In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: I. M. K. and M. M. R., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0945

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
I. M. K. and M. M. R., Parents.

Filed November 25, 2019
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-JV-19-322

Kimberly Stommes, Stommes Law Office, LLC, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant)

Brian Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Kari O’Leary, Assistant County Attorney,
Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Morrison County Social Services)

Courtney Rannow, Little Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
I.M.K. challenges the district court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
one-year-old child, E.J.K. Child-protection staff removed the child from I.M.K.’s care ,
believing that she was failing to protect the child from her boyfriend, who was living with
her and physically abusing the child. The district court found, among other things, that
clear and convincing evidence proved three statutory grounds for termination and that
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terminating parental rights was in the child’s best interests . Because the district court’s
findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
I.M.K. is the mother of E.J.K., who was one year old at the time the district court
ordered I.M.K.’s parental rights terminated. M.M.R. is the boy’s father but has not been
involved in his life and did not appear at the termination trial. T he district court
involuntarily terminated M.M.R.’s parental rights, which are not at issue in this appeal.
Morrison County Social Services successfully petitioned the district court to find
E.J.K. to be in need of protective services in January 2019 after I.M.K. took the infant to
the hospital for a head injury. The county alleged that he had been physically abused by
I.M.K.’s boyfriend, C.S., after I.M.K. left the child in his care. The county filed a petition
in March 2019 seeking an order terminating I.M.K.’s parental rights. The petition alleged
three statutory grounds for termination: failure to comply with parental duties, palpable
unfitness, and egregious harm in the parent’s care. The primary basis for the petition was
that I.M.K. failed to provide a safe environment for the child because C.S. had repeatedly
abused him and I.M.K. intended to continue living with C.S. The district court conducted
a termination trial in May 2019.
Testimony from I.M.K. and other witnesses established that the child’s injuries were
sustained while C.S. was living with I.M.K. and caring for E.J.K. C.S. first moved in with
I.M.K. and E.J.K. in October 2018. They lived together in I.M.K.’s parents’ home in a
basement area partitioned only with fabric. I.M.K. and C.S. jointly cared for the
child. C.S. eventually provided most of the caregiving, especially at night.
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C.S. excessively physically disciplined the child. I.M.K. saw hi m slap and heard
him spank E.J.K. on multiple occasions. She said that C.S. occasionally got so out of
control that she had to stop him. I.M.K.’s mother testified that she confronted I.M.K. in
November 2018 after another family member heard a loud slap. She told I.M.K. that the
child should not be slapped and warned that C.S. must move out if it happened
again. C.S.’s nine-year-old daughter, who stayed with them in the basement on weekends,
said that she saw C.S. slap the infant regularly on the buttocks and the face and that the
child would get a bloody lip.
After E.J.K. was taken to the hospital in January 2019, child-abuse pediatric doctor
Mark Hudson examined him. Dr. Hudson noted bruises on E.J.K.’s head, ear, trunk, and
shoulder. He also determined that the child’s left wrist had been fractured, most likely
within the previous three months. I.M.K. and C.S. offered various explanations about
possible causes of some of the injuries. Dr. Hudson concluded that some explanations were
implausible and could not account for the injuries. Based on the amount of bruises and their
location in places atypical of accidental trauma, Dr. Hudson concluded that the child was
the victim of abuse.
The county removed E.J.K. from I.M.K.’s care and draf ted an out-of -home
placement plan. Child-protection case manager Logan Swendsrud worked with the family.
Under the plan, I.M.K. was to visit the boy twice a week for two hours. The case plan
identified two safety concerns: parenting practices and home environment. The case plan
directed I.M.K. not to allow C.S. to have any contact with the child. I.M.K. was also
offered two parenting education programs: Early Childhood Family Education (ECFE) and
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Mothers of Preschoolers (MOPS). I.M.K. attended only half the sessions for ECFE and
none for MOPS. She participated in in -home counseling during her visits with the child,
and the case manager referred her for intensive individual therapy. I.M.K. made one
appointment for the therapy, but she rescheduled it to a date after the trial.
I.M.K. expressed her disagreement with the case plan’s assessment of her
relationship with C.S. She told Swendsrud repeatedly that she did not share the same
