Catherine Marie Schaefer, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0657

Catherine Marie Schaefer,
Respondent,

vs.

Brock William Fredin,
Appellant.

Filed April 20, 2020
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HR-CV-18-527

Peter R. Mayer, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Brock Fredin, Baldwin, Wisconsin (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Pres iding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Smith
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to grant respondent’s petition for
a 50-year harassment restraining order (HRO), arguing that the district court (1) lacked
jurisdiction under the HRO statute because neith er party resided in Minnesota at the time
of the HRO petition, (2) erred in denying his notice to rem ove a judicial officer, and

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(3) erred in applying collateral estoppel to determine that appellant had violated a previous
HRO on two or more occasions. Appellant also raises constitutional arguments for the first
time on appeal. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Catherine Marie Schaefer was a graduate student at Pennsylvania State
University when she fi rst made contact with appellant Brock William Fredin on a dating
website in January 2014. Schaefer and Fredin agreed to meet in pe rson. After receiving
“very odd texts” from Fredin, Schaefer sent him a message not to contact her again. Fredin
and Schaefer did not meet in person until after Schaefer st arted legal proceedings in
Minnesota to obtain an HRO.
Over several months following their initia l contact, Fredin repeatedly contacted
Schaefer by text message through various so cial media platforms, and wrote posts about
her on several websites. Scha efer petitioned in Ramsey Coun ty seeking an HRO against
Fredin, which the district court granted after an evidentiary hearing (2016 HRO,
62-HR-CV-16-411). The district court found that Schaefer to ld Fredin “that she did not
want any contact,” but that Fredin “proceeded to contact [her] . . . knowing that she did not
want any contact with him.” The order also fo und that “[t]he contact . . . was repeated,
unwanted, and had the effect of having a substantial adverse effect on [Schaefer’s] security
and privacy.” The district court ordered Fredin to not have any “direct or indirect contact”
with Schaefer for two years and specified that no contact meant not contacting Schaefer
“via electronic means such as email or social networking sites.”

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After the 2016 HRO, Fredin indirectly contacted Schaefer in the following ways.
First, on the same day the district court gran ted the 2016 HRO, Fredin contacted the St.
Paul Police Department and met with an offi cer, alleging that Schaefer was stalking and
harassing him. Second, Fredin “authored and posted a website” discussing the law firm
representing Schaefer and including a link to Sc haefer’s graduate-student profile. Third,
Fredin filed a formal complaint against Schaefer with Pennsylvania State University’s Title
IX office, alleging that Schaefer had stalked, harassed, and sexually exploited him, among
other things. Fourth, Fredin emailed the head of Schaefer’s graduate program, raising
allegations like those in his Title IX compla int. Finally, Fredin posted comments about
Schaefer on social media websites.
In April 2017, Schaefer moved for an order for Fredin to show cause why the district
court should not hold him in contempt for violating the 2016 HRO, submitting an affidavit
describing Fredin’s conduct. The district court initially denied Schaefer’s motion, without
prejudice, because of ongoing investigations by police and the university. When Schaefer
renewed her motion in January 2018, the distri ct court held an evidentiary hearing and
received testimony from Schaefer and Fredin.
In a written order, the district court found that Fredin had violated the 2016 HRO in
each of the ways summarized above and that he continued to violate the HRO by creating
posts on specific websites that “remain[] accessible to the public at the present time” (May
2018 order). The district court ordered Fredin to submit an affidavit detailing his efforts to
remove his posts about Schaefer. Fredin filed a notice of appeal from the May 2018 order,
but his appeal was dismissed. (Order, Appeal No. A18--090, Aug. 21, 2018.)

