A20-0556

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0546
A20-0556

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
I. M. K. and C. M. S., Parents.

Filed September 8, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-JV-19-949

Kimberly Stommes, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant-mother I.M.K. (A20-0546))

Cathleen Gabriel, Annandale, Minnesota (for appellant-father C.M.S. (A20-0556))

Brian Middendorf, Morrison C ounty Attorney, Kristyna Stavish, Assistant County
Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Morrison County Social Services)

Amanda Rakow, Little Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pr esiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In these consolidated appeals, both a ppellant-mother I.M.K. and appellant-father
C.M.S. challenge the district court’s order terminating parental rights to their child. Mother
argues that the district court erred by conc luding that she failed to overcome the
presumption of palpable unfitness to parent and by determining that terminating mother’s

2
parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Father argues that the district court erred by
failing to make adequate findings to support its determination that another child suffered
egregious harm in father’s car e, by determining that the co unty did not need to make
reasonable efforts to reunite father and child, and by determining that terminating father’s
parental rights is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
Mother and father are the biological pa rents of A.M.S., who was seven months old
at the time of the termination-of-parental -rights (TPR) trial in this matter. One month
before A.M.S. was born, mother’s parental rights to her other biological child, E.J.K., were
terminated.1 E.J.K. had been hospitalized when he was eleven months old due to abusive
injuries caused by father, who is not E.J.K.’s biological parent but provided care for him.
E.J.K.’s injuries included over a dozen bruise s at various stages of healing, two wrist
fractures, and a bloody lip.
In the TPR matter regarding E.J.K., the distri ct court found that father’s acts against
the child constituted egregious harm. Father was also criminally charged with and
convicted of felony malicious punishment of a child in connection with E.J.K.’s injuries.
As to mother, the district court found that she refused to acknowledge father’s actions as
abusive, despite admitting that she had observ ed father spank and slap E.J.K. on multiple
occasions and that she at times needed to interven e. Mother testified at the TPR trial

1 We affirmed the termination of mother’s parental rights to E.J.K. in In re Welfare of Child
of I.M.K., No. A19-0945, 2019 WL 6285909 (Minn. App. Nov. 25, 2019), which contains
more factual background.

3
involving E.J.K. that she would continue her relationship with father and that she believed
him to be a safe caregiver for young children. The district court ultimately determined that
mother was unable to keep E.J.K. safe, a nd it concluded that the statutory bases for
termination in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4) and (6) (2018), were satisfied and
that termination of her parental rights was in E.J.K.’s best interests.
In light of the matter in volving E.J.K., the county initiated a child-maltreatment
assessment the day that A.M.S. was born. Wh en a child-protection social worker spoke
with mother and father at the hospital, the parents were upset because they had planned to
execute a power of attorney to attempt to tran sfer custody of A.M.S. to father’s relatives.
A.M.S. was immediately placed on a 72-hou r law-enforcement hold and has been in
continuous out-of-home placement since his birth.
On July 12, 2019, two days after A.M.S.’s birth, the county filed a petition seeking
the expedited termination of both father’s a nd mother’s parental ri ghts to the child. The
matter eventually proceeded to trial on February 24, 2020.2
At trial, mother testified that, since the termination of her parental rights to E.J.K.,
she had gained employment at a forestry products company. She testified that she had also
attended therapy for four months but had st opped attending because of her job. Mother
stated that the therapy sessions addressed her emotions, grief, and how “to better [her]self
for the kids.” Mother testified that she is no longer romantically involved with father. She
stated, however, that she was still living with him in a one-bedroom apartment. Mother

2 The trial was initially scheduled for December but was continued pending the resolution
of father’s criminal matter in the malicious-punishment case.

