In re Petition for Reinstatement of

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1603

Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam
Dissenting, Thissen, Anderson JJ.

In re Petition for Reinstatement of Filed: June 16, 2021
Randall D. Tigue, a Minnesota Attorney, Office of Appellate Courts
Registration No. 0110000.

________________________

Randall D. Tigue, Golden Valley, Minnesota, pro se.

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for respondent.

Kenneth E. Keate, Keate Law Firm, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae First
Amendment Lawyers Association.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. Based on our independent review of the record, the panel’s conclusion that
petitioner has not undergone the requisite moral change was not clearly erroneous.
2. Application of the moral change requirement for reinstatement does not
violate petitioner’s free speech rights under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Petition denied.

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O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.
In 2017, we indefinitely suspended petitioner Randall Tigue. In 2019, Tigue filed
a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law. After a hearing, a panel of the Lawyers
Professional Responsibility Board unanimous ly recommended against reinstatement,
concluding that Tigue failed to prove by cl ear and convincing ev idence that he had
undergone the requisite moral change. The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional
Responsibility agrees with the panel. Tigue contests the panel’s findings and
recommendation, asserting that he should be reinstated.
Based on our independent review of the re cord, we hold that the panel’s findings
and conclusions are not clearly erroneous. Because Tigue has failed to show by clear and
convincing evidence that he has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement to the practice
of law in Minnesota, we deny his petition for reinstatement.
FACTS
Tigue was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in 1973. He has a lengthy
disciplinary history featuring repeated and es calating incidents of financial misconduct,
culminating in intentional mi sappropriation of client fund s. In 2007, we publicly
reprimanded Tigue and placed him on probation for 2 years for allowing his trust account
to become overdrawn, failing to promptly fix the overdraft, and failing to maintain required
trust account books and records. In re Tigue (Tigue I), No. A07-1936, Order (Minn. filed
Oct. 26, 2007). In 2014, we suspended Tigue for 30 days for failing to properly maintain
trust account books and records and for neglig ent misappropriation of client funds. In re

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Tigue (Tigue II) , 843 N.W.2d 583, 588–89 (Minn. 2014). We noted that Tigue had
“intentionally stopped maintain ing his trust account books a nd records shortly after his
previous probation period ende d because he was not require d to submit reports to the
Director.” Id. at 587.
Following the end of his 30-day suspen sion, in April 2014, we conditionally
reinstated Tigue and again placed him on a 2-year probation. In re Tigue (Tigue III) ,
845 N.W.2d 761, 762 (Minn. 2014) (order). As a condition of his probation, we required
Tigue to submit his trust account books and records to the Director for review and approval
and provide the Director with monthly cer tifications, signed by a CPA, that his trust
account books and records were maintained in accordance with the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct and the trust account was not overdrawn. Id. We also required Tigue
to provide “proof of [his] successful completion of the professional responsibility portion
of the state bar examination” by March 12, 2015. Id.
In October 2014, the Director admonished Tigue. Tigue had failed to withdraw
from representation or address a conflict of inte rest and paid a mediator fee with client
funds despite the client’s refusal to pay the mediator.
In April 2015, we revoked Tigue’s cond itional reinstatement and indefinitely
suspended him because he had failed to provi de proof of successful completion of the
professional responsibility portion of the state bar examination. In re Tigue (Tigue IV) ,
No. A13-0519, Order at 2–3 (Minn. filed Apr. 15, 2015). The following month, after Tigue
provided proof of completion, we reinstated him and placed him on probation, subject to

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the same conditions imposed in our April 2014 order. In re Tigue (Tigue V), 863 N.W.2d
82, 83 (Minn. 2015) (order).
Tigue’s most recent suspen sion occurred in 2017. In re Tigue (Tigue VI) ,
900 N.W.2d 424, 434 (Minn. 2017). We suspended Tigue because he intentionally
misappropriated client funds, negligently mi sappropriated client funds, and failed to
promptly correct an overdraf t in his trust account. Id. at 427–28. With respect to the
intentional misappropriation, Tigue agreed to represent a client in a matter in federal court.
Id. at 428. Pursuant to the written fee agreement, Tigue received “ ‘an advance retainer of
$2,000.00.’ ” Id. Of that retainer, $400 was “ ‘an advance payment of the . . . filing fee.’ ”
Id. Tigue transferred the entire retainer amount, including the $400 filing fee, to himself,
without filing a complaint or any other pleading in federal court. Id. The client later
terminated the representation. Id. Tigue repaid this client only after the petition for
disciplinary action was filed. Id.
Tigue argued that the terms of the retainer agreement entitled him to keep the filing
fee. That agreement stated that Tigue was “ ‘entitled to quantum meruit compensation’ ”
if Tigue “ ‘withdr[e]w from representation’ ” because the client had “ ‘hinder[ed Tigue’s]
representation.’ ” Id. at 429–30. We rejected that argu ment, reasoning, in part, that the
retainer agreement “clearly reserv ed $400 for a filing fee, and the quantum meruit
provisions did not alter that reservation.” 1 Id. at 430. Instead, we concluded that Tigue

1 The dissent claims that Tigue’s argument “was not unreasonable” because “his case
represented the first occasion in which we had rejected such an interpretation of a quantum
meruit fee agreement provision in a discipline proceeding.” Tigue’s argument, however,

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intentionally misappropriated client funds because he “obtained $400 from [a client] to pay
a filing fee; . . . did not keep these funds in tr ust; . . . never paid a filing fee on behalf of
[the client]; and . . . disbursed the $400 to himself,” in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct
8.4(c) and other rules.2 Tigue VI, 900 N.W.2d at 430.
Regarding the negligent misappropriation, af ter we reinstated Tigue in 2014, he
initially complied with the terms of his probation. Id. at 427. However, once the Director
instructed Tigue to begin quarterly, instead of monthly, reporting of his trust account books
and records, the Director noticed several trust account shortages. Id. at 427 −28. An
investigation by the Director revealed that on six occasions, “Tigue issued payments from
his trust account that caused shorta ges in client trust accounts.” Id. at 427. Tigue
eventually made payments to cu re the shortages, and as a result, no client “suffered any
permanent financial loss during those periods.” Id. at 427.
We again suspended Tigue in definitely with no right to petition for reinstatement
for 2 years. 3 Id. at 434–35. We also “permanently prohibited Tigue from being an

was contrary to the clear language of the fee agreement and the facts in that case. See Tigue
VI, 900 N.W.2d at 430. It was also contrary to our long-standing definition of
misappropriation. See, e.g., In re Brooks, 696 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 2005) (“An attorney
misappropriates client funds whenever the funds are not kept in trust and are used for a
purpose other than one specified by the client.”).

2 Rule 8.4(c) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct states that “[i]t is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation.”

3 While he was subject to th is suspension, the Director admonished Tigue for failure
to make all of the required notifications re garding his suspension under the professional
rules.

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authorized signatory on a client trust account.” Id. at 435. Two members of the court
dissented, arguing that we should have disbarred Tigue for his intentional
misappropriation. See id. at 435–38 (Stras, J., dissenting).
On October 8, 2019, Tigue filed a petition for reinstatement. Following a hearing,
the panel unanimously recommended against reinstatement primarily because of its
conclusion that Tigue “failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he has
undergone the requisite moral change to now render him fit to resume the practice of law”
and “that he recognizes the wr ongfulness of his misconduct.” The Director also opposes
Tigue’s reinstatement. Tigue urges us to disregard the panel’s recommendation and
reinstate him to the practice of law in Minnesota.
ANALYSIS
“The responsibility for determining whether a petitioner will be reinstated rests with
this court.” In re Kadrie, 602 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1999). We conduct an independent
review of the entire record; although we consider a panel’s recommendation, we are not
bound by it. See In re Dedefo , 781 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2010) (reinstating a suspended
attorney when a panel recommended against reinstatement).
If a petitioner orders a transcript of the reinstatement hearing, “none of the [panel’s]
findings of fact or conclusions shall be conclusive, and either party may challenge” them.
Rule 18(c), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR). However, “we uphold
the panel’s factual findings if they have evidentiary support in the record and are not clearly
erroneous.” In re Stockman , 896 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn. 2017). “Factual findings are
clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the record , we are ‘left with the definite and firm

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conviction that a mistak e has been made.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Lyons , 780 N.W.2d 629,
635 (Minn. 2010)).
In a petition for reinstatement, the pe titioner bears the burde n of proving:
“(1) compliance with the conditions of suspension; (2) comp liance with the requirements
of Rule 18, RLPR; and (3) demo nstration of moral change.” Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at
856; see also In re Porter , 472 N.W.2d 654, 655 (Minn. 1991) (stating that a petitioner
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are entitled to reinstatement).
“Showing a moral change is the most important factor in the determination of whether to
reinstate an attorney.” Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 857.
In addition to moral change , “we weigh five other factors” when considering
reinstatement: “the attorney’s recognition that the conduct was wrong, the length of time
since the misconduct and suspension, the seri ousness of the misconduct, any physical or
mental pressures ‘susceptible to correction,’ and the attorney’s ‘intellectual competency to
practice law.’ ” Id. at 856 (quoting Kadrie, 602 N.W.2d at 870). “While moral change and
recognition of wrongfulness are considered to be only two fact ors in the overall analysis,
we have previously reco gnized the ‘decisive’ natu re of these factors.” In re Holker ,
765 N.W.2d 633, 639 n.2 (Minn. 2009) (quoting In re Reutter , 474 N.W.2d 343, 345
(Minn. 1991)); see also In re Griffith , 883 N.W.2d 798, 801– 03 (Minn. 2016) (denying
petition for reinstatement because the petiti oner failed to prove moral change and
recognition of wrongfulness wi thout addressing the additiona l reinstatement factors).
Here, the panel concluded that Tigue failed to show both moral change and recognition of
the wrongfulness of his misconduct.