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On the day that Fredin’s affidavit was due, his attorney wrote to the district court,
stating that Fredin had removed all commen ts about Schaefer, except for those on one
website, and that the attorney had advised Fred in not to submit an affidavit based on his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
The district court set a hearing for June 25, 2018, during which both parties agreed
that the violations in the May 2018 order had resolved. But Schaefer raised two new issues,
alleging that Fredin had committed a new violation of the 2016 HRO and she was entitled
to a 50-year HRO. After hearing argument a nd receiving testimony on the new violation,
the district court temporarily granted the HRO, continued the matter, and set an evidentiary
hearing.
Schaefer filed her affidavit and petition for a 50-year HRO two days after the June
25 hearing (2018 HRO pe tition, 62-HR-CV-18-527). 1 Her petition described Fredin’s
violations of the 2016 HRO, and alleged that he “continues to falsely file court documents
to draw me into further hearings, which have been dismissed.” Schaefer requested an HRO
of up to 50 years because Fredin had “violated a prior or existing restraining order between
us on two or more occasions.”
At the evidentiary heari ng on July 9, 2018, Fredin’s attorney appeared and
represented him on the 2016 HR O; Fredin stated he was pr oceeding pro se in the 2018
HRO petition proceedings. The dist rict court declined to ta ke any testimony on the 2018
HRO petition because, on the day of the hearing, Fredin had f iled a notice to remove the

1 Schaefer at first filed her 2018 HRO petition in the 2016 HRO file on June 22. After the
June 25 hearing, Schaefer refiled it as a new matter on June 27, 2018.

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presiding judicial officer, which the district court took under advisement. The district court
heard arguments and received testimony from Fredin and Schaefer on her allegations that
he had committed new violations of the 2016 HRO.
In a later written order, the district court denied Fredin’s notice to remove on the
2018 HRO petition because his notice was un timely (July 2018 order). The 2018 HRO
petition was set for an evidentiary hearing.
In a separate order, the district court determ ined that Fredin was in contempt of court
for a new violation of the 2016 HRO (October 2018 order). The district court found that
Fredin had filed a temporary restraining order (TRO) agains t Schaefer in Wisconsin and
had “affirmatively and intentionally” provided “false and misleading” information to the
Wisconsin court because he failed to disclose the 2016 HRO against him. The district court
also found that Fredin omitted any information about the 2016 HRO “in an effort to ensure
that he would at least get one (1) hearing wh ereby [Schaefer] would be forced to appear
with [him] in Court.” The district court found that Fredin’s request for a TRO was
“designed to thwart the very purpose of the 2016 HRO.”
At a two-day evidentiary hearing on the 2018 HRO petition in November 2018,
Schaefer submitted 12 exhibits and Schaefer and Fredin testified, as did Fredin’s brother.
Schaefer testified to the events described above. She also testified that she needed an HRO
because she does not “feel like [she is] safe from [Fredin].” Fredin testified that he did not
intend to harass Schaefer, he had stood her up on a date, and Schaefer had threatened him.
Fredin also argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 2018 HRO petition

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under the HRO statute because neither he nor Schaefer resi ded in Ramsey County and
because the alleged violations of the 2016 HRO did not occur in Ramsey County.
On November 17, 2018, the 2016 HRO expired.
In a February 2019 order, th e district court first determ ined that Fred in had been
served with the 2018 HRO pe tition, Fredin had previously contested th e underlying
allegations in court, and the district court had jurisdiction under the HRO statute because
“at least some of the harassment alleged in the petition occurred in Ramsey County.” The
district court also granted Schaefer’s request for a 50-ye ar HRO against Fredin after
determining that Fredin had committed two or more viola tions of the 2016 HRO (2018
HRO). The district court adopted the factua l findings of the May 2018 and October 2018
orders, which established that “beginning the day after the 2016 HRO was issued and
continuing through at least Ma y 22, 2018, [Fredin] engaged in an extensive course of
conduct in violation of the prohibitions of the 2016 HRO against harassment of [Schaefer]
and direct or indirect contact with [Schaefer ].” The district court reasoned that collateral
estoppel prevented Fredin from contesting the previously issued findings in the 2016 HRO
file because the orders addressed “identical” issues, “represented final judgments on the
merits,” the same parties were involved, and Fredin had a “fu ll and fair opportunity to be
heard.” Fredin appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A district court may grant an HRO if it “finds at the hearing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5(b)(3) (2018). Harassment includes “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted

