A19-1347

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1343
A19-1347

In re the Estate of:
Frank Joseph Soboleski, Deceased,
and
In re the Estate of:
Renee Maxine Soboleski, Deceased

Filed April 20, 2020
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge *

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-PR-17-686

Steven A. Nelson, Nelson & Barnhart, LLC, International Falls, Minnesota (for appellant)

Steven M. Shermoen, International Falls, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
In these consolidated probate appeal s, husband and wife Frank Joseph Soboleski
and Renee Maxine Soboleski are both deceased. The Soboleskis entered into a prenuptial

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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agreement before they got remarried in 2008. Before her death, Renee executed a codicil
to her existing will that removed Frank’s children from a bequest of property. In probate
court, the parties’ per sonal representatives and heirs brought claims related to Renee’s
codicil, the prenuptial agreement, and the mortgage balance on a shared marital home. The
district court, inter alia, concluded that Renee’s codicil was valid and ordered Frank’s estate
to pay off the mortgage balance on a shared marital home. We affirm.
FACTS
Frank and Renee Soboleski were married in 1973. Each spouse had children from
previous relationships: Frank had five children, one of whom predeceased him, and Renee
had three daughters . The Soboleskis did not have any children together. Before the
marriage, Frank owned fee simple in a cabin called Gold Shores in Koochiching County
(hereinafter “Gold Shores”). The Soboleskis divorced in 1997. During the divorce, Frank
executed a quit-claim deed transferring Gold Shore s to Renee and reserving a life estate
for himself.
The Soboleskis reconciled approximately ten years later. Frank and Renee signed
a prenuptial agreement on July 9, 2008 , and remarried the next day. The prenuptial
agreement provided that “[s]pecific entitlements are granted each to the other according to
the Wills of each party and are to be adhered to in case of divorce or death.” The prenuptial
agreement noted, however, that
[t]he separate property owned by each party at the execution of
this Agreement, however and whenever acquired, will be
owned and managed solely by such party at all times and will
remain the separate property of such party after the executio n

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of this Agreement, with no claim by the other party upon
separation or otherwise.

The prenuptial agreement further provided that “this Agr eement will be binding
upon and will inure to the benefit of the parties, their respective heirs, executors,
administrators, and assigns,” and “may only be terminated or amend ed by the parties in
writing signed by both of them.”
After the Soboleskis remarried, they purchased a home on Park Avenue in the city
of International Falls ( hereinafter “Park Avenue”). In 2011, Frank and Renee added
Renee’s three daughters to the deed of Park Avenue, making them joint tenants with a right
of survivorship in the home. In December 2012, Frank and Renee refinanced the mortgage
on Park Avenue. All joint tenants, including Renee’s daughters, signed a new mortgage,
but only Frank and Renee signed the $75,000 note, and all parties understood that the
daughters would not be responsible for the debt.
Wills of the Parties
On January 5, 2012, Frank and Renee executed simultaneous w ills. The parties do
not claim that either spouse signed a consent to the other’s will.
Paragraph 3.1 on the second page of Renee’s 2012 will provided that Park Avenue
should eventually be sold and the proceeds distributed per stirpes between her three
daughters. Paragraph 3.3 provided that Gold Shores should be sold upon Frank’s death
and that the proceeds from the sale should be used to pay off Park Avenue’s mortgage
balance, with any remaining proceeds being divided between Frank’s children. Meanwhile,
Frank’s will only addressed Gold Shores, stating:

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I have a life estate in [Gold Shores]. I give to my wife, Renee
M. Soboleski. In the event of her death, its value will be given
to all of my five children equally, per stirpes.

Frank’s will did not mention the plan to pay off the mortgage balance of Park Avenue with
the proceeds from Gold Shores. Frank and Renee executed the wills and filed them with
the court administrator at the Koochiching County courthouse.
At some point, Renee removed her 2012 will from the county courthouse. On or
about December 14, 2012, Renee signed and executed a one-page document that revise d
the second page of her 2012 will. A new version of paragraph 3.3 specified that, upon
Frank’s death, Gold Shores should be sold and the proceeds divided per stirpes between
Renee’s three daughters. The amendment was acknowledged by two witnesses and a
notary on January 14, 2013.
Death of Parties
Renee died on May 6, 2017 . She was survived by Frank and her three daughters.
After Renee’s death, Renee’s personal representative found the 2012 will and the 2013
amendment in an envelope inside Renee’s safety-deposit box.
In the days following Renee’s death, Frank engaged in a series of significant
financial and property transactions, including severing his joint tenancy in Park Avenue
and becoming a one-quarter share tenant-in-common with Renee’s three daughters. Frank
died on May 22, 2017.
At the time of Renee’s death, t he mortgage payoff balance for Park Avenue was
$53,197. After Frank’s death, Gold Shores was sold , with net proceeds held in trust

