Mark R. Krampf, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1753

Mark R. Krampf,
Appellant,

vs.

University of Minnesota, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed June 22, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CV-18-272

Mark R. Krampf, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Douglas R. Peterson, General Counsel, Dan Herber, Senior Associate Counsel, University
of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Mark Krampf appeals from the district court’s summary judgment
dismissing his claims against respondent Univ ersity of Minnesota (the University) under
the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01-.90 (2018)
(MGDPA). Appellant argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion in denying his

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motion for default judgment, (2) abused its discretion in denying his motion for an in-
camera review of materials not produced by the University in re sponse to his MGDPA
request, (3) abused its discretion in denying his motion to rem ove the district court judge
for cause, (4) erred in granting summary judgmen t sua sponte in favor of the University,
(5) erred in denying his own motion for summ ary judgment, and (6) abused its discretion
in denying his rule 60.02 motion. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 5, 2017, appellant submitted an MG DPA request to the University for data
in the University’s possession concerning Regenerative Medicine Minnesota (RMM). 1
The next day, the University acknowledged that it received appellant’s MGDPA request
and provided appellant with a receipt and trac king number. On May 18, in response to a
follow-up inquiry from appellant, the University explained to appellant that his request for
data was “fairly broad and involve[d] quite a bit of information.” The University stated
that it was “in the process of gathering all of the relevant materi als” and that “[t]hose
materials [would] then have to be reviewed for private data before making them available
for [appellant] to view.” The University also asked appellant if he wanted to prioritize any
of the data that he had requested.

1 Regenerative Medicine Minnesota (RMM ) began in 2014 and is a “collaborative
partnership between the University of Minn esota and the Mayo Clinic for regenerative
medicine, clinical translation, and commercialization.” H.F. 3172, 2014 Reg. Sess., art. 1,
§ 4 (3rd engrossment). A principal investig ator—the person who will lead the research
team—submits a grant proposal to RMM, and RMM chooses which proposals to fund.

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On June 15, 2017, th e University provided a partial MGDPA response to appellant.
The University uploaded four files with a to tal of 191 pages onto the University Data
Request Portal and provided appellant with a link to the documents. The University also
informed appellant “that he would be notified to set up an appointment to view materials
when the additional documents relevant to his request [were] ready.”
In September 2017, the University “notified Principal Investigators identified in the
Year 1 awarded grant application proposals that the University had received a request under
the MGDPA for copies of their proposals.” The University gave the principal investigators
a date by which investigators needed “to notify the University if there was any information
in his/her proposal that he/she believed would fall under the ‘trade secret’ provision of the
MGDPA.”
On November 17, 2017, the University received documents from the RMM program
administrator. On November 22 , the University notified appe llant that a second set of
documents was available for his inspection. The University provided appellant “several
dates and times” to inspect the documents. On November 29, appellant inspected “one
banker’s box containing hard copy paper documents” at the University. The box included
925 pages of documents.
In December 2017, the University notifie d additional principa l investigators of
appellant’s MGDPA request. The University requested that the investigators notify the
University by December 13 of any informati on concerning which trade-secret claim was
made under the MGDPA.

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On January 22, 2018, the University received additional hard-copy documents from
the RMM program administrator. In early February 2018, the University again emailed
each principal investigator and asked that th e investigators identify by February 15 any
information that they believed would qualify as a trade secret under the MGDPA. In total,
the University notified approximately 300 pr incipal investigators of appellant’s data
request. About 80 of those principal inves tigators notified the University that their
documents contained trade-secret information as set forth in the MGDPA. The University
then conducted its own review of the documents that the principal investigators flagged as
containing trade-secret information. The University redacted any claimed trade-secret or
private educational data and “identified the redactions with the statutory criteria.”
On August 10, 2018, the University notified appellant that a third set of data was
ready for his review and mailed him a USB fl ash drive containing the information, from
which the University had redacted some private educational and trade-secret data.
On October 16, the University mailed a ppellant a USB flash drive containing a
fourth and final batch of data in response to his MGDPA re quest. The University again
noted its redaction of private educational and trade-secret data.
Appellant Sues the University
On January 10, 2018, appellant served his summons and complaint on the
University. In his complaint, appellant a lleged that the University was in “willful
violation” of the MGDPA and claimed damages “estimated to exceed $50,000.00.”
On February 7, 2018, appellant filed his summons and complaint with the Carlton
County District Court. On February 22, the University filed its answer, dated January 20,

