Timothy Soboleski, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Frank Soboleski, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1578

Timothy Soboleski, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Frank
Soboleski,
Appellant,

Patrick Frank Soboleski, et al.,
Defendants,

vs.

Barbara Louise Cassibo, Personal Representative,
Respondent,

Estate of Renee Soboleski,
Defendant.

Filed September 13, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-CV-18-216

Steven A. Nelson, Steven A. Nelson, LLC, International Falls, Minnesota (for appellant)

Steven M. Shermoen, International Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant-personal-representative challe nges a district court order granting
summary judgment for respondent-personal-repr esentative. Appellant argues the district
court (1) erred by determining the civil cl aim was statutorily time-barred; (2) erred by
determining the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel also barred the civil claim;
and (3) abused its discretion by denying a motion to amend the complaint. We affirm.
FACTS
This action arises out of a lawsuit by a ppellant-plaintiff, the estate and heirs of
husband, Frank Soboleski (Frank Soboleski’s estate), against respondent-defendant, the
estate and heirs of wife, Renee Soboleski (R enee Soboleski’s estate). Frank and Renee
Soboleski are deceased and the parties here are their respective personal representatives
and heirs. The facts have been fu lly set out in an earlier appeal. See In re Estate of
Soboleski, No. A19-1343, 2020 WL 1910182, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 20, 2020).
Frank and Renee Soboleski first married in 1973. Each spou se had children from
their previous marriages, but they did not have any children together. At the time of their
marriage, Frank Soboleski owned property on Gold Shores. Frank and Renee Soboleski
divorced in 1997. Frank and Renee Sobol eski reconciled about ten years later and
remarried, after signing a prenuptial agreement. They bought a house on Park Avenue in
International Falls and added Renee Soboleski’s three children to the deed. Frank and
Renee Soboleski later refinanced the mortgage on this house, which was signed by Frank
Soboleski, Renee Soboleski, and Renee Soboleski’s children.

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Frank and Renee Soboleski ex ecuted their wills in 2012. Renee Soboleski’s will
provided that the Park Avenue house would eventually be sold and the proceeds distributed
among her children. The Gold Shores propert y would be sold at the time of Frank
Soboleski’s death and the pro ceeds used to pay off the Park Avenue mortgage balance,
with the remaining proceeds to be divide d among Frank Soboleski’s children. Renee
Soboleski later revised her will to provide that upon Frank Soboleski’s death, Gold Shores
should be sold and the proceeds divided among her children. Frank and Renee Soboleski
both died in May 2017. Following Frank Soboleski’s death, the Gold Shores property was
sold and the proceeds were plac ed in trust. The Park Av enue house was sold and the
proceeds were distributed in one-quarter shares to Frank Soboleski’s estate and to each of
Renee Soboleski’s three children.
In August 2017, Frank Soboleski’s son an d personal representative, appellant
Timothy Soboleski, objected to the probate of Renee Soboleski’s will. Frank Soboleski’s
estate also served a civil complaint in December 2017, asserting breach of contract. Renee
Soboleski’s estate filed three claims against Frank Soboleski’s estate. The estates settled
some of these claims and the rest of the outstanding issues proceeded to trial. In December
2018, the district court found that Renee S oboleski’s will amendment was a valid codicil
which did not violate the terms of the prenuptia l agreement, and ordere d her estate to be
distributed according to that c odicil. Frank Soboleski’s esta te appealed. We determined
that Renee Soboleski did not breach the prenuptial agreem ent by changing her will and
affirmed the district court. Id. at *3-5.