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pending the final decision of this court , and Park Avenue was sold, with net proceeds
distributed in one-quarter shares to F rank’s estate and Renee’s daughters.
Probate Claims
In August 2017, Frank’s personal representative objected to the probate of Renee’s
will under the 2013 will amendment. Meanwhile, i n March 2018, Renee’s personal
representative filed three claims, each in the amount of $32,078, against Frank’s estate,
arguing, among other things, that Frank was responsible for paying off the mortgage on
Park Avenue as the last living signer of the mortgage note.
The estates settled some of these claims in August 201 8. The rest of the claims in
each probate file, including the $53,197 mortgage balance claim, proceeded to trial. In
December 2018, the district court ordered Frank’s estate to pay off the mortgage balance
on Park Avenue and to reimburse Renee’s daughters for the amount they paid toward the
mortgage between Frank’s death and the sale of Park Avenue. The district court also
concluded that Renee’s 2013 will amendment was a valid codicil and ordered her estate to
be distributed in accordance with the codicil.
Frank’s estate moved to amend the district court’s findings of fact and conclusio ns
of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial in both probate court files. In June 2019, the
district court denied appellants’ motions for a new trial in both probate cases and denied
the motions for amended findings.
Frank’s personal representative and the beneficiaries of his will (appellants) appeal.
This court consolidated the appeals on August 28, 2019.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The So boleskis’ prenuptial agreement did not require mutual consent for a
spouse to change his or her will.

Appellants contend that Renee breached the prenuptial agreement by altering her
will without Frank’s consent and that his beneficiaries are entitled to damages based on
this alleged breach. Appellants make three arguments: (1) that the prenuptial agreement
unambiguously prohibits the parties from changing their will without the consent of the
other; (2) that the parties’ conduct establis hes that they intended the prenuptial agreement
to prohibit changes to the wills without mutual consent; and (3) the codicil is invalid
because it was created in breach of the prenuptial agreement.
“An antenuptial agreement is a type of contract recognized and favored at common
law.” Pollock-Halvarson v. McGuire , 576 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Minn. App. 1998), review
denied (Minn. May 28, 1008). “[T]he goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain and
enforce the intent of the parties.” RAM Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rohde, 820 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn.
2012) (quotation omitted). “Whether a contract is ambiguous is a legal determination” that
is reviewed de novo. Blattner v. Forster, 322 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Minn. 1982); see also
Isaac v. Vy Thanh Ho , 825 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn . 2013) . A contractual provision is
ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Hoffman v. N .
States Power Co. , 764 N.W.2d 34, 53 (Minn. 2009) . If a contract ual provision is
unambiguous, the contract must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, Denelsbeck v.
Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346-47 (Minn. 2003), and a court should not “rewrite,
modify, or limit its effect by strained construction,” Travertine Corp. v. Lexington -

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Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 2004) , nor consider evidence of the parties’
conduct after signing an agreement. Dorsey & Whitney LLP v. Grossman , 749 N.W.2d
409, 419-20 (Minn. App. 2008).
The Soboleskis’ prenuptial agreement provides, in relevant part, the following:
PROPERTY
1. The separate property owned by each party at the
execution of this Agreement, however and whenever
acquired, will be owned and managed solely by such
party at all times and will remain the separate property
of such party after the execution of this Agreement, with
no claim by the other party upon separation or
otherwise.

2. The parties hereby acknowledge that with respect to any
determination of ownership of property that may occur
in the event of the parties separating, or upon the death
of a party, all property will be treated as separate
property owned solely by one party unless there is proof
of shared legal ownership.

. . .

ESTATES AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION
16. Specific entitlements are granted each to the other
according t o the Wills of each party and are to be
adhered to in case of divorce or death. . . .

. . .

DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
19. This Agreement creates a fiduciary relationship
between the parties in which each party agrees to act
with the utmost of good faith and fair dealing toward the
other in all aspects of this Agreement.

. . .

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ENUREMENT
22. This Agreement will be binding upon and will enure to
the benefit of the parties, their respective heirs,
executors, administrators, and assigns.

. . .

TERMINATION OR AMENDMENT
24. This Agreement may only be terminated or amended by
the parties in writing signed by both of them.

