State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0414

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Edward Nixon,
Appellant.

Filed February 22, 2021
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-78

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of second -degree burglary , arguing that the
underlying charge was not brought to trial within the deadline for speedy disposition under

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the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA) and that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2018, police investigated a string of burglaries that occurred at several locations
in Minneapolis and St. Paul between February and September of 2018. On e of the
burglaries occurred at a BP gas station on May 21, 2018. The burglar used a tool to break
a window. A video of the burglary depicted a B lack male wearing a black jacket, a black
baseball cap, jeans, a white surgical mask, distinctive gloves, and shiny boots. The clothing
worn by the burglar resembled the clothing worn by an individual who had been recorded
on video burglarizing several other buildings. The burglar stole cigarettes from the BP gas
station and left a walkie-talkie radio at the scene.
On May 22, 2018, St. Paul police distributed an internal “Info Alert” regarding
burglaries of the Ha Tien Market and Augustine’s in St. Paul. The alert stated:
The suspect has bur glarized the HA TIEN MARKET
. . . and Augustines . . . and possibly other businesses. Suspect
usually has another person with him waiting in the area of the
burglary then picks suspect up.

The suspect vehicle is a 2001 to 2006 White Chevrolet
Impala with a distinctive rear spoiler.

If possible vehicle is located create your own PC for a
stop and ID driver and occupants.

The alert contained a photo of a B lack man wearing dark clothes, a dark baseball
cap, gloves, and a white surgical mask; a close -up photo of black and red gloves worn by

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the suspect; and two photos of the suspect vehicle. The pictures of the vehicle depicted its
rear spoiler, a black strip down its side, and distinctive markings on its wheel rims.
At 1:37 a.m., on May 25, 2018, Officer Michael Tschida stopped a white Chevrolet
Impala that resem bled the vehicle depicted in the Info Alert photos. Like the Impala
depicted in the Info Alert, the vehicle had a rear spoiler; dark, tinted windows; a black strip
on its side ; and “unique holes” in its wheel rims . Officer Tschida suspected that the
vehicle’s occupants were connected to the string of burglaries because he knew that the
burglar worked with an accomplice and because the Impala resembled the vehicle depicted
in the alert. Officer Tschida identified appellant Daniel Nixon as the driver of th e vehicle
and identified the front-seat passenger as Nixon’s brother.
Officer Tschida asked Nixon to r oll down the rear window. In the back of the
Impala, Officer Tschida observed a black baseball hat, multicolored gloves, and a “yellow
band-type thing which was later determined to be a slingshot.” Consistent with the close-
up photo of the burglar’s gloves in the alert, the gloves in the back of the Impala were black
with red and yellow accents, including the word “Hardy.” Based on his observations,
Officer Tschida believed that Nixon and his brother were involved in the burglaries. After
another officer arrived at the scene, Officer Tschida arrested Nixon and his brother.
The police impounded the Impala and obtained a warrant to search the vehicle. In
addition to the items that Officer Tschida observed in the back of the Impala, officers
recovered another baseball cap and two walkie-talkies. In the trunk of the Impala, officers
found a black coat, a reciprocating saw, pry bars, and a yellow “RYOBI” bag with black
handles that resembled the bag used during the burglaries. That bag contained a

4
sledgehammer, a screwdr iver, and several reciprocating saw blades. One of the gloves
recovered from the Impala was later tested and shown to contain Nixon’s DNA.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Nixon with second-degree burglary for the
burglary of the BP gas station. The state also charged Nixon, by seven separate complaints,
with additional charges of second-degree burglary for crimes that had occurred in St. Paul
between April 10, 2018, and May 21, 2018.
On or about January 9, 2019, the state received Nixon’s request under the UMDDA,
Minn. Stat. § 629.292 (2018), for final disposition of the burglary charges. Subsequently,
the district court granted N ixon’s petition to proceed pro se. On April 28, 2019, Nixon
moved the district court to suppress the evidence that was seized from the Impala, arguing
that police did not have probable cause to search his vehicle. On May 8-9, 2019, the district
court held a contested omnibus hearing and denied Nixon’s suppression motion.
Because Nixon had filed a demand for speedy disposition of his cases under the
UMDDA, the district court indicated that the court planned “to get all [eight burglary] cases
tried in time before July.” The first of the eight burglary cases was tried to the court on
May 10, 2019.1 Prior to the start of that trial, the district court ruled on the state’s motion
to admit Spreigl evidence2 regarding the other burglary cases in each of the eight separate
burglary trials. Following the bench trial, the district court found Nixon guilty of the first
charged burglary offense. Nixon then demanded a jury trial on the second charged burglary

1 The district court’s order finding Nixon guilty of this offense incorrectly states that the
matter was tried before the court on May 13, 2019. See 62-CR-19-74.
2 See State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965).