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2018, the date on which it later claimed that it had attempted to serve appellant by United
States Mail with the answer.
Appellant Moves for Default Judgment
On February 20, 2018, the same day th at his complaint was docketed, appellant
served a motion for default judgment on the University, arguing that the University had not
served an answer.
On May 22, the University filed its response to appe llant’s motion for default
judgment. The University asse rted that it “timely served an Answer in this action on
January 20, 2018.” The University alleged that it had attempted to serve appellant at what
turned out to be an incorrect address. The University again served its answer, which
appellant acknowledged receiving.
The district court denied appellant’s moti on for default judgment, explaining that
the University had initially used an incorrect address on the envelope containing its answer,
but that the University “filed an affidavit of service indicating that their Answer on the
[appellant] was served on January 30, 2018.” The district court noted that appellant
acknowledged in his filings that he received the University’s answer on February 23, 2018.
The district court found that appellant was not prejudiced by the short delay occasioned by
the University’s having first served its answer using an incorrect address for appellant.
Appellant Moves for In-Camera Review of Redacted Documents
On August 20, 2018, appellant informed the district court of his intent to move “for
an in camera review of the government data in dispute.” On October 10, appellant moved
to compel compliance and fo r an in-camera review arguing “that many of the data

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redactions applied to the RMM documents will not satisfy the rigorous definition of trade
secret” in the MGDPA.
On November 13, the University filed its response to appellant’s motion for an in-
camera review, arguing that appellant “fail[ed] to cite an adequate basis for the Court to
invoke its right to permissive review of the University’s trade secret designations.”
At a December 20, 2018 hear ing on appellant’s motion, appellant and the district
court had a brief colloquy concerning appellant’s pleadings:
COURT: All right. Just before I turn to [the University], as I
review this case yet again, [I wonder whether] an in camera
review at this juncture [is] even appropriate[.] . . . [A]s I looked
at the pleadings again, I don’t s ee that this is an action to
compel compliance. I see this, in looking at the complaint, as
an action for damages that was—so you filed an inspection
request.
APPELLANT: Yes.
COURT: And then after several months of alleged
noncompliance, you initiated a la wsuit for violations of the
Data Practices Act.
APPELLANT: Yes.
COURT: And in your prayer for relief you’re seeking
damages.
APPELLANT: Yes.
. . .
COURT: But just a second. I don’t—I don’t read yours as
being an—as an action to compel compliance. You’re saying
they didn’t—they’re in willful violation.
APPELLANT: Yep.

On February 20, 2019, the district court denied appellant’s motion for an in-camera
review of the redacted documents. The district court found that appellant “failed to make
a prima facie case that the [University] ha[d] incorrectly redacted trade secret data.”

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Appellant Moves for Summary Judgment an d the District Cour t Grants Summary
Judgment for the University

On December 10, 2018, appe llant filed a motion for summary judgment. On
February 1, 2019, the University filed its response to appellant’s motion for summary
judgment. The University argue d that appellant’s motion should be denied and that “the
Court should exercise its discre tion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.06.” On February 11, the
district court heard arguments on appellant’s summary judgment motion during which both
parties argued at length. At the hearing, the University clarifie d for appellant and the
district court that it did not file its own dispositive motion, but instead referenced the “the
Court’s ability to dismiss an action for the reasons set forth in [Minn. R. Civ. P.] 56.06.”
On May 8, 2019, the district court denied appellant’s motion for summary judgment
and granted summary judgment in favor of th e University. The district court denied
appellant’s motion for summary judgment because it found there to be two genuine issues
of material fact precluding summary judgment in appellant’s favor. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the University, invoking its discretion to do so under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. The district court concluded that appellant had “failed to show
how the [MGDPA] violations caused him damage.” It concluded that there remained “no
issue of fact left to be decided” and that appellant was not entitled to recover damages.
Judgment was entered dismissing appellant’s complaint on May 9.
Appellant Moves to Remove the District Court Judge
On April 1, 2019—after the dispositive-motion hearing, but before the district court
issued its order—appellant moved to remove the district court judge for cause. Appellant