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acts, words, or gestures that have a substan tial adverse effect or are intended to have a
substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1).
An HRO is granted “for a fixed period of not more than two years.” Id., subd. 5(b).
But if “the petitioner has had two or more previous restraining orders in effect
against the same respondent or the respondent has violated a prior or existing restraining
order on two or more occasions, relief granted by the restraining order may be for a period
of up to 50 years.” Id. A district court “may not extend a restraining order beyond two years
from the effective date of the initial restraining order.” Roer v. Dunham, 682 N.W.2d 179,
181 (Minn. App. 2004). To obtain a subsequent HRO, the HRO must be based on “recent
events, not on the events on which the initial order was based.” See id. at 182.
This court reviews a district court’s decision to issue an HRO for abuse of
discretion. Kush v. Mathison , 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). “A district court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due rega rd is given to the district court’s opportunity to judge the
credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 843-44.
I. The district court did not err in dete rmining that jurisdiction in Ramsey
County was proper under the HRO statute.

Fredin argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the HRO statute
because neither he nor Schaefer are Minnesota citizens, the HRO statute does not “assert
jurisdiction where neither party is a citize n of Minnesota,” and the “allegations of
harassment did not occur in Minnesota.” We consider Fredin’s specific statutory challenge

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to the district court’s jurisd iction based on the HRO statute. 2 We review de novo the
district court’s interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts. Seagate Tech.,
LLC v. W. Digital Corp ., 854 N.W.2d 750, 757 (Minn. 20 14) (interpretation of statute);
Anderson v. Christopherson, 816 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 20 12) (application of a statute
to undisputed facts “involves a legal conclusion we review de novo”).
Under the HRO statute, a petitioner can file an HRO “in the county of residence of
either party or in the county in which th e alleged harassment occurred.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 2 (2018). “There are no resi dency requirements that apply to a petition
for a harassment restraining order.” Id. Fredin challenged whether the 2018 HRO petition
was properly filed in Ramsey County based on section 609.748, subdivision 2, arguing that
neither party is a resident and that the alleged harassment did not occur in Ramsey County.
The district court found jurisdiction wa s proper under Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 2, because at least some of “the ha rassment that gave rise to [the] 2016 HRO”
occurred in Ramsey County. The district cour t found that Fredin harassed Schaefer in
Ramsey County on “at least two occasions af ter the 2016 HRO was issued.” First, the
district court found Fredin’s November 2016 violation occurred in Ramsey County because
(a) Fredin resided in St. Paul when he f iled a police complaint against Schaefer in
November 2016, based on info rmation in the police report, and (b) Fredin admitted he

2 We question whether the HRO statute include s what Fredin calls a “jurisdictional”
requirement. Instead, the provision Fredin cha llenges is either a f iling requirement or a
venue provision. But because neither Schaefer nor the district court questioned Fredin’s
reference to the HRO statute as having a juri sdictional requirement, we will continue to
refer to this as a statutory challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction.

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spoke in person with a police officer at the St. Paul headquarters on Grove Street to make
his complaint against Schaefer. The district court also found that, at the November 2018
evidentiary hearing, Fredin “o ffered no coherent or credible testimony as to where he
currently resides.” Second, afte r finding Schaefer’s testimony credible, the district court
found that she was “physically located in Ramsey County” wh en she viewed at least two
of Fredin’s online posts about her. Fredin’s br ief to this court does not challenge any of
these factual determinations, which are supported by the record.
Fredin’s brief to this court does not di scuss the district court’s analysis of
jurisdiction under subdivision two of the HRO statute. Rather, in his brief to this
court, Fredin argues that Schaefer did no t timely serve him with the 2018 HRO petition
30 days before the July 9 evidentiary hear ing, as required by Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5(d) (2018). Fredin misc onstrues Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(d), which grants
respondents the right to request that an HRO be vacated or modified. If the respondent
makes this request, “[p]ersonal se rvice must be made upon the petitioner named in the
restraining order not less than 30 days before the date of the hearing.” Id. (emphasis added).
Subdivision 5(d) did not apply to Schaefer’s 2018 HRO petition. Rath er, Schaefer had to
serve Fredin with her 2018 HRO petition “at least five days before the hearing.” Id.,
subd. 3. Schaefer complied with this requirement because she served Fredin with the 2018
HRO petition on June 29—ten days before the July 9 hearing.
We conclude that the district court properly rejected Fredin’s statutory challenge to
jurisdiction after finding that Schaefer filed the 2018 HRO petition in the county where at
least some of the alleged harassment occurred.