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offense. That trial began on May 13, 2019, and concluded on May 14, 2019, when the jury
received the case. On May 15, 2019, while the jury was still deliberating in the second
burglary case, the district court began t he trial on the burglary charge in this case. Tha t
afternoon, the jury returned a guilty verdict on charges in the second burglary case.
The next day, Nixon appeared in court in his jail clothing. Nixon refused to change
into civilian clothing, refused to cooperate, and referred to the proceedings as a “modern-
day lynching.” Nixon informed the district court that he was “going [to] be disruptive.
Disruptive verbally not physically, and so that’s in advance, knowledge of my actions.”
The parties engaged in off -the-record discussions, after which N ixon agreed to
waive his right to jury trials on the remaining burglary charges and to submit those charges
to the district court for a trial on stipulated evidence , including the Spreigl evidence that
the district court had previously ruled admissible. T he parties also agreed that the state
would mail evidence packets and proposed stipulations for each of the individual cases to
Nixon at the Department of Corrections (DOC) in Moose Lake. The parties agreed that
the state would mail the evidence packets a nd stipulations in one -week intervals and that
Nixon would sign and return the information, which would then be submitted to the district
court. The state indicated that this procedure would “allow the [district] [c]ourt to have
time to prepare findings a nd orders” for each of the cases before the deadline under the
UMDDA.
The state mailed Nixon the first packet, which Nixon returned. Nixon received the
second packet, but when he attempted to return the packet to the state, the DOC confiscated

6
it beca use it was deemed contraband. As a result, the state never received the second
packet.
Because the state was concerned about losing jurisdiction in light of Nixon’s
assertion of his rights under the UMDDA, the state moved for a continuance on June 20,
2019. The state argued that Nixon’s “failure to communicate with the state has caused a
delay in having the pending matters reach a final determination” and that a continuance
was “necessary to give the parties an opportunity to fully develop the stipulat ions for the
agreed upon court trials that are pending before the court.” Thus, the state argued that good
cause existed to extend the disposition deadline under the UMDDA.
The district court held a hearing on June 26, 2019, at which the DOC’s confiscation
of the second packet was revealed. The district court asked Nixon if he was willing to
withdraw his motion for speedy disposition under the UMDDA. Nixon declined and asked
if the remaining packets could be submitted simultaneously so the charges co uld be
resolved before the UMDDA deadline. The district court responded that the packets were
to have been submitted on a staggered basis “for the [c]ourt’s benefit so that I’m not writing
five Findings of Fact simultaneously, so that I get the benefit of writing one at a time.” The
district court then considered the state’s request for a continuance and determined that
“based on everything that we’ve discussed, and the reality of this timeline, in order to give
this [c]ourt an appropriate length of time . . . to render a thoughtful decision in t he five
remaining matters, the [c]ourt does find there is good cause to extend all of these matters.”
The original deadline under the UMDDA expired in mid-July 2019. On August 26,
2019, Nixon signed the state’s stipulation regarding the burglary charge in this case and

7
returned the packet to the state. The district court subsequently found Nixon guilty as
charged and sentenced him to 90 months in prison. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I.
Nixon contends that his conviction must be reversed because h is case was not
brought to trial within the deadline for speedy disposition under the UMDDA. The
UMDDA allows “[a]ny person who is imprisoned in a penal or correctional institution . . .
[to] request final disposit ion of any untried indictment or complaint pending against the
person in this state.” Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd. 1(a). “Within six months after the receipt
of the request . . . or within such additional time as the court for good cause shown in open
court may grant,” a trial must be held on such indictment. Id., subd. 3. If a trial is not held
within that period, “no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction . . . and the court
shall dismiss [the indictment] with prejudice.” Id. Whether a district court retains
jurisdiction is a legal issue, which this court reviews de novo. State v. Wilson, 632 N.W.2d
225, 229 (Minn. 2001).
The purpose of the UMDDA is to “establish a prisoner’ s right to a speedy
disposition of untried charges.” State v. Miller, 525 N.W.2d 576, 583 (Minn. App. 1994).
“The UMDDA is designed to provide a speedy trial for prisoners who face additional
criminal charges,” and in so doing, the UMDDA “addresses the concerns of prisoners who,
because of pending charges, are unable to participate in work programs and other
rehabilitative prison services.” State v. Vonbehren , 777 N.W.2d 48, 50 -51 (Minn. App.
2010), review denied (Minn. Mar. 16, 2010). But additional time may be added to the six-