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I.
A petitioner “must establish by clear and convincing evidence that she or he has
undergone such a moral change as now to re nder [the petitioner] a fit person to enjoy the
public confidence and trust once forfeited.” In re Hanson, 454 N.W.2d 924, 925 (Minn.
1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish moral change, a
petitioner must show: a) “remorse and accept ance of responsibility for the misconduct,”
b) “a change in the [petitioner’s] conduct an d state of mind that corrects the underlying
misconduct that led to the suspension,” and c) “a renewed commitment to the ethical
practice of law.” In re Mose (Mose II), 843 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Minn. 2014).
The dissent asserts that this test is nebulous and slippery and, thus, difficult to apply.
We disagree with the dissent’s claim that it is too difficult to apply our moral change test.4

4 A showing of remorse is relevant in other areas of the law. See State v. Trog ,
323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (stating that a court should consider numerous factors,
including the defendant’s “remorse,” when deciding whether to impose a downward
dispositional departure). And while part of the showing re lated to moral change is
subjective, such as the change in the petitioner’s state of mind, fact finders are regularly
required to determine an actor’s mental state, such as when a jury has to decide whether
the defendant had the intent to kill.
We also note that other courts require a petitioner to prove moral change or consider
factors comparable to our moral change requirement when determining whether to reinstate
an attorney. See Milligan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn. , 301 S.W.3d 619, 631
(Tenn. 2009) (stating that “all states require so me sort of proof of moral character” when
considering whether to reinstat e an attorney and that “[i] n general, the moral character
requirement requires that petitioners show that they have undergone a ‘moral change’ so
that the weaknesses that produced the prior conduct have been corrected”); see also In re
McLaughlin, 419 P.3d 239, 242 (Okla. 2018) (“In evaluating a bid for readmission,” the
court weighs, among other factors, present moral fitness, “the applicant’s understanding of
the wrongfulness and disrepute their unpr ofessional conduct br ought upon the legal
profession,” evidence of rehabilitation, and the post-resignation conduct); In re Yum ,
187 A.3d 1289, 1291–92 (D.C. 2018) (stating that factors to consider when deciding to

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Remorse and acceptance of responsibility are not difficult concepts. Petitioners often prove
remorse and acceptance of responsibility by presenting evidence that the petitioner is sorry
for, or regrets, the misconduct, that what the petitioner did was wrong, and that the
petitioner took responsibility for the misconduct. See, e.g., In re Severson , 923 N.W.2d
23, 29 (Minn. 2019) (noting the petitioner’s testimony “ ‘that he felt remorse and was sorry
he caused hurt to [his clie nt],’ ” that what he did was “ ‘just wrong,’ ” and he
“ ‘acknowledged he had prev iously blamed others when he should have blamed
himself’ ”). And panels regularly make credibility determinations and findings related to
the three components of moral change and determine whether a petitioner has proven moral
change. See, e.g., In re Griffith, 883 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Mi nn. 2016) (discussing panel’s
findings that supported its conclusion that the petitioner had not proven moral change).

reinstate an attorney include “whether the attorney reco gnizes the seriousness of the
misconduct; the attorney’s conduct si nce discipline was imposed,” whether the traits that
led to discipline “no longer exist” and the pe titioner “is a changed indi vidual having full
appreciation of the wrongfulness of [h is or her] conduc t” (citation omitted ) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); In re Holt, 166 So.3d 9, 15 (Miss. 2012) (“While good moral
character is but one of five jurisdictional requirements to be weighed in determining
reinstatement to the practice of law, this Court previously has held that ‘[t]he declarations
of the person whose reformation is urged are worthy of solemn consideration, but more so
are his overt acts and habits which disclose any professed changes in his moral attitude,
practical beliefs and conduct.’ ” (quoting Miss. State Bar Assoc. v. Wade, 167 So.2d 648,
650 (Miss. 1964))); Score v. People , 179 P.3d 1041, 1048 −49 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2008)
(stating that when considerin g whether to reinstate an a ttorney, “the analysis of
rehabilitation should be directed at the professional or moral shortcoming, which resulted
in the discipline imposed” and that other rele vant factors are the a ttorney’s “conduct and
business pursuits” since the discipline was imposed, and whether the attorney “recognizes
the seriousness of the conduct that lead to the” discipline).

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Here, the panel found that Tigue “failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he has undergone the requisite moral chan ge to now render him fit to resume the
practice of law.” We agree.
A.
Tigue did not present evidence of much, if any, remorse for his misconduct in his
reinstatement hearing. In his testimony, he e ssentially characterized all of his client trust
account issues as “clerical errors” and contended he “kept all the records [he] was supposed
to keep,” downplaying the seriousness of his misconduct. Although he acknowledged that
he made some errors in trust account calculations and kept a filing fee he should not have
kept, he also repeatedly characterized his 2017 suspension as “unfair.” He said: “Do I feel
I was treated unfairly by getting that two-year suspension. Damn right I do.”
The panel found that although Tigue agreed that his conduct leading up to the 2017
suspension was serious, his testimony lacked credibility because of his continued
characterization of his misconduct as “clerical errors” as well as his blaming of others. The
panel also discounted Tigue’s testimony that he accepted our decision that he committed
intentional misappropriation and will not commit intentional misappropriation in the future
due to Tigue’s “history and disregard for his ethical obligations with his trust account.”
We generally defer to the panel’s findings th at the petitioner’s testimony regarding moral
change was not credible. Griffith, 883 N.W.2d at 802 (“The panel did not find [petitioner]
credible on key points in his testimony . We defer to the panel’s credibility
determinations.”); Dedefo, 781 N.W.2d at 9 (stating that we typically “defer to a panel’s
finding” regarding the credibility of a petitione r’s testimony that they “ha[ve] undergone

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the requisite moral change” (citation omitte d) (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re
Mose (Mose I), 754 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2008) (“As a general rule we will defer to a
panel’s finding that a petitioner’s testimony that he has undergone the requisite moral
change is not credible . . . .”).
The record supports these findings. At the reinstatement hearing, Tigue agreed that
when we suspended him in 2017, we concluded that his misconduct was serious. However,
Tigue continued to frame his repeated misconduct as mere clerical errors, while disputing
whether he should have been subject to discipline in the first place. 5 Tigue’s negligent
misappropriation of client funds occurred in part because of his failure to perform monthly
reconciliations of his trust account books and records and “keep his client subsidiary
ledgers up to date.” See Tigue VI, 900 N.W.2d at 429. These were not mere clerical errors;
they resulted from Tigue’s de liberate choices not to keep all the required trust account
books and records. See id. (referring to Tigue’s claim that he kept all trust account books
and records in a manner compliant with the rules as “unavailing”). Tigue also shifted some
blame for his 2017 suspension to a prior client as well as to the Director. He testified that
he was treated unfairly becaus e he had represented unpopular clients in the past and

5 The dissent dismisses reliance by the pa nel and Director on “Tigue’s use of the
phrase ‘clerical errors’ to describe his trust account mismanagement.” We, however, have
said that a lawyer’s minimiza tion of their prior misconduct is relevant in determining
whether that lawyer has proven moral change. See Mose I, 754 N.W.2d at 363 (stating that
the attorney’s characterization of his “int entional lies to clients” as “ ‘inaccurate
statements’ or ‘misstatements’ . . . indica tes an ongoing unwillingn ess to recognize the
wrongfulness of his conduct”). By referring to Tigue’s use of the phrase “clerical errors”
to describe his negligent misappropriation, the panel made findings and the Director
presents arguments based on this precedent.

