State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1277

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antonio Deshaun Collins,
Appellant.

Filed August 31, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-8903

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Erik A. Nilsson, Acting Minneapolis City Attorney, Paula Kruchowski Barrette, Assistant
City Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Stan Keillor, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Co chran, Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challe nges his conviction of carrying or possessing a
pistol without a permit in vi olation of Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2016). Appellant
argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred by failing to strike a
juror sua sponte for bias. He also argues that the district court abused its discretion by
limiting cross-examination of the arresting offi cers. In addition, he contends that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. C oncluding that appellant has failed
to demonstrate grounds for a new trial or reversal of his conviction, we affirm.
FACTS
On the night of February 14, 2018, two police officers stopped a vehicle driven by
appellant Antonio Deshaun Collins. The police stopped the vehicle after one of the officers
observed that the vehicle’s headlights were “e xtremely dim” and that the driver was not
wearing a seat belt. When that officer a pproached the stopped vehi cle, he could smell
marijuana emanating from the ve hicle. The officer then s earched the vehicle while his
partner remained outside with Collins. During the search, the officer found a pistol in the
center console. The officers took Collins to the police station to question him. During the
interview at the police station, Collins told one of the officers that he had a permit for the
pistol, but that the permit was no longer va lid. The state charged Collins with possession
of a pistol without a permit under Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. During voir dire, the district court asked the
potential jurors about their fe elings and opinions on drugs. A potential juror, Juror C,

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informed the court that he “would not be able to be fair if dr ugs are brought out in this.”
The district court asked Juror C if he would be able to consider the evidence presented and
apply the law as instructed. Juror C responded that “if someone was arrested and had drugs
on them, no matter what I was told, I would go guilty automatically.” The court then asked
if any jurors had “such strong views about drug abuse” that they would be unable to be fair
and impartial in this case. Juror C raised his hand.
At the end of voir dire, defense counsel challenged two jurors for cause—neither of
which was Juror C. Defense counsel challenged one juror because she stated that she could
not be fair and impartial in a case involving firearms. Defense counsel challenged a second
juror because she experienced a sexual assault at gunpoint and also expressed concern
about whether she could be fair and impartial. The district court granted the first challenge,
but denied the second. Defens e counsel later used a perempto ry challenge to remove the
second-challenged juror. Defense counsel had remaining peremptory challenges, but did
not challenge Juror C. Juror C served on the jury.
At trial, the state called the two arresting officers to testify. At the time they stopped
Collins, both officers were members of the Community Response Team, a team responsible
for narcotics and weapons investigations. The first officer testified about his observations
that led to the stop. He also testified that he recognized the vehicle that they stopped. And,
when he approached the stopped vehicle, he recognized Collins as the driver of the vehicle.
The officer was familiar with Collins from an investigation of Collins’s brother in 2017.
During the 2017 investigation, the officer learned that Collins carried a pistol in his vehicle
and that he had a permit to carry the pistol at that time. With rega rd to the stop at issue

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here, the officer explained that he searched the vehicle because he smelled marijuana when
he first approached the vehicle. During the search, the officer found a pistol in the center
console under the cup holders.
The officer also testified a bout interviewing Collins at the police station. According
to the officer, Collins ad mitted during the interview that th e pistol belonged to him. The
officer also testified that Collins indicated that he no longer had a valid permit to carry the
pistol. And that Collins did not present him with a valid permit. The officer then testified
that, according to records he had accessed, Collins was not issued a new permit for the
pistol.
On cross-examination, defense counsel played an audio recording of the interview
at the police station. Defens e counsel asked the officer if, after the record ed interview
ended, he tried to recruit Collin s to be an informant. The o fficer testified that he did not
recall, but also stated that he may have ha d “other conversations” with Collins. Defense
counsel then asked the officer if he remembered the specifics of the “other conversations.”
The state objected on relevance grounds. The district court sustained the objection.
The second arresting officer also testif ied that he had met Collins during the 2017
investigation and that he knew that Collins had a pistol in the past. The officer
acknowledged that a bodycam video of the incident at issue in this case captured him saying
that Collins “keeps it in his center console.” He also testified that he attempted to drive
Collins’s car to the precinct where Col lins was interviewed. When asked on
cross-examination why Collins was brought in to be interviewed—to recruit him as an
informant or to investigate the permit offense—the officer replied, “I don’t know.”