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argued that the district court judge’s impartiality was “suspect to possible suspicion, bias,
and prejudice” because her spouse was a “faculty member of the University of Minnesota.”
On May 3, the district court denied appellant’s motion to remove for cause.
On May 16, 2019, the Chief Judge for the Sixth District affirmed the denial of
appellant’s motion to remove the district court judge for cause.
Appellant Moves for a New Trial and for Relief from Judgment
On May 13, 2019, appellant moved for a new trial under Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01 and
for relief from judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Appellant asserted that he was
eligible for relief under rule 60.02 because of surprise, fraud, and other reasons justifying
relief.
On June 17, the University responded to appellant’s motion for a new trial and for
relief from judgment. It argued that rule 59 does not apply because there was no trial and
appellant did not meet his burden with respec t to any of the potential bases for his rule
60.02 motion.
The district court denied appellant’s motion, concluding that there was no basis for
a new trial because there was no trial. Concerning the rule 60.02 motion, the district court
determined that appellant was not surprised by the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the University beca use appellant had sufficient notice of the
possibility and that no fraud, misrepresentati on, or other misconduct had occurred. The
district court also found appellant’s other ar guments for relief were “essentially a rehash
of his previous arguments and filings.”
This appeal followed.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in denying appellant’s motion for
default judgment.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for default judgment because “(1) inexcusable neglect caused the [University’s] failure to
answer the summons and complaint within the 20-day timeline (M.R.C.P. 12.01); (2) [the
University] never serve[d] an Answer with in [the] timeframes required and; (3) [the
University] fail[ed] 4/4 criteria under the Finden-test.”
“When a party against whom a judgment fo r affirmative relief is sought has failed
to plea or otherwise defend within the time allowed therefor by these rules or by statute, . . .
judgment by default shall be entered against that party.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. A district
court’s decision to permit service or filing of a pleading after expiration of the applicable
time limit is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Coller v. Guardian Angels Roman Catholic
Church of Chaska, 294 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. 1980). A district court can deny a motion
for default judgment if the “d efendant has a reasonable defe nse on the merits; defendant
has a reasonable excuse for his failure to answer; defendant acted with due diligence after
notice of the entry of judgment; and no substan tial prejudice will result to other parties.”
Id. This standard is essen tially that enunciated in Finden v. Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750
(Minn. 1964), concerning the circumstances in which a judgment may properly be vacated.
“All four of the Finden factors must be satisfied in orde r to justify relief under the rule.”
Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 1997).

10
The district court here determined that the “record demonstrates that [appellant] was
not properly served with the [University’s] Answer until Fe bruary 23, 2018, which is
approximately 21 days after the answer was due.” The district court found that the
University met each factor of the Finden test:
A review of the [University’s] Answer shows that it possesses
a reasonable defense. Additiona lly, the [University] here did
provide a reasonable excuse for their failure to file a timely
complaint, namely th at they served the [appellant] at his
address. It was not until the date of the hearing on May 31,
2018 that the [University] first learned that the [appellant] was
claiming the envelope sent was incorrectly addressed. While
the [appellant] was served ap proximately 21 days after the
Answer was due, there is no show ing that this 21 day delay
substantially prejudiced the [appellant] in any way.

The district court identified and examined each factor relevant to appellant’s case
and to his motion for default judgment. It pr operly identified the applicable factors and
applied them to the facts of the case before concluding that default judgment was not
warranted. We agree with the district court that appellant was not prejudiced in any way
by the minimal and inadvertent delay by the University in answering appellant’s complaint.
Respondent clearly has a reasonable defense on the merits and acted with due diligence
once its error of using the wrong address was discovered. The district court acted well
within its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for default judgment.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in denying appellant’s motion for
an in-camera review of the redacted documents.

