Lindsey Middlecamp, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0539

Lindsey Middlecamp,
Respondent,

vs.

Brock William Fredin,
Appellant.

Filed February 8, 2021
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HR-CV-19-621

K. Jon Breyer, Kutak Rock LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Brock Fredin, St. Croix County, Wisconsin (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
The district court issued a harassment re straining order that prohibits Brock William
Fredin from harassing or contacting Li ndsey Middlecamp, from anonymously posting
online content about her, and from commencing a lawsuit against her on a self-represented
basis without prior approval of the district cour t. We conclude that the district court did
not err and, thus, affirm.

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FACTS
In 2017, Lindsey Middlecamp, a licensed attorney, operated an anonymous Twitter
account. In January of that y ear, she posted a tweet about Fredin. Afte r learning of the
tweet, Fredin attempted to fi nd out the identity of the person who ha d posted it, and he
eventually did so. In April 2017, Fredin posted multiple tw eets about Middlecamp. His
tweets accused her of posting tweets that violated state law. His tweets also identified the
law school from which she graduated, her then-current employer, and a bar association of
which she apparently was a member. Fredin also created a webs ite with a URL that
consisted of Middlecamp’s name. The webs ite made derogatory statements about
Middlecamp, such as a statement that she ha d “engaged in multiple acts of professional
misconduct.” The website encouraged readers to file professional and criminal complaints
against Middlecamp.
After discovering Fredin’s online conten t, Middlecamp petitioned the district court
for a harassment restraining or der (HRO). In October 2017, th e district court issued an
HRO that prohibited Fredin from harassing Middlecamp, from having any direct or indirect
contact with her, and from being present at or near her home or workplace. In addition,
the HRO prohibited Fredin from harassing Middl ecamp by making pub lic statements, as
follows:
Writings or other communications by [Fredin] which are made
available for public hearing or viewing and which contain
addresses, telephone numbers, photographs or any other form
of information by which a reader may contact, identify or
locate [Middlecamp] are acts of harassment and are prohibited
by this order. Any communications made by [Fredin] under an
identity or auspices other than his true name and which refer to

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[Middlecamp] are acts of harassment and are prohibited
regardless of the truth or falsity of any statement made about
[Middlecamp].

In December 2017, Middlecamp filed an affi davit in which she st ated that Fredin
had violated the HRO. The district court issued a show-cause order and scheduled a
hearing for January 4, 2018. While the parties were at the courthouse that day, Fredin
attempted to talk to Middlecamp in a hallway. A deputy sheriff who witnessed the incident
immediately arrested Fredin for violating th e 2017 HRO. The state charged Fredin with
the criminal offense of violating an HRO, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.748.6(b) (2016).
A Ramsey County jury later found him guilty of that offense.
The district court conducted an evidentia ry hearing on the show-cause order in
February 2018. The district court later filed a 10-page order in which it found that Fredin
had violated the 2017 HRO by creating five websites that made disparaging statements
about Middlecamp and others, each of which in cluded a hyperlink to the complaint in a
federal civil action Fredin had filed agains t Middlecamp, which disclosed Middlecamp’s
home address, in viol ation of the provision prohibiting public statements that “contain
addresses, telephone numbers, photographs or any other form of information by which a
reader may contact, identify or locate [Middlec amp].” The district court ordered Fredin
“to remove the content of the websites that is in violation of” the 2017 HRO. The district
court also ordered that the 2017 HRO would remain in effect until September 2019.
In July 2019, Middlecamp petitioned the district cour t for another HRO. She
requested an HRO of up to 50 years in duration on the ground that Fredin had violated the
2017 HRO on two or more occasions. The district court promptly granted the petition on