concern that C.S. was a danger to the child. She complained that the child-protection case
and C.S.’s pending child-abuse criminal case were “B.S.” Swendsrud therefore opined that
the safety concerns that led to the child’s out- of-home placement had not changed since
the removal.
I.M.K.’s trial testimony echoed her statem ents to Swendsrud dismissing concerns
about C.S.’s apparent abuse of the child. She had moved out of her parents’ home and was
living with C.S. in a one-bedroom apartment. She disagreed with social services’
assessment that he was a danger to E.J.K. She said that she planned to marry C.S. and
considered him to be the boy’s father, intending that he would adopt the boy . She
acknowledged that the state had charged C.S. with felony assault for child abuse of E.J.K.,
but she disagreed with the charges and considered C.S. to be a safe caregiver. And she
testified that, even if she did believe that C.S. was guilty of harming the child, she would
still continue her relationship with him , relying on her hope that he would improve his
parenting skills. She said also that she would not leave C.S., even if ordered to do so in a
case plan.
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The district court terminated I.M.K.’s parental rights. It found that E.J.K.’s injuries
were caused by C.S. and that I.M.K. either knew or should have known about the abuse. It
found that I.M.K. failed to take the necessary steps to protect E.J.K. and that there was no
substantial likelihood that she would do so in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The district court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports the
termination of parental rights on all three statutory grounds alleged and that termination is
in the child’s best interests. It also found that social services had made reasonable efforts
to reunite I.M.K. and the child but that additional efforts would be futile. I.M.K. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.M.K. challenges the district court’s order terminating her parental rights. We give
considerable deference to a district court’s termination decision. In re Welfare of Children
of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) . We review the district court’s findings to
determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly
erroneous. Id. We will affirm a district court’s termination of parental rights if there is clear
and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination exists, termination is in
the child’s best interests, and either social services made reasonable efforts to reunite
parent and child or additional efforts would be futile. In re Welfare of Children of
T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708–09 (Minn. 2005). I.M.K. challenges the district court’s
determinations on all three requirements.
I
I.M.K. first argues that the county presented insufficient evidence to prove any of
the statutory grounds. To terminate parental rights, the district court must find that clear
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and convincing evidence establishes at least one of the grounds under Minnesota Statutes
section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b) (2018). See T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d at 708. We will focus
on whether the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that I.M.K. is palpably
unfit to parent under subdivision 1(b)(4).
The district court had an adequate basis to terminate I.M.K.’s parental rights based
on her palpable unfitness. A finding of palpable unfitness requires a showing of a consistent
pattern of specific conduct or specific conditions that directly relate to the parent-child
relationship and that are of a duration or nature that renders the parent unable to care
appropriately for the child’s needs for the reasonably foreseeable future. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). The district court based its palpable-unfitness determination on
I.M.K.’s failure to protect E.J.K. from C.S.’s abuse and her unwillingness to keep the child
safe if he were returned to her care. Three findings support the conclusion. First, the child’s
injuries were caused by C.S.’s abuse. Second , I.M.K. either knew or should have known
about the abuse. And third, if E.J.K. were returned to I.M.K.’s care, she would continue to
live with C.S. and allow him to harm the child. The record supports each finding with clear
and convincing evidence.
The evidence that C.S. was physically harming the child is clear and convincing.
I.M.K., C.S., and E.J.K. were living together in the base ment of I.M.K.’s parents’
home. C.S. provided much of the child’s caregiving and regularly physically disciplined
him. C.S.’s daughter stayed with the family and said that C.S. frequently slapped the child,
bloodying his lip. I.M.K. testified that the child developed many bruises while C.S. was
caring for him. Dr. Hudson concluded that E.J.K. suffered physical abuse based on the
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number and atypical location of the bruises and the lack of any other plausible explanation
for most of the injuries. The record supports the finding that C.S. was abusing the infant.