4
maintained her position that father would be a safe person to have around young children
and stated that she does not agree with the jury’s verdict of felony malicious punishment
in father’s criminal case. When asked how she would keep A.M.S. safe, mother responded
that she would “take care of him” and be there to “feed him, play with him, [and] keep him
clean.”
When mother’s testimony concluded, the district court heard arguments on whether
mother had produced sufficien t evidence to overcome the presumption of palpable
unfitness to parent that had resulted from the previous TPR. The district court determined
that mother had not overcome the presump tion and asked which witness would be called
next. Mother’s attorney then requested that he and mother be excused because, he said, the
trial was “essentially over,” and they exited the courtroom.
Father and several other witnesses then tes tified. Father said he is employed with a
tree service and landscaping comp any. After A.M.S. was born, he asked the county for
visitation with the child, but the county denied his request. Father did not receive or request
any services or assessments from the county. Like mother, father said he disagrees with the
jury’s verdict in the criminal matter. When asked whether he had made any “substantial
changes” in his life since the time of the conduct giving rise to the malicious-punishment
charge, father replied that he has not. He went on to state, though, that he had made a
change in that he and mother no longer were living with mother’s parents.
The county social worker who was the case manager for both E.J.K’s. and A.M.S.’s
cases testified that he would be concerned for A.M.S.’s safety if A.M.S. were to live with
mother and father, especially because A.M.S. is similar in age to E.J.K. when E.J.K.

5
experienced abuse. The social worker testified that he does not believe that there would be
any benefit in preserving the parent-child relationship between father and A.M.S. because
there is no established relationship and because the safety concerns are significant.
A.M.S.’s initial guardian ad litem (GAL), Courtney Rannow, testified. Rannow
explained that she had also served as GA L for E.J.K. Rannow explained that during
E.J.K.’s case, mother minima lly complied with her case plan . Mother visited E.J.K., but
she did not attend therapy and maintained her relationship with father, denying that he had
abused E.J.K. despite the county’s maltre atment determination. Rannow expressed
significant safety concerns for A.M.S. if he we re to be placed with father and explained
that her concern with mother is that mother has maintained a relationship with father and
has not acknowledged the harm that he ca used to E.J.K. Rannow concluded that
terminating father’s parental rights to A.M.S. is in the child’s best interest because of the
child’s young age and vulnerability.
A.M.S.’s current GAL, Amanda Rakow, also testified. Rakow said that she had been
appointed only a few days before the TPR trial but that she had been observing A.M.S. in
his foster home for several months prior when she visited another child there. She explained
that A.M.S. is in a developmental stage where safety is especially important. Based on her
review of the file, she also recommended that termination of father’s parental rights would
be in A.M.S.’s best interests.
Following the testimony on February 24, the district c ourt held another hearing,
upon the county at torney’s request, to a llow mother to question the current GAL and to
address the best interests of the child. Rakow testified again and stat ed that she does not

6
believe that mother would be able to provi de a safe and stable living arrangement for
A.M.S. Rankow testified that she does not believe mother has remedied the issues that led
to the previous termination of parental rights since mother continues to reside with father.
She concluded that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of A.M.S.,
again primarily based upon safety concerns.
The district court granted the county’s petition and issued its order terminating
mother’s and father’s parental rights on March 19, 2020.
3 It concluded that mother had not
overcome the presumption of palpable unfitness to parent and that it was in A.M.S.’s best
interests to terminate mother’s parental rights . It also concluded that father had caused
egregious harm to a child in his care and that termination was accordingly warranted under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6), and that it was in A.M.S.’s best interests to terminate
father’s parental rights.
Each parent appealed, and this court consolidated the appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Parental rights should be terminated only for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 591 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotation omitted), review denied
(Minn. Apr. 15, 2003). To terminate parental rights, there must be clear and convincing
evidence that at least one statutory basis for termination exists, and the termination must
be in the best interests of the child. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381,

3 The district court issued an amended or der on March 23, 2019, which changes only a
reference to where the appeals rules are foun d within the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile
Protection Procedure.

