State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1811

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joshua Thomas Lee,
Appellant.

Filed August 4, 2025
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Freeborn County District Court
File Nos. 24-CR-20-263, 24-CR-20-465

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David Walker, Freeborn County Attorney, Abigail L. Ehret, Assistant County Attorney,
Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Appellant challenges an order by the district court that revoked his probation and
executed his prison sentences in two district court files. In particular, appellant argues that
the district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because the record does
not establish that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.
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Because we conclude that the district court made sufficient findings that are adequately
supported by the record, we affirm.
FACTS
Underlying Charges, Plea Agreement, and Sentence
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Joshua Thomas Lee with several
offenses, including third-degree burglary, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.582, subdivision 3 (2018). The state later charged Lee in a second case with two
offenses, including second-degree burglary, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.582, subdivision 2(a)(1) (2018). All of the charges—seven in total— arose from
incidents that occurred in February 2020. The parties eventually reached a global plea
agreement to resolve the two cases. Lee pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary in the first
case and to second-degree burglary in the second case, and the state agreed to dismiss the
remaining charges. And, consistent with the parties’ agreement, the district court
furloughed Lee to inpatient chemical-dependency treatment.
At a sentencing hearing in May 2021, the district court granted Lee’s motion for
downward dispositional departures in both cases, stayed execution of a 32-month sentence
for the third-degree burglary charge and a 57-month sentence for the second-degree
burglary charge, and placed Lee on probation. The conditions of Lee’s probation included
that he: follow state and federal laws; contact probation as directed; inform probation
within 72 hours of any contact with law enforcement, a new criminal charge, or a change
of address, employment, or telephone number; avoid possessing alcohol and mood-altering
chemicals; complete chemical-dependency treatment and follow recommendations; pay
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restitution; complete 40 hours of sentence to service (STS); and submit to random
substance-use testing.
Probation Violation Reports
In July 2021, the department of corrections (DOC) filed the first of four separate
probation violation reports. A corrections agent alleged that Lee neither contacted
probation as directed nor informed probation of a change of address. After a contested-
revocation hearing, the district court found that there were sufficient facts to establish that
Lee had violated his probationary conditions but nonetheless reinstated him on probation.
In May 2023, the DOC filed the second probation violation report. Lee later
admitted that he had violated his probationary conditions because he did not follow the law
and he used and possessed controlled substances. The district court reinstated Lee on
probation with an added condition that he complete an updated chemical-dependency
assessment and follow any resulting recommendations.
In November 2023, the DOC filed the third probation violation report. Lee again
admitted that he had violated his probationary conditions by using controlled substances.
The district court again reinstated Lee on probation and ordered him to complete another
chemical-dependency assessment, if necessary.
In March 2024, the DOC filed the fourth probation violation report, this time
alleging that Lee did not report to three scheduled meetings with his probation agent in
February 2024 and did not complete 40 hours of STS and a mental-health evaluation.
Alleging that Lee also did not report to probation in April 2024, the DOC later filed an
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amendment to the March 2024 report. And, in a second amendment, the DOC further
alleged that Lee did not report to a meeting in May 2024.
Final Contested-Revocation Hearing
The district court held a contested-revocation hearing in August 2024. During the
hearing, Lee and his probation officer (C.H.) testified.
C.H. stated that Lee had generally been unsuccessful on probation and that—aside
from “an official scheduled appointment” in February 2024 and a “couple” of phone
conversations—she had not had an in-person meeting with him. In addition, C.H.
summarized Lee’s history of probation violations.
Moreover, C.H. told the district court that Lee did not attend three appointments in
February 2024 and that Lee neither provided notice of his absences nor contacted C.H. to
reschedule. And C.H. testified that, although she tried to reschedule these meetings many
times, Lee’s failure to report to her persisted. According to C.H., her inability to meet with
Lee made it difficult for her to conduct random tests for controlled substances and to
observe whether he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
C.H. also addressed Lee’s failure to complete 40 hours of STS . Although Lee
testified that his previous probation agent had allowed him to satisfy this requirement by
working at Catholic Charities, C.H. stated that she saw no notes in the file to that effect.
In addition, C.H. reported that Lee had failed to follow through with the
recommendations of his mental-health assessment. She explained that, although Lee
completed the mental- health assessment, he neither provided C.H. with a copy of it nor
followed the assessment’s recommendations. During his testimony, Lee claimed that he
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did not complete the recommendations “[o]ut of fear . . . of getting arrested for [an
outstanding] warrant.” Lee also stated that there was “no good reason that [he] didn’t have
it done other than the fact that [the mental-health provider was] behind several months, so
[he] had to wait for them to call [him].” And Lee admitted that, in the nine months that he
waited for such contact from his provider, he made no attempt to follow up on the
recommendations of the mental-health assessment.
C.H. furthermore testified that Lee was instructed to immediately contact the DOC
after he was released from jail on April 26, 2024 following his arrest on a probation
warrant, but he did not do so. More specifically, C.H. elaborated that Lee did not
communicate with her through any means and provided no excuse for this noncompliance.
And C.H. said that, when she tried to call and email Lee on April 30, she received no
response.
Finally, C.H. explained that, when Lee was similarly jailed and released in May
2024, he was instructed to contact her and he likewise did not comply. She stated that she
eventually spoke with Lee on the phone and scheduled an appointment with him for May
21 at a probation office in Winona. But C.H. testified that, about ten minutes before the
May 21 meeting, Lee “left a voicemail saying he would be late because he ran into some
rain in St. Charles,” although he said “ that he [still] was on his way to the office.” C.H.
reported that she “tried calling him back” close to the end of the day “because he still hadn’t
reported.” And C.H. said that, the next day, she discovered she “had a voicemail
from . . . Lee explaining that he had . . . gotten to the office after [it] had closed,” “that he
had ridden his motorcycle down to Winona, and that it [had been] raining and storming
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that day,” which C.H. acknowledged was true. C.H. testified that, since May 21, she had
not spoken with Lee.1
Overall, C.H. said that she could not monitor Lee properly because he had not been
in contact with her. In C.H.’s opinion, Lee had received “all the proper opportunities to
engage in and be successful on probation.” According to C.H., “Lee[] had months to follow
through with recommendations that he [had] received through the assessment he completed
and . . . just [had not] made himself available to probation or treatment providers.” C.H.
did not believe that there were any available options to help Lee succeed on probation. But
C.H. also acknowledged that Lee had not violated his probationary conditions by
committing additional crimes.
Lee requested that the district court place him back on probation because he needed
mental-health resources and did not want to lose his job. He told the district court that his
father had recently been released from a hospital to a nursing home and his mother was in
a hospital intensive-care unit. Lee also said that he needed to care for his children.
Finding that much of Lee’s testimony was not credible, the district court determined
that the state had met its burden to prove the alleged violations . In addressing disposition,
the district court discussed the third Austin
2 factor. The district court reasoned that this was