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the finding that I.M.K. knew or should
have known about this abuse. O nly fabric separated the parts of the basement where C.S.
and I.M.K. lived. I.M.K. testified that she knew of C.S.’s physical discipline and that
she felt she had to occasionally tell him to stop. She testified that she heard C.S. slap the
child and that the slap was so loud once that her mother confronted her about it. I.M.K.
recognized that the child was developing more bruises when C.S. was caring for him. The
evidence clearly establishes that I.M.K. knew about C.S.’s abuse but continued to leave the
child in his care.
The record also sup ports the finding that, if E.J.K. were returned to I.M.K. , she
would not protect the child from abuse. She began living with C.S. in a one- bedroom
apartment before the time of trial, knowing that he had been charged with felony assault
for abusing the child. And she said that, even if C.S. harmed the child, she would continue
her relationship with C.S. She in fact planned to marry C.S. , considered him to be the
child’s father, and hoped he would adopt him. She clarified her preference for the child’s
apparent abuser over the child’s safety by announcing that she would not leave C.S. even
if directed to do so in a court-ordered child-protection plan. The evidence that I.M.K. would
fail to prevent future abuse if the child were returned to her care is very clear and especially
convincing.
These findings support the district court’s determination that I.M.K. is palpably
unfit to parent. A palpable-unfitness determination is supported when a parent’s children
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have been abused by her boyfriend, the parent continues to allow the abuser to live with
her after learning of the abuse, and she refuses to acknowledge her responsibility to protect
her children. T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d at 708–09. I.M.K.’s behavior constitutes a consistent
pattern of specific conditions, and it directly relates to the parent-child relationship because
it involves the child’s safety. I.M.K.’s testimony supports the finding that the dangerous
conditions are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
Because clear and convincing evidence establishes that I.M.K. is palpably unfit to
parent, we decline to address the other statutory grounds for termination.
II
We also affirm the district court’s conclusion that termination of rights is in E.J.K.’s
best interests. Termination can be ordered only if it is in the best interests of the child.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). The district
court’s order properly weighed the competing interests and concluded that termination
served E.J.K.’s best interests. The district court’s underlying findings are supported by
clear and convincing evidence. The district court concluded that E.J.K.’s safety depended
on termination. This conclusion is supported by I.M.K.’s demonstrated preference for her
child’s abuser over the child’s protection. The child’s interest in living in a safe
environment prevails over I.M.K.’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship.
III
The record belies I.M.K.’s argument that the district court erred by determining that
social services provided reasonable efforts to reunify parent and child and that further
reunification efforts would be futile. The district court may not terminate parental rights
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unless it finds that social services made reasonable efforts to reunify parent and child
or that reasonable efforts are not required. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2018).
Reasonable efforts are not required where they would be “futile and therefore unreasonable
under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(7) (2018).
The county’s efforts were reasonable. The case plan allowed I.M.K. to visit the child
twice weekly. She received in-home counseling during the visits. Her case manager met
with her periodically. I.M.K.’s case manager recommended that she engage in parenting
training, and ECFE and MOPS programs were offered to her. Her case manager also
referred her for intensive individual therapy. The record supports the finding that social
services’ efforts were reasonable.
I.M.K. implies that she was able to assume parental duties at the time of trial and
that the fast pacing of the proceedings deprived her of the opportunity to demonstrate her
progress. But the district court determined that additional reunification efforts would be
futile, and the record also supports this determination. Despite all of the services already
provided, I.M.K. remained steadfast in refusing to acknowledge the abuse that she
allowed or to make any plans to remove the abuser from the child’s life. None of
the services provided brought her close to addressing the primary concern about her
unsafe home environment. Because the extensive services that she received over a
four-and-a-half-month period did not lead her to acknowledge that living with C.S. would
be unsafe for the infant, the record amply supports the district court’s conclusion that
additional efforts would be futile.
Affirmed.