State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0732

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Roosevelt Mikell,
Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-26380

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijó,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Pr esiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Ross, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convi ctions of violating a domestic-abuse no-contact order
(DANCO), arguing that his convictions should be reversed because his speedy-trial rights

2
were violated under the state and federa l constitutions, and the Uniform Mandatory
Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA). Appella nt also argues that the district court
abused its discretion by not dismissing the case under Minn. R. Crim. P. 30.05. Finally, in
his pro se supplemental brief, appellant raises the same arguments presented in his primary
brief. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 6, 2017, respondent State of Mi nnesota charged appellant Roosevelt Mikell
with domestic assault. The next day, the district court issued a DANCO, which prohibited
Mikell from having contact with the victim. After the DANCO was issued, Mikell twice
called the victim from jail. Mikell was subsequently charged with two counts of violating
a DANCO.
On August 21, 2017, Mikell appeared pr o se for a scheduled jury trial on the
domestic-assault charge. Mikell was also sche duled to make his first appearance related
to the DANCO charges later that afternoon. In an effort to avoid an interruption of the jury
selection in the domestic-assault case, th e district court proceeded with Mikell’s
arraignment on the DANCO charges prior to the beginning of the jury trial on the
domestic-assault charges. During his arraignment, Mikell requested a speedy trial related
to the DANCO charges, and the district cour t noted that “a speedy [trial] demand will be
entered.” Mikell then proceeded pro se in his jury trial fo r the domestic-assault charges,
and was found guilty.
On October 5, 2017, the district court se ntenced Mikell to 60 months in prison for
domestic assault. That same day, Mikell re minded the district court of his speedy trial

3
demand in the DANCO cases. And on November 7, 2017, the state received Mikell’s
request under the UMDDA, Minn. Stat. § 609.292 (2018), for final disposition of the
DANCO charges. The state responde d by dismissing the DANCO charges on
November 13, 2017.
Mikell appealed his domestic-assault convicti on. In September 2018, this court, in
an order opinion, reversed Mikell’s domestic -assault conviction and remanded for a new
trial. State v. Mikell, No. A18-0028 (Minn. App. Sept. 14, 2018). Shortly thereafter, on
October 25, 2018, the state filed a new complaint alleging the same two DANCO violations
that were alleged in the Augu st 18, 2017 complaint. Mi kell moved to dismiss the new
complaint on November 2, 2018, asserting a viol ation of his right to a speedy trial. The
district court denied the motion. The stat e subsequently dismissed the domestic-assault
charges and agreed to resolve the DANCO charges with a 30-month sentence. Mikell
accepted the offer, agreeing to waive his right to a jury trial and stipulate to the state’s
evidence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, thereby preserving his right to appeal the
speedy-trial issue.
Based on the stipulated evidence, the distri ct court found Mikell guilty of both of
the alleged DANCO violations. The district court then sentence d Mikell to a 30-month
sentence on each count, to run concurrently.
This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. Mikell’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions afford criminal defendants the right
to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Mi nn. Const. art. I, § 6. This court reviews a
claimed speedy-trial violation de novo. State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015).
“If a defendant has been depriv ed of his or her right to a speedy trial, the only possible
remedy is dismissal of the case.” State v. Osorio , 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted).
“To determine whether a speedy-trial violation has occurred, we apply the
four-factor balancing test set forth by th e Supreme Court of the United States in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).” Id. The four factors are: “(1) the
length of the delay; (2) the reason for the dela y; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or
her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whethe r the delay prejudiced the defendant.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “None of these factors is ‘either a necessary or sufficient condition
to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors
and must be considered togeth er with such other circumstan ces as may be relevant.’”
Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2182). It is “a
difficult and sensitive balancing process” in which the court considers “the conduct of both
the State and the defendant.” Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628 (quotations omitted). We
consider each of the four factors in turn.