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II. Fredin failed to preserve his challenge to the district court’s decision to deny
his notice to remove a judicial officer.

Fredin argues that he timely filed a notice to remove the assigned judicial officer in
response to the 2018 HRO, but that the district court judge “failed to comply with civil
procedure and remove himself pursuant to Rule 63.03.”
A notice to remove “shall be served and filed within ten days after the party receives
notice of which judge or judicial officer is to preside at the trial or hearing, but not later
than the commencement of the trial or hearing.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 63.03. Removal cannot
be filed “against a judge or judicial officer who has presided at a motion or any other
proceeding of which the party had notice.” Id. A party can “once” disqualify a presiding
judge or judicial officer “as a matter of right.” Id.; see also OCC, LLC v. County Of
Hennepin (In re OCC, LLC) , 917 N.W.2d 86, 91 (Minn. 2018) (“The timely filing and
service of a notice under Rule 63.03 automatically results in the judge’s removal.”).
The district court found that Fredin’s notice of removal was untimely for two
reasons. First, the district court found Fred in’s July 9 notice of removal was untimely
because it was filed against a judge who ha d presided over a hearing on the 2018 HRO
petition. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 63.03. The district c ourt found that the first hearing on the
2018 HRO petition was on June 25, 2018, when Schaefer first raised her request for a
50-year HRO, having filed the petition in th e 2016 HRO file. Fred in and his attorney
appeared at the June 25 hearing and did not object to the presiding judge or seek his
removal. Second, the district court found that Fredin had actual notice of the judicial
assignment for the 2018 HRO pe tition no later than the June 25, 2018 hearing when the

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district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for July 9, 2018. Yet Fredin filed his notice
of removal on July 9, 2019, more than ten days after the June 25 hearing.
“A petition for a writ of prohibition is th e proper means of challenging a district
court judge’s denial of a notice of removal.” In re Ihde, 800 N.W.2d 808, 809-10 (Minn.
App. 2011). “Such a writ prevents a judge from proceeding in a matter where he has been
disqualified by a properly filed notice of removal” and “avoid[ s] the possibl[e] waste of
time, money, and effort requi red of all parties by a procedure which might involve two
trials and possibly two appeals in order to adjudicate the issue.” State v. Azure, 621 N.W.2d
721, 725 n.3 (Minn. 2001) ( quotation omitted). Whether an ap pellate court will review a
notice of removal without a properly filed petition for writ of prohibition depends on “the
circumstances of th[e] case.” In re OCC, LLC , 917 N.W.2d at 90 n.3 ; see, e.g. , State v.
Burrell, 743 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2008) (reviewing petition for writ of mandamus filed
three days after the district court denied removal).
Here, the district court denied Fredin’s not ice to remove in its July 2018 order.
Fredin filed a 90-page “emerge ncy petition for writ of prohibition” with this court in
October 2018 “requesting relief in seven differe nt district court matters,” including civil
and criminal cases. Fredin’s petition did not challenge the district court’s decision to deny
his notice of removal. This court dismisse d Fredin’s writ petition because he failed “to
provide proof of service, pa y required filing fees , or comply with the rule governing
motions to proceed in forma pauperis.” (Order, Appeal No. A18-1231, Sept. 5, 2018).
We conclude that Fredin’s removal argu ment is not properly before this court
because he never petitioned for a writ of prohibition seeking review of the district court’s

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decision. The district court issued a written order denying Fredin’s notice to remove as
untimely in July 2018. The evidentiary hearing was held four months later in November
2018, and the district court granted the 50-year HRO in February 2019. Even though Fredin
filed a writ petition on other issues, he never ra ised the removal issue. Now that district
court proceedings are complete, he asks this court to grant him a second evidentiary hearing
with a different judge. We decline to do so under the circumstances. Allowing Fredin to
start over with a new judge would waste cour t resources and undermine the rationale for
requiring parties to pursue removal by a writ petition. See Azure, 621 N.W.2d at 725 n.3.
III. The district court properly applied collateral estoppel.