Appellants argue that the prenuptial agreement unambiguously prohibited Renee
from changing her will without Frank’s consent. Specifically, appellants contend that
paragraph 16, read in context with the rest of the agreement (particularly paragraphs 19,
22, and 24), clearly requires both spouses to agree on any future dispositions by will. See
Kremer v. Kremer , 912 N.W.2d 617 , 627-29 (Minn. 2018). But this is not a reasonable
interpretation of the agreement.
The plain language of the prenuptial agreement provides that, upon death of either
spouse, all property should be “treated as separate property owned solely by” one spouse
or the other “unless there is proof of shared legal ownership.” The agreement clarifies that
there was “no jointly owned property ” when the agreement was signed. The agreement
then allows the spouses to make “specific entitlements” within their individual wills of the
separate property discussed in paragraphs 1 -2. The agreement does not propose any
requirements for the modification of an existing will. Because the prenuptial agreement is
unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and need not consider extrinsic evidence of the
parties’ intent. See Dorsey & Whitney, 749 N.W.2d at 419 -20.

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Thus, Renee did not breach the prenuptial agreement by changing her will without
Frank’s consent. Because we determine that Renee did not breach the agreement, we need
not reach appellants’ argument about the codicil’s validity, or damages.1
II. The district court did not err by concluding that Frank’s estate was responsible
for paying the balance of the mortgage note on Park Avenue.

Appellants contend that the district court erred by holding Frank’s estate responsib le
for the unpaid mortgage on Park Avenue. Appellants primarily argue that it is unjust to
require Frank ’s estate to pay off the mortgage on Park Avenue after his heirs were
disinherited from Renee’s will and deprived of the net proceeds from the sale of Gold
Shores. Respondents contend that Frank’s estate is responsible for the mortgage balance
because Frank was the “last surviving person that signed the Note.”
“On appeal from a probate court’s decision after a trial without a jury, findings of
fact will be disturbed only if clearly erroneous.” In re Estate of Torgersen , 711 N.W.2d
545, 550 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. June 20, 2006). “When reviewing
mixed questions of law and fact, we correc t erroneous applications of law, but accord the
district court discretion in its ultimate conclusions and review such conclusions under an
abuse of discretion standard.” In re Estate of Sullivan, 868 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. App.
2015) (quotation omitted).

1 Furthermore, appellants did not raise the issue of damages below. This court generally
declines to consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court. Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 ( Minn. 1988); see also Dean v. City of Winona , 868 N.W.2d
1, 8 (Minn. 2015). Thus, we need not reach this issue.

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The district court found that Frank and Renee purchased Park Avenue together as
marital property and that they signed a quit-claim deed to Renee’s three daughters granting
them a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in the home. The district court found that
Frank and Renee then refinanced Park Avenue by taking out a mortgage note for $75,000 ,
which was only signed by the two of them. The district court found that Renee’s daughters
were not parties to the mortgage note and that the bank assured the th ree joint tenants that
they would not be responsible for the debt because they were not on the note . Finally, the
district court found that Frank severed his joint tenancy in Park Avenue after Renee’s death
and became a tenant in common, leaving him with an “undivided one -fourth interest” in
the home. The district court concluded that, upon Renee’s death, Frank became responsib le
for repaying the mortgage as the sole surviving borrower under the note. The district court
therefore ordered Frank’s estate t o pay off the mortgage balance and to repay Renee’s
beneficiaries for payments made on the mortgage between the time of Frank’s death and
the sale of the home in 2017.
The district court’s findings are supported by the record, and appellants provide no
evidence that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that Frank was legally
responsible for the mortgage debt. The appellant has the burden of showing that the district
court erred. See Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949). Appellants argue that it
is unfair to hold Frank’s estate responsible for pa ying off the remaining mortgage but fail
to cite any legal authority to support their argument that the district court’s order should be
reversed. Moreover, the district c ourt’s order is supported by the plain language of the
prenuptial agreement, which provides that all jointly acquired debts should be “paid by

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each party that is responsible for them as stated in the Wills of each.” Frank’s will states
that his personal r epresentative should pay “from the residue of my estate” any “valid
debts.”
We are sympathetic to appellants’ argument that this result does not seem fair .
However, we are constrained by the law to this result. Appellants did not provide the
district court with enough evidence for this court to determine that the district court abused
its discretion by concluding that Frank’s estate is responsible for the mortgage payoff, nor
did they provide the court with any legal authority suggesting that the district court erred
in applying the law. Sullivan, 868 N.W.2d at 754.
Thus, the district court did not err by ordering Frank’s estate to pay off the mortgage
on Park Avenue.
Affirmed.