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A. The Length of the Delay
In Minnesota, if a defendant demands a speedy trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09,
a delay of just 60 days is presumptively prejudicial. State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311,
315-16 (Minn. 1999). “The length of the delay is a triggering mechanism which determines
whether further review is necessary.” Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628 (quotations omitted).
Analysis of the other three factors is onl y required if the length of the delay is
presumptively prejudicial. See State v. Johnson, 498 N.W.2d 10, 15-16 (Minn. 1993).
Mikell argues that analysis of the other th ree factors is triggered because the length
of the delay between the filing of the DANCO charges in August 2017, and the trial in
January 2019, consisted of over 500 days. The state agrees that analysis of the other three
factors is triggered because th e delay exceeded 60 days but ar gues that the length of the
delay should be calculated at only 120 days.1 Because the parties agree that the length of
the delay exceeded 60 days, we conclude that the length of the delay weighs in Mikell’s
favor and the analysis of the other Barker factors is required.
B. The Reason for the Delay
“Under the second prong of the Barker test, the key question is whether the
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay.” Osorio, 891 N.W.2d

1 The state argues that the length of the delay should be calculated at only 120 days because
(1) the length of the delay should not include the time between dismissal of the original set
of charges and refiling of the second set of ch arges; and (2) the earliest date Mikell could
demand a speedy trial under the rules of crim inal procedure was at the October 5, 2017
rule 11 hearing, not his August 21, 2017 first appearance. We need not address the parties’
disagreement at this juncture because, regard less of whether the delay is 120 days, or in
excess of 500 days, the delay is presumptively prejudicial.

6
at 628. Once we have determined which pa rty is responsible for the delay, we must
consider the specific reasons for the delay. Id. Various reasons for the delay are weighed
differently. Id. Negligent or administrative reasons for delay are given less weight than
deliberate attempts by the state to delay trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192.
Mikell argues that the reason for the dela y should weigh against the state because
after being charged with the DANCO viola tion, he “immediately” and “repeatedly”
demanded a speedy trial and “did nothing to contribute to the delay.” Mikell also contends
that “there is conduct by the state that indi cates that filing a seco nd complaint was legal
maneuvering after [Mikell] succeeded on appeal in [the domestic-assault] case and rejected
a plea offer.”
To support his argument, Mikell cites State v. Kasper , 411 N.W.2d 182
(Minn. 1987). In that case, the defendant demanded a speedy trial in writing to require the
state to bring him to trial within 60 days under the app licable procedural rule. Kasper,
411 N.W.2d at 183. Approximately one month before the trial date, the prosecutor moved
for a continuance. Id. After the district court denied the motion, the prosecutor dismissed
the tab charges and then immediately filed a formal complaint alleging the same charges,
in an attempt to restart the 60-day period. Id. T h e Kasper court admonished the
prosecutor’s attempted “legal maneuvering” around the 60-da y speedy-trial requirement.
Id. at 185.
Mikell’s reliance on Kasper is misplaced. In In re Welfare of G.D. , this court
distinguished Kasper, noting that in Kasper, the state’s attempt to avoid the defendant’s
formal speedy-trial demand contained an element of bad faith. 473 N.W.2d 878,

7
881 (Minn. App. 1991). This court then held that, absent bad faith, the length of delay does
not include the time during which charges have been dismissed. Id. at 882.
Here, unlike in Kasper, the record lacks the element of bad faith. The record reflects
that after Mikell was convicted of domestic assault and received a 60-month sentence,
Mikell filed his request for final dispositi on of the DANCO charges under the UMDDA.
The state then dismissed the DANCO charges on November 13, 2017, “because the State
had obtained a lengthy prison sentence on the domestic assault.” As Mikell concedes, the
decision to dismiss the DANCO charges “benefitted [him] at that time.” It was only after
Mikell’s domestic-assault convictions were reversed that the state refiled the charges in the
DANCO case. Although the state first attempted to obtain a plea agreement before refiling
the DANCO charges, there is no indication of bad faith by the state. The domestic-assault
charges were interrelated with the DANCO charges, and the record indicates that the state
intended to hold Mikell responsible for hi s conduct without n ecessarily obtaining
convictions and sentences for all the pending charges. In fact, Mikell admits in his reply
brief that the state ultimately “dismissed the domestic assau lt case.” Because there is no
evidence of bad faith on the part of the state, the length of the delay does not include the
time during which the DANCO charges were dismissed. See G.D., 473 N.W.2d at 882.
The remaining time periods to be considered consist of: (1) the period between the
August 21, 2017 filing of th e DANCO charges, and the Nove mber 13, 2017 dismissal of
the DANCO charges; and (2) the October 25, 2018 refiling of the DANCO charges, and
the January 14, 2019 trial date. The stat e argues Mikell’s first speedy-trial demand on
August 21, 2017, was premature under the rules of criminal procedure and, therefore, the