1 On cross-examination, Lee conceded that “there was a little bit of a lack of
communication between” him and C.H. He acknowledged that he had moved to Rochester
but waited about three months to inform probation. And Lee admitted that he had failed to
inform probation of his new employment within 72 hours.

2 See State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980) (explaining that, before a district
court revokes probation, the court must (1) “designate the specific condition or conditions
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Lee’s fourth probation violation and that Lee had “consistently found himself before the
[c]ourt from the time of sentencing, every six to eight months, on violations.” Although
the district court acknowledged that Lee’s violations were not for new crimes, the court
identified the problem as Lee’s lack of contact with probation since May 2024, which
prevented the court from knowing whether Lee had been engaging in antisocial behaviors,
such as using controlled substances, failing to complete treatment, and otherwise violating
probationary conditions.
The district court explained that it was unpersuaded by Lee’s employment and
personal circumstances because it believed that Lee would have pursued mental healthcare
and followed the recommendations of his assessment if his job and family were important
to him. And the district court determined that Lee should have asked C.H. for assistance
with following the recommendations of his mental-health assessment rather than doing
nothing based on his claimed fear of arrest for failing to contact C.H. In the district court’s
assessment, Lee’s lack of compliance conveyed that he was “not someone who’s amenable
to probation.”
Based on the above, the district court ruled that reinstating Lee on probation was
not appropriate, reasoning:
I think it does unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violations if probation isn’t revoked. We expect people to do
the bare minimum. We expect people to show up to their
probation meetings, to maintain contact with their probation
officers, and . . . Lee couldn’t even do that.