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an ex parte basis and issued a temporary HRO, pending a hearing on the petition. In
December 2019 and March 2020, the district court held a tw o-day evidentiary hearing at
which Middlecamp appear ed with counsel a nd Fredin appeared pro se . Middlecamp
testified on her own behalf, and Fredin cross- examined her. Fredin elected not to testify
when given the opportunity to present eviden ce. Middlecamp called Fredin as a rebuttal
witness, but he refused to answer any questions.
In March 2020, the district court file d a four-page order granting Middlecamp’s
petition and an accompanying six-page memorandum. The district court found that Fredin
violated the 2017 HRO six times: five times by creating five websites that disclosed
Middlecamp’s home address, as previously determined by the district court’s February
2018 order, and once by attempting to contac t Middlecamp at the courthouse on January
4, 2018, as previously determined by the jury in Fredin’s criminal trial. The district court
determined that a 50-year HRO is appropriate because Fredin had “violated a prior or
existing restraining order on two or more occasions.” Accordingly, the district court issued
an HRO that forbids Fredin from harassing Middlecamp, from having any direct or indirect
contact with her, and from being present at or near her home or workplace, until January
2070.
The district court also found that Fr edin had harassed Middlecamp by filing an
unsubstantiated complaint with the office of lawyers professional responsibility in October
2017; by filing a civil lawsuit against Middlecamp in federal district court in August 2017;
by filing civil lawsuits referencing Middlecamp against two other persons in federal district
court in February 2018; and by filing a petition for an extraord inary writ in this court in

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July 2019. The district cour t determined that it is “approp riate to issue an order which
limits [Fredin] from using the c ourt system to harass [Middlecamp].” Accordingly, the
district court imposed two additional restrictions on Fredin. The first states as follows:
Respondent shall not anony mously or pseudonymously
register or publish websites, contribute to websites or generate
social media posts, memes, images, or other online content, or
induce others on his behalf, which relate to petitioner, nor shall
he anonymously or pseudonymously contact third parties for
any reason pertaining to petitioner. Respondent must use his
own legal name to the extent he wishes to communicate with
third parties or publish content related to petitioner so that this
court may, if necessary, evalua te whether such content or
communications constitute harassment.

In its memorandum, the district court stated, “It is appropri ate to . . . limit respondent’s
ability to harass petitioner through using ano nymous or pseudonymous websites or other
social media postings as he did in five of the violations mentioned above . . . .” The district
court noted that “respondent’s right to comment about petitioner in public is protected as
long as respondent is transparent.” The second additional restriction states as follows:
Respondent shall not, as a self-represented party,
commence any new litigation a sserting claims against
petitioner without first obtaining leave of this court or judicial
officer of the court in which th at litigation is proposed to be
filed. In the event respondent elects to obtain leave of a judicial
officer in the court in which he seeks to file a claim, respondent
must provide that judicial office r with a copy of this court’s
order and accompanying memorandum.

In its memorandum, the district court stated, “It is also appropriate to issue an order which
limits respondent from using the court system to harass petitioner.” The district court noted
that “respondent’s right to sue petitioner in court remains intact, but is restricted: he must
either have a licensed attorney represent him who is subject to the ethical duties to bring

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meritorious claims and contentions or he must obtain leave of this court or a judicial officer
of the court in which he seeks to file the claim.”
Fredin appeals.
DECISION
I. Issuance of 50-Year HRO
We begin by considering Fredin’s argumen t that the district court erred by granting
Middlecamp’s petition and issuing a 50-year HRO.
A district court may grant an HRO if it fi nds that there are “reasonable grounds to
believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Mi nn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5(b)(3) (2018). Harassmen t is defined by statute to mean “repeated incidents of
intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are
intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another.”
Id., subd. 1(a)(1). In general, a district court may issue an HRO that is valid for two years.
Id., subd. 5(b). But if “the petitioner has had tw o or more previous restraining orders in
effect against the same respondent or the respondent has violated a prior or existing
restraining order on two or mo re occasions,” the district court may issue an HRO that is
valid for 50 years. Id.
In reviewing a district court’s issuance of an HRO, this court applies a clear-error
standard of review to a distri ct court’s findings of fact. Kush v. Mathison , 683 N.W.2d
841, 843-44 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 20 04). We apply a de
novo standard of review to a district court’s legal conclusions. Peterson v. Johnson, 755

