State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1722

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Roosevelt Vinson,
Appellant.

Filed November 9, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Worke, Judge
Concurring specially, Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-9179

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal- Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for first-degree burglary, arguing that the
district court (1) violated his right to a jury trial, (2) improperly admitted relationship
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evidence, and (3) failed to make written findings of essential facts. Because we determine
that the district court properly allowed the relationship evidence but committed plain error
by not obtaining a valid jury-trial waiver, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
Appellant Roosevelt Vinson was charged with burglary for breaking into the home
of his ex-girlfriend, K.P. The district court appointed Vinson with a public defender who
represented him through the trial. Before the bench trial began, Vinson filed a motion in
limine, moving to preclude the state from introducing relationship evidence. The district
court denied the motion and stated that it would address the evidence in relation to the
findings at the end of the trial.
K.P. testified that she and Vinson had dated for six to eight months in 2015, and she
ended the relationship because Vinson began “a pattern of drinking and violence.” After
their relationship, Vinson “would call and show up at [K.P.’s] place of employment
constantly.” She also testified that Vinson went to her house “a few times,” banging on
her door and demanding to be let in. Before the incident at issue, K.P. had last seen Vinson
in the summer of 2017.
K.P. testified that she was at home watching television at 1:00 a.m. on December 22,
2018, when she heard a “bang” outside, “felt a thud,” and simultaneously saw Vinson from
her Ring Video Doorbell. Her boyfriend ran downstairs, and K.P. could hear him
communicating with Vinson in an elevated voice. K.P.’s boyfriend then returned and put
his shoes on, and K.P. called 911. K.P. heard “a large crash” and saw Vinson coming up
the stairs while yelling threats to K.P.’s boyfriend. K.P.’s boyfriend wrestled Vinson to
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the ground and held him there until the police arrived. The police arrested Vinson, and
K.P. went downstairs to see “the sidelight window shattered and laying on the other side
of the foyer, in its frame.” Both K.P. and the arresting officers testified that Vinson
appeared intoxicated.
Following a bench trial, the district court found Vinson guilty of first-degree
burglary and addressed the admissibility of the relationship evidence by stating, “[t]he
history of the relationship evidence is relevant. And because the [c]ourt concludes that its
probative value substantially outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice in the fact finder, it is
something that I am considering in my decision.” The district court sentenced Vinson to
68 months in prison. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Right to jury trial
Vinson argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he did not waive his right to
a jury trial.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the
right to a jury trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. Defendants may waive
their right to a jury trial if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v.
Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 651 (Minn. 200 6). This waiver must be done “personally, in
writing or on the record in open court, after being advised by the court of the right to trial
by jury, and after having had an opportunity to consult with counsel.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.01, subd. 1(2)(a). “Absent such a waiver, a criminal defendant must be tried by a jury.”
State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn. 2014).
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Here, the parties agree that the district court improperly convicted Vinson after a
bench trial without obtaining Vinson’s waiver of his right to a jury trial. But the parties
disagree about whether we should analyze the issue under the structural-error or plain-error
standard, and whether the case should be remanded for a new trial.
“Structural errors are defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy
analysis by harmless-error standards.” State v. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 851 (Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted). Only a “very limited class of” errors qualify as structural errors,
but they warrant automatic reversal of a conviction. Id. (quotation omitted). “In contrast,
a trial error is an error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and
which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented
in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “If a criminal defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial
adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that most constitutional errors are subject to
harmless-error analysis.” State v. Fluker, 781 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Minn. App. 2010).
Because we determine that Vinson is entitled to a new trial under the plain-error analysis,
we need not determine which reviewing standard is appropriate. See Little, 851 N.W.2d at
884 (declining to determine appropriate review standard when remand required under
plain-error analysis).
Vinson did not object to the bench trial. An appellant generally forfeits any relief
by not objecting at trial. State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 786 ( Minn. 2017). But we
may review unobjected-to claims under the plain-error test. Id. An appellant must
establish “(1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected [his] substantial rights.” Id.
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If the appellant establishes all three elements, “we may correct the error only if it seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
The parties agree that the district court committed error and that the error was plain.
But the parties disagree about whether it affected Vinson’s substantial rights. “An error
affects a defendant’s substantial rights when there is a reasonable likelihood that the error
substantially affected the verdict.” State v. Brown, 792 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 2011)
(quotation omitted). In Little, the supreme court concluded that the district court’s failure
to obtain a waiver on an additional charge affected the defendant’s substantial rights
because the record did not show that the defendant was aware of a newly added charge,
which meant that he may not have received adequate counsel and that he may have selected
a plea agreement. 851 N.W.2d at 884-85. The supreme court determined that Little’s
substantial rights were affected because there was “a reasonable possibility that [ Little]
would not have waived his right to a jury trial on the amended charge.” Id. at 886. Because
the record here does not show that the district court told Vinson about his right to a jury,
the reasoning in Little applies. Vinson’s substantial rights were affected by this error.
Finally, the error also “affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” See Webster, 894 N.W.2d at 786. In Little, the supreme court reasoned,
“Allowing Little to stand convicted of a . . . more serious offense when there is a reasonable
likelihood that but for the . . . error he would not have waived his . . . right to a jury trial on
the . . . added charge will adversely affect the public’s confidence in the fairness and
integrity of judicial proceedings.” 851 N.W.2d at 886. The same is true here; the public’s
confidence in the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings would be undermined by
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allowing Vinson to stand convicted when there is a reasonable likelihood that he would not
have waived his right to a jury trial. Because the district court’s error satisfies the plain-
error analysis, we reverse and remand.
Relationship evidence
Vinson also challenges the admission of evidence of his prior domestic conduct.
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district] court and will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn.
2003). “When challenging a district court’s evidentiary ruling, an appellant must establish
both that the district court abused its discretion and that, as a consequence, the appellant
was prejudiced.” State v. O’Meara, 755 N.W.2d 29, 33 (Minn. App. 2008).
Evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is generally inadmissible. Minn. R. Evid.
404. The district court admitted the evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2018), which
allows for the admissibility of “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the
victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household members.” But the state
concedes that section 634.20 does not apply to this case, and instead argues that K.P.’s
testimony was admissible as general relationship evidence.
The state argued general relationship evidence in its notice of intent to introduce
domestic-related evidence. The relationship-evidence exception falls under Minn. R. Evid.
404(b). “[R]elationship evidence is character evidence that may be offered to show the
strained relationship between the accused and the victim [ and] is relevant to establishing
motive and intent and is therefore admissible.” State v. Loving, 775 N.W.2d 872, 880
(Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). This exception does not require an underlying
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domestic-abuse charge . State v. Horm ann, 805 N.W.2d 883, 890 (Minn. App. 2011),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012).
K.P.’s testimony about her prior relationship with Vinson is admissible as general
relationship evidence to show motive. The question before the district court was whether
to believe K.P.’s or Vinson’s testimony. The district court found that Vinson’s testimony
was not credible “[p]articularly in light of the history of the relationship evidence.” The
district court also found that the evidence’s “probative value substantially outweighs the
risk of unfair prejudice.” Because the evidence is admissible under the alternative theory
of admissibility that the state argued, Vinson was not prejudiced by the district court’s error
in admitting the evidence under an inapplicable rule.
Finally, because we reverse the case for a new trial, we need not consider whether
the district court failed to make written findings of the essential facts.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
CS-1