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because he “had the te merity to call out attorneys on the Lawyers Board for professional
misconduct and dishonesty.” When asked what he had learned from his misconduct, Tigue
stated, “if you call out a member of the legal es tablishment . . . for engaging in dishonest
or unprofessional conduct, not only will you get no relief, you will be retaliated against for
having done so.” And he downplayed the seve rity of his misconduct, testifying that the
Director sought to suspend him “for conduct wh ich I am sure you will not be able to find
a single instance of somebody who engaged in that conduct even provoking a disciplinary
investigation.” Tigue does not appear to recognize the gravity of his misconduct—namely,
misappropriation of client funds, which we have repeatedly stated is a “particularly serious
violation.” In re Lundeen , 811 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that we
“generally disbar attorneys who [intentionally] misappropriate client funds unless there are
substantial mitigating circumstances” (cit ation omitted) (inter nal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Tigue II , 843 N.W.2d at 587 (“This court considers ‘unintentional
misappropriation’ of client funds and the failu re to maintain the required trust account
books and records a serious violation of the rules.”).
Our decision in In re Holker provides an apt analogy to this case. 765 N.W.2d 633
(Minn. 2009). There, the panel reco mmended against reinstatement following a
suspension, concluding “that Ho lker failed to demonstrate . . . that he had undergone the
requisite moral change for reinstatement or recognized that his conduct was wrong.” Id. at
634. We suspended Holker, in part, because he had fabricated certain documents provided
to the Director in the course of the investigation of his alleged misconduct. Id. at 634 n.1.
In his reinstatement hearing, Holker continue d to dispute this, arguing that he had not

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fabricated the documents. Id. at 637. He also shifted blame to his staff and clients while
minimizing the seriousness of his misconduct. Id. at 638. Accordingly, we deferred to the
panel’s findings that Holker had failed to display remorse and accept responsibility for the
wrongfulness of his conduct and denied his petition for reinstatement. Id. at 638–39.
Like in Holker, Tigue has repeatedly minimized the seriousness of his conduct and
called into question the grounds for his suspen sion in the first pl ace, though he did
acknowledge that he remains bound by our 2 017 decision. And his comments at the
hearing suggest that Tigue may not be fully “clear on what he had done wrong” in the past.
Id. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, based on our independent
review of the record, the panel’s finding that Tigue did not show remorse and acceptance
of responsibility for his misconduct is not clearly erroneous.
B.
The panel also concluded that Tigue “f ailed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that he has had a change of conduc t and state of mind,” making several specific
findings of fact to support this point. See Mose II, 843 N.W.2d at 575 (finding an attorney
had “not established that he . . . changed either his conduct or his state of mind that resulted
in his misconduct.”). First, the panel found that Tigue’s “testimony . . . evidences a history
and disregard for his ethical obligations with his trust account.” Second, the panel found
that Tigue “has done nothing by which the Panel could find that [he] would not continue
to make the same mistakes” and that “[t]he only action [Tigue] identified taking regarding
his trust account is obtaining another lawyer to act as trust account signatory, which is a
Court-ordered requirement for his reinstatem ent.” Third, the panel found that Tigue

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asserted “without sufficient evidence . . . that it would be impossible for [him] to
misappropriate client funds” in the future. Finally, the panel found that “[m]ost of
[Tigue’s] character witnesses could not iden tify specific examples of how [Tigue] had
undergone the requisite moral change since he has been suspended and had not had an
in-depth conversation with [Tigue] about the facts of his misconduct.”
The record supports these findings. Tigue stated in his hearing that he “absolutely
know[s] how to keep trust a ccount records” and does not need any further education
because he has “successfully” maintained his trust account records for years. Tigue’s
disciplinary history involving repeated failures to properly maintain his trust account books
and records refutes this claim.
Further, Tigue argues that because he ha s arranged for another attorney with no
disciplinary history (R.S.) to serve as the signatory on and do the accounting for his trust
account, there is no way that he could misappr opriate client funds going forward. In
particular, Tigue emphasizes that if he were to ask R.S. to “sign a check that results in the
negligent or deliberate diversion of client f unds,” R.S. would refuse to do so. But Tigue
and R.S. are not going to practice law in the same firm. In addition, R.S. will be completely
dependent on information that Tigue provides him. For example, Tigue could provide
incomplete or inaccurate inform ation to R.S., such as a bill that did not properly reflect
work Tigue had done. In such a scenario, it is not entirely clear how R.S. would know this
inaccuracy had occurred. Thus , Tigue’s claim that his arra ngement with R.S. makes it
impossible for him to misappropriate client funds is simply not true.

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Moreover, when pressed about how he pl anned to ensure th at R.S. accurately
maintains his trust account reco rds, Tigue simply stated, “ I’m going to look at them.”
Tigue appears to be placing all of his eggs in one basket: that R.S. will not make any
mistakes handling his client trust account. Tigue has not provided any assurances beyond
a claim that he will check R.S.’s work. Gi ven Tigue’s history of failure to properly
maintain trust account books and records and his refusal to further educate himself on his
trust account obligations, we conclude that the panel did not clearly err in finding Tigue’s
assurances insufficient.
In addition to his own testimony, Ti gue’s character witnesses provided little
evidence of how Tigue’s conduc t or state of mind has changed since his suspension.
Several witnesses testified about Tigue’s character, yet none of the witnesses had discussed
Tigue’s misconduct with him in detail. And while some of them testified positively about
his ethics in general, most could not provide specific examples of how Tigue’s conduct or
state of mind had changed since his suspensi on. The panel’s findings regarding these
character witnesses were not clearly erroneous. See Griffith , 883 N.W.2d at 802
(concluding “that the panel did not clearly err when it gave little or no weight to the
testimony of [the petitioner’s] witnesses” when they had not discussed the misconduct with
the petitioner and did not “provide[] specific examples of how he had demonstrated a moral
change”).
Finally, in disputing the panel’s conclusion on change in conduct and state of mind,
Tigue claims that he meets the moral change requirement simply because he would have

16
R.S. handle his trust account matters going forward.6 Because we permanently prohibited
Tigue from being an authorized signatory on a client trust account, Tigue VI, 900 N.W.2d
at 435, this decision appears to be complian ce with our prior order and not a change in
conduct that Tigue has actually made. Other th an that, it does not appear that Tigue has
had a shift in his state of mind regard ing the underlying misconduct—intentional
misappropriation and trust account mismanagem ent—that led to his 2017 suspension.
Tigue asserts that because he has implemen ted a technical solution that supposedly
prevents him from committing the same misconduct, he automatically satisfies the change
in conduct and state of mind factor. We have already rejected Tigue’s claim that this
solution prevents him from committing the same misconduct. But even if Tigue’s proposed
arrangement with R.S. functioned flawlessly, we require both a showing of change of
conduct and state of mind to satisfy the moral change requirement. See In re Swanson ,
405 N.W.2d 892, 893 (Minn. 1987) (“[E]vidence of a ‘moral change’ must come not only
from an observed record of appropriate conduct, but from the petitioner’s own state of mind
and his values” (emphasis added)). Tigue has not demonstrated a change in his state of
mind regarding his underlying misconduct.
Mose II provides another useful analogy to this case. 843 N.W.2d at 575–76. There,
we agreed with the panel’s c onclusion that Mose had faile d to demonstrate a sufficient
change in conduct and state of mind to satisfy the moral change requirement. Id. at 576.

6 Tigue stated at the hearing: “I have rendered it impossible for me to engage in the
conduct that got me suspended. And that ought to account for more than any moral
change.”

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Much of Mose’s misconduct stemmed from office mismanagement and missed client
deadlines, which Mose proposed to address by using a calendar “tickler” system. Id. We
suggested that such a promise by itself was insufficient because Mose had failed to educate
himself further on law office management. Id. In other words, Mose proposed a technical
solution to establish his change in conduct and state of mind, which was not enough to
demonstrate moral change.
Like Mose, Tigue has put forth a plan to fix the “recurring theme” of his prior
misconduct: having R.S. handle his trust account. Id. In some ways, Tigue’s plan is more
credible and concrete. For example, R.S. te stified that he would manage Tigue’s client
trust account, whereas in Mose II , the petitioner’s plan did no t involve oversight by a
competent attorney. However, the panel here concluded that Tigue’s plan was still
insufficient because it raised questions about issues that could arise with R.S.’s supervision
of the trust account and Tigue failed to dem onstrate that he understood trust account
management.
In the end, our independent review of th e record supports the panel’s conclusion
that Tigue failed to demonstrate a sufficient change in conduct and state of mind to correct
his underlying misconduct. Tigue’s insisten ce that R.S.’s handling of his trust account
shows sufficient moral change suggests that Tigue’s state of mind regarding the underlying
conduct that led to his suspension has not changed much, if at all, since 2017.
C.
Finally, the panel concluded that Tigue’s “i nability to testify regarding anything he
has done to improve his unders tanding of trust account books and records demonstrates

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that [Tigue] does not have a renewed commitment to the practice of law.” “[A]n attorney’s
plan to return to the practice of law or impl ement systems to avoid future misconduct are
factors that may be relevant” to whether a petitioner has demonstrated “a renewed
commitment to the ethical practice of law.” Severson, 923 N.W.2d at 32.
As discussed above, Tigue has both a plan to return to the practice of law if
reinstated as well as a “syste m” to avoid future misconduct (h aving R.S. handle his trust
account). On the other hand, Tigue has apparently failed to take steps since his suspension
to educate himself on trust account management.7 And even though he would not handle
his trust account directly if reinstated, he would remain responsible for ensuring that R.S.
did so properly, and as the panel found, there was no evidence showing that Tigue and R.S.
had even discussed how Tigue would “practic ally and permissibly divorce himself from
his trust account obligations.” Without a s howing by Tigue that he actually understands
proper trust account management, we agree with the panel that Tigue has not demonstrated
a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law.8

7 When asked on cross-examination in th e reinstatement hearing what steps he had
taken since his 2017 suspension to edu cate himself on trust account books and
recordkeeping in accordance with the professiona l rules, Tigue replied: “I’ve read the
rules. I don’t need any education. I have d one it, I have successfully done it for years.
And the Lawyers Board knows I’ve successfully done it for years.” This statement clashes
with Tigue’s history of public and private discipline related to trust account misconduct.