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Defense counsel then asked the officer if “that” was “something that has been done
before?” At that point, the state objected on relevance grounds and the district court
sustained the objection.
After the officers testified, Collins testified in his own defense. He testified that he
met the two arresting officers in 2017 when they were executing a warrant at his house
concerning his brother. During that interaction, the officers took his pistol and wallet, and
brought him to the precinct to be interviewed. Collins testified that, at that time, he had a
license to carry. And that, during the 2017 interview, the officers asked him about his
brother and if his brother was selling drugs. They also as ked Collins if he knew anyone
selling large amounts of marijuana. In response , Collins told the office rs that he did not
interact with anyone selling drugs.
Collins also testified about the February 2018 incident at issue here. He confirmed
that the officers pulled him over and that they found a pistol in his car. He denied, however,
that there was an odor of ma rijuana in the car. Collins adm itted that the pistol found by
the officers belonged to him. He testified that he did not remember when he put the pistol
in the car and stated it was an “honest mistake.” Collins also testified that after the recorded
interview at the police station, there was a “significant conversation.” The state objected
to further questioning about the unrecorded conversation. The district court sustained the
objection.
The jury found Collins guilt y of possessing a pistol without a valid permit. Collins
appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
Collins raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court plainly erred by
failing to sua sponte strike Juror C for bias; (2) whether the district court abused its
discretion by limiting cross-examination of th e arresting officers; and (3) whether the
evidence was sufficient to pr ove Collins’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We address
each issue in turn.
I. Collins’s juror-bias argument is not reviewable.

Collins argues that the district court erred when it failed to strike Juror C sua sponte
for bias after Collins’s trial counsel failed to challenge Juror C. The state argues that under
State v. Stufflebean , 329 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 1983), Collins was required to challenge
Juror C for bias in district court to preserve the issue on appeal. We agree with the state.
Minnesota courts have held it is “too late” to challenge a biased juror for the first
time on appeal. State v. Thieme , 160 N.W.2d 396, 398 (19 68) (declining to consider
appellant’s biased-juror argument because the “defendant, after consultation with his
counsel, chose to make no . . . challenge” to the juror); see also Stufflebean, 329 N.W.2d
at 317 (stating that an appellant must challenge the juror for cause to preserve the issue for
appeal); State v. Geleneau, 873 N.W.2d 373, 379 (Minn. App. 2015) (same), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 29, 2016). As the supreme court recognized in Thieme, allowing a defendant
to challenge a juror for the first time on a ppeal “would extend an invitation to every
defendant to leave unchallenged an objectio nable juror only to raise the objection upon
appeal.” 160 N.W.2d at 398.

7
In Stufflebean, the supreme court held that “[i]n an appeal based on juror bias, an
appellant must show [1] that the challenge d juror was subject to challenge for cause,
[2] that actual prejudice resu lted from the failure to dismi ss, and [3] that appropriate
objection was made by appellant.” 329 N.W.2d at 317.1 The first Stufflebean requirement
leaves no room for an appeal based on juror bias where appellant failed to challenge the
juror for cause. See Geleneau, 873 N.W.2d at 380 (noting that Stufflebean establishes that
“an objection is necessary for appellate relief, which implies that the absence of an
objection in the district court is a sufficient basis for rejecting a biased-juror argument on
appeal” (emphasis added)). As we observed in Geleneau, the requirement that a defendant
first challenge a juror for cause in the district court “is consistent with the principle that the
district court is in the best position to dete rmine whether a prospective juror can be an
impartial juror because the district court can assess the prospective juror’s demeanor and
credibility during voir dire.” Id. Accordingly, Stufflebean requires that a defendant must
first challenge the juror for bias in the district court to raise the issue of juror bias on appeal.
Collins argues that we should circumvent the challenge requirement in Stufflebean
and instead review the juror-bias issue pursu ant to Minn. R. Crim. 31.02. That rule
provides that a “[p]lain error affecting a substantial right can be considered by the
court . . . on appeal even if it was not brought to the trial court’s attention.” Minn. R. Crim.

1 We note that the supreme court has clarif ied that an appellant is not required to
demonstrate that a juror’s bias resulted in actual prejudice. See State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d
615, 625-26 (Minn. 2015). Rather, the presence of a biased juror is a structural error that
requires a new trial, without any inquiry into the consequences of the biased juror’s
participation. Id.