7
N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). And we apply an abuse-of-dis cretion standard of
review to a district court’s ultimate decision to issue an HRO. Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 843.
In its memorandum, the district court stat ed that Fredin violated the 2017 HRO six
times: by creating five websites that were in violation of the 2017 HRO, based on the
district court’s findings in its February 20 18 order, and by making personal contact with
Middlecamp at the courthouse on January 4, 2018, based on the jury’s guilty verdict in the
subsequent criminal pr osecution. The district court’s reasoning is supported by the
evidence in the record. In addition to introducing evidence of the prior judicial
determinations, Middlecamp testified that Fredin created websites that were directed at her,
and she introduced exhibits to corroborate her testimony. Sh e also testified that Fredin
attempted to talk to her at the courthouse on January 4, 2018. In addition, she introduced
evidence that Fredin had continued to harass her by filing complaints against her with the
office of lawyers professional responsibility and in the stat e and federal courts, and the
district court made findings consistent with that evidence. Fredin did not introduce any
evidence that contradicts Middlecamp’s evidence of harassment.
Fredin contends that Middlecamp’s eviden ce is insufficient to justify the issuance
of a 50-year HRO. He asserts that his conduc t was not as serious as the conduct that has
justified 50-year HROs in other cases. He cites Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.
2014), in which the supreme court rejected numerous constitutional challenges to the
issuance of a 50-year HRO. Id. at 777, 780, 784. Because the appellant in Rew asserted
only constitutional arguments, the supreme court did not establish any particular
evidentiary standard for the issuance of a 50-year HRO. Id. at 777-84. Fredin has not cited

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any precedential caselaw that has establishe d a minimum evidentiary threshold for the
issuance of a 50-year HRO, an d we are unaware of any such caselaw. This court’s
nonprecedential caselaw indicates that Fredin’s c onduct in this case is similar to or more
egregious than his conduct in other cases in which this court has affirmed the issuance of
50-year HROs. See Schaefer v. Fredin , No. A19-0657, 2020 WL 1921101, *1-7 (Minn.
App. Apr. 20, 2020), review denied (Minn. July 23, 2020); Miller v. Fredin , Nos. A18-
1154 & A18-1155, 2019 WL 3293766, *1- 5 (Minn. App. July 22, 2019), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 15, 2019).
Thus, the district court did not err by granting Middlecamp’s petition and issuing a
50-year HRO.
II. Constitutionality
Fredin also argues that the district court erred by issuing an HRO that violates his
constitutional rights to freedom of speech a nd access to the courts. His constitutional
arguments are based on the Fi rst Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech” and protects “the right of the people . . .
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I.

With respect to his right to free speech, Fredin contends that the HRO is both facially
unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him. The first of those two arguments
is foreclosed by caselaw. In Rew, the supreme court held that a similar statute authorizing
an order restricting speech toward a protected person for up to 50 years is not facially
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 845 N.W.2d at 776-80 (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 6a(b) (2012) (current version at Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a(c)

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(2018))). In addition, this cour t has held that section 609.748, subdivision 1(a)(1), is not
facially unconstitutional because it focuses on unprotected speech and is not overbroad.
Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 564-67 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Mar.
28, 2006).
Fredin’s as-applied argument requires us to determine whether “the terms and
conditions of the [HRO] burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant state
interest.” Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 779-80 (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc. , 512
U.S. 753, 765, 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (1994)). It is signi ficant that the HRO restricts
Fredin’s speech only to th e extent that he seeks to publish anonymously or
pseudonymously; the HRO does not restrict Fr edin’s speech in any way so long as he
identifies himself as the speake r. The district court explaine d that this limited restriction
would make it possible for the court to “evaluate whether such content or communications
constitutes harassment.” In one respect this restriction is na rrower than the restriction in
Rew, which prohibited the appellant from engaging in certain forms of speech even if he
identified himself. See id. at 774. The Rew court nonetheless rejected the appellant’s as-
applied challenge on the ground that “the district court carefully crafted the specific terms
and conditions of the extended OFP in light of the significant government interest at stake:
the prevention of future domestic abuse against Rew.” Id. at 781. The HRO in this case is
similar: it seeks to prevent future harassment by Fredin against Middlecamp. In Rew, the
supreme court noted that it “does not prev ent Bergstrom from expressing his ideas and
messages in a number of other forums and ways.” Id. The same is true in this case. Thus,
the HRO, as applied, does not violate Fredin’s right to free speech.