Appellant argues that the district court improperly denied his motion for an in-
camera review of the unredacted documents in order to ascertain whether the University
provided him with all data to which he was entitled under his MGDPA request. Appellant

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disputes that the University properly redacted the documents to protect trade-secret data.
Appellant contends that the district court’s ruling is incorrect because (1) “the [district
court] shifted the burden of establishing a tr ade secret claim from th e [University] to the
Appellant,” (2) the district court erroneousl y cited Minn. Stat. § 13.32 instead of Minn.
Stat. § 13.37 when it denied his motion for in -camera review, and (3) the district court
incorrectly concluded that appe llant “made an insufficient sh owing that [the University]
[was] incorrect in [its] redac tions,” that appellant “cited no case law or authority which
would call into question the reda ctions,” and that appellant’s “comments do not rise to a
prima facie showing that the [University’s] determ ination of what material constitutes a
trade secret is improper.” Appellant argues that the district court judge “mis-underst[ood]
the requirements of a trade-secret claim” and therefore the district court “err[ed] in the
application and interpretation of the law.”
Appellate courts review the denial of a motion for an in-camera review for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 873 (Minn. 2008). “The [district] court has
considerable discretion in granting or denying discovery requests.” Erickson v.
MacArthur, 414 N.W.2d 406, 407 (Minn. 1987). “A bsent a clear abuse of discretion, a
[district] court’s decision regarding discovery will not be disturbed.” Id. “A district court
abuses its discretion when it bases its conclu sions on an erroneous interpretation of the
applicable law.” Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship , 811 N.W.2d 596, 599
(Minn. 2012).
We see no abuse of the district court’s discretion when it denied appellant’s motion
for an in-camera review of the unredacted documents in the University’s possession. The

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district court denied appellant’s motion beca use appellant’s “comments do not rise to a
prima facie showing that the [University’s] determination of what material constitutes a
trade secret is improper.” The district cour t explained that, in response to appellant’s
claims, the University detailed the process it used to decide what materials were entitled to
trade-secret protection and “provided a sample of the documents that were redacted to the
Court.” The district court found the Univers ity’s redactions to be “minimal” and noted
that, “of the materials that ar e redacted, a substantial portio n of the application remains
readable and understandable.” The district court explained that “approximately 32% of the
applications contain[ed] redactions, or ab out 144 of the 456 pa ges of applications”
provided as a sample to the district court.
In denying appellant’s motion, the district court explained the relevant law:
Minnesota law provides that governmental data is presumed to
be public unless there is some data classification that would
classify the data as non-public. Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01 and 13.03.
Information that is cl assified as a trade secret is considered
non-public and private data, a nd as such, is not subject to
disclosure. Minn. Stat. § 13.37, Subd. 2.

The district court then gave the definition of a trade secret as defined in Minn. Stat. § 13.37,
subd. 1(c):
“Trade secret information” means government data, including
a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique or process (1) that was supplied by the affected
individual or organization, (2) th at is the subject of efforts by
the individual or organizati on that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy, and (3) that derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and no t being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other pers ons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use.

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Next, the district court correctly noted the University’s duty to redact. “When a document
contains both public and nonpubl ic information, it is appropriate to redact the protected
information and release th e public information.” Prairie Island Indian Cmty. v. Minn.
Dept. of Pub. Safety , 658 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. App. 2003). The district court also
correctly noted that the “MGDPA requires that when the government opposes the
discovery of data, the court shall first decide if the data is disc overable or releasable
pursuant to the rules of evidence and civil proc edure.” Minn. Stat. § 13.03, subd. 6. The
district court concluded that “the data th at the [University] seeks to protect is not
discoverable as it is protected trade-secret data. The MGDPA does give the Court the
option to conduct such an in-camera review, however such a review is not required.” Minn.
Stat. § 13.08, subd. 4.
The district court analyzed the relevant documents, caselaw, and statutes and
determined that the University complied with its duty to re dact nonpublic information by
redacting a small amount of information considered to be trade secrets. The district court
acted within its discretion when it carefully analyzed the re daction process used by the
University under the applicable law and declined to conduct a further in-camera review.
III. The district court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for summary
judgment.

Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary
judgment.