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P. 31.02. Collins contends that the issue of Juror C’s bias is properly raised on appeal
under rule 31.02 because the district court’s failure to strike the juror was plain error. The
language of rule 31.02, however, is permissive—not mandatory. The rule provides that an
appellate court “can” consider a question of plain error, not that it “must.” See generally
The American Heritage Dictiona ry of the English Language 269, 1162 (5 th Ed. 2011)
(defining “can” as a word “[u]sed to indica te possibility or probability” and “must” as a
word “[u]sed to indicate inevitability or certainty”). And the supreme court decided
Stufflebean after the promulga tion of the rule 31.02 and s till required the appellant to
challenge the juror for cause to preserve the issue on appeal. See generally In re Proposed
Rules of Criminal Procedure , No. 45517 (Minn. Feb. 26, 1975) (order adopting the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure). Ther efore, we decline to apply the plain-error
standard of review and instead apply the standard set forth in Stufflebean, which requires
Collins to show that he cha llenged the juror for cause at the district court level. See
State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (noting that we are “bound by supreme
court precedent”). Because Collins failed to br ing a for-cause challenge to Juror C in
district court, the question of whether the di strict court erred by failing to strike Juror C
sua sponte is not properly before us.2

2 Moreover, even if we were to apply the pl ain-error test, Collins would be unsuccessful.
The plain-error test requires a defendant to esta blish (1) an error; (2 ) that is plain; and
(3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740
(Minn. 1998). An error is plain “when it cont ravenes a rule, case law, or a standard of
conduct.” State v. Brown , 792 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. 2011). The error here was not
plain because “[n]either the caselaw nor the rules of crim inal procedure impose on the
district court a duty to strike prosp ective jurors for cause sua sponte.” State v. Gillespie,
710 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2006).

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it limited cross-examination
of the arresting officers.

Collins next argues that the district cour t abused its discretion when it limited
cross-examination of the arresting officers regarding an alleged un recorded conversation
because the excluded testimony had the potential to show that the arresting officers wanted
to recruit Collins as an informant and were biased against him. The state argues that Collins
was afforded an adequate opportunity to question the officers about bias, and therefore the
district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the testimony. We agree with the state.
Under the Confrontation Clause, the accused has a right to confront witnesses. U.S.
Const. amends. VI, XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. “The e ssence of confrontation is the
opportunity to cross-exam ine opposing witnesses.” State v. Greer , 635 N.W.2d 82, 89
(Minn. 2001); see also State v. Brown , 739 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. 2007) (“[T]he
defendant’s right to cross-examine witne sses for bias is secured by the Sixth
Amendment.”). District cour ts, however, have broad discre tion to control the scope of
cross-examination. Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 89.
In terms of witness bias, “the C onfrontation Clause contemplates a
cross-examination of the witne ss in which the defendant has the opportunity to reveal a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.” State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635,
640 (Minn. 1995). To establish a violation of the Confrontation Clause, a defendant must
show “that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination
designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “Bias is a catchall te rm describing attitudes, feelings, or emotions of a witness

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that might affect [the witness’s] testimony, leading [the witness] to be more or less
favorable to the position of a party fo r reasons other than the merits.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Thus, not everything a witness testifies to will show bias, and evidence that is
“only marginally useful” for that purpose may be excluded. Id. Our examination of
whether the district court abused its discre tion in restricting a defendant’s attempted
cross-examination to show bias “turns on whether the jury has sufficient other information
to make a discriminating appraisal of the witness’s bias or motive to fabricate.” Id. at 641
(quotation omitted).
We conclude that the district court di d not abuse its discretion by excluding the
attempted cross-examination because the jury had sufficient other information by which to
make an appraisal of any bias on the part of the officers. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 641.
At trial, the jury watched po rtions of the second officer’s bodycam video in which the
officer revealed that he knew where Collins kept his pistol before the other officer searched
the car. Similarly, each of the officers te stified that they kn ew Collins from a prior
investigation of his brother and that they knew Collins had a pistol. Moreover, Collins
himself testified, over the state’s objection, that the officers tried to recruit him to be an
informant in 2017. He described how the of ficers asked about his brother’s involvement
with drugs and if he knew of others who sold drugs. Collins also testified that after the
interaction in 2017, the officers continued to stop him. And defens e counsel played the
recording of the police-station interview to the jury where Collins asked the officer if they
were talking about the other investigation, and the officer told Collins that they would talk
about that later. Finally, while the district court sustained the state’s objection to certain

