Cheryl L. Stinski, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0525

Cheryl L. Stinski,
Appellant,

vs.

Jim Ruedebusch, et al.,
Respondents,

Carlton County,
Respondent.

Filed October 28, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CV-18-1161

Neil Polstein, Polstein Law Offices, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Curt N. Trisko, Rudy Law Firm, Cloquet, Minnesota (for respondents Jim Ruedebusch and
Brenda Ruedebusch)

Jason J. Kuboushek, Francine M. Kuplic, Iverson Reuvers Condon, Bloomington,
Minnesota (for respondent Carlton County)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of her appeal of respondent
county’s variance decision as untimely, arguing that the county’s notice of the decision
was insufficient to trigger the 30 -day appeal deadline under Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9
(2018). We affirm.
FACTS
On April 23, 2018, respondents Jim and Brenda Ruedebusch requested variances
from respondent Carlton County for their Barnum property. They sought to add an attached
garage and a deck to their home on the property. On May 15, appellant Cheryl L. Stinski,
the Ruedebusches’ neighbor, emailed the zoning administrator for the county, asking the
Carlton County Board of Adjustment to deny the Ruedebusches’ variance requests. Later
that day, the board held a hearing regarding the variance requests and voted to approve the
variance for the attached garage and deny the variance for the deck. On May 23, the county
mailed Stinski a writ ten “Notice of Decision,” which stated, “Request is hereby
GRANTED for Jim and Brenda Ruedebusch for the following purpose: Construct a 24
feet by 24 feet attached garage onto existing nonconforming dwelling. ” The notice also
stated, “Request is hereby DENIED for Jim and Brenda Ruedebusch for the following
purpose: Construct a deck onto existing nonco nforming dwelling.” Although the record
does not indicate the date on which Stinski received that notice, she does not dispute that
she received it.

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On June 20, Stinski filed a motion in district court, challenging the board’s decision.
Stinski named the Ruedebusches as the sole defendants. 1 On August 16, Stinski filed an
“Amended Summons” and “Amended Complaint” in district court, challenging the board’s
decision. The parties and district court construed Stinski’s amended complaint as an
appeal. On August 17, Stinski served her “Amended Summons” and “Amended
Complaint” on the county. Stinski served the Ruedebusches on August 23. R espondents
moved to dismiss Stinski’s appeal, arguing that it was untimely and that the district court
therefore lacked jurisdiction. The district court agreed with respondents and dismissed the
appeal. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
The issue in this case concerns the application of Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9,
which provides:
All decisions by the board of adjustment in granting
variances or in hearing appeals from any administrative order,
requirement, decision, or determination shall be final except
that any aggrieved person or persons, or any department, board
or commission of the jurisdiction or of the state shall have the
right to appeal within 30 days, after receipt of notice of the
decision, to the district court in the county in which the land is
located on questions of law and fact.

(Emphasis added.)

The 30-day appeal deadline in Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9, is jurisdictional. See
Elbert v. Tlam , 830 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Minn. App. 2013) (holding that failure to serve
notice of appeal under Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9, within the 30-day time period set forth

1 Stinski’s June 20, 2018 motion is not at issue in this appeal.

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in the st atute is an in curable jurisdictional defect) , review granted (Minn. Jul. 16, 2013)
and order granting review vacated (Minn. Sept. 25, 2013). Jurisdiction is an issue of law
that this court reviews de novo. In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn.
2013).
Stinski contends that “[t]he District Court erred in finding that [her] Receipt of the
Mailing started the thirty -day p eriod allowed by [Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9,] for
appealing the grant of the garage variance.” Specifically, Stinski complains that the
mailing did not include the board’s findings, an adequate description of “who won ,”
information regarding the right to appeal, or the timeline for appealing. As to information
regarding the appeal process, Stinski argues, “It would seem anomalous, when viewed
through a due process lens, to say that a document starts the clock running on any appeal
when that document doesn’t mention any appeal period.” 2 But Stinski agrees that if the
written notice was sufficient, then her appeal was untimely and the district court did not
err by dismissing it on that ground.
Stinski relies on Graham v. Itasca Cty. Planning Comm’n, 601 N.W.2d 461 (Minn.
App. 1999), and In re Appeal of Saldana, 444 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. App. 1989), in support
of her position. In Saldana, this court held, “Oral announcement by the Board of
Adjustment of its dec ision does not trigger [the] 30 –day appeal period under Minn. Stat.
§ 394.27, subd. 9 (1988).” 444 N.W.2d at 892. In Graham, this court held, “An aggrieved

2 Although Stinski mentions due process, she does not expressly argue that her right to due
process was violated. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902-
03 (1976) (setting forth traditional procedural-due-process analysis).