8 As highlighted above, several of Tigu e’s character witnesses spoke about Tigue’s
ethics generally. But none could articulate specifically how Tigue had demonstrated a
renewed commitment to ethical practice in li ght of the misconduct that led to his 2017
suspension.

19
D.
Both Tigue and the dissent challenge the application of the moral change
requirement to Tigue’s misconduct. Tigue argues that his misconduc t did not show any
kind of moral failing on his part, such as dishonesty, and thus he should not be required to
show moral change at all. The dissent cont ends that the moral change requirement does
not apply to Tigue’s negligent misappropriation of client funds. We reject both positions.
We begin with Tigue’s argument that he does not need to show moral change
because his misconduct did not involve any kind of moral failing. Such a conclusion
requires two assumptions: 1) that Tigue’s misconduct did not involve a moral failing; and
2) that we alter our reinstatement test ba sed on the nature of a petitioner’s misconduct.
Neither assumption is accurate.
First, Tigue’s misconduct clear ly involved a moral failing. As we noted in 2017,
misappropriation of client funds in any amount—whether negligent or intentional—
represents serious misconduct. See Tigue VI, 900 N.W.2d at 431. Indeed, we generally
disbar attorneys who intentionally misappropriate client funds because taking a client’s
money and using it for the lawyer’s own pe rsonal benefit is dishonest conduct that
represents a significant breach of a client’s trust. See id. In addition, Tigue’s negligent
misappropriation occurred in part because of his deliberate c hoice to stop maintaining
required trust account books and records as soon as the Dire ctor stopped reviewing them

20
on a monthly basis. 9 Id. at 427–28 (“Tigue admitted that he did not reconcile his trust-
account books and records for the month of November 2015 until Ja nuary 2016, despite
knowing that he was required to complete monthly reconciliations.”). The same behavior
led to Tigue’s 2014 suspension. See Tigue II , 843 N.W.2d at 587 (stating that Tigue
“intentionally stopped maintain ing his trust account books a nd records shortly after his
previous probation period ende d because he was not require d to submit reports to the
Director”). Thus, Tigue’s negligent misappropriation he re involved the moral failing of
choosing not to comply with his ethical obligations when he no longer had to demonstrate
his compliance.
Second, we do not alter our reinstatemen t test or the moral change requirement
based on the nature of a petitioner’s misconduct. We have consistently applied the same
basic test and standard of review for reinstat ement cases for years, regardless of the type
of misconduct the attorney committed. See, e.g., Severson, 923 N.W.2d at 27–29 (applying
moral change requirement in reinstatement proceeding involving an attorney who entered
into improper business dealings with a client and committed multiple acts of dishonesty);
Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 855–57 (applying moral change requirement in reinstatement

9 The dissent claims that we “seek[] to have [our] cake and eat it too” by
characterizing Tigue’s negligent misappropriati on as being based on de liberate choices.
We disagree. Consider a person who causes a car crash because they were texting while
driving. That person may neg ligently, but not inten tionally, cause the cr ash, but in that
case, the negligence was based on the deliberate choice to send and review text messages
while driving. Tigue is like that driver. Some of Tigue’s misappropriation was negligent,
and not intentional, but his negligent misappr opriation occurred because of his deliberate
choice not to comply with his ethical obliga tions as soon as he no longer needed to
demonstrate compliance.

21
proceeding involving an attorney who failed to maintain required trust account books and
records, failed to communicate with clients, ne glected client matters, failed to respond to
discovery requests, improperly loaned money to clients, and charged an unreasonable fee);
Mose II , 843 N.W.2d at 572–76 (applying moral ch ange requirement in reinstatement
proceeding involving an attorney who incompetently represented clients, neglected client
matters, failed to communicate with clients, made misrepresentations to clients, and failed
to refund an unearned retainer). In fact, we have required a showing of mo ral change in
reinstatement proceedings since at least 1945. See, e.g., In re Smith, 19 N.W.2d 324, 326
(Minn. 1945).
The dissent takes a slightly different approach. It contends that we should not apply
our moral change standard to less serious negligent misappropriation. The dissent claims
that the reinstatement cases in which we have applied the moral change requirement
involved either dishonesty or wh at it defines as moral turpitude. 10 The dissent’s position
is flawed.
Under our rules, we do not require ever y lawyer to prove moral change to be
reinstated to the practice of law. But we do not base the determination of who must prove

10 The dissent bases its definition of mora l turpitude on a Wisconsin Supreme Court
decision, State v. McCarthy, 38 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Wis. 1949), that we cited in In re Bunker,
199 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Minn. 1972). Bunker was a discipline case, not a reinstatement
case, involving a lawyer’s failure to file inco me tax returns. 199 N.W.2d at 628–29. We
did not adopt the definition of moral turpitude from McCarthy in Bunker. See id. (stating
we were not deciding the case based “on the question of moral turpitude”). More
importantly, the dissent cites no case in which we have stated that we required a lawyer
seeking reinstatement to prove moral change because that lawyer committed an act of
moral turpitude or dishonesty.

22
moral change on whether the lawyer’s misconduct involves dishonesty or moral turpitude.
Instead, we generally reinstate lawyers who have been suspended for 90 days or less
without requiring them to prove moral change. See Rule 18(f), RLPR (stating that “unless
otherwise ordered by the cour t,” the provisions for petitioni ng for reinstatement do not
apply and permitting lawyers suspended for 90 days or less to be reinstated by affidavit).
We apply this procedure to lawyers who have committed dishonest acts. See, e.g., In re
Aitken, 787 N.W.2d 152, 162–64 (Minn. 2010) (suspending a lawyer for 90 days for
submitting a forged document to a court and failing to cooper ate with the Director and
allowing him to petition for reinstatement). Lawyers disbarred or suspended for more than
90 days must petition for reinstatement and prove moral change. See Rule 18(a)–(d), RLPR
(addressing petitions for reinstatement); Hanson, 454 N.W.2d at 925 (outlining a lawyer’s
burden of proof when petitioning for reinstatement). Thus, we use the overall seriousness
of the misconduct that a lawyer has committed, as judged by the length of their suspension,
and not the categorization the dissent has crea ted, to determine whether a lawyer must
prove moral change to be reinstated.
In addition, we have app lied our moral change requireme nt to reinstatement cases
that did not involve dishonesty or the dissent’s definition of moral turpitude. See In re
O’Gara, 887 N.W.2d 279, 279 (Minn. 2016) (ord er) (reinstating an attorney who was
suspended for neglect of clie nt matters and failing to comp ly with terms of a private
probation after a panel concluded the atto rney had proven “by clear and convincing

23
evidence that she is mo rally fit to resume the practice of law”); 11 In re Schaefer ,
794 N.W.2d 372, 372–73 (Minn. 2011) (order) (reinstating an attorney who was suspended
“for neglect of a single client matter that resulted in the entry of a default judgment against
the client” when the panel fo und that the attorn ey “has proven by clear and convincing
evidence that he has undergone the requisite moral change”); In re McCormick ,
767 N.W.2d 1, 1 (Minn. 2009) (order) (reinstating an attorney who was suspended, in part,
for neglect of client matters and incompetent representation, after a panel found that he
“has undergone the requisite moral change”);12 In re Fraley, 721 N.W.2d 605, 605 (Minn.
2006) (order) (reinstating an attorney w ho was suspended for, among other things,
incompetent representation and failure to maintain trust account books and records after a
“panel found that petitioner had undergone a moral change”);13 In re Haugen, 583 N.W.2d

11 See In re O’Gara, 746 N.W.2d 130, 130–31 (Minn. 2008) (order) (suspending the
attorney for 90 days and requiring her to petition for reinstatement for failing to appear at
court hearings in two matters, neglecting t hose matters, and failing to comply with the
terms of a private probation).