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With respect to his right to petition the gov ernment for redress of grievances, Fredin
contends that the HRO “preve nts [him] from seeking relief in the courts.” The First
Amendment’s Petition Clause “pro tects the right of individuals to appeal to courts and
other forums established by the government for resolution of legal disputes.” Johnson v.
County of Hennepin, 915 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). But the right
to petition the government is not absolute. In re Disciplinary Action Against Graham, 453
N.W.2d 313, 319 (Minn. 1990 ). For example, “speech co ntained within a petition is
subject to the same standards for defamation and libel as speech outside a petition,” and
there is “‘no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made
in a petition . . . than other Fi rst Amendment expressions.’” Borough of Duryea v.
Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 389, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011) (quoting McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485, 105 S. Ct. 2787, 2791 (1 985)). Accordingly, the Petition Clause does
not protect persons whose petitio ns unlawfully harass other pers ons in ways that are not
protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. See State v. Alphonse, 197 P.3d
1211, 1215-17 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). Furthermore, the Petition Clause does not preclude
court orders that restrict but do not comple tely bar the filing of lawsuits by frivolous
litigants. See Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 699-705 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
In this case, the HRO prohibits Fredin from commencing a new lawsuit against
Middlecamp only if he represents himself (rat her than retaining an attorney to represent
him) and only if he commences it without se eking and obtaining leave of court. This
restriction does not impose an absolute bar to Fredin’s access to the courts. The restriction

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simply requires him to employ a licensed attorn ey or to obtain approval from the district
court to ensure that he does not use litigation as a means to engage in further harassment.
These restrictions are justified by the record , which shows that Fred in has an extensive
history of commencing pro se lawsuits against Middlecamp and others in both state and
federal court. Specifically, the district court record reveals that Fredin has commenced at
least five civil lawsuits against Middlecamp 1 and five additional lawsuits against other
women in which he has made allegations about Middlecamp.2 There is no indication in
the record that Fredin ever has achieved any success in any of those legal actions. Because
we have concluded that the restriction on future lawsuits does not violate Fredin’s right to
free speech, we also conclude that it does not violate his right to petition the government.
See Borough of Duryea, 564 U.S. at 389, 131 S. Ct. at 2495.
Thus, the district court did not err by issuing an HRO that violates Fredin’s First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and access to the courts.
III. Denial of Sanctions Motion
Fredin also argues that the district c ourt erred by denying his motion for sanctions
against Middlecamp.

1Fredin v. Middlecamp , 62-CV-17-3994 (Ramse y Cnty. Dist. Ct.); Fredin v.
Middlecamp, 17-CR-3058 (D. Minn.); Fredin v. Clysdale, Middlecamp et al., 18-CV-510
(D. Minn.); Fredin v. Diamond, Street & Middlecamp, 19-CV-2864 (D. Minn.); Fredin v.
Miller, Middlecamp et al., 19-CV-3051 (D. Minn.).
2See Fredin v. Miller, 18-CV-466 (D. Minn.); Fredin v. Halberg, 18-CV-02514 (D.
Minn.); Fredin v. Olson , 18-CV-02911 (D. Minn.); Fredin v. City Pages , 19-CV-00472
(D. Minn.); Fredin v. Halberg, 19-CV-03068 (D. Minn.).