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Following our decision, Renee Soboleski’s estate moved for summary judgment on
the outstanding breach-of-contract claim. Frank Soboleski’s estate sought leave to amend
the complaint. The district court granted the summary-judgment motion, determining the
complaint was time-barred under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-801(a) (2020). The district court also
determined the claim was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
The district court denied Frank Soboleski’s estate’s motion to amend on the ground that it
could not withstand summary judgment.
Frank Soboleski’s estate now appeals.
DECISION
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matte r of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. “A
genuine issue of material fact exists if a rati onal trier of fact, considering the record as a
whole, could find for the nonmoving party.” Leeco, Inc. v. Cornerstone Bank, 898 N.W.2d
653, 657 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2017). We review a grant of
summary judgment de novo, viewing “the evid ence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and resolv[ing] all doubts and factual inferences against the moving
part[y].” Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted). To survive summary judgment, the opposing party must “extract specific,
admissible facts from the record that demonstrate that a genui ne issue of material fact
exists.” Beecroft v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. , 798 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Minn. App. 2011)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011).

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I. The district court did not err by determining the breach-of-contract claim was
time-barred under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-801 (2020).
Frank Soboleski’s estate challenges the di strict court’s determination that the
breach-of-contract claim is time-barred unde r Minn. Stat. § 524.3-801. This argument
presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Staab v. Diocese
of St. Cloud, 853 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Minn. 2014).
“Creditors that the personal representative has no knowledge of may be given notice
by the general probate court’s publication under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-801.” In re Estate of
Hadaway, 668 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn. App. 2003). “Effectively, this is a form of official
notice to all potential creditors that they must assert their claim within four months of the
notice or be barred from recovery.” Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 524.3-803(a)(1) (2020)).
Specifically,
all claims as defined in s ection 524.1-201(8), against a
decedent’s estate which arose before the death of the decedent
. . . are barred against the estate . . . unless presented as follows:
. . . within four months after the date of the court
administrator’s notice to cred itors which is subsequently
published pursuant to section 524.3-801.
Minn. Stat. § 524.3-803(a)(1). Section 524.1-2 01(8) defines “[c]laims” as “liabilities of
the decedent whether arising in contract or otherwise and liabilities of the estate which
arise after the death of the decedent.” Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(8) (2020).
There is no evidence in th e record that Frank Sobolesk i’s estate filed a notice of
claim against Renee Soboleski’s estate as required by statute.
Frank Soboleski’s estate argued to the dist rict court that it filed an objection to
probate in August 2017. The estate provide d no evidence for this assertion and instead

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cited the objection-to-probate document filed in August 2017. The es tate abandoned this
argument on appeal and claimed instead that the objection to probate served as a notice of
claim against Renee Soboleski’s estate. We will not consider arguments made for the first
time on appeal. Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Moreover, this
argument is not persuasive. The objectio n-to-probate document alleged that Renee
Soboleski violated the prenuptial agreement by amending her will. It did not say that Frank
Soboleski’s estate was seeking a claim against Renee Soboleski’s estate.
Frank Soboleski’s estate did not file a no tice of claim, separate from the objection
to probate. Thus, Frank Sobo leski’s estate failed to comp ly with the statutory notice
requirements. As a result, the district court did not err by determining the claim is barred
by Minn. Stat. § 524.3-801 and by granting summary judgment fo r Renee Soboleski’s
estate.
II. The district court properly applied the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel.
We recognize that we need not reach the argument that the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel bar further claims from Frank Soboleski’s estate. That said, we
address this argument in the interests of ju stice and determine that the district court
properly applied these doctrines.
The district court determined that Frank Soboleski’s estate’s claim was statutorily
time-barred, as discussed above , and further barred by the do ctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. Whether collateral estoppel applies is a mixed question of law and fact,
which we review de novo. Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004).

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“Once the reviewing court determines that colla teral estoppel is available, the decision to
apply collateral estoppel is left to the district court’s discretion.” In re Estate of Perrin ,
796 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation om itted). “We do not rigidly apply
collateral estoppel, and we will not apply collateral estoppel if its application would work
an injustice on the party to be estopped.” State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 659 (Minn.
2007). Similarly, regarding res judicata, “we also recognize that res judicata is an equitable
doctrine that must be applie d in light of the facts of each individual case.” R.W. v. T.F.,
528 N.W.2d 869, 872 n.3 (Minn. 1995).
Res judicata bars relitigation of a claim wh en: “(1) the earlier claim involved the
same set of factual circumstances; (2) the ear lier claim involved the same parties or their
privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the estopped party had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the matter.” Rucker v. Schmidt, 794 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn.
2001). “The common test for de termining whether an action is precluded is to determine
whether the same evidence will sustain both actions.” Mach v. Wells Concrete Prods. Co.,
866 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). “Res judicata not only applies to
all claims actually litigated, but to all claims that could have been litigated in the earlier
action.” Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is a related doctr ine and applies to issues
that have already been litigated. Id. at 837. Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue
when: (1) the issue is identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) the adjudication was final
on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a party to or in priv ity with a party in the prior