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party’s right to appeal a variance decision of a county adjustment board under Minn. Stat.
§ 394.27, subd. 9 (1998), begins to run when the party receives written notice of the
decision.” 601 N.W.2d at 463.
Stinski argues that “[t]he Mailing failed to inclu de the kinds of meaningful
information required by [Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9], as construed in Saldana and
Graham.” She cites language in Saldana and Graham that explained that one of the reasons
for requiring written notice is the p ossibility that i t c ould provide more information
regarding the bas is for the decision and therefore enable informed consideration of the
merits of an appeal.3 For example, in Saldana this court said, “[I]t was not until appellants
received the Board’s order and findings that they were made aware of the basis upon which
the Board made its decision. Appellants were thus unable to make a cogent decision
whether to launch an appeal until that time.” 444 N.W.2d at 894. In Graham this court
said, “[W]ritten notice would facilitate judicial review by providing aggrieved individuals
with the basis for the decision sought to be reviewed.” 601 N.W.2d at 465. Stinski
concludes that “[i]n the Saldana and Graham cases, this Court interpreted the phrase
‘notice of the decision,’ as used in [Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9,] to include a requirement

3 That was one of multiple reasons provided for the holdings in Saldana and Graham.
Other reasons included the fact that the county’s actual practice was to send written notice,
traditional notions of fairness, due -process concerns, previous supreme court decisions
construing similar statutes, lack of an undue burden on the governing body, a more definite
and unambiguous establishment of the appeal period, reduction in disputes regarding
whether a party had actual notice, establishment of a more uniform system of practice, and
the preference for written notice in other contexts under the rules of civil procedure.
Graham, 601 N.W.2d at 465; Saldana, 444 N.W.2d at 894.

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that any purported notice, to be deemed legally sufficient, must inform the recipient of the
bases for the decision.”
Stinski reads this court’s holdings in Saldana and Graham too broadly. The relevant
issue in those cases was whether oral or actual notice was sufficient to trigger t he 30-day
appeal deadline. See Graham, 601 N.W.2d at 464 (describing relevant issue as whether
“Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9 (1998), require[s] written notice of a board of adjustment’s
variance decision to commence the running of the 30-day limitations period for appeal”);
Saldana, 444 N.W.2d at 893 (“Appellants argue that oral notice is insufficient to trigger
the 30–day appeal period in subd. 9.”). This court held that written notice is required.
Graham, 601 N.W.2d at 463; Saldana, 444 N.W.2d at 892-94. But this court was not asked
to determine, and therefore did not determine, whether the written notice must contain the
information Stinski demands.
Nonetheless, Stinski argues that “it seems obvious that the Statute contemplates
notice actually sent to and received by the aggrieved party and actually containing whatever
information this Court interprets the Statute to impart .” Stinski urges this court to “make
express what it plainly implied in Saldana and Graham: that a purported notice that
provides no information regarding the basis of the decision is not a legally sufficient
‘notice’ under [subdivision 9].”
Stinski’s approach raises an iss ue of statutory interpretation, which is reviewed de
novo. State v. Overweg , 922 N.W.2d 179, 182 -83 (Minn. 2019). “The goal of statutory
interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Kremer v. Kremer, 912 N.W.2d
617, 623 (Minn. 2018). “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is

7
assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.” Burkstrand v. Burkstrand,
632 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn. 2001). Appellate courts “will not read into a statute a
provision that the legislature has omitted, either purposely or inadvertently.” Reiter v.
Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. 2006). The legislature has set forth factors that
may be considered when ascertaining legislative intent including the occasion and
necessity for the law; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the mischief to be
remedied; the object to be attained; the former law, if any, including other laws upon the
same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular interpretation; the
contemporaneous legislative history; and legislative and administrative interpretations of
the statute. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018); see Marks v. Comm’r of Revenue , 875 N.W.2d
321, 326 -28 (Minn. 2016) (applying factors in section 645.16); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 645.08 (2018) (setting forth canons of construction); Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2018) (setting
forth presumptions in determining legislative intent).
Although statutory interpretation is necessary to reach Stinski ’s desired result, she
does not present her argument in that analytical framework. Indeed, Stinski’s briefing does
not cite or discuss any of the statutory -interpretation principles set forth above. Instead,
Stinski relies on this court’s statements in Saldana and Graham and notes that “this Court
has repeatedly declared that the Statute is rather bare-bones in its language and thus in need
of construction in order to flesh out its particulars,” suggesting that this court should add
to the language of subdivision 9 because it has done so in the pas t. For the reasons that
follow, we decline to do so.

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First, we “will not read into a statute a provision that the legislature has omitted,
either purposely or inadvertently.” Reiter, 721 N.W.2d at 911. Second, as noted above, in
Saldana and Graham, thi s court was not asked to determine, and therefore did not
determine, the necessary content requirements of a notice of decision under Minn. Stat.
§ 394.27, subd. 9. And third, although the supreme court caselaw on which this court relied
in Saldana and Graham addresses content requirements for notices in other contexts, that
caselaw does not support Stinski’s argument that a notice of decision must contain the
underlying findings of fact, the basis for the decision, and information regarding the right
to appeal the decision. For example, in Rieman v. Joubert, the supreme court interpreted
the meaning of “service of notice . . . of the filing of the decision or order” in Minn. R. Civ.
P. 59.03. 376 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Minn. 1985) (quoting Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.03) . The
supreme court concluded, “It is implicit in the requirement of service that the notice be a
written notice. While it does not appear that any particular form of notice must be given,
plainly the writing must call to the attention of the recipient what it is that has been filed
and when .” Id. (emphasis added). The county’s notice in this case satisfied that
requirement.
We understand why this court’s statements in Saldana and Graham prompted
Stinski’s argument. But the holdings of those cases alone do not support Stinski’s assertion
that a notice of decision under Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9, is insufficient to trigger the
statutory appeal timeline unless it contains the underlying findings of fact, the basis for the
decision, and information regarding the right to appeal the decision. Thus, Stinski has not
shown that the county’s notice of decision was insufficient to trigger the 30 -day appeal

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deadline. Because it is undisputed that Stinski did not file her not ice of appeal within 30
days of receipt of that notice, the district court did not err by dismissing Stinski’s appeal as
untimely. We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.