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In February 2020, between the first da y and the second day of the evidentiary
hearing, Fredin brought a motion seeking sanctions against Middlecamp based on rule 11
of the rules of civil procedure. The motion was based primarily on Middlecamp’s filing of
petitions for HROs in 2017 and 2019. The motion also was based on assertions (which are
not clearly explained) that Middlecamp prompt ed police officers to execute a search
warrant of his residence and that she prompted prosecutors to file criminal harassment
charges against Fredin. The district court denied Fredin’s motion from the bench during
the second day of the evidentiary hearing. The district court reasoned that Middlecamp
had not asserted frivolous claims in this case. The district court also reasoned that the other
issues raised in Fredin’s mo tion were collateral attacks on va rious prior decisions of the
district court.
A district court may impose sanctions under rule 11 on a party who presents a
“pleading, written motion, or other document . . . for any im proper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” Minn.
R. Civ. P. 11.02(a). This c ourt applies an abuse-of-discre tion standard of review to a
district court’s decision on a sanctions motion. In re Claims for No-Fault Benefits Against
Progressive Ins. Co., 720 N.W.2d 865, 874 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Nov.
22, 2006).
On appeal, Fredin reiterates his argument that Middlecamp should be sanctioned for
her “vexatious litigation.” But this court ha s affirmed the district court’s grant of
Middlecamp’s July 2019 petition and its issuance of the March 2020 HRO in this case. See
supra parts I & II. That Middlecamp has prevailed on the merits indicates that her petition

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was not frivolous and was not bro ught for an improper purpose. See Minn. R. Civ. P.
11.02. To the extent that Fr edin seeks sanctions for conduc t occurring outside this legal
proceeding, he cannot show a basis for sanctions under rule 11, which is limited in scope
to the pleadings, motions, and other documents filed with the district court. See id.
Thus, the district court di d not err by denying Fredin’s motion for rule 11 sanctions
against Middlecamp.
IV. 2017 HRO
Fredin raises two additional issues concerni ng the district court proceedings that led
to the issuance of the 2017 HRO. It appears that neither issue was raised with the district
court between Middlecamp’s second petition in July 2019 and the district court’s issuance
of the second HRO in March 2020.
First, Fredin asserts that he was not served with the ex parte 2017 HRO. He does
not elaborate by providing any additional fact s. In any event, the caselaw generally
provides that a person against whom an HRO has been issued must challenge the validity
of the HRO, if at all, in the case in which the HRO is issued, not in a subsequent action in
which the validity of th e HRO is presumed. See State v. Romine , 757 N.W.2d 884, 890
(Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 2009); State v. Harrington, 504 N.W.2d
500, 503 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1993).
Second, Fredin asserts that a member of th is court, before joining the court, was a
witness in the evidentiary hearing that led to the 2017 HRO. In April 2017, Fredin sent an
e-mail message to Middlecamp’s supervisor to accuse Middlecamp of professional
misconduct and otherwise cast Middlecamp in a negative light. During an evidentiary

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hearing in July 2017, Middleca mp’s attorney called the supe rvisor as a witness for the
purpose of laying a foundation for an exhibit consisting of Fredin’s e-mail message. The
supervisor was appointed to this court more than two years later but is not a member of this
three-judge panel and has not had any input into the resolution of the merits of this appeal.
Fredin suggests in his brief th at the judge improperly signed an order in this appeal. On
May 11, 2020, the judge signed a case-processing order concerning an untimely transcript
certificate. The certificate was filed two weeks later without any adverse consequences for
Fredin. That one member of this court testified briefly in a prior, related proceeding does
not preclude other members of the court from serving on this panel and resolving the merits
of Fredin’s appeal. See Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A). Fredin did not file a
motion seeking the recusal of any member of this panel. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 141.02.
Unless disqualification is required, each member of this panel has an obligation to serve
on the panel and to resolve Fredin’s appeal on the merits. See Minn. Code Jud. Conduct
Rule 2.7.
Affirmed.