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questions regarding the alleged conversation, both officers did answer some questions
about the issue on cross-exam ination before an objection was made by the state on
relevance grounds. Accordingly, there was sufficient information by which the jury could
evaluate any officer’s bias or motive to fabricate without the excluded cross-examination.
Id.
Moreover, Collins focuses hi s argument on the motive for stopping and arresting
him as a basis for showing offi cer bias. Even though extrinsi c evidence may be used to
show bias, “courts may exclude evidence that is only marginally useful for this purpose.”
State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Minn. 2010) (q uotation omitted). It is unclear to
us how additional evidence related to the motiv e for the stop and arrest would be helpful
in showing officer bias on testimony regardi ng the elements of the crime of carrying a
pistol without a license, partic ularly given that Collins hims elf admitted that the pistol
belonged to him and that he di d not have a valid permit. Th e excluded testimony in this
case is only “marginally useful” to show officer bias. Id.
In sum, the jury had sufficient information to appraise the officers’ bias or motive
to fabricate given the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by limiting the scope of the cross-examination.
III. There is sufficient corroborating evidence to support Collins’s admission.

Collins next argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
did not have a permit and therefore failed to prove an element of the offense—that he did
not possess a permit to carry the pistol. The state argues that Collins’s admission that he
did not have a valid permit is direct eviden ce of his guilt and that one of the arresting

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officers corroborated Collins’s admission by c onfirming that he was not issued a new
permit.
We analyze a claim of insu fficient evidence by determining whether the evidence,
when considered in the light most favorable to the conviction, co uld reasonably support
the verdict with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004). In
doing so, we assume that the jury belie ved the state’s witnesses and evidence and
disbelieved contrary evidence. State v. Robinson, 539 N.W.2d 231, 238 (Minn. 1995).
A defendant’s confe ssion is direct evidence of guilt. State v. McClain ,
292 N.W. 753, 755 (1940). However, despite our deference to the jury on matters of
credibility, uncorroborated confessions of guilt are not sufficient to support a conviction
under Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 634.03 (2016) (“ A confession of the defendant
shall not be sufficient to warrant conviction without evidence that the offense charged has
been committed[.]”). Secti on 634.03 has a dual fu nction: “it discourages coercively
acquired confessions and requires that ad missions and confessions be reliable.”
State v. Heiges, 806 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2011). But section 634.04 does not require that
each element of the offense charged be individually corroborated. Id. at 13; see also In re
Welfare of M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 735 (Minn. 1984) (stating that “not all or any of the
elements had to be individua lly corroborated” to sufficiently corroborate a defendant’s
confession). Instead, it “only requires inde pendent evidence of attending facts or
circumstances from which the ju ry may infer the trustworthin ess of the confession.”

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Heiges, 806 N.W.2d at 13 (quotation omitted). The statement at issue here relates to only
one element of the offense—that Collins did not possess a permit to carry the pistol.
The evidence in this case establishes that, during the traffic stop, Collins admitted
that he did not have a permit to carry the pistol. Then, during the interview at the precinct,
Collins told the officer that he had a permit to carry the pistol in the past but that it was no
longer valid.
To corroborate Collins’s confession, the state presented an officer’s testimony that
Collins admitted the pistol was his and that he did not have a valid permit to carry the
pistol. The same officer also testified that Collins did not present him with a valid permit.
The prosecutor then asked the officer, “And according to the records, did you have access
to—he was not issued a permit, a new permit; is that correct?” The officer replied,
“Correct.”
Collins argues that because the question regarding the o fficer’s record search was
compound and confusing, the state failed to corroborate Collins’s confession. We are not
persuaded. It is clear that the prosecutor was asking whether the officer found a valid
permit in his record search. While we agre e the better practice would be to support the
confession by other evidence such as the records themselves, the corroboration need only
provide the jury with independent evidence to “infer the trustworthiness of the confession.”
Heiges, 806 N.W.2d at 13 (quotation omitted). We conclude that the state presented
sufficient evidence to corroborate the attendant facts and circumstances of Collins’s
confession.

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IV. Pro Se Brief
Collins also filed a supplemental pro se brief. In his brief, Collins describes a
number of encounters with the arresting offi cers and the circumstances surrounding his
arrest but does not articulate any legal arguments. Nor does he cite to legal authority. To
the extent we are able to discern any legal arguments, the arguments that he raises are
similar to those raised in his primary brief. Because Collins’s supplemental pro se brief
contains no argument or citation to legal au thority, we deem the issues raised waived
and do not address them except to the extent that we have already addressed similar
issues in the preceding sections of this opinion. See State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713,
719 (Minn. 2002) (noting that allegations of error without “argument or citation to legal
authority in support of the allegations” are deemed waived).
Affirmed.