Fredin argues that the district court e rred in granting the 2018 HRO and applying
collateral estoppel. In granting the 2018 HRO, the district court determined that Fredin had
violated “a prior or existi ng restraining order on two or more occasions” and collateral
estoppel applied to prevent Fredin from cont esting the factual findings in the May 2018
and October 2018 orders involving the 2016 HRO.
“Collateral estoppel, also known as i ssue preclusion, prohibits a party from
relitigating issues that have been previously adjudicated.” Barth v. Stenwick, 761 N.W.2d
502, 507 (Minn. App. 2009). Collateral estoppel may bar the relitigation of an issue when:
(1) the issue is identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there
was a final judgment on the mer its in the prior proceeding;
(3) the estopped party was a party or in privity with a party to
the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a
full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.

Id. at 508. “Whether collateral estoppel precludes litigation of an issue is a mixed question
of law and fact that [appellate courts] review de novo.” Hauschildt v. Beckingham ,

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686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004). “Once it is determined that collateral estoppel is
available, the decision to apply the doctrine is left to the trial court’s discretion.” Pope Cty
Bd. of Comm’rs v. Pryzmus, 682 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted).
“The district court’s decision to apply coll ateral estoppel will be reversed only upon a
demonstrated abuse of discretion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In his brief to this court, Fredin does not challenge the district court’s analysis of
the first three elements of collateral estopp el. The district court determined that the
elements were met because (1 ) the May 2018 and October 2018 orders found that Fredin
had violated the 2016 HRO, which is identical to the issue raised by the 2018 HRO petition;
(2) the May 2018 and October 2018 orders were final judgments on the merits because
Fredin did not appeal; and (3) “[t]he partie s in this action and the prior actions are
identical.” The record supports the district court’s conclusions.
Fredin argues the district court erred in its analysis of the fourth element—whether
he had a full and fair opportun ity to be heard on the issue. Whether a party has had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate largely turns on “whether there were significant procedural
limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to litigate fully the
issue, or whether effective litigation was lim ited by the nature or relationship of the
parties.” State v. Joseph , 636 N.W.2d 322, 328 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). The
district court determined that Fredin had a full and fair opportunity to be heard “with both
the May [2018] and October [2018] Orders being issued only after full evidentiary hearings
at which [Fredin] had ample incentive to litigate the harassment issues without significant
procedural limitations.”

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Fredin identifies no procedural limitations that restricted his opportunity to litigate
the issues decided in the Ma y 2018 and July 2018 Orders . Rather, Fredin appears to
complain only that the district court prev ented him from cross-examining Schaefer about
her conduct at the evidentiary hearings. Fredin argues that “[t]ranscripts demonstrably
prove [he] lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate” because the district court
“adamantly refused to address [his] contentions that Schaefer had destroyed [him] by
defaming him.”
The only issue at the evidentiary hearings was whether Fredin had violated the 2016
HRO, not the allegations Fredin made about Scha efer’s conduct. Thus, the district court
properly sustained objections to Fredin questioning Schaefer about her conduct. Based on
our review of the record, Fredin had a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether he
violated the 2016 HRO in the proceedings le ading up to the May 2018 and October 2018
orders.
Because all four elements of collateral est oppel were satisfied, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that Fredin was estopped from contesting the May
2018 and October 2018 orders, which found that he had violated the 2016 HRO on two or
more occasions.
IV. Fredin raises constitutional arguments for the first time on appeal.

Fredin appears to raise two constitutional arguments in his brief, contending that the
February 2019 HRO violates his First Amendment right to free speech, and that the HRO

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statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1, violates constitutional due-process requirements as
applied to him.
Fredin did not raise either issue during district court proceedings. The record only
establishes that Fredin’s br other vaguely mentioned the Fi rst Amendment when Fredin
elicited minimal testimony from him during the November 2018 evidentiary hearing. But
Fredin made no cogent legal argument about the First Amendment or due process, nor did
he cite any legal authority or ask for any re lief. Because Fredin rais ed neither the First
Amendment nor the due-process i ssues in the district court, we conclude that Fredin did
not properly raise either argument on ap peal, and we decline to review them. Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (holding that appellate courts generally will not
consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court).
Affirmed.