8
45-day period between August 21, 2017, and October 5, 2017, shou ld not weigh against
the state. The state further argues that the 62-day delay between November 13, 2018, and
the trial on January 14, 2019, should not be held against the state because Mikell requested
a continuance. Even assuming we disagree with the state, we conclude that the weight due
to the delays during periods (1) and (2) identified above is not heavy.
“Where calendar congestion is the reason fo r delay, it weighs less heavily against
the state than would deliberate attempts to delay trial.” State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509,
513 (Minn. 1989). Here, there is nothing in the record indicating that any of the delay was
an attempt by the state to hamper the defense. Rather, as the state points out, much of the
delay “appears to be typical court scheduling. ” Moreover, the record reflects that in
November 2018, Mikell requested that the domestic-assault case be continued because he
“need[ed] a little more time.” Although Mikell never requested that the DANCO case be
continued, the record reflect s that because the DANCO case was interrelated with the
domestic-assault case, a continua nce in the domestic-assault ca se necessitated a delay in
the trial of the DANCO case. In fact, Mikell’ s attorney stated at the November 5, 2018
motion hearing that she would object to trying the DANCO case before the
domestic-assault case. Therefore, even if the state is responsible for the delay, it does not
weigh heavily against the state.
C. Whether Mikell Asserted the Right to a Speedy Trial
“Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other
[Barker] factors . . . .” Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 629 (quotation omitted). “The defendant’s
assertion of his speedy trial right . . . is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining

9
whether the defendant is bei ng deprived of the right.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[T]he
frequency and force of a demand must be considered when weighing this factor and the
strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which
has resulted.” Friberg, 435 N.W.2d at 515. Here, the record reflec ts that Mikell made
timely and repeated requests for a speedy trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). Thus, as
the state concedes, this factor weighs against the state.
D. Whether Mikell was Prejudiced by the Delay
“Three types of prejudice may result from an unreasonable delay between formal
accusation and trial: oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused,
and the possibility that the accuse d’s defense will be impaired.” Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at
631 (quotations omitted). The mo st serious form of prejudice is the possibility that the
defense will be impaired because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case
“skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id. (quotations omitted).
If a defendant is already in custody for anot her offense, as Mikell is here, the first
two interests are not implicated. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20. Consequently, the only
remaining question is whether Mikell’s de fense was likely harmed by the delay. Id. “A
defendant does not have to affirmatively prove prejudice; rather, prejudice may be
suggested by likely harm to a defendant’s case.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318. Such
prejudice is typically suggested “by memory loss by witnesses or witness unavailability.”
Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20.
Mikell argues that he suffered prejudice be cause a material witness to the charged
offenses “was no longer in custody,” and because “the delay resulted in [Mikell] losing the

10
opportunity to have any DANCO violation se ntence be imposed more favorably to the
[domestic] assault sentence.” But as the state points out, th e sentencing issue is moot
because the state dismissed the domestic-assault case. And the availability-of-the-witness
argument is speculative because, although the witness is no longer in custody, there is no
evidence in the record indicating that the witness is not available to testify. Therefore, the
fourth factor weighs against Mikell.
In sum, the first three Barker factors weigh in favor of Mikell. But even where the
first three factors weigh in favor of an a ppellant, there may not be a violation of the
appellant’s right to a speedy trial. In State v. Jones , the supreme court held that the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated even though the first three Barker
factors weighed in a defendant’s favor because he had not suffered any prejudice as a result
of the delay. 392 N.W.2d 224, 234-36 (Minn. 1986). The same reasoning applies here.
As discussed above, Mikell has not suffered an y prejudice as a result of the delay.
Moreover, the state did not act in bad faith and the delays were not excessive. Accordingly,
Mikell was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
II. Mikell was not denied his right to a speedy trial under the UMDDA.
Mikell also contends that the state vi olated his speedy-trial rights under the
UMDDA. The purpose of the UMDDA is to “establish a prisoner’s right to a speedy
disposition of untried charges.” State v. Miller, 525 N.W.2d 576, 583 (Minn. App. 1994).
Under the UMDDA, detained persons charged with a crime may request a final disposition
of an untried indictment or pending complaint. Minn. Stat. § 629.292 , subd 1. Once a
petition is received by the court and prosecuti ng attorney, the case must be “brought to