that were violated”; (2) “find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable”; and
(3) “find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation”).
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I don’t know that I can find that he’s somehow
amenable to probation at this point when he’s been back before
the [c]ourt on numerous occasions, you know, being told you
need to use your probation officer, you need to follow these
conditions, you need to do these things, and he still doesn’t do
it. I’m not convinced by his explanations here that somehow
this was all just a miscommunication or a misunderstanding
because he had a couple of different probation officers.

. . . Lee isn’t the first person to have more than one
probation officer. It’s on . . . Lee to make sure that he
understands what his obligations are and who he’s responsible
to, and he just didn’t do that . . . .

So I’m going to find that it would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violations here if I don’t revoke the
probation and if I were to put . . . Lee back on probation at this
point. I just can’t – I can’t believe his explanations or accept
them as reasonable here given the testimony.

The district court therefore revoked Lee’s probation and executed the imposed
sentences.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Lee asks that we reverse the district court’s order revoking his probation based on
his argument that the record does not establish that the need for confinement outweighed
the policies favoring probation. We conclude that Lee’s contention does not warrant
reversal.
If the district court determines that an individual has violated probation or the
individual admits a probation violation, the court may either “continue an existing stay of
execution and order probation” or revoke probation and execute a sentence. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.04, subd. 3(2)(b). “The district court has broad discretion in determining if there is
9
sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse
of that discretion.” State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023). “A district court abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
As noted above, before the district court may revoke an individual’s probation, the
court must: (1) “designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated”; (2) “find
that the violation was intentional or inexcusable”; and (3) “find that [the] need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. “The
decision to revoke cannot be a reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations
but requires a showing that the offender’s behavior demonstrates that he or she cannot be
counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Id. at 251 (quotation omitted). “[C]ourts should
not assume that they have satisfied Austin by reciting the three factors and offering general,
non-specific reasons for revocation, as it is not the role of appellate courts to scour the
record to determine if sufficient evidence exists to support the district court’s revocation.”
State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2005). Whether the district court “has
made the findings required under Austin presents a question of law” that appellate courts
review de novo. Id. at 605.
Lee challenges the district court’s findings on the third Austin factor—whether the
need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. When analyzing the third
factor, the district court must “balance the probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s
interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public safety, and base their decisions on
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sound judgment and not just their will.” Id. at 606–07 (quotation omitted). In doing so, the
district court must consider whether:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further
criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can
most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation
if probation were not revoked.

Id. at 607. “Only one Modtland subfactor is necessary to support revocation.” Smith, 994
N.W.2d at 320.
Lee maintains that the record does not show the need for confinement outweighed
the policies favoring probation. He asserts that, in making its determination on the third
Modtland subfactor, the district court neither considered nor concluded that Lee had
exhausted community-based options for chemical-dependency or mental- health
treatment.3 Lee reasons that, because he had been employed for over a year, had been
caring for his parents, had completed chemical-dependency treatment, and had access to
chemical-dependency and mental-health programming in the community, the district court
should not have revoked his probation.

3 Lee also seems to advance an argument about the first Modtland subfactor. But because
the district court revoked Lee’s probation under the third Modtland subfactor and only one
subfactor is necessary to support revocation, we decline to address Lee’s argument on the
first Modtland subfactor. See id.