7
385 (Minn. 2008). “[T]ermination of parental rights is always discretionary with the
[district] court.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014).
Appellate courts review the di strict court’s factual findings that a statutory ground for
termination of parental rights exists for clear error. In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643,
648 (Minn. 1995). We review the district cour t’s decision that termination is in a child’s
best interests for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88,
95 (Minn. App. 2008).
I. The district court did not err when it concluded that mother failed to overcome
the presumption of palpable unfitness to parent.

A natural parent is typically presumed fit to care for his or her child. In re Welfare
of D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App. 2003). But “[o]nce it has been shown that
the parental rights to one or more children have been involuntarily terminated, Minnesota
law presumes the parent to be palpably unfit to be a party to a parent-child relationship.”
In re Welfare of Child of T.C.M., 758 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Minn. App. 2008); see also Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). If the presumption of palpable unfitness to parent applies,
the burden of production is on the parent to produce evidence su fficient “to support a
finding that the parent is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the children.” In re Welfare
of Child of J.A.K. , 907 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotations omitted). The
evidence necessary to rebut th e presumption must only “create a genuine issue of fact on
the issue of palpable unfitness.” Id. If a parent produces sufficient evidence, the
“presumption is rebutted and has no further function at the trial.” Id. (quotations omitted).
If the presumption is not rebutted, the statutory ground of palpable unfitness is established.

8
See In re Welfare of Child of J.W. , 807 N.W.2d 441, 445- 46 (Minn. App. 2001), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). Appellate cour ts review de novo a district court’s
determination as to whether a parent presented evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption
of palpable unfitness. J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 246.
Mother argues that she presented suffici ent evidence to rebut the presumption of
palpable unfitness because she testified that she gained employment, attended therapy, and
is no longer in a romantic rela tionship with father. She also argues that the district court
should not have focused on th e harm that father caused to E.J.K because father was not a
party to the previous TPR proceeding and had not yet been criminally convicted when the
previous TPR trial occurred.
In the previous termination matter, the dist rict court determined that mother was
palpably unfit to parent pr imarily because she would not protect her child from abuse by
father, and this court affirmed the district court’s decision. I.M.K., 2019 WL 6285909 at
*3. Here, mother had the burden to produce evidence that would justify a finding that she
is not palpably unfit to parent the child. J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 246. To do so, she offered
only her own testimony, which was quite brief—her direct examination spans less than
three pages of trial transcript. Although she testified that she is employed and attended
therapy for a few months, she did not explain how these facts relate to her ability to parent
the child and keep him safe. She did not enter any exhibits and did not call any witnesses
to testify on her behalf. Critically, mother acknowledged that she continues to reside with
father, and she continued to deny that he caused harm to E.J.K. Mother accordingly did not
produce evidence that she has remedied the safety issue that led to the previous termination

9
of her parental rights. Under these circumst ances, the district court did not err by
determining that mother did not meet her burden of producing sufficient evidence to
support a finding that she is fit to care for the child. See id.
Mother’s argument regarding the district court’s reliance on father’s criminal
conviction is also unavailing. She essentially argues that the presumption should have been
more easily rebutted because it was father—not she—who harmed the other child and the
evidence against father was weak. But the di strict court in the previous termination
proceeding found that father ca used egregious harm to E.J.K. and that mother refused to
acknowledge that harm and protect the child, an d this court affirmed the district court’s
decision. I.M.K., 2019 WL 6285909 at *3. That father was not criminally convicted until
after the previous termination is of little consequence here. It was mother’s burden in this
case to overcome the presumption of parental unfitness, and the district court properly
determined that she had not done so.4
II. The district court did no t abuse its discretion by determining that terminating
mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

Mother also argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion by finding that
termination of her parental rights is in the child ’s best interests. Even if a statutory basis
for TPR exists, a district cour t cannot terminate parental ri ghts unless it is in the best
interests of the child. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn.

4 Mother makes a separate argument in her appellate brief that the evidence was insufficient
to support a statutory basis for termination of her parental rights. But because the district
court relied solely on mother’s failure to rebut the presump tion of parental unfitness to
parent as the statutory basis for termination, we need only analyze whether she rebutted the
presumption.