12 See In re McCormick, 710 N.W.2d 563, 563 (Minn. 2006) (order) (suspending the
attorney for 90 days and requ iring him to petition for reinst atement for neglecting client
matters, failing to communicate with clients, and failing to cooperate with the Director); In
re McCormick, 728 N.W.2d 496, 496–97 (Minn. 2007) (order) (extending the attorney’s
suspension by 30 days for failing to properly file an appeal, advising client he did not need
to comply with terms of criminal proba tion while appeal was pending, failing to
communicate with the client, and failing to cooperate with the Director).

13 See In re Fraley , 709 N.W.2d 624, 625 (Minn. 2006) (order) (suspending the
attorney for 90 days and re quiring him to petition for re instatement fo r incompetent
representation of a client, charging an unreas onable fee, conflict of interest, failure to
adequately supervise a suspen ded attorney, improper fee shar ing, and failing to maintain
trust account books and records).

24
925, 925 (Minn. 1998) (order) (denying petition for reinstatement of an attorney who was
suspended for trust account violations and failing to pay court reporting fees when the panel
concluded that the attorney “had failed to pr ove by clear and convincing evidence that he
is conscious of the wrongfulness of his conduct giving rise to his discipline or that he now
has the moral character and trustworthiness necessary to reassume the title of attorney”);14
In re Lawton, 552 N.W.2d 25, 26 (Minn. 1996) (ord er) (reinstating an attorney who had
been suspended for trust account violations and neglecting client matters after a panel
concluded that he “ha[d] undergone the moral change necessary to again be certified to the
public as trustworthy”).15
Finally, we have never done what the di ssent is suggesting here—separate an
attorney’s acts of misconduct into different categories and re quire the attorney to show
moral change only with respect to some of them.16 Cases the dissent cites when we have

14 See In re Haugen, 543 N.W.2d 372, 375–76 (Minn. 1996) (suspending the attorney
for 12 months for trust account violations and failure to pay court reporters when the
attorney had a disciplinary history).

15 See In re Lawton , 538 N.W.2d 905, 905 (Minn. 1995) (order) (suspending the
attorney for 6 months for “trust account violations including commingling client funds and
business account funds and client neglect and disservice in two instances”).

16 Setting aside the dissent’s flawed, myopic view of moral change, even when the
dissent claims to apply our moral chan ge requirement to Tigue’s intentional
misappropriation, it fails to properly apply that standard. We review a panel’s finding that
a petitioner has not proven moral change for clear error. In re Trombley, 947 N.W.2d 242,
250 (Minn. 2020) (“For all of these reasons, we conclude that the panel’s finding that
Trombley has not proven moral change was clearly erroneous.”). The dissent does not
apply this standard of review. It also misapplies the burden of proof when it relies on the
panel’s failure to identify any past dishonest conduct by Tigue, apart from his intentional
misappropriation of client funds. It was Tigue’s burden to prove that his actions since his
suspension demonstrate his moral change. See Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 856.

25
applied the moral change standard, In re Stockman, 896 N.W.2d 851 (Minn. 2017), and In
re Mose (Mose II) , 843 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 2014), illust rate this. In both of them, we
suspended the lawyers for a variety of misconduct, much of it client-related misconduct of
incompetence and failure to communicate, as well as making false statements to either
clients or opposing counsel. See Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 855; Mose II, 843 N.W.2d at
572–73. Stockman had also committed trust account violations, including shortages in his
trust account and failure to maintain the required trust account books and records.
Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 855. When evaluati ng the panels’ findings regarding moral
change, we did not limit our analysis to the petitioners’ dishonest acts. See Stockman,
896 N.W.2d 859–61; Mose II, 843 N.W.2d at 574–76. Instead, we considered all of their
misconduct when determining whether they had proven moral change. See Stockman ,
896 N.W.2d at 860 (explaini ng that “[m]uch of Stockman ’s client-related misconduct
involved a lack of diligence and failure to communicate with clients” and concluding that
he had shown an observed record of change in conduct and state of mind based, in part, on
testimony that he had worked diligently a nd competently as a legal assistant while
suspended); Mose II , 843 N.W.2d at 576 (stating that a “recurring theme in Mose’s
disciplinary history is client neglect, failu re to follow through on his commitments, and
failure to represent clients diligently” and concluding that he had not proven moral change,
in part, because problems he had during his suspension wh ile volunteering and student
teaching “are reminiscent of the problems he had while practicing la w”). Therefore, our
precedent does not support the dissent’s claim that we s hould apply our moral change
requirement to only some of Tigue’s misconduct.

26
E.
In summary, based on our independent review of the record, we hold that Tigue has
not met his burden of showing by clear and co nvincing evidence that he has undergone a
moral change or recognizes the wrongfulness of his conduct.17 Accordingly, we deny his
petition for reinstatement.
II.
Tigue also alleges that both the Direct or and the panel oppose his reinstatement
“solely because [he] expresse[d] the belief that he was treated unfairly and did not deserve
his current suspension.” Consequently, Ti gue asserts that denying his reinstatement
petition based on his failure to demonstrate moral change wo uld violate his free speech
rights under the First Amendment to the Un ited States Constitution, which applies to
Minnesota through the Fourteenth Amendment. See State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793,
797 (Minn. 1999). Tigue further alleges that the panel made its recommendation because
he disagreed with the Director’s charact erization of his prior misconduct and the
requirements for reinstatement. Thus, according to Tigue, the Director and panel punished
him for exercising his constitutional speech and expression rights, and denying his petition
for reinstatement would violate those rights. See U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV. We disagree.

17 Because moral change and recognition of past wrongful conduct are intertwined,
“we may consider those factors together.” In re Lieber , 834 N.W.2d 200, 208 (Minn.
2013). The details we outlined above in assessing moral change—including Tigue’s lack
of remorse, insistence that he need not demonstrate mo ral change, minimization of
previous misconduct, and characterization of disciplinary actions taken against him as
unfair—all suggest that Tigue has not truly gra ppled with his past conduct to the extent
necessary to satisfy this requirement. Thus, we conclude that the panel’s finding on this
factor is not clearly erroneous.

27
In reinstatement proceedings, the petitioner has the burden of proof to show by clear
and convincing evidence that they are entitled to reinstatement. See Porter, 472 N.W.2d
at 655; cf. In re Stanbury , 561 N.W.2d 507, 512 n.3 (Mi nn. 1997) (dismissing a First
Amendment argument in a disciplinary action wi thout extensive analysis in part because
the attorney “made no effort” to analyze the scope of the relevant professional rule). Tigue
bases his First Amendment claim on the fa ctual premise that the panel recommended
against reinstatement solely because he expre ssed his belief that he was treated unfairly
and should not have been suspended. There are two fatal flaws to Tigue’s claim.
First, Tigue does not supply any evidence to support his allegation that the Director
and the panel oppose his reinstatement solely because of his belief that he was treated
unfairly in the prior disciplinary proceeding and should not have been suspended. Rather,
he asserts—without evidence—that the Direct or and the panel oppose his reinstatement
simply because he disagreed with their char acterization of his misc onduct and the moral
change requirement. He provides no substantive explanation to back up this claim. More
importantly, Tigue’s comments about the su pposed unfairness of his prior discipline
represent only one factor in the panel’ s analysis and recomme ndation. The panel
considered other factors, including Tigue’s pl anned trust account arrangement with R.S.,
his failure to demonstrate any improved unde rstanding of trust account management, the
inability of his character witnesses to provi de specific examples of how he had shown
moral change, and his lack of remorse with regard to the misconduct for which he was
suspended. In other words, the panel did not oppose Ti gue’s reinstatement—and we do
not deny his petition—solely because of his words and thoughts.

28
Second, Tigue expressly concedes that it would not violate the First Amendment to
deny a reinstatement petition based on an a ttorney’s ideas about their misconduct “when
there is a nexus between a mora l characteristic, such as di shonesty, and an attorney’s
likelihood of repeating” the mi sconduct that led to the suspension. We suspended Tigue
in part because he engaged in dishonest co nduct by intentionally misappropriating client
funds. And as we outlined above, Tigue’s negligent misappropriati on also involved a
moral failing because of his deliberate choice to not comply with the relevant rules when
managing his trust account.
Because Tigue’s misconduct involved “a moral characteristic,” there is a clear nexus
between his beliefs about his misconduct and the likelihood of him repeating it. We believe
that Tigue is more likely to repeat such mi sconduct if, as the record here shows, he
minimized it while testifying at the reinstat ement hearing, because such testimony shows
that Tigue does not fully appreciate or acknow ledge what he did wrong. This conclusion
is especially true when considering Tigue’s disciplinary history, which involves repeated
and escalating financial misconduct, culminating in intentional misappropriation while on
a disciplinary probation that demonstrates a pattern of committing the same type of
misconduct, despite the prior discipline we imposed. Thus, even if we adopt Tigue’s legal
theory on when we may consider an attorney ’s beliefs about their prior misconduct in
determining if they have proven moral change, there is no First Amendment violation under
that theory based on the facts of this case.