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In denying appellant’s motion, the district court explained that summary judgment
was improper based on appellant’s argument that the University con tinued to withhold
documents:
[Appellant] appears to argue that [the University] continue[s]
to withhold documents that he requested. However, his Motion
fails to identify documents he believes are missing, other than
those containing redactions. Because this Court has previously
ruled that the redactions were proper, it appears [appellant] has
received all responsive documents to his request made on
May 5, 2017. Nevertheless, th ere is a factual dispute and
summary judgment is not proper on this point.

The district court also explained that summary judgment was improper based on
appellant’s argument that the University “willfully withhe ld data by not promptly
producing the requested documents.” The district court explained that “there is a genuine
issue of fact in regards to the withholding of documents.”
“Appeal of a denial of a motion for summary judgment is properly taken from a
subsequent judgment.” Reinhardt v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. , 524 N.W.2d 531, 533
(Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995). It is questionable whether the
district court’s denial of appellant’s summa ry-judgment motion is within our scope of
review. See Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 918-19 (Minn. 2009) (holding
that, after a case has been tr ied to a jury, the earlier deni al of a motion for summary
judgment is not properly within the scope of review on appeal from the judgment); Schmitz
v. Rinke, Noonan, Smoley, Deter, Colombo, Wiant, Von Korff and Hobbs, Ltd., 783 N.W.2d
733, 744 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010) (holding that denial of
a motion for summary judgment is within the scope of review on appeal when the issue on

15
appeal is one of law concerning the sufficiency of expert affidavits in a legal-malpractice).
We review the denial of appellant’s motion for summary judgment in this instance because
final judgment has been entered dismissing a ppellant’s complaint with prejudice, and the
district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for summary judgment rested on its conclusion
that triable issues of fact remained for resolution.
The district court correctly identified two genuine issues of material fact when it
denied appellant’s motion for summary judgment.
Concerning the withholding of documents, the University provided appellant with
over 16,500 pages of documents in four in stallments. Appellant received documents
responsive to his request in June 2017, November 2017, August 2018, and October 2018.
The University contends that it provided appellant with all of the requested data appropriate
for release in response to appellant’s May 2017 data request and that any data not provided
is private. Appellant argues that the Univ ersity did not provide all of the requested
documents.
Concerning the promptness of the Univer sity’s document production, appellant
made his data request on May 5, 2017, and on June 15, 2017, the University uploaded its
first batch of documents for appellant’s in spection. The University contacted grant
applicants whose data was reque sted and asked them to screen their materials for private
information. The Univ ersity conducted its own independe nt screening of the claims of
applicants that the requested documents contained private in formation, made redactions
where necessary, and then produced the data in installments. The University contends that

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it worked as quickly as was practical. Appellant conversely argues that the University took
an unreasonably long time to produce the data to him.
The district court correctly found that genuine issues of material fact exist
concerning whether the Univer sity complied with the requi rements of the MGDPA. It
therefore did not err in denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment.
Whether the University timely and fully responded to appellant’s MGDPA request
remains in genuine dispute. But although the district court determined that a genuine issue
of material fact existed concerning whether the University complied with the MGDPA, the
district court granted summary judgment in fa vor of the University, as discussed below,
because appellant failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove that he suffered damages—
the relief appellant sought under the MGDPA.
IV. The district court did not err in gran ting summary judgment in favor of the
University.

Appellant argues that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in
favor of the University. Appellant contends that he “suffered actual damages, has been
injured . . . , and is aggrieved as a result of being improperly denied inspection of access to
all . . . public government data requested.”
In its order, the district court explained that, as pleaded, appellant’s action is for
damages resulting from the claimed MGDPA violations. The district court explained that,
“[e]ven if [appellant]’s allegations that [the University] violated the MGDPA are taken as
true, he has failed to show how the violations caused him damage. Therefore, [appellant]
cannot recover damages and there is no issue of fact left to be decided.”