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App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012). “In analyzing the best interests of the
child, the court must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and
(3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.
App. 1992). “Competing interests include such things as a stable environment, health
considerations and the child’s preferences.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (quotation omitted).
If the interests of the parent and those of the child compete, the child’s interests are
paramount. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
Appellate courts “review a district court’ s ultimate determination that termination
is in a child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
“[D]etermination of a child’s best interests ‘i s generally not susceptible to an appellate
court’s global review of a record,’ and . . . ‘an appellate court’s combing through the record
to determine best interests is inappropriate because it involves credibility determinations.’”
In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting In re
Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003)).
Mother argues that the evidence does not support the district court’s determination
that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the child because “[t]he only
testimony provided was that the GAL felt that [mother] had not changed anything since
her last termination, despite [mother’s] testimony to the contrary.” Mother also argues that
the district court erred by failing to make specific findings regarding the conditions related
to the parent-child relationship that have not been corrected. She asserts that, in the absence
of any findings of harmful effects on A.M.S., the district court’s decision must be reversed.

11
The child’s current GAL, Rakow, testified that she does not believe mother can
provide a safe and stable living arrangement for him. Rakow said that she does not believe
mother has remedied the issues that led to the very recent, previous termination of parental
rights because mother continues to reside with father. Rakow’s recommendation that
termination was in the child’s best interests was primarily based on safety concerns in light
of the significant abuse suffered by E.J.K. The district court found Rakow’s testimony
credible.
Although the district court di d not specifically state, in connection with the best-
interests analysis, that the safety concerns leading to the prior te rmination had not been
corrected, it is clear that that the district c ourt concluded that the in terest in the child’s
safety outweighed mother’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship. The district
court made numerous findings related to the ch ild’s best interests, and these findings are
supported by the evidence in the record. Especially in light of mother’s persistent refusal
to acknowledge the safety concerns regarding father, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that termination was in the child’s best interests.
III. The evidence is sufficien t to show that a child su ffered egregious harm in
father’s care.

Father argues that the evid ence is insufficient to support the district court’s
determination that a statutory basis—specific ally, the basis related to egregious harm—
exists to terminate his parental rights.

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The district court terminated father’s parental rights pursua nt to Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6), which provides that termination is appropriate if the district
court finds
that a child has experienced egregious harm in the parent’s care
which is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that indicates a lack
of regard for the child’s well- being, such that a reasonable
person would believe it contrary to the best interest of the child
or of any child to be in the parent’s care.

“Egregious harm” is statutorily defined as “the infliction of bodily harm to a child or
neglect of a child which demonstrates a gro ssly inadequate ability to provide minimally
adequate parental care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 14 (2018). The statute specifies that
egregious harm includes “conduct towards a child that constitutes felony malicious
punishment of a child under section 609.377.” Id., subd. 14(3).
Father first contends that the district c ourt did not make specific findings regarding
the “nature,” “duration,” and “chronicity” of his conduct. Instead, he argues, it merely
relied on the allegations in mother’s previous TPR case to support its findings, which was
an error because he was not a party to that proceeding.
It is true that the district court did no t explicitly address the “nature,” “duration,”
and “chronicity” of father’s conduct against E. J.K. But the district court referenced the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and or der from mother’s previous TPR trial, which
was admitted as an exhibit withou t objection at this trial. An d the findings from that case
include many details that relate to the natu re, duration, and chroni city of the conduct,
including that E.J.K. was hosp italized in January 2019 with numerous bruises in various
stages of healing, two wrist fractures, and a bloody lip. The district court found that father