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adjudication; and (4) the estopped party must have had a full and fair opportunity to be
heard on the issue. Id.
The district court determined that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
apply, and we agree. The claims asserted in the complaint arise from the same action and
involve the same set of factual circumstances. Two claims involve the same set of factual
circumstances when the same evid ence will sustain both actions. McMenomy v. Ryden ,
148 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Minn. 1967). The bre ach-of-contract claim relies on the parties’
prenuptial agreement and on Re nee Soboleski’s will, the same evidence previously
presented to the district court. See In re Estate of Soboleski , 2020 WL 1910182, at *3-5.
The action also involves the sa me parties or their privies. The district court issued a
judgment on the merits and determined that Renee Soboleski did not breach the prenuptial
agreement by amending her will. The district court determined that Renee Soboleski’s will
was valid and we affirmed this decision on appeal. See id. There has been a final
adjudication on the merits of the dispute, and the questions of fact related to the will and
the prenuptial agreement have already been resolved. See id. Lastly, Frank Soboleski’s
estate had a full and fair oppor tunity to be heard on matters related to the property, the
prenuptial agreement, and the will.
For a court to find that res judicata or co llateral estoppel applies, all the elements
must be met. Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840. We determine that all the elements of these
doctrines have been satisfied here. There is no justification for relitigating these issues
again. Id. at 837 (“Fundamental to both doctrines is that a right, question or fact distinctly
put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed

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in a subsequent suit between the same partie s or their privies.” (q uotations omitted)).
Because the elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel have been satisfied, the district
court properly concluded these doctrines bar further litigation.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to amend.
Frank Soboleski’s estate challenges the di strict court’s decision to deny its motion
to amend the complaint. The estate argues it should have been permitted to assert that the
parties had a long-standing agreement to care for their respec tive heirs upon their deaths.
“Generally, the decision to permit or deny amendments to pleadings is within the discretion
of the district court and will not be revers ed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Johns v.
Harborage I, Ltd., 664 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. 2003). Moreover, “[a] motion to amend
a complaint is properly deni ed when the additional clai m could not survive summary
judgment.” Bebo v. Delander , 632 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied
(Minn. Oct. 16, 2001).
Frank Soboleski’s estate argues the breach- of-contract claim is not based on the
prenuptial agreement itself and rests instead on an oral agreement to equitably provide for
each other’s heirs. The plain language of the complaint belies this argument. The breach-
of-contract claim explicitly re ferences the prenuptial agreem ent, alleging that Renee
Soboleski “unilaterally breached the Prenuptial Agreement” by amending her will. Frank
Soboleski’s estate sought to file an amended complaint as serting that “Renee Soboleski
unilaterally breached agreement between the parties to equitably provide for their heirs by
drafting and executing an amendment” to her w ill. Again, the claim rests on the parties’
prenuptial agreement and on Renee Soboleski’s will.

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The district court denied the motion because the proposed amendment “merely
seek[s] to provide additional su pport for or to resurrect clai ms previously raised in the
probate court, or to raise claims which could have been brought in the prior litigation before
the probate court.” The district court concluded the proposed amendment could not
withstand summary judgment because it would face the same statutory time bar and “the
same res judicata and/or collateral estoppel bar as the claims in their current Complaint.”
Because we determine the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in Renee
Soboleski’s estate’s favor, we conclude the district court di d not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion to amend.
Affirmed.