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“We review the grant of su mmary judgment de novo to determine ‘whether there
are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of
the law.’” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc. , 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017)
(quoting Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC , 705 N.W.2d 746, 754 (Minn.
2005)). “The evidence is view ed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
Lishinski v. City of Duluth, 634 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn.
Jan. 15, 2002). “This de novo review in cludes our interpretation of the MGDPA.”
Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. App. 2017), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 26, 2017).
In the factual-allegations portion of his complaint, appellant alleged that “willful
failure by [the University] to respond to th e [MGDPA] request now results in this matter
being brought forward . . . with hope fo r a speedy resolution a nd action to compel
compliance.” But under the heading in the comp laint styled as “legal claims,” appellant
asserted only that the Univers ity willfully violated the MG DPA and that he is seeking
damages for the University’s violations of the MGDPA under Minn. Stat. § 13.08. The
complaint identified no specifi c injury suffered by appellant . It alleged only that the
University violated the MGDPA and that appellant seeks damages as a consequence.
Under the MGDPA,

a responsible authority or gove rnment entity which violates
any provisions of [c hapter 13] is liable to a person . . . who
suffers any damage as a result of the violation, and the person
damaged . . . may bring an ac tion against the responsible
authority or government entity to cover any damages sustained,
plus costs and reasonable attorney fees. In the case of a willful
violation, the government entity shall, in addition, be liable to

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exemplary damages of not less than $1,000, nor more than
$15,000 for each violation.

Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1. In order to recover money damages under the MGDPA,
appellant must allege and prove that he suffered damage “as a result of the violation.”
Appellant’s complaint contains no mention of the specific injury suffered by him or
any other item of recoverable damages. And the summary-judgmen t record reveals no
evidence of any damages suffered by appellant. Appellant fails to explain how he was
injured or damaged, instead a sserting only that he seeks “[d] amages estimated to exceed
$50,000.00 USD.”
At the hearing on his summary judgment motion, appellant explained his claimed
entitlement to money damages as follows: “the [U]niversity . . . took a position to
assassinate my character throughout this proce ss. Hundreds of ema ils . . . are out there
trying to assassinate me and my character.” Appellant asked that the district court
follow the Rules of Civil Proced ure, of General Practice, to
provide summary judgment to this case, to award damages, and
to award the damages that are required under the Data Practices
Act, and to order the Univers ity to comply with the Data
Practices Act and turn over all the data requested.

Appellant further stated, “There is a damage. In violating the Data Practices Act, the
University has violated my, and every ot her citizen’s, constitutional rights that are
guaranteed under Chapter 13. And that is a damage.”
In his brief on appeal, appellant argues th at he “suffered emotional distress [and]
harm and suffered a loss of reputation” and that he “no longer trusts his Government and
has lost faith in the judiciary.” Appella nt argues that the University “engaged in

19
defamatory communications not only internally but also externally with outside grant
reviewers and other associated individuals including [a]ppellant’s colleagues.” Appellant
also claims on appeal:
In addition to defamatory dama ges, [the University] through
the University of Minnesota Polic e Department . . . , violated
Appellant’s rights by improperl y and illegally accessing the
State of Minnesota Permit Tracking System to inquire if
Appellant had a permit to carry. Appellant is injured by [the
University’s] actions (who are using [the University of
Minnesota Police Department] as their own investigative and
Gestapo-like services) and [the University of Minnesota Police
Department].

It is clear from the statut e that exemplary damages are only available to individuals
who have suffered damages. Appellant has produced no evidence of injury or damage, and
appellant points to no author ity for the notio n that a loss of confid ence in government is
compensable by money damages. Moreover, a nd despite appellant’s multiple references
to the district court and in his briefing on ap peal to having been “defamed,” appellant did
not sue the University for defamation. The only claim referenced in appellant’s complaint
is a claim under the MGDPA. And, as the district court properly concluded, material fact
issues remain concerning whet her the University timely co mplied with the MGDPA, but
appellant has failed to create any genuine issue of material fact concerning any injury or
compensable damages suffered by him as a result of any violation that the University may
have committed, despite his explicit agreement that his was an action for damages.
Appellant makes two additional arguments on appeal, one concerning the timeliness
of the University’s oppos ition to appellant’s summary judgment motion and another
concerning notice.