29
In sum, assuming without deciding that it may violate the First Amendment to deny
an attorney’s petition for reinstatement based on their beliefs about their misconduct, the
facts of this case do not establish a First Amendment violation.
Petition denied.

D-1
D I S S E N T
THISSEN, Justice (dissenting).
Petitioner Randall D. Tigue was suspended in 2017 for neglig ent and intentional
misappropriation of client funds. In re Tigue (Tigue VI) , 900 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Minn.
2017). Tigue’s misconduct stemmed from his failure to timely cure overdrafts in his trust
account and his retention of a $400 filing fee from a client. Id. at 428. “[N]o client was
permanently deprived of money,” with the sole exception of Tigue’s client who incurred a
$12 fee when Tigue’s check repaying the $400 bounced. Id. at 432. In our 2017 suspension
order, we permanently prohibited Tigue from serving as an authorized signatory on a client
trust account if he were reinstated. Id. at 435.
Tigue now seeks reinstatement to the practice of law. His petition has been pending
since 2019. The Director of the Office of Lawyers Prof essional Responsibility opposes
Tigue’s reinstatement chiefly because of the conclusion made by a panel of the Lawyers
Professional Responsibility Board that Tigu e failed to demonstrate sufficient moral
change. The Director concedes that Tigue met all other reinstatem ent conditions in our
2017 order. I conclude that proving moral ch ange is not necessary in this case. Tigue
established that, if reinstated under the conditions he propos es, he will not engage in the
misconduct for which he was suspended and the public will be protected. Because I would
grant his petition for reinstatement, I respectfully dissent.
The core goals of attorney discipline are to “protect the public, safeguard the judicial
system, and deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney and other attorneys.” In re
Severson, 860 N.W.2d 658, 671 (Minn. 2015). Accordingly, ou r focus when deciding

D-2
whether to reinstate an attorney is whether the petitioner will likely recommit the conduct
that got him suspended and whether clients can “submit their most intimate and important
affairs to him with complete confidence in both his competence and fidelity.” In re
Herman, 197 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. 1972); see also In re Kadrie, 602 N.W.2d 868, 870
(Minn. 1999). We consider the specific misconduct that led to violations of the Minnesota
Rules of Professional Conduct and whether we are confident that a petitioner, if reinstated,
will not repeat those violations. See In re Mose (Mose II), 843 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Minn.
2014) (stating that we look for a “change in the lawyer’s conduct . . . that corrects the
underlying misconduct that led to the suspension” (emphasis added)).
We suspended Tigue for two basic rules violations: negligent misappropriation
resulting from trust account mismanagement that resulted in temporary shortages in client
trust account balances and intentional mi sappropriation of a $400 filing fee. Tigue VI,
900 N.W.2d at 426–28. Thus, we must decide whether we are sufficiently confident that
Tigue will neither mismanage his trust account nor intentionally mi sappropriate client
funds. It is to those questions that I now turn.
A.
I start first with Tigue’s trust account violations and associated negligent
misappropriation. Tigue failed to keep proper and timely trust account books and records
and, as a result, on multiple occasions over the course of several months, his trust account
had insufficient funds to cover client trust account liabilities. No client lost money because
of this negligent misconduct. Tigue VI, 900 N.W.2d at 433.

D-3
Tigue seeks reinstatement to practice la w under the condition we imposed in our
2017 suspension order perm anently prohibiting hi m from serving as a signatory on any
client trust account. He also proposes that R.S., an attorney trained in accounting with no
previous disciplinary record, manage his trus t account on a regular basis and serve as
signatory. Under this arrangement, Tigue argues, he cannot commit similar trust account
violations in the future.1 I agree.
The panel concluded that Ti gue “has done nothing by which the Panel could find
that Petitioner would not continue to make the same mistakes.” That conclusion is directly
contradicted by the record and clearly error. See In re Torgerson , 870 N.W.2d 602, 609
(Minn. 2015) (stating that clear error exists where we have “a ‘definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made’ ” (quoting In re Wentzell , 656 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Minn.
2003))). Tigue states that he has arranged fo r R.S. to manage his trust account and serve
as signatory and that he will continue to comply with the cond ition of reinstatement we
imposed in 2017; namely, to never serve as signatory on any c lient trust account.2 Tigue
VI, 900 N.W.2d at 435.

1 This type of arrangement is not unpreced ented as a condition of reinstatement. In
In re Barta, 491 N.W.2d 654, 655 (Minn. 1992), we approved reinstatement of a lawyer
under a supervisory requirement similar to the arrangement that Tigue has proposed here.

2 At oral argument, the Director raised th e specter that Tigue could falsify bills or
receipts and trick R.S. into trust account viol ations. But the Direct or could point to no
evidence that Tigue has ever engaged in such conduct in the past. Such unfounded and
frankly irresponsible speculation by the Director must be rejected.
The Director and the court also assert that Tigue engaging R.S. to manage his trust
account is not a sufficient safeguard to protect the public because Tigue ultimately remains
responsible for the account. But the Direct or offers no meaningful explanation of how

D-4
Relying on the panel’s findings, the cour t grounds its decision to reject Tigue’s
petition for reinstatement as it relates to trust account viol ations and related negligent
misappropriation in Tigue’s failu re to demonstrate moral change. I disagree with the
court’s analysis as well as the panel’s relevant findings.
First, the panel and Director appear deep ly offended by Tigue’s use of the phrase
“clerical errors” to describe his trust account mismanagement. They suggest that such
language diminishes the seriousness of the misconduct and fails to show a change of heart
and mind and renewed commitment to the ethica l practice of law. I am less concerned.
Tigue does not dispute that he committed misconduct by failing to properly maintain his
trust account, he acknowledged th at his violation of the professional rules is serious, and
he accepted responsibility for failing to keep accurate books and records. And once again,
no client lost money as a result of Tigue’s mismanagement of his trust account. Indeed, if
one looks at the substance of the trust accoun t errors that led to Tigue’s 2017 suspension,
“clerical error” is a commonsense descriptor of what caused the shortfalls in Tigue’s client
trust accounts.3 This characterization does not mean that Tigue’s rules violations were not

Tigue could mismanage his trust account under the conditions and limitations to which he
is agreeing. Further, the Director points to absolutely no other conditions that we could
impose on Tigue to assuage her concerns. To the extent that the panel and Director are
concerned that Tigue does not sufficiently understand principles of trust account
management to oversee R.S.’s handling of his account, I am fully comfortable with
requiring that Tigue attend a CLE on the prin ciples of trust account management as a
condition of reinstatement.

3 Although the record show s that Tigue was not diligent in reconciling his trust
account books and records on a regular basis, he eventually corrected all of his
bookkeeping errors by performing the required reconciliations. Tigue acknowledged that

D-5
serious. But these violations were less serious than intentional manipulation of a trust
account to line one’s pockets.
More fundamentally, I disagree that moral change is an appropriate reinstatement
consideration in the context of Tigue’s tr ust account mismanagement and the related
negligent misappropriation. Specifically, be cause the conditions un der which Tigue has
agreed to handle his trust account if rein stated (no signatory power and independent
management) are sufficient to protect the public and deter future violations, there is no
need to dive into an inquiry about moral change. The c ourt does not come to terms with
this fundamental point. It simply takes a form alistic approach and insists that we need to
apply the moral change requirement in every case where a suspension of over 90 days is
imposed without regard to the specific facts of the case.
My consideration of whether we should assess moral change when considering
Tigue’s reinstatement petition begins once again with a focus on our fundamental inquiry
when addressing such petitions: if reinstated, is the petitioner likely to engage in the same
misconduct for which he was suspended or otherwise put the public at risk? See In re
Porter, 472 N.W.2d 654, 655 (Minn. 1991) (sta ting that the purpose served by the moral
change standard is to ensure that a petitione r, if reinstated, is f it “to enjoy the public

he “made mistakes in calculation,” which was one of the reasons that he was “getting [R.S.]
to do the calculations” on his trust account going forward. Thus, while Tigue may have a
history of shoddy trust account recordkeeping, the record does not support a conclusion
that Tigue intentionally or dishonestly ceased compliance with the relevant rules. Rather,
the record suggests that, although Tigue struggled with regular compliance and
recordkeeping, he ultimately corrected his errors. His arrangement with R.S. will mitigate
this risk of noncompliance going forward.

