State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1322

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kristen Marie Stradtmann,
Appellant.

Filed April 13, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-CR-17-398

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Rick Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Abby Wikelius, Assistant County Attorney, Marshall,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
In this appeal from an order revoking appellant’s probation and e xecuting a
previously stayed prison sentence, appellant argues that the district court abused its

2
discretion because it (1) improperly determined that appellant received a downward
dispositional departure and (2) made insufficient findings on the third Austin factor. We
reverse and remand.
FACTS
On the night of April 14, 2017, appellant Kristen Marie Stradtmann struck another
vehicle while driving and left the scene. An officer responded and proceeded to appellant’s
home approximately one block away, to which appellant returned shortly thereafter. The
officer made contact with appellant and noticed an odor of alcohol and that appellant had
bloodshot, watery eyes and poor balance. Appellant then got into an altercation with the
officer as he attempted to arrest her. She repeatedly commanded her 150 - to 200-pound
dog to attack the officer, and it jumped at and bit him, allowing appellant to run free.
Additional officers arrived at the home and ultimately arrested appellant and brought her
into custody.
Appellant entered an Alford plea1 to a charge of second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon, her dog, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2016) , during
which she acknowledged that the state would present the above evidence. Appellant
entered a traditional guilty plea on a charge of driving while intoxicated in violation of
Minn. Stat § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2016) . The district court sentenced appellant to 27

1 In an Alford plea, a defendant maintains her claim of innocence, but she agrees that the
state has sufficient evidence for a jury to find her guilty and chooses to accept the state’s
plea offer. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167-68 (1970);
see also State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Minn. 1977) (recognizing Alford pleas
in Minnesota).

3
months’ imprisonment , stayed for five years. Appellant’s probation conditions for the
assault offense included the requirements that she remain law abiding and not use or
possess alcohol or drugs except as prescribed.
The Minnesota Department of C orrections filed a probation -violation report
alleging that appellant failed to remain law abiding due to three drug-related charges filed
on March 11, 2019, and that she violated the no -use condition based upon her admission
to law enforcement that she had been using methamphetamines. It recommended revoking
her probation and executing the imposed sentence.
Respondent State of Minnesota withdrew the alleged violation for failing to remain
law abiding because the violation depended on the outcome of an ongoing criminal case in
another county, for which the parties had already twice delayed the probation-revocation
proceedings. At the revocation hearing, appellant admitted to violating her probation by
using methamphetamines. The district court revoked appellant’s probation and executed
the previously stayed sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court sentenced appellant to a downward dispositional departure.

Appellant argues that the district court incorrectly determined that her stayed
sentence is a downward dispositional departure2 rather than the presumptive sentence. We
disagree.

2 While we note that the district court did not refer to a “downward dispositional departure”
at the revocation hearing, it referred to a downward departure, to amenability to probation
or treatment, and to appellant’s “Departure Report,” which categorized the departure type
as “dispositional.” Neither party contends that the district court intended to refer to another

4
As an initial matter, appellant did not object to the district court’s characterization
of her sentence or otherwise raise this issue to the district court. We generally only consider
issues presented t o and considered by the district court. State v. Beaulieu , 859 N.W.2d
275, 278 n.3 (Minn. 2015). But because this issue relates to the probation-revocation issue,
we will review it.
Whether a sentence conforms to the requirements of a statute or the sent encing
guidelines is a question of law that we review de novo. See State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d
514, 520 (Minn. 2009). Second-degree assault is subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence. Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 9 (2016). “[T] he presumptive dispositi on for an
offense subject to a mandatory sentence under Minn. Stat. § 609.11 is always
commitment.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.E.2.b(1) (2016). Therefore, appellant’s second-
degree-assault conviction carried a presumptively executed sentence, and the district
court’s imposition of a stayed sentence constituted a downward dispositional departure .
See In re Welfare of D.W. , 731 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Minn. App. 2007) ( rejecting argument
that presumptive sentence for second-degree assault, as level-VI offense, is stayed); see
also Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.E.01 (2016).
Appellant’s reliance on State v. Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. 2005), to argue that
a mandatory minimum sentence func tions as an aggravating factor when it changes a
presumptive sentence from stayed to executed is inapposite . Here, the presumptive
sentence is executed. Moreover, appellant pleaded guilty to and waived her right to a jury

type of downward departure, and it is clear that the stayed sentence would be a downward
dispositional departure.