8
month period if the district court finds good cause to do so. Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd.
3. “Whether good cause exists for extending the UMDDA time limit is a subjective, factual
question within the discretion of the [district] court.” Miller, 525 N.W.2d at 580.
The district court found that good cause existed to extend the statutory timeline
based on the “reality” of the timeline set forth in the parties’ agreement, so the court would
have “an appropriate length of time . . . to render a thoughtful decision in the five remaining
matters.” Nixon argues that good cause did not exist to extend the UMDDA deadline. The
state disagrees, but argues that even if good cause did not exist, Nixon’s conviction should
be affirmed based on t he four -factor balancing test used to determine wheth er the
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972) (setting forth test).
A. Good Cause
The Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that good cause for extending the
UMDDA time limit may be based on difficulties in locating crucial witnesses. State v.
Hamilton, 268 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Minn. 1978). The supreme court has also suggested in dicta
that complex discovery may establish good cause for extending the UMDDA time limit.
Wilson, 632 N.W.2d at 226-27, 229. Moreover, delays caused by the defendant are tolled
against the statutory period for a speedy disposition. Id. at 230. But delays caused by the
prosecution, even if unintentional, are not good cause for a continuance. Miller, 525
N.W.2d at 582. And “good cause for delay does not include calendar congestion unless
exceptional circumstances exist.” State v. Griffin , 760 N.W.2d 336, 340 (M inn. App.
2009).

9
Nixon argues that the district court’s decision to extend the UMDDA time limit was
an abuse of discretion because it was “based on [the judge’s] own convenience” in order
to “hold the stipulated-evidence trials on a staggered basis so [the judge] would have more
time in each case to write the Findings of Fact.”
The record reflects that the parties originally agreed to a process that would dispose
of all of Nixon’s burglary charges within the statutory time frame established in the
UMDDA. The record also reflects that the agreed-on process was frustrated by the DOC’s
seizure of the second stipulation packet as contraband. That seizure was caused by neither
the prosecution, nor Nixon. And, but for that seizure , the charges against Nixon were
scheduled to be resolved in accordance with the parties’ agreement.
After the DOC’s seizure of the second stipulation packet was discovered, it was too
late for the parties to complete the process set forth in their agreement before the deadline
under the UMDDA. Although the state could have sent all the packets to Nixon
simultaneously as he requested, the district court’s refusal to accept simultaneous
submissions was not unreasonable. Under the rules of criminal procedure, the district court
was required to make separate, specific findings of fact relating to each of the charges. See
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3 (setting forth the requirements for a trial based on
stipulated evidence and referring to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2, requiring the district
court to “make findings in writing of the essential facts” following a trial without a jury).
As the district court found:
I want to take – have enough time to give to each case, because
I look at it from the lens of, each matter is separat e from each
other. You just happen to have five of them remaining. But

10
those are five different cases in my eyes. And I have to look at
each of those cases completely distinct and separate from each
other.

I cannot and I will not confuse the facts of one case with
– the alleged facts of one case with the alleged facts of another
case. And so I . . . hope that you can appreciate that as well.

We cannot quarrel with the district court’s reasoning. At that time, five separate
complaints charging Nixon with felony burglary were pending disposition under his
UMDDA demand . The charges were interrelated and the state’s proof was based on
circumstantial and Spreigl evidence, making the necessary findings more complicated. It
was not unreasonable for the district court to allocate sufficient time to consider and make
written findings in each of the five remaining cases. See id. Moreover, we note that the
district court had originally scheduled all eight burglary cases for jury trial s in a manner
that would have complied with the UMDDA deadline. Th at schedule was disrupted by
Nixon’s refusal to cooperate at the start of the third trial.
We not e that the supreme court in Hamilton upheld a good -cause determination
under the UMDDA because the additional delay was minimal —the trial b egan
approximately a month after the end of the six -month period —and there was “no
indication, or even a claim, that [the] defendant was prejudiced by the delay.” 268 N.W.2d
at 62. Here, similar to Hamilton, the de lay was minimal: the district court received the
stipulated evidence on September 16, 2019, approximately two months after the end of the
six-month period. And Nixon does not assert that he was prejudiced by the delay.

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In sum, under the unique circumsta nces of this case, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by finding good cause to extend the 180-day disposition
deadline under the UMDDA.
B. Application of the Barker Factors
Consistent with this court’s precedent, we consider whether Nixon’s constitutional
right to a speedy trial was violated, using the following factors as set forth in Barker:
“(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted
his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” 3
State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
As to the fourth factor, “[t]hree types of prejudice may result from an unreasonable
delay between formal accusation and trial: oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and
concern of the accused, and the poss ibility that the accused’ s defense will be impaired.”
State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 631 (Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted). The most serious
form of prejudice is the possibility that the defense will be impaired because the inability

3 Nixon argues that the Barker factors are inapplicable when reviewing an alleged UMDDA
violation. But in Miller, this court stated that “the Barker factors are applicable to our
UMDDA statute.” 525 N.W.2d at 581. Moreover, in a recent nonprecedential opinion,
this court relied on Miller and applied the Barker factors when reviewing an alleged
violation of the UMDDA. State v. Mikell, No. A19-0732, 2020 WL 2703709, at *6 (Minn.
App. May 26, 2020), review granted (Minn. Aug. 25, 2020). The supreme court has since
granted review of Mikell. But this court’s opinion in Miller dictates that we apply the
Barker factors when reviewing the alleged UMDDA violation in this case . See State v.
M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that this court “is bound by
supreme court precedent and the [precedential] opinions of the court of appeals.”), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).