13
had been abusing E.J.K. for approximately two months before the hospitalization occurred.
Father contends that the findings from the previous case cannot be used against him in this
one, but he cites no rule or caselaw for that pr oposition, and he did not object to entry of
the earlier findings at trial. He accordingly has not shown error by the district court in
relying on the previous termination matter.
Father also argues that the district cour t “dealt with [him] as though he had already
been convicted” from the time the county filed the TPR petition in July 2019 until he was
convicted of felony malicious punishment of a child in December 2019. He states that this
is evidenced by the district court’s postponement of the TPR trial until the criminal matter
was resolved.
As the county note s, the child-protection matter proceeded separately from the
criminal matter and a determination of egregious harm had already been made in the child-
protection sphere when the termination petition in this case was filed. That father had not
yet been found guilty in the criminal matter at the time of the petiti on did not negate the
safety concerns that the county had for the child. And, as to the ordering of the criminal
trial and the TPR trial, Minn. Stat. § 260C .503, subd. 2(c) (2018), permits the county
attorney to determine which proceeds first, so the sequence here does not suggest any error.
In sum, father has not demonstrated that the timing of the resolution of his criminal
matter undermines the district court’s finding th at he caused egregious harm to a child in
his care. The evidence amply supports the district court’s determination that father caused
such harm and that the statutory basis fo r termination in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(6) is met.

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IV. The district court did not err by dete rmining that the county did not need to
make reasonable efforts to reunite father with the child.

Father next argues that the district court erred by determining that the county did
not need to make reasonable efforts to reunite him and the child.
In a TPR proceeding, the district court mu st find “(1) that reasonable efforts to
finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were made . . . or (2) that
reasonable efforts for reunification are not re quired as provided u nder section 260.012.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd . 8(1)-(2) (2018). Under Minn . Stat. § 260.012 (2018),
reasonable efforts are not required “upon a de termination by the c ourt that a petition has
been filed stating a prima facie case that . . . the parent has subjected a child to egregious
harm.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(1).
Here, the district court relieved the county of efforts to reunify father and A.M.S. at
the emergency protective care he aring held July 15, 2019. The petition in this matter
describes in significant detail the child-protec tion matter involving E.J.K., including the
harm inflicted by father. The district court in that matter specifically found that father had
caused egregious harm to E.J.K. The petition in this matter a ccordingly states at least a
prima facie case that father caused egregious harm to a child.
Father contends the county should nonethe less have provided him services, but he
cites no rule, statute, or case law to support that proposition. On appeal, it is his burden to
show error by the district court. See, e.g., Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278, 283 (Minn.
App. 1999). We conclude that father has not shown how the district court erred by

15
determining that the county did not need to make reasonable efforts to reunite him and the
child.
V. The district court did not abuse its discretion wh en it determined that
terminating father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

Lastly, father argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that
termination of his parental rights is in the best interests of the child.
Father challenges the testimony of the soci al worker and the GALs that termination
is in the child’s best interest. He contends that their conclusions were based primarily on
their assessment that the re lationship between him and A.M. S. is not worth preserving
because it does not exist, a nd that such reasoning is unfair because the reason the
relationship does not exist is be cause he has not been permitted to visit A.M.S. He also
argues that he was unfairly fa ulted for not participating in domestic-violence or anger-
management programming when the county did not “provide or allow” services to him.
The county responds that, contrary to fath er’s assertions, nothing prohibited father
from attending therapy, anger management pr ogramming, or parenting classes. He could
have done any of these things between the time the child was born and when the trial took
place, but he did not do so. The county argues that because father did not demonstrate that
he could provide safety for the child, and because he has not yet taken responsibility for
the harm to E.J.K., safety concerns ultimately override father’s desire to parent A.M.S.
The district court weighed permissible considerations in determining the best
interests of the child. The ove rriding concern was for the safe ty of the child, and a social
worker and both GALs testified that they belie ved the child would be unsafe with father.

16
The district court found their testimony credible, and we afford great deference to a district
court’s credibility determinations in its best-interests analysis. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at
385; D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d at 546. Father has not shown that the district court abused its
discretion by determining that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best
interests.
Affirmed.