged to him, that he
exchanged text messages with C.L. on March 13, 2021, that he met C.L. in St. Paul later
that day, and that he sold oxycodone pills to C.L.
The state charged Harlan with third-degree murder proximately caused by the
delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.195(b) (2020), and
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second-degree manslaughter by means of culpable negligence, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.205(1) (2020). In December 2022, the parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence court
trial, which occurred in January 2024. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. The evidence
consisted of nine exhibits, including police reports, Harlan ’s statements to officers, cell-
phone records, medical records, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension reports, and
photographs.
In March 2024, the district court filed an order in which it found Harlan guilty of
both charges. In May 2024, the district court imposed a sentence of 120 months of
imprisonment on the third-degree murder conviction. The district court did not impose a
sentence on the second-degree manslaughter conviction. Harlan appeals.
DECISION
I. Third-Degree Murder
Harlan first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of third-
degree murder under section 609.195(b).
In general, to determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, this
court undertakes “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.” State v. Jones,
977 N.W.2d 177, 187 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). This court “carefully examine[s]
the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them
would permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d
895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “We assume that the jury believed the state’s
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witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205,
214 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). If an appellant’s argument implicates the meaning
of a criminal statute, we apply a de novo standard of review. State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d
551, 556 (Minn. 2017); State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2013).
If a conviction rests on circumstantial evidence, this court applies a heightened
standard of review with a two-step analysis. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Minn.
2018); State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016); State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83,
88 (Minn. 2014). At the first step, we “identify the ‘circumstances proved.’” State v. Isaac,
9 N.W.3d 812, 815 (Minn. 2024) (quoting State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn.
2021)). “In identifying the circumstances proved, we assume that the jury resolved any
factual disputes in a manner that is consistent with the jury’s verdict.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d
at 88. Accordingly, we “disregard evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.”
State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). At the second step of the analysis,
“we examine independently the reasonableness of the inferences that might be drawn from
the circumstances proved,” determine whether “the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt,” and determine whether the circumstances proved are “inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88 (quotations omitted).
At the second step, we do not give deference to the jury ’s verdict. Loving v. State, 891
N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
A.
The applicable statute provides, “Whoever, without intent to cause death,
proximately causes the death of a human being by, directly or indirectly, unlawfully selling,
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giving away, bartering, delivering, exchanging, distributing, or administering a controlled
substance classified in Schedule I or II, is guilty of murder in the third degree . . . .” Minn.
Stat. § 609.195(b).
Harlan focuses his argument on the issue of proximate cause. He argues that, to
prove proximate cause in a prosecution under section 609.195(b), the state is required to
prove that the defendant was “able to have anticipated that injury would likely result from
the sale of the controlled substance.” H e argues further that, “[f]or a person to be able to
anticipate that the sale of a controlled substance was likely to result in an injury, they must
know the exact nature of the controlled substance they’re selling.” He continues by arguing
that, because he did not know that the pills he sold to C.L. contained fentanyl, he could not
have anticipated C.L.’s death.1

1We reiterate that Harlan’s argument is directed at the element of proximate cause,
not the element of intent. We assume without deciding that the offense of third-degree
controlled-substance murder is a general-intent crime. See State v. Cogger, 802 N.W.2d
407, 410-11 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2012); State v. Hart, 477
N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1992). Proof of a general-
intent crime requires only evidence that “the defendant engaged intentionally in specific,
prohibited conduct,” In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 808 n.10 (Minn. 2000)
(quotation omitted), or, stated differently, evidence of “an ‘intention to make the bodily
movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires,’” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d
303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2(e)
(2d ed. 2003)). Harlan does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he
intentionally engaged in an act that is prohibited by the applicable statute. Such an
argument would be inconsistent with State v. Ali, 775 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. App. 2009), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 16, 2010), in which the appellant challenged his drug-possession
conviction by arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew specifically
that he possessed cathinone. Id. at 917-18. We rejected the argument and affirmed,
reasoning that “proof that the defendant was aware that he possessed a controlled substance
satisfies the statute’s actual-knowledge requirement.” Id. at 919.