CONNOLLY, Judge (concurring specially)
I agree with the majority’s decision: under State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 885-86
(Minn. 2014) the failure to have obtained a defendant’s personal waiver of a jury trial on
every charge of which he is convicted is an error that is plain and that violates the
defendant’s substantial rights. See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)
(setting out the three prongs of the plain-error test).
I write separately because I have a concern that Lit tle appears to gloss over the last
prong of the Griller test, namely the “heavy burden” it imposes on defendants to show a
violation of their substantial rights by demonstrating that the error was prejudicial and
affected the outcome of the case. Id. at 741. The facts of this case are such that a jury,
having heard K.P.’s testimony about the history of her relationship with appellant, would
have been more likely than the district court to find appellant guilty. Thus, the likelihood
of appellant’s having chosen a jury trial rather than a bench trial is minimal, and the record
provides no indication that he would have done so. It does not reflect that appellant ever
expressed dissatisfaction with a bench trial or a preference for a jury trial, or that he sought
review of whether he had been prejudiced by the district court’s failure to obtain his waiver
of a jury trial. It does not appear to me that appellant met the “heavy burden” imposed by
the substantial-rights prong of the plain-error test.
Nevertheless, because Little is the law, I agree that we must follow it. See State v.
Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (noting that the court of appeals is bound by
supreme court precedent).