11
trial” within six months unle ss additional time is granted by the court for “good cause.”
Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd. 3. If a trial is not held within that peri od, “no court of this
state shall any longer have jurisdiction . . . and the court shall dismiss [the indictment] with
prejudice.” Id.
Here, the record reflects that the state received Mikell’s request for final disposition
of the DANCO charges under the UMDDA on November 7, 2017, and then dismissed the
charges less than a week la ter on November 13, 2017. The record also reflects that the
state refiled the DANCO charges in Octobe r 2018, after Mikell’s convictions in the
domestic-assault case were reversed. And the record reflects that Mikell’s stipulated-facts
trial on the DANCO charges was held in January 2019. Thus, Mikell’s trial on the DANCO
charges was held outside of the six-month period prescribed in the UMDDA as measured
from the date that the state received his request.
The state argues that the UMDDA was not violated because the six-month time
period was tolled by the dismissal of the DANCO charges. Indeed, our supreme court has
determined that the six-month time-period pr escribed in the UMDDA may be tolled by a
defendant’s motion that causes a delay. State v. Wilson , 632 N.W.2d 225, 230
(Minn. 2001) (holding that the six-month statutory time period under the UMDDA may be
tolled when the defendant causes or creates a de lay in bringing the matter to trial, such as
filing a motion to dismiss the complaint); see also State v. Kurz, 685 N.W.2d 447, 448-51
(Minn. App. 2004) (recogniz ing a tolling exception to th e UMDDA when the delay in
disposition is caused by the defe ndant’s motion to dismiss fo r lack of probable cause),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2004). But the state cites no case law holding that the state’s

12
dismissal of charges tolls the six-month st atutory time period prescribed under the
UMDDA, nor have we found any such published case.
Moreover, in Miller, this court addressed the defenda nt’s alleged violation of the
UMDDA where the charges were dismissed and later refiled. 525 N.W.2d at 576. In that
case, the state twice dismissed and refiled charges against the defendant after the defendant
requested a speedy disposition of the charges under the UMDDA. Id. at 578-79. The
defendant was eventually brought to trial more than six months after his request under the
UMDDA. Id. In determining whether the UMDDA was violated, this court noted that no
appellate court had previously addressed whether the dismi ssal and refiling of charges
starts the UMDDA time period anew. Id. at 580. This court then found guidance from the
supreme court’s decision in Kasper, where the supreme court rejected a claim that the
60 days required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.06 to bring a defendant to trial on misdemeanor
charges “‘should be calculated afresh’” from the refiling of charges. Miller, 525 N.W.2d
at 580 (quoting Kasper, 411 N.W.2d at 184). The Kasper court reasoned that “[t]he
dismissal and refiling of the charges did not shorten [the defendant’s] wait for trial and so
should not affect the calculations.” Kasper, 411 N.W.2d at 184-85.
Under Miller, we conclude that the six-month period prescribed in the UMDDA did
not start afresh after the state dismissed an d refiled the DANCO charges against Mikell.
See Miller, 525 N.W.2d at 580. And we note that the state did not seek a good-cause
extension of Mikell’s trial date beyond the UMDDA’s six-month time period, nor did the
district court make a good cause determination. See Kurz, 685 N.W.2d at 449 (recognizing
that a “good cause” determination to extend the six-month period under the UMDDA must

13
be made within the six-month period). Therefore the date on which Mikell was brought to
trial on the DANCO charges runs afoul with the UMDDA.
The state argues that if we determine that the length of time exceeds the mandate of
the UMDDA, then we should analyze the Barker factors to determine if Mikell is entitled
to relief. We agree. In Miller, this court stated that “the Barker factors are applicable to
our UMDDA statute.” 525 N.W.2d at 581. And Mikell makes no argument that the Barker
factors are not applicable to the UMDDA statute. We therefore analyze the Barker factors
as applied to Mikell’s claimed UMDDA violation to determine if he is entitled to relief.
The first and third Barker factors—the length of the delay and Mikell’s assertion of
his speedy-trial rights—weigh in favor of Mikell. As addressed above, Mikell was brought
to trial on the DANCO charges more than six months after he requested disposition of his
case under the UMDDA, and it is undisputed th at Mikell made the required request for
final disposition under the UMDDA.
The second factor—the reason for the de lay—also weighs in favor of Mikell
because the state dismissed th e DANCO charges and then re filed them. But unlike in
Miller, where this court determined that there was “no legitimate reason” for the state’s
first dismissal and subsequent refiling of the charges against the defendant, the record here
reflects that the state had a good faith reason for dismissal. See Miller, 525 N.W.2d at 580.
The record reflects that after receiving his request for final disposition under the UMDDA,
the state dismissed the DANCO charges “because the state had obtained a lengthy prison
sentence on the domestic assault.” In other words, the state d ecided that the interests of
justice did not require pursuing the DANCO charges because Mikell was convicted and