5
trial on second -degree assault with a dangerous weapon , the elements of which alone
support the imposi tion of a mandatory minimum sentence. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.11
(applying mandatory minimum when offender uses dangerous weapon), 609.222
(describing second-degree assault as assault with a dangerous weapon).
Because we conclude that appellant’s sentence is not an upward departure and no
element of appellant’s offense operated as an aggravating factor, we need not address her
argument that Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 4 (2016), and Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.03 required
the state to provide notice of its intent to seek an “aggravating factor.”
II. The district court abused its discretion by revoking appellant’s probation
without making sufficient findings on the third Austin factor.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion because it relied on only
appellant’s downward dispositional departure and did not adequately describe the factual
basis for its revocation or the substantive reasons supporting it. Appellant’s argument has
merit.
We give broad deference to a district court’s determination that there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). But
whether the district court made the required findings to revoke probation is a question of
law that we review de novo. State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d 319, 331 (Minn. App. 2015),
aff’d on other grounds , 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016) . A district court may revoke
probation if the probationer violates any of the probation conditions. Minn. Stat. § 609.14,
subd. 1(a) (2018). But its decision must not be “a reflexive reaction to an accumulation of
technical violations.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted). Technical violations

6
are “any violation of a court or der of probation, except an allegation of a subsequent
criminal act that is alleged in a formal complaint, citation, or petition.” Minn. Stat.
§ 244.196, subd. 6 (2016).
In revoking probation, the district court must (1) specify the condition or conditions
that the probationer violated; (2) find that the probationer intentionally or inexcusably
violated the condition; and (3) “find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the policies
favoring probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. A district court must provide substantive
reasons and the evidence upon which it relied in making its Austin findings. State v.
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2005). “[District] courts should not assume that
they have satisfied Austin by reciting the three factors and offering general, non -specific
reasons for revocation[] . . . .” Id. Rather, district courts must make “thorough, fact -
specific records” and “seek to convey their substantive reasons for revocation and the
evidence relied upon.” Id.
Appellant challenges only the district court’s findings on the third Austin factor.
Under this factor, district courts “must balance ‘the probationer’s interest in freedom and
the state’s interest in insuring [the probationer’s] rehabilitation and the public safety,’ and
base their decisions ‘on sound judgment and not just their will.’” Id. at 607 (quoting Austin,
295 N.W.2d at 250-51). Further, district courts “should refer to” whether “(i) confinement
is necessary to protect the public,” “ (ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if [the offender] is confined,” or (iii) not revoking
probation “would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation.” Id. (quoting Austin,
295 N.W.2d at 251).

7
Here, the district court found that appellant violated her probation condition of not
using or possessing alcohol or drugs. It then stated that
I am going to —I find that the violation was intentional or
inexcusable. Further, the need f or confinement outweighs
policy favoring probation because you are in need of
correctional treatment that can be best offered if confined, and
it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if
probation were not revoked.

After executing appellant’s 27-month sentence, the district court addressed appellant and
added that it had reviewed the departure report, and “one of the main factors that was
considered [in staying the sentence] was your amenability to probation or treatment and,
unfortunately, that has not been the case in this matter.”
The district court’s findings are essentially a recitation of the Austin factors, and its
additional statement that appellant had not been amenable to probation or treatment does
not provide more than a “general, non -specific reason[] for revocation,” against which
Modtland cautioned. Id. at 608. These findings reveal neither the evidence upon which
the district court relied nor its substantive reasons for revoking appellant’s probation. See
id. For example, its findings do not show how it determined that treatment would “be best
offered” if appellant were confined, as she had no t been required to participate in any
community-based treatment with which to compare treatment in confinement. In contrast
with cases in which probationers have nearly exhausted community -based treatment
options, there is no indication that treatment is not available here. See, e.g., Fleming, 869
N.W.2d at 331. The district court also did not describe the seriousness of a ppellant’s
violation in concluding that not revoking her probation would depreciate it. Finally, while

8
a district court may consider a downward dispositional departure in its revocation decision,
id., the district court did not substantiate its finding that appellant had not been amenable
to probation or treatment or relate that finding to any of the Austin factors.
“[I]t is not the role of appellate courts to scour the record to determine if sufficient
evidence exists to support the district court’s revocation.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608.
The district court abused its discretion by revoking appellant’s probation without stating
adequate reasons to support its finding that the need for confinement outweighed the
policies favoring continued probation. We therefore reverse and remand for additional
findings as to the third Austin factor. See id.
Reversed and remanded.