12
of a defendant to adequately prepare his case “skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id.
(quotations omitted).
When, as here, the defendant is already in custody for another offense, the first two
types of prejudice are not present. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20 . Consequently, the only
possible prejudice in this case was impairment to Nixon’s defense. Id. Such prejudice is
typically suggested “by memory loss by witnesses or witness unavailability.” Id. Nixon’s
defense was not impaired by the delay because Nixon agreed to a trial based on stipulated
evidence. Thus, the prejudice factor weighs against Nixon.
The supreme court has held that even though the first three Barker factors weighed
in a defendant’s favor, the defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated because he
did not suffer any unfair prejudice as a result of the delay. State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224,
234-36 (Minn. 1986) . The same reasoning applies here. Nixon’s defense was not
prejudiced by the delay. Moreover, there is no indication that the state acted in bad faith,
and the delay was not excessive. Accordingly, the Barker factors do not support Nixon’s
request for reversal.
II.
Nixon contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
items discovered in his vehicle as fruits of an unlawful search. “When reviewing pretrial
orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and
determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing —or not
suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). This court

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reviews the district court’s factu al findings for clear error and its legal determinations de
novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009).
The United States and Minnesota Constitution s protect against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A search or
seizure without a warrant is per se unreasonable. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 222
(Minn. 1992). But if police have probable cause to search a vehicle, it is “constitutionally
permissible” to impound the vehicle and search it later after a warrant is obtained. State v.
Jankowski, 281 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn. 1979).
“Probable cause exists when there are facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant
a reasonably prudent person to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” State v.
Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “Probable cause is an
objective inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances in each case.” Id. “[T]he
totality of the circumstances includes reasonable inferences that police officers draw from
facts, based on their training and experience, because police officers may interpret
circumstances differently than untrained persons.” Id. “Therefore, an appellate court must
give due weight to reasonable inferences drawn by police o fficers and to a district court’ s
finding that the officer was credible and the inference was reasonable.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
Nixon argues that bec ause “police did not see evidence or proceeds of a burglary,
the information the police had did not create probable cause to believe” that Nixon and his
brother were burglars. Nixon’s argument focuses on the limited amount of evidence in

14
plain view inside the Impala when it was stopped by police. He ignores that fact that the
Impala itself was a major factor in the probable-cause determination.
The record establishes that at the time of the seizure, St. Paul police were
investigating several burglaries that appeared to be connected. An internal “Info Alert”
was distributed to St. Paul police officers indicating that two establishments, and possibly
others, had been bu rglarized, and that a “2001 to 2006 White Chevrolet Impala with a
distinctive rear spoiler” was used to facilitate the burglaries . The Info Alert contained
pictures of the Impala, which depicted its rear spoiler, a black strip down its side, and
distinctive markings on its wheel rims. Officer Tschida stopped a vehicle that matched
that description.4 In fact, Officer Tschida testified that when he first saw the Impala, he
“immediately thought, that’s the vehicle” and that he was “95 percent confident” tha t the
vehicle he stopped was the Impala depicted in the Info Alert. In addition, Officer Tschida
observed the Impala in the same “general area” where the burglaries occurred at
approximately 1:30 a.m., which was consistent with the timing of the burglaries.
The vehicle was occupied by two males, which was consistent with the Info Alert’s
statement that the burglar worked with an accomplice who pick ed up the burglar after an
establishment was burglarized. Nixon’s race was consistent with the race of the burglar
depicted in the Info Alert photos. Moreover, after asking Nixon to roll the back window
down,5 Officer Tschida observed a black baseball cap and distinctive black and red gloves
with the word “Hardy” in the vehicle. The cap and gloves were consistent with the hat and

4 Nixon does not challenge the basis for the stop in this appeal.
5 Nixon does not challenge the expansion of the stop.

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gloves worn by the burglar pictured in the Info Alert. And Nixon was wearing a black
“hoody or a jacket,” which was consistent with the clothing worn by the burglar depicted
in the Info Alert.
When taken together, the totality of the circumstances were sufficient to cause a
reasonably prudent person to believe that the vehicle contain ed contraband. Thus, there
was probable cause to search the Impala , and the district court did not err by denying
Nixon’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.