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In challenging the state’s evidence of proximate cause, Harlan cites two supreme
court opinions discussing proximate cause in civil negligence cases. In the first, Lubbers
v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. 1995), the supreme court stated:
[I]n order for a party’s negligence to be the proximate cause of
an injury the act must be one which the party ought, in the
exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was likely to
result in injury to others, . . . though he could not have
anticipated the particular injury which did happen. There must
also be a showing that the defendant’s conduct was a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury.

Id. at 401 (quotations omitted). In the second, Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859 (Minn.
1961), the supreme court stated that “it is clear . . . that [proximate cause] is not a matter
of foreseeability.” Id. at 861. The Lubbers and Dellwo opinions appear to be in tension
with each other inasmuch as the “ought . . . to have anticipated” concept that was approved
in Lubbers is quite similar to the foreseeability concept that was disavowed in Dellwo. See
Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC, 964 N.W.2d 613, 620-21 (Minn. 2021) (citing Lubbers
and stating that party’s negligence is not proximate cause of injury unless injury was “a
foreseeable result of the negligent act”); McDougall v. CRC Indus., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 3d
1061, 1072 (D. Minn. 2021) (citing Lubbers and stating that whether defendant “should
have anticipated the likely injury . . . is ultimately a question of foreseeability”).
In any event, the civil caselaw does not directly apply to a criminal prosecution for
third-degree controlled-substance murder under section 609.195(b), even though the civil
caselaw has informed the criminal caselaw. The Dellwo opinion has been cited by the
supreme court in only one criminal case, which was not a prosecution for third-degree
controlled-substance murder under section 609.195(b). See State v. Smith, 119 N.W.2d
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838, 849 n.2 (Minn. 1962) (affirming conviction of third-degree depraved-mind murder
under section 619.10 (1958)). The Lubbers opinion has been cited by the supreme court in
only two criminal cases, neither of which was a prosecution for third-degree controlled-
substance murder under section 609.195(b). See State v. Smith, 835 N.W.2d 1, 7-8 (Minn.
2013) (citing Lubbers for proposition that superseding cause is question of fact and
affirming conviction of criminal vehicular homicide); State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866,
869-72 & n.5 (Minn. 2009) (citing Lubbers in discussing elements of duty and proximate
cause and reversing conviction of second-degree culpable-negligence manslaughter).
Neither the supreme court nor this court has cited either Lubbers or Dellwo in a precedential
opinion concerning a prosecution for third- degree controlled-substance murder under
section 609.195(b).2
To find the applicable law concerning proximate cause in a prosecution for third-
degree controlled-substance murder, we look to the 2013 Smith opinion, in which the
supreme court stated, “to prove proximate cause, the State must show that the defendant’s
acts were a substantial factor in causing the death.” 835 N.W.2d at 4 (citing State v. Olson,
435 N.W.2d 530, 534 (Minn. 1989)). This court applied a similar definition in a case of
third-degree controlled-substance murder, stating that proximate cause may be understood
as “something that had a substantial part in bringing about the individual’s death either

2We have cited Lubbers in one nonprecedential opinion while discussing third-
degree controlled-substance murder under section 609.195(b). See Walker v. State,
No. A19-0161, 2019 WL 4409412, *2 (Minn. App. Sept. 16, 2019), pet. dismissed (Minn.
Nov. 8, 2019). But this court’s nonprecedential opinions are “not binding authority.”
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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directly and immediately or through happenings that follow one after another.” State v.
Schnagl, 907 N.W.2d 188, 196 (Minn. App. 2017) (quoting 10 Minnesota Practice,
CRIMJIG 11.40 (2015)), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2018). These formulations of
proximate cause reflect the second concept in Lubbers, that “the defendant’s conduct was
a substantial factor in bringing about the injury,” but do not incorporate the first concept in
Lubbers, that the defendant “ought . . . to have anticipated [the act] was likely to result in
injury to others.” See 539 N.W.2d at 401. Thus, in a prosecution for third-degree
controlled-substance murder, the inquiry is limited to the question whether a defendant’s
“acts were a substantial factor in causing the death.” See Smith, 835 N.W.2d at 4.