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In furtherance of his argument, Lee cites two nonprecedential opinions. 4 See State
v. Stradtmann, No. A19-1322, 2020 WL 1845512 (Minn. App. Apr. 13, 2020); State v.
Sayers, No. A15-1345, 2016 WL 1619389 (Minn. App. Apr. 25, 2016). Neither decision
supports reversal here.
In Stradtmann, the district court determined that the appellant had violated
probation and stated that “the need for confinement outweigh[ed the] policy favoring
probation because [the appellant was] in need of correctional treatment that [could] be best
offered if confined, and it would [have] unduly depreciate[d] the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.” 2020 WL 1845512, at *3. The district court also
told the appellant she “had not been amenable to probation or treatment.” Id. On appeal,
we concluded that the district court had abused its discretion by merely reciting the Austin
factors and that the court’s “findings reveal[ed] neither the evidence upon which the . . .
court relied nor its substantive reasons for revoking [the] appellant’s probation.” Id.
Reasoning that the district court “did not describe the seriousness of [the] appellant’s
violation in concluding that not revoking her probation would depreciate it,” we reversed
and remanded for additional findings on the third Austin factor. Id. at *3–4.
In Sayers, the district court revoked the appellant’s probation because he was not
taking probation seriously, his behavior was escalating, and his violations were
underscored by his use of alcohol. 2016 WL 1619389, at *2. On appeal, we concluded that

4 See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions . . . are not
binding authority except as law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel, but
nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
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“the district court . . . did not explicitly consider any of the three [ Modtland] subfactors”
and that the record was insufficient for appellate review. Id. at *3.
We conclude that Stradtmann and Sayers are distinguishable from the case at hand.
In this case, the district court stated during the final contested-revocation hearing that “this
is . . . Lee’s fourth probation violation in these matters” and that “Lee ha [d] consistently
found himself before the [c]ourt from the time of sentencing, every six to eight months, on
violations.” The district court explained that Lee had not maintained contact with his
probation agent, which made it impossible to know whether Lee had engaged in antisocial
behaviors, including the use of controlled substances and the avoidance of required mental-
health treatment. Although the district court acknowledged that Lee had been employed
and was caring for his parents, the court did not consider those reasons sufficient to
maintain Lee on probation based on the entire record before the court. Nor did the district
court find Lee’s explanations for his probation violations to be credible—a determination
to which we must defer. State v. Losh, 694 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Minn. App. 2005), aff’d, 721
N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 2006). And while the district court did not find that Lee had exhausted
community-based options for treatment, the court did determine that Lee had not utilized
the resources that probation had made available for him. We therefore conclude that the
district court did far more than just recite the Austin factors and Modtland subfactors.
Instead, the district court discussed the evidence that it relied on for revocation and
provided case-specific reasons why the need for confinement outweighed the policies that
favored continuing probation.
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Moreover, based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that the district
court’s findings in support of its decision to revoke Lee’s probation are reasonably
supported. C.H. testified that this was Lee’s fourth probation violation, that Lee had
generally been unsuccessful on probation, and that she had not been able to properly
monitor Lee because he did not maintain contact with her. The lack of contact prevented
C.H. from conducting random substance-use testing and from determining whether Lee
was under the influence. Although he had been assigned to supervision by C.H. for four
months—aside from an official scheduled appointment in February 2024 and a “couple”
of phone conversations—Lee had failed to meet with C.H. in person. Lee conceded that he
had not timely informed probation of changes in his employment and address, instead
taking several months to update probation about these changes. He also acknowledged that
he had not followed up on the recommendations of his mental-health assessment.
In sum, the record establishes that the district court’s decision to revoke Lee’s
probation was not a “reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations.” Austin,
295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted). The district court considered and made findings
about Lee’s continued lack of cooperation with probation, his need for treatment, and the
manner in which his conduct precluded probationary supervision. And the district court’s
findings are reasonably supported by the record. Thus, we conclude that the district court
acted within its discretion by ordering revocation of Lee’s probation and execution of his
prison sentences.
Affirmed.