D-6
confidence and trust once forfeite d”). The moral change standa rd is one predictive tool
that we use to answer that question.
We have identified a constellation of eye- of-the-beholder factors that imprecisely
inform our assessment of whether a petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated moral change,
including whether the petitioner has shown “r emorse and acceptance of responsibility for
the misconduct, a change in the [petitioner’s] conduct and state of mind that corrects the
underlying misconduct that led to the suspension, and a renewed commitment to the ethical
practice of law.” Mose II, 843 N.W.2d at 575. This inquiry is slippery, much like Justice
Potter Stewart’s old test for obscen ity: “I know it when I see it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart , J., concurring). Quite frankl y, as a person charged with
applying the moral change standard, I must ad mit that I truly struggle to grasp when a
petitioner has demonstrated sufficient moral change.4
Despite the nebulous nature of the moral change standard, however, one thing is
clear from our case law: when assessing the character of lawy ers for reinstatement, we
distinguish personal moral character from professional moral character. Our responsibility
“to formulate ethical principles and standards of professional conduct and to enforce those

4 The court points to standards used in othe r states that require some showing of moral
change or moral character in reinstatement proceedings to a ssert that Minnesota’s moral
change standard for reinstatement is not “too difficult to apply.” Th e standards that the
court cites to, with one excep tion, do not align precisely wi th Minnesota’s moral change
standard. Moreover, that some other states examine moral charac ter in reinstatement
proceedings does not mean that Minnesota’s moral change st andard is easy to apply
consistently from case to case . Nor does that fact reso lve the possible free speech
implications that I discuss below. Finally, the fact that states examine moral character does
not answer the basic question of whether we need to do so in this particular case.

D-7
standards on the lawyers of this state does not give us license to make judgments as to a
lawyer’s personal morality, but only with regard to that lawyer’s professional moral
character.” In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1 979). Accordingly, we do not
penalize petitioners for their unorthodox persona l views or irascible demeanor so long as
we are confident in their f itness to practice law and capac ity to regain “the public
confidence and trust [they] once forfeited.” Id. at 925–26. Put another way, moral change
does not turn on whether the lawyer petitioni ng for reinstatement f its our conception of
what a lawyer should be like. Instead, we focus solely on whether the petitioner will follow
the rules of professional conduct and serve clients competently and honestly. Id.
This case illustrates the dange rs inherent in the moral change standard. Consider,
for example, the panel’s and Director’s analysis of wh ether Tigue was sufficiently
remorseful, accepted responsibility for his trus t account violations and related negligent
misappropriation, and demonstrated a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law.
The record plainly discloses that Tigue repe atedly acknowledged th at he violated the
professional conduct rules on trust account ma nagement, stated that he does not plan to
violate the rules again, and pr offered a set of reinstatement conditions that would impose
accountability on him. That is good evidence of remors e: a lawyer has accepted
responsibility for his misconduct and is committed to complying with the rules.
The Director, however, demands more. The Director emphasizes that while Tigue
stated that he is bound by our interpretation of the professional conduct rules, he would not
concede that our interpretation of the rules is correct. For instance, contrary to our holding
in Tigue VI, Tigue asserts that, where no client money ends up in the lawyer’s pocket and

D-8
no client actually loses money, trust account errors should not be considered negligent
misappropriation. See Tigue VI , 900 N.W.2d at 429. Tigue also claims that he was
disciplined more severely than other lawyers who have committed trust account violations;
a claim the panel and Director never effectivel y refuted. The Director effectively insists
that to satisfy the moral change standard, a petitioner must not only swear that he will abide
by the rules of professional conduct as we have interpreted those rules (as Tigue has done
here), but he must also affirm that he agrees with how we have interpreted the rules.
The Director’s position is flawed. First, to protect the public and deter misconduct,
lawyers need not agree with how we have inte rpreted the rules of professional conduct as
long as they abide by our interpretation of the rules. More critically, requiring a lawyer to
agree with our interpretation of the law (a nd so be constrained from expressing
disagreement in his advocacy) presents serious concerns under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3, of the Minnesota Constitution.5 At the
very least, it is hard to see how requiring a lawyer to not only agree to abide by our
interpretation of the rules of professional cond uct, but also to pledge agreement with our
interpretation of the law, is narrowly tailored to protect the public and deter future trust
account violations where another preventativ e tool (here, the strict conditions of
reinstatement prohibiting Tigue from serving as signatory on any client trust account and

5 The court essentially sidesteps the Firs t Amendment implications raised by Tigue
on this front. I reach no conclusions today on whether the Director’s interpretation of the
moral change standard necessarily violates the free sp eech and expression rights
guaranteed by the United Stat es and Minnesota Constitutions , but simply note that the
Director’s interpretation plausibly implicates such rights.

D-9
requiring that Tigue engage R.S. to manage his trust account) effectively serves those same
interests. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 (2002) (observing
that restrictions on certain categories of speech protected by the First Amendment must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d
509, 521 (Minn. 2012) (applying a narrowl y tailored standard when assessing speech
restrictions “directly related to established professional conduct standards”). There is no
legitimate public protec tion reason for us to require petiti oners to prostrate themselves
before this court in sackcloth and ashes and pledge fealty to our legal reasoning.6 Indeed,
for public protection purposes, we expect lawyers in this state to do precisely the opposite
when representing their clients.
Setting aside any broader concerns with the moral change standard, the question
before us here is whethe r moral change is a useful and necessary tool in every case for
assessing whether, if the petitioner is reinstated , the public will be pl aced at risk because
the petitioner is likely to engage in the sa me type of misconduct for which he was
suspended. A brief review of the emergence and evolution of the moral change standard
provides insight into when it is proper and useful to apply it.
We first applied the standard in 1945, noting that “[t]he burden of proof [for
reinstatement] is upon [an] applicant to establish by clear and satisfactory evidence . . . that
[the] applicant has undergone such a moral chan ge as now to render [the applicant] a fit

6 See, e.g., Jonah 3:4–10 ( The New American Bible 2020) (wherein the people of
Nineveh donned sackcloth and as hes to placate a deity and av oid the destruction of their
city).

D-10
person to enjoy the public confidence and trust once forfeited.” In re Smith, 19 N.W.2d
324, 326 (Minn. 1945). We further explained th at “[t]he decisive in quiry is whether the
applicant is of such good mora l character that he should be readmitted to the office of
attorney and recommended to the public as a trustworthy person.” Id. (emphasis added).
Our earliest cases applying the moral cha nge standard—and indeed nearly every
case we have decided since—dealt with atto rney misconduct involving either dishonesty
or “moral turpitude.”7 See, e.g., Smith, 19 N.W.2d at 326 (embezzlement); In re Strand,
107 N.W.2d 518, 519 (Minn. 1961) (dishonesty towards clients and business partners);8 In
re Peterson, 181 N.W.2d 341, 341 (Minn. 1970) (induce ment of client to pay retainer to
defend a fictitious charge); Herman, 197 N.W.2d at 241–42 (re peated “swindling” of
clients); In re Swanson , 343 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Minn. 19 84) (forgery and intentional
misappropriation); In re Hanson , 454 N.W.2d 924, 925 (Minn. 1990) (forgery and

7 An act of moral turpitude is a very seri ous violation of accepted conduct: “an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the privat e and social duties which a [person] owes to
[other persons], or to society in general, co ntrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between [person and person].” State v. McCarthy , 38 N.W.2d 679, 687
(Wis. 1949) (definition cited by our court in In re Bunker, 199 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Minn.
1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); see also In re Haukebo, 352
N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1984) (noting that “good moral character” in the attorney
licensing context “has traditionally been defi ned as absence of proven conduct or acts
which have been historically considered as manifestations of moral turpitude” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (cita tions omitted)). Not every vi olation of law or of the
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct is an act of moral turpitude. See Bunker ,
199 N.W.2d at 631; In re Conley, 248 N.W. 41, 42 (Minn. 1933) (concluding that being
held in contempt by a federal court in violation of Minnesota law is not de facto an act of
moral turpitude).

8 We discussed the facts of Strand’s misconduct in In re Strand, 260 N.W. 499 (Minn.
1935).

D-11
intentional misappropriation); In re Trygstad , 472 N.W.2d 137, 138 (Minn. 1991)
(conspiracy); Kadrie, 602 N.W.2d at 869 (forgery and dishonesty); In re Jellinger , 728
N.W.2d 917, 919–20 (Minn. 2007) (false statements); In re Holker, 765 N.W.2d 633, 637
(Minn. 2009) (fabrication of documents); In re Dedefo , 781 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2010)
(intentional filing of meritless lawsuits, presentation of false affidavit, and obstruction of
access to evidence in an ongoing case); In re Lieber, 834 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Minn. 2013)
(improper financial advances to clients by charging interest at a monthly rate of 15 percent
and false statements under oath); In re Stockman , 896 N.W.2d 851, 855 (Minn. 2017)
(improper loaning of money to clients and false statements to opposing counsel); Severson,
923 N.W.2d at 27 (knowingly imposing unfair and unreasonable investment agreement on
client).9

9 The court cites to several orders involv ing stipulations on reinstatement petitions
where we have required proof of moral ch ange for reinstatemen t in cases where the
underlying misconduct did not involve fraud, dish onesty, or moral turpitude. Orders that
adopt a stipulated condition are not the re sult of adverse briefing and do not carry
significant precedential weight. See In re Pearson , 888 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Minn. 2016)
(placing limited value on a stipulated discipline case).