B.
In its March 2024 order, the district court found that C.L. died, that Harlan directly
sold pills to C.L., that Harlan acted intentionally, that Harlan knew that the pills he sold to
C.L. contained a controlled substance, and that Harlan’s sale of the pills to C.L. was
unlawful.
With respect to the issue of proximate cause, the district court made the following
findings: C.L.’s cause of death was “mixed ethanol and fentanyl toxicity.” Three blue
pills with oxycodone markings were found next to C.L.’s dead body along with his cell
phone. C.L.’s cell phone revealed that Harlan offered to sell C.L. oxycodone in February
2021 and that C.L. responded with interest on March 13, 2021. Harlan regularly met
customers in parking lots and other public places to sell controlled substances and, when
he was arrested, he had a large amount of cash on his person. There was no evidence that
C.L. might have purchased oxycodone or blue pills from any other supplier. The stipulated
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evidence supports these findings. Based on its predicate findings, the district court made
an ultimate finding that Harlan proximately caused C.L.’s death by selling him pills
containing fentanyl.
To resolve Harlan’s argument, we need not describe the stipulated evidence
supporting each of the district court’s predicate findings because he makes a very narrow
argument: that the evidence is insufficient to prove proximate cause on the ground that the
stipulated evidence shows that he believed that the pills he sold to C.L. contained
oxycodone and did not believe that the pills contained fentanyl. Based on the law of
proximate cause discussed above, Harlan’s knowledge or understanding of the ingredients
of the pills that he sold to C.L. is immaterial. Rather, the relevant question is whether
Harlan’s act of selling pills to C.L. was a substantial factor in causing his death. See id.
The 2013 Smith case is instructive. Smith drove a car at high speeds through a
residential neighborhood while impaired by alcohol. Id. at 3. He crashed into another
vehicle at an intersection and injured a 93-year-old woman, who suffered, among other
injuries, a traumatic brain injury and complex fractures of her cervical spine. Id. During
a long hospitalization, she developed lung problems, including aspiration and pneumonia,
leading to respiratory failure, which caused her death. Id. at 3-4. Smith was charged and
convicted of criminal vehicular homicide. Id. at 3. On appeal, he challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence of proximate cause. Id. at 4. The supreme court’s proximate-
cause analysis focused on “Smith’s conduct” and his “actions.” Id. at 5-7. The supreme
court did not inquire into Smith’s knowledge or beliefs about, for example, the likelihood
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of a collision with another vehicle or the age and physical condition of the occupants of
other vehicles. See id.
As in Smith, we focus on the appellant’s conduct. Harlan engaged in the prohibited
act of selling a controlled substance to C.L. As a result of Harlan’s conduct, C.L. consumed
the controlled substance, which caused his death. For these reasons, Harlan’s conduct was
“a substantial factor in causing the death.” See id. at 4.
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to prove that Harlan proximately caused C.L.’s death
and, therefore, is sufficient to support his conviction of third- degree controlled-substance
murder.
II. Second-Degree Manslaughter
Harlan also argues that, for the same reasons, the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction of second-degree manslaughter by means of culpable negligence. A person
commits that offense if he or she “causes the death of another . . . by the person’s culpable
negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances
of causing death or great bodily harm to another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.205(1).
The district court found Harlan guilty of second-degree culpable-negligence
manslaughter but did not impose a sentence for that offense. The criminal appellate rules
provide that a defendant “may appeal as of right from any adverse final judgment” and that
a “final judgment within the meaning of these rules occurs when the district court enters a
judgment of conviction and imposes or stays a sentence.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02,
subd. 2(1) (emphasis added). Because the district court did not impose a sentence on the
conviction of second-degree manslaughter, there is not a final judgment with respect to that
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offense from which Harlan may appeal as of right. See State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649,
650 (Minn. 1979) (declining to address sufficiency-of-evidence argument for charges on
which defendant was found guilty but not sentenced). Thus, we need not decide whether
the evidence is sufficient to support Harlan’s conviction of second-degree culpable-
negligence manslaughter. See id.
Affirmed.