14
sentenced on the domestic-assaul t charges. Mikell benefited from this decision because,
notwithstanding his conviction and sentence in the domestic-assault case, the state could
have pursued a conviction in the DANCO case. It was only after the domestic-assault case
was reversed and remanded that the state decided to refile the DANCO charges. Therefore,
the reason for the delay does not weigh heavily against the state because the state dismissed
the DANCO charges against Mikell in good faith and Mikell, at the time, benefitted from
that decision.
Mikell also cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the delay. Although Mikell
remained in custody after th e DANCO charges were dismisse d, he was serving a prison
sentence on the domestic-assault conviction. And Mikell has not argued or alleged that he
was prejudiced in his programming while incarcerated on the domestic-assault conviction
due to the delay in bringing hi s DANCO charges to trial. Cf. Miller, 525 N.W.2d at 583
(concluding appellant was prejudiced, in part, because appellant’s prison programming was
affected by the delay). Finally, as addre ssed above, Mikell is unable to show that his
defense to the DANCO charges was harmed by the delay. Accordingly, based on our
review of the Barker factors, Mikell is not entitled to relief under the UMDDA.
III. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying Mikell’s motion to
dismiss under rule 30.02.

Finally, Mikell argues that the district court should have dismissed the DANCO
charges under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.02. Rule 30.02 provides that
“[t]he court may dismiss the complaint . . . if the prosecutor has unnecessarily delayed
bringing the defendant to trial.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 30.02. In addition to the

15
unnecessary-delay element, the challenger must also establis h that the delay prejudiced
him. State v. Banks , 875 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 2016), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 28, 2016). We review a district court’s decision on a rule 30.02 motion for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Olson, 884 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Minn. 2016).
Mikell argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his rule 30.02
motion because it erroneously focused on the Barker factors without considering “the
state’s conduct in re-charging [Mikell] only af ter he rejected the st ate’s plea offer and
whether that circumstance may have suggested bad faith in re-filing the charges.” We
disagree. The record reflects that the district court consider ed this bad-faith argument in
addressing the Barker factors and determined that the st ate did not act in bad faith. The
district court found that there were “good reasons for the delay” because the state pursued
the “more serious” domestic-assault charges and “wanted to see what they were going to
get for a sentence” on those charges. The district court also found that the state ultimately
dismissed the DANCO charges because Mike ll “went to prison” on the domestic-assault
charges and the state “didn’t feel any need to prosecute him any more” for the alleged
DANCO violations. The district court then noted that it would be “kind of an absurd result”
to determine that the state “couldn’t have dismissed the [DANCO charges] because of the
situation we’re in now, that to avoid that they would have had to try those cases even though
there was no good reason at the time to try them because of the 60-month sentence.” And
finally, the district court stated that the DANCO charges were essentially refiled “because
of the Court of Appeals reversing me for my errors about dismissing counsel, and so I take
full responsibility for that, but . . . that shouldn’t punish the State for just doing what they

16
felt right, which actually benefited [Mikell].” By rejecting Mikell’s argument that the state
did not act in bad faith in refiling the DA NCO charges, the district court implicitly
determined that the prosecutor did not unnecessarily delay bringing Mikell to trial for the
alleged DANCO violations.
Moreover, as addressed above, Mikell is unable to demonstrate that the delay
prejudiced him. See Banks, 875 N.W.2d at 345 (holding that “prejudice is required to
justify dismissal under rule 30.02 for unnecessa ry pre-charge delay”). A defendant can
show prejudice by demonstrating that he was incarcerated during the pre-charge delay, that
he experienced anxiety over the possibility of potential charges, and that his defense would
be impaired by the delay. Id. at 346.
Here, although Mikell was incarcerated, he was incarcerated on different charges.
Moreover, as the district court found, although a defense witness was no longer in custody,
it was “speculative” to conclude that the witness could not be located. And there is no
evidence that Mikell suffered anxiety over the possibility of not being able to locate the
witness. In fact, after Mikell was found guilty of the domestic-assault charges, the DANCO
charges were dismissed, and Mikell offers no evidence that he suffered anxiety over the
possibility of the DANCO charges being refiled. Ac cordingly, the dist rict court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Mikell’s motion under Minn. R. Crim. P. 30.02.

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IV. Mikell’s pro se brief raises no additional issues.
Mikell filed a pro se supplemental brief rais ing the same issues as those raised in
his main brief. For the reasons explained above, those arguments do not provide a basis
for relief.
Affirmed.