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First, and concerning the timeliness of th e University’s response, the district court
correctly determined that the University’s response was timely. A response to a dispositive
motion must be served and filed at least nine days prior to the hearing. Minn. R. Gen. Prac.
115.03(b) (2015).2
The district court set a hearing on this matter for February 11, 2019. The University
filed its response to appellant’s motion on February 1, 2019, ten days before the hearing.
Second, and concerning whet her appellant had adequate notice of the University’s
response to his motion for summary judgment—which included the University’s invitation
to the district court to consider a summary dismissal of appellant’s claims on a sua sponte
basis—the district court explained that appella nt “received notice of this issue when [the
University] filed [its] Memo randum in Opposition to Plai ntiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment” and that appellant “had the oppor tunity to respond in writing and during the
hearing on February 11, 2019.”
“After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the [district] court may . . .
grant summary judgment for a nonmovant.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.06(a). “Unless an
objecting party can show prejud ice from lack of notice or ot her procedural irregularities,
or was not afforded a meani ngful opportunity to oppose summary ju dgment, the court’s
judicious exercise of its inherent power to grant summary judgment in appropriate cases

2 This rule has since been amended. Order Promulgating Amendments to the General
Rules of Practice for the District Courts, No. ADM09-8009 (Minn. June 20, 2019). As of
January 1, 2020, a party shall file their response to a motio n at least 14 days before the
hearing. Minn. R. Gen. Prac . 115.03(b) (2020). The prior ve rsion of the rule is cited
because that was the version in effect at the time that the Un iversity’s responsive
memorandum was filed.

21
should not be disturbed.” Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Obermoller, 429 N.W.2d 251, 255
(Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 1988). In summarily dismissing
appellant’s complaint, the district court refere nced this authority under rule 56.06(a), and
specifically discussed the prospect of its doing so at the hearing on appellant’s dispositive
motion.
At an earlier hearing on December 20, 20 18, the district court and the parties had
discussed at length the framing of appellant’s complaint and whether appellant must plead
and prove damages in order to recover money damages under the MGDPA. The
University, in opposing appe llant’s motion for summary ju dgment, further outlined its
argument concerning the need for proof of da mages in an action as appellant framed the
issues in his complaint, and it implored the district court to exercise its discretion to dismiss
appellant’s complaint under Minn . R. Civ. P. 56.06. On Fe bruary 11, 2019, the district
court held a motion hearing on appellant’s summary judgment motion. At the hearing,
appellant argued his motion and asked clarifying questions about the University’s motion.
The University clarified, at appellant’s direction, that it filed only a response to appellant’s
motion for summary judgment. The University explained that its response referenced the
district court’s ability to use its discretion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.06 to summarily
dismiss appellant’s complaint based on the r ecord as constituted. The University also
reiterated its argument concerning the insufficiency of appellant’s claim for damages.
Appellant had a meaningful opportunity to oppose the University’s arguments based
both on the University’s written response a nd its arguments at the summary judgment
motion hearing. He did so in his presentation to the distri ct court in response to the

22
University’s request that the district court ex ercise its discretion under Minn. R. Civ. P.
56.06. The question of whether appellant had pleaded and produced evidence of damages
was raised in the University’s response to appellant’s di spositive motion and was further
clarified and discussed at length at the moti on hearing. Appellant was not prejudiced by
the district court’s summary judgment ruling.3
V. The district court did not abuse its disc retion in denying appellant’s motion to
remove the district court judge for cause.

Appellant also argues on appeal that the district court erred by denying his motion
to remove the district court judge for cause an d that the Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial
District further erred by affirming the denial of his motion to remove.
“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the [district] court
and this court will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” Hooper v. State , 680
N.W.2d 89, 93 (Minn. 2004). “While removal is warranted when the judge’s impartiality

3 Our conclusion is limited to the facts of this particular case, wherein the parties sparred
and parried at multiple heari ngs concerning whether damage s are recoverable for every
MGDPA violation or whether a claimant must plead and prove damages in order to recover
money damages under Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1. We think district courts should be—
and ordinarily are—hesitant to summarily dismiss a complaint under rule 56 in the absence
of a motion seeking that relief. See Obermoller , 429 N.W.2d at 255 (stating that the
exercise of a court’s inherent power to gran t summary judgment should be “judicious”).
And we think that a party seeking summary adjudication should ordinarily note a motion
to that effect in compliance with the Minnesota General Rules of Practice. See Del Hayes
& Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 230 N.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Minn. 1975) (explaining that the district