In re the Matter of:

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-0372

Court of Appeals Chutich, J.

In re the Matter of:

Rodney Tristan Miller,

Respondent,
vs. Filed: January 20, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Pamela Marie Miller, n/k/a Pamela Marie Spera,

Appellant,

Maria Molloy, intervenor,

Respondent.
________________________

Pamela M. Spera, Eden Prairie, Minnesota, pro se.

David M. Cox, Two Rivers Law P.A., Otsego, Minnesota, for respondent Maria Molloy.

_______________________

S Y L L A B U S
Respondent is entitled to intervene as a matter of ri ght under Minnesota Rule of
Civil Procedure 24.01 because her minor daughter has an interest in the retirement accounts
that are the subject of appellant ’s enforcement action. Respondent’s right to intervene is
limited specifically to the valuation of the accounts.
Affirmed as modified.

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O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
This case presents the question of whether a third party can intervene as a matter of
right in a proceeding to enfo rce a 14-year-old divorce de cree (“Decree”). Appellant
Pamela Marie Spera1 (Spera) sought enforcement of the Decree that dissolved her marriage
to Rodney Miller, seeking specifically to have the retirement accounts she and Miller each
held divided according to the terms of the Decree. Neither party had divided their accounts
at the time, as the Decree required, while Miller was still alive. Instead, before he passed
away in 2018, Miller named his four daught ers—his three children with Spera, and one
child with respondent Maria Molloy (“Mollo y”)—as beneficiaries of his retirement
accounts. Molloy is the mother of Miller’s youngest daughter, K.M.M., a minor. Molloy
sought to intervene in Spera’ s enforcement proceeding as a matter of right to assert
K.M.M.’s interest in Miller’s retirement accounts.
The district court denied intervention, fi nding that under the Decree, Spera had a
superior interest in the accounts and that K.M.M.’s interest attached only after the property
division required by the Decree took place. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that
the four requirements under Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.01 for intervention were met. We conclude
that Molloy has satisfied the standard for inte rvention as of right under Rule 24.01 of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Because we hold that Molloy’s right to intervene is
narrower than the court of appeals held, we affirm as modified.

1 Spera was formerly known as Pamela Miller.

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FACTS
Rodney Miller and Pamela Spera were married in September 1981. They had three
daughters together and subsequently separated in July 1999. When they dissolved their
marriage in May 2004, Miller and Spera each owned several retirement accounts. Miller
owned five accounts: one each at Vanguard, Fidelity Investments, and Dreyfus Founders
Funds, and two at American Century. Sp era owned four accounts: one at Fidelity
Investments and three at American Century.
The Decree ordered the parties to divide their interests in the accounts equally:
28. Retirement Accounts – By virtue of the divorce decree and judgment
entered on this day disso lving the bonds of marri age existing between the
Petitioner and Respondent, along with this Order, the parties are ordered by
the court to divide equally between them selves their interests in all of the
above retirement accounts, by transferring one-half of the interest in each of
the parties’ individual accounts to the other party, pursuant to the divorce
decree and judgment. The va lue of the accounts is to be determined at the
time of the division of the accounts, wh ich shall be done within 30 days of
the date of this Order.

The Decree also ordered the parties to cooperate in making the conveyances required under
paragraph 28:
36. Execution and Exchange of Docu ments – To implement the terms and
provisions contained here in, each of the parties shall make, execute and
deliver to the other party instrument s of conveyance, assignment and other
documents as may be required. In the event either party fa ils to do so, the
Judgment and Decree shall operate as said conveyance.

And the Decree reserved jurisdiction for the district court to distribute assets that were not
properly divided:
37. Retention of Jurisdiction – In the event there are assets or income which
have not been disclosed and/or divi ded herein, the court shall retain

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jurisdiction over said in come and/or assets for the purpose of making an
equitable division thereof. The party fa iling to disclose said income and/or
assets shall pay the reasonable attorney fees and costs of the other party
incurred in enforcing this provision.

Miller and Spera never divided and transferred the one-half in terests in their respective
retirement accounts.
In 2012, Miller and Molloy had a daughter, K.M.M. 2 After K.M.M.’s birth, Miller
changed the beneficiary designation on his re tirement accounts so that each of his four
children would receive a percentage of the accounts upon his death. Spera was not included
as a designated beneficiary on any of the accounts. Miller died in February 2018, without
a will.
On June 22, 2018, Spera filed a motion to enforce the Decree and to divide the
retirement accounts. She requested an order enforcing paragraphs 28 and 36 of the Decree
and holding the Decree to be in full force and effect concerning the division of the parties’
interests in the retirement acc ounts. Spera also requested th at the value of the retirement
accounts be determined as of the date of the new order, excluding any value attributed to
contributions that she or Miller made after the date of the Decree.
Molloy moved to intervene on behalf of K.M.M. She argued that intervention as a
matter of right is allowed u nder Minnesota Rules of Civ il Procedure 24.01, based on
K.M.M.’s interest in her late father’s retirement accounts. Molloy alternatively requested
permissive intervention under Rule 24.02. She also argued that Spera’s motion to enforce
the Decree should be denied because it was ba rred by laches and the 10-year statute of