D-12
Consequently, our cases suggest that a sh owing of moral change matters when a
petitioner’s underlying misconduct involves so me display of fraud, dishonesty, or moral
turpitude.10 And there is no evidence here to suggest such misconduct.11
Moreover, we have never required a showing of moral change solely in the context
of negligent misappropriation involving trus t account mismanagement where there is no
evidence of fraud, dishones ty, or moral turpitude. 12 And that makes sense, especially
where, as here, a concrete so lution exists that will protec t the public and deter future
misconduct going forward. For instance, why is it necessary to probe Tigue’s mind and

10 The court notes that “we do not base the determinati on of who must prove moral
change on whether the lawyer’s misconduct involves dishonesty or moral turpitude.
Instead, we generally reinstate lawyers who have been suspended for 90 days or less
without requiring them to prove moral change.” I agree that, in accordance with Rule 18(f),
Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), we typically do not require an
attorney suspended for 90 days or less to show moral change. But that is not the issue in
this case. The issue is wh ether attorneys suspended for more than 90 days who must
petition for reinstatement under Rule 18(a)–(d), RLPR (like Tigue here) must demonstrate
moral change in every case if the conduct for which they were suspended did not involve
some underlying fraud, dishonesty, or moral turpitude.

11 In the next section, I address our finding in Tigue VI that Tigue intentionally
misappropriated a $400 filing fee.

12 At oral argument, the Director cited th ree cases she claims s upport the use of the
moral change standard where negligent misappr opriation and trust account violations are
the only acts of misconduct at issue: In re Holker , 765 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 2009), In re
Mose, 843 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 2014), and In re Griffith, 883 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. 2016).
None of these cases supports the Dire ctor’s argument because each one involved
dishonesty or moral turpitude. Holker involved a petitioner wh o allegedly fabricated
documents during a disciplinary inves tigation. 765 N.W.2d at 637. Mose involved a
petitioner who had been disciplined in part fo r lying to clients and failing to account for
and return unearned retainer fees . 843 N.W.2d at 572–73. And Griffith involved a
petitioner who had sexually harassed a law student and atte mpted to pressure the student
into recanting her complaints against him. 883 N.W.2d at 799.

D-13
soul using an imprecise standard to see if he has demonstrated a change in conduct and
state of mind correcting the underlying mi sconduct that led to his suspension?
Reinstatement conditions like the prohibition on Tigue having signatory authority for client
trust accounts and requiring Tigue’s engagement of R.S. to manage his trust account
objectively accomplish just that. We do not n eed a proxy predictive tool like the moral
change standard in the context of the neglig ent handling of trust ac counts when we can
impose objective, limiting reinst atement conditions to protect the public effectively and
avoid future misconduct.13
B.
I now turn to the other rules infraction underlying our 2017 suspension of Tigue: his
intentional misappropriation of a $400 filing fee. In 2015, R.D. retained Tigue to pursue a
matter in federal district court. Tigue VI, 900 N.W.2d at 428. R.D. signed a $2,000 retainer
agreement providing that $400 of that amount would f unction as an advance payment to
cover the district court filing fee. Id. Tigue drafted a complaint but did not file it, and R.D.
ultimately terminated the representation. Id. Tigue claimed “that he was entitled to retain
the $400 filing fee as quantum meruit compensation for the services he rendered to R.D.”

13 Like the Director, the court also specu lates about possible ways that the R.S.
arrangement could fail. But there are ways to mitigate these risks. For example, we could
require Tigue and R.S. to enter into a formal , binding arrangement with the Director as a
condition of reinstatement to ensure Tigue ’s trust account mi smanagement does not
reoccur in the future, and R.S.—an attorney with no record of discipline—has signaled his
willingness to do so. At any rate, if reinstated, Tigue still would have to practice under our
prohibition on him serving as an authorized signatory for client trust accounts. He has no
other option: he must comply with that prohibition or face further discipline.

D-14
prior to termination of the representation. Id. Tigue eventually refunded the $400 to R.D.
while the disciplinary investigation that led to his suspension was pending.14 Id.
In 2017, Tigue argued that he believed he could retain the filing fee based on an
express provision in the retainer agreemen t, which provided: “Client understands that
should it hinder Attorney’s representation of Client in any way, Attorney shall immediately
withdraw from representation and be entitled to quantum meruit compensation as per the
terms of this agreement.” Id. at 429–30. We noted that Tigue believed that he was entitled
to keep the $400 filing fee under the quantum meruit provisions of the retainer agreement.
Id. at 429. The referee in the disciplinary proceeding, however, rejected Tigue’s argument
and we concluded that the record supported the referee’s finding that Tigue intentionally
misappropriated the filing fee. Id. at 430. While Tigue ultim ately failed to persuade us
with his quantum meruit argument, his case represented the first occasion in which we had
rejected such an interpretation of a quantum meruit fee agreement provision in a discipline
proceeding, so his good faith argument under the provision was not unreasonable.
Nonetheless, because we held that the re feree in 2017 did not clearly err by finding
that Tigue had intentionally misappropriated client funds—behavior at the very least
suggestive of dishonesty, fraud, or moral turpitude—requiring a showing of moral change

14 As mentioned above, R.D. incurred a $12 bank fee when Tigue’s check for
repayment of the $400 bounced. Tigue VI, 900 N.W.2d at 428. After that initial mishap,
Tigue “successfully repaid the $400 with a money order.” Id. This loss of $12 is the only
instance in the record wher e Tigue’s misconduct—whether negligent or intentional—
resulted in a client suffering a permanent financial loss.

D-15
as to Tigue’s intentional misappropriation is justifiable. And under the moral change
standard, I believe Tigue should be reinstated.
Although Tigue maintains th at we decided the intenti onal misappropriation issue
incorrectly, he repeatedly acknowledged in the reinstatement hearing that he is bound by
our decision and will not commit the same misconduct in the future. The panel nonetheless
found Tigue’s promise that he will not withhold filing fees to cover his own expenses under
a quantum meruit or any other theory in the fu ture not credible base d solely on his past
negligence in handling his trust account. But th at mismanagement is not intentional
conduct.15 Indeed, the panel did not identify any past dishonest conduct by Tigue apart
from the single instance of using the $400 filing fee to cover his own expenses in
accordance with his understanding of his retainer agreement. Because of Tigue’s repeated
statements that he will not comm it this same type of intentio nal misconduct in the future
and the panel’s failure to identify anything in the record or Tigue’s disciplinary history that
undermines Tigue’s credibility on this point, I conclude that Tigue has met his burden to
prove moral change as to his prior intentional misappropriation of client funds. At the very
least, he has demonstrated “acceptance of responsibility” for his misconduct and a change

15 The court characterizes Tigue’s ne gligent appropriation as resulting from a
“deliberate choice to stop maintaining required trust account books and records as soon as
the Director stopped reviewing them on a monthly basis.” The court seeks to have its cake
and eat it too: the shortages in Tigue’s client trust accounts stemming from his trust account
mismanagement amounted to negligent misappropriation, but the mismanagement was
somehow simultaneously the result of Tigue’s intentional choice to stop maintaining his
books and records. Either Tigue’s actions vis-à-vis his trust account were negligent or
intentional; they cannot be both. In fact, in our 2017 order, although we stated that “Tigue’s
negligence caused shortages in several client tr ust accounts” we did not suggest that
Tigue’s actions were intentional. Tigue VI, 900 N.W.2d at 429 (emphasis added).

D-16
in his “conduct and state of mind that correct s the underlying misconduct that led to [his]
suspension.” Mose II, 843 N.W.2d at 575. He accepts our decision and has pledged to not
repeat this conduct in the future. Nothing in the record supports a finding to the contrary.
C.
Tigue seeks reinstatement because his pl anned arrangement with R.S. and his
permanent prohibition on serving as an authorized signatory on client trust accounts means
that he cannot repeat his misconduct involving trust account mismanagement and negligent
misappropriation. I agree. Further, Tigue has stated many times that he will not repeat the
conduct that constituted intentional misappropriation and there is no evidence in the record
undermining Tigue’s statements on that fr ont. Finally, Tigue acknowledged in his
reinstatement hearing that he remains bound by our 2017 decision and that his behavior
represented misconduct under the professional rules.
Consequently, because Tigu e has demonstrated sufficien t moral change as to his
intentional misappropriation and because a showing of moral change is inapplicable to his
trust account misconduct and negligent misappropriation, I would reinstate Tigue.
For the reasons stated abov e, I respectfully dissent.

ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Thissen.