2 Miller and Molloy never marrie d; they separated in 2014.

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limitations under Minn. Stat. § 541.04 (2020). In the alternative, Molloy asked the district
court to reserve ruling on Spera’s motion pend ing an exchange of statements for the
retirement accounts of Miller and Spera.
The district court denied Molloy’s motion to intervene on behalf of K.M.M. The
court found that by naming K.M.M. as a designated beneficiary of a portion of the accounts,
Miller “acted in contravention to the Judgment and Decree by designating beneficiaries to
his account other than Ms. Spera.” Citing Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. App.
1999), the court reasoned that “strong public policy discourages third party intervention in
dissolution matters.” The court concluded that although K.M.M. “has an interest in the
accounts in question, she does not have an interest in the initial division of the accounts
within the context of the dissolution” and therefore Molloy could not intervene as a matter
of right on K.M.M.’s behalf.
The district court also denied permissive intervention, citing the same public policy
considerations, which “supersede[d] Ms. Molloy’s interest in ensuring [K.M.M.]’s future
interests are protected.” The court did not address the merits of Molloy’s laches and statute
of limitations arguments because it found that she was not a proper intervenor. The court
granted Spera’s motion for enforcement of th e Decree and found that the parties to the
dissolution are each entitled to “50% of the retirement accounts pursuant to [paragraph] 28
of the Judgment and Decree” and that the aw ard did not include “a ny contributions by
either party to those accounts after the date of the Judgment and Decree or any additional
value that is a consequence of those contributions.” Molloy appealed.

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The court of appeals reversed, holding th at the district court erred in denying
Molloy’s Rule 24.01 motion to inte rvene as a matter of right. In re Miller v. Miller ,
No. A19-0372, 2020 WL 1676639 (Minn. App. Apr. 6, 2020). The court of appeals
reasoned that the district court’s reliance on Luthen was “misplaced,” because that case
was factually distinguishable. 2020 WL 1676639, at *3. Th e court of appeals concluded
that “[b]ecause K.M.M. claims that she is entitled to a portion of the accounts awarded to
Miller, the value of K.M.M.’s interests in the accounts directly depends on accurate
valuations of the accounts.” Id. The court of appeals noted that “[i]f Miller were alive, he
could protect his interests in the accounts by participating in the valuation process; he
would not be required to simply accept [Spera’s] evidence regarding the account values.”
Id. The court of appeals further stated, “Inco rrect valuations will impair or impede
[Molloy’s] ability to protect K.M.M.’s interests and, as the district court found, K.M.M. is
‘not adequately represented by the existing parties.’ ” Id. (footnote omitted). The court of
appeals declined to consider the merits of the statute of limitations and laches issues. Id.
at *4. Instead, after reversing the order gr anting Spera’s motion fo r enforcement of the
Decree, the court of appeals remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at
*3.
Spera sought review by this court, which we granted.
ANALYSIS
We independently assess the appropriateness of an order that denies a motion to
intervene as a matter of right under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 24.01. See Norman
v. Refsland, 383 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn. 1986). “The standard is similar to that used by

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the federal court in reviewing orders under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).” Norman, 383 N.W.2d
at 676.
Intervention as of right is governed by Rule 24.01. The rule provides as follows:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the matter may as a practical matter
impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.01.
Rule 24.01 establishes four requirements for intervention as of right: “(1) a timely
application; (2) an interest in the subject of the action; (3) an inability to protect that interest
unless the applicant is a party to the action; and (4) the applicant’s interest is not adequately
represented by existing parties.” League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d
636, 641 (Minn. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The rule seeks to protect persons who clai m an interest relating to the property or
subject at issue in the litigati on from having that interest adversely affected by litigation
taking place without their participation. See Avery v. Campbell, 157 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn.
1968) (explaining that the rule is intended to allow a person claiming an interest to become
a party “to prevent judicial processes from being used to the prejudice” of the rights of the
proposed intervenor (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In determining
whether intervention is proper, the court must accept the allegations in the pleadings as
true, unless they are frivolous on their face. Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d
21, 28 (Minn. 1981).

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Here, we conclude that factors (1) and (4) are met, primarily because neither Spera
nor Molloy disputes these factors. Molloy’s application was timely and the district court
correctly found that K.M.M.’s interest was not adequately represented by Spera; Spera has
not offered any arguments that would support reaching a different conclusion on either of
these factors.3 Accordingly, we turn to the remaining factors: whether Molloy, on behalf
of her daughter K.M.M., has a sufficient intere st to support intervention and whether the
disposition of the action may impa ir Molloy’s ability to protect that interest. We discuss
each requirement in turn.
Although an intervenor must have “an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action,” Rule 24. 01 does not require a potential intervenor to
show a likelihood or probability of success on the merits. The rule “requires merely a
claimed interest, not a certain one.” Miller v. Astleford Equip. Co., 332 N.W.2d 653, 654
(Minn. 1983). Although a frivolous claim will not suffice, id., we have “followed [a] policy
of encouraging all legitimate interventions.” Costley, 313 N.W.2d at 28 (citing Engelrup
v. Potter, 224 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Minn. 1974); Avery v. Campbell , 157 N.W.2d 42, 46
(Minn. 1968)). The standard applicable to the corresponding federal rule, Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(a)(2), is well stated and applicable to Minnesota’s rule as well: Rule 24.01 requires “a

3 Spera was the only party before the distri ct court, given that Miller was deceased
and no probate proceeding had been opened fo r his estate. Spera did not affirmatively
assert, in her briefs to this court, that she could adequately represent the child’s interests as
a beneficiary of Miller’s accounts. To the ex tent that Spera suggest ed that the child’s
interests were adequately represented beca use financial institutions would divide the
accounts, those institutions are not parties to this action and therefore cannot represent the
child’s interests.

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direct and concrete interest that is accorded some degree of legal protection.” Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 75 (1986).
Applying these principles here, K.M.M.’s claimed interest in her late father’s
retirement accounts is direct and concrete— it is not frivolous. K.M.M. is a named
beneficiary of certain retirement accounts that are the subject of Spera’s action to enforce
the Decree. Given her father’s death, K.M.M. has an interest in a portion of the property
subject to paragraph 28 of the Decree; that is, her claim as a beneficiary to some portion of
Miller’s retirement accounts. Further, once a valuation is completed in Spera’s
enforcement action, K.M.M. would be entitled to a share of the accounts from the financial
institutions that have custody of them. Under these circumstances, K.M.M. has a concrete
and legally protectable interest. How Miller’s accounts are valued has a direct bearing on
K.M.M.’s interests. Because Molloy can demonstrate that K.M.M. has a legitimate, non-
frivolous interest in the retirement accounts, she has satisfied Rule 24.01’s second factor.4
Having concluded that K.M.M. has a present, vested interest, we next determine
whether Molloy “is so situated that the dis position of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede [her] ability to protect that interest.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.01. We
conclude that she is so situated. The va luation that Spera seek s necessarily impacts
K.M.M.’s interests in the accounts subject to Spera’s action. The relief Spera seeks

4 The district court alternatively found th at Molloy had no interest in the retirement
accounts because Miller acted “in contravention of the divorce decree” when he designated
K.M.M. as a beneficiary. It is not clear that this conclusion, even if correct, has any effect
on whether Molloy has a sufficient interest to support intervention under Rule 24.01. An
interest obtained by a beneficiary designation, even if later held to be in violation of the
Decree, is still a colorable interest, which is all that Rule 24.01 requires.

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requires consideration of the contributions, w ithdrawals, and earnings in the accounts, on
a time-specific basis stretching over many years. While financial institutions may be able
to do this valuation easily, as the court of ap peals aptly reasoned, incorrect valuations of
Miller’s and Spera’s respective interests in the accounts “will impair or impede [Molloy’s]
ability to protect K.M. M.’s interests.” Miller, 2020 WL 1676639, at *3. Without
intervening as a party in this enforcement action, Molloy cannot protect K.M.M.’s interest
in Miller’s retirement accounts and the proper valuation of th ose accounts. Accordingly,
the third requirement of Rule 24.01 is met.
Although K.M.M. has a present, vested inte rest in the valuation of the retirement
accounts of her father, we agree with the district court that “s he does not have an interest
in the initial division of the accounts within the context of the dissolution.” In a prior
dissolution action, we reversed a ruling that gave the children of the marriage a potential
interest in the real prop erty their parents had acqui red during the marriage. Johnson v.
Johnson, 169 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Minn. 1969). In Johnson, the district court did not divide
the parties’ real property and ordered that “i f either party should die while the property is
held in joint tenancy, then the title to the property shall vest in the names of the surviving
joint tenant and the children born of this marriage.” Id. at 596. In reversing the order, we
explained that “there is nothing in the stat utes which authorizes a court to award the
children of the marriage any interest whatsoever in the property acquired during coverture.”
Id. at 597; see also Melamed v. Melamed, 286 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn. 1979) (holding that
the district court did not have the power to award a property interest to the parties’ children
in a dissolution action).

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Similarly, K.M.M. has no interest that gives her the right to intervene in the
enforcement action regarding the division of retirement accounts that Miller and Spera
acquired during their marriage. K.M.M. is not a child of the marriage. Cf. Valentine v.
Lutz, 512 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that the “property or transaction”
language in Rule 24.01 “more appropriately applies to interests involved in traditional civil
actions, such as in contracts and torts, rather than the very personal and family interests”
involved in a family law matte r). As a matter of public polic y, the parties to a marriage
have the right “to their own divorce action.” Luthen v. Luthen , 596 N.W.2d 278, 282
(Minn. App. 1999).
Our holding today is necessarily narrow. Our holding recognizes that K.M.M. has
some interest in property awarded in the Decree and that interest is sufficient for Molloy
to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24.01 as to the valuation of Miller’s retirement
accounts. On remand, Molloy does not have the right to intervene as to the division of the
retirement accounts, which is a matter governed by the Decree. Molloy also does not have
the corresponding right to make arguments concerning laches or the statute of limitations,
which challenge the timeliness of Spera’s enforcement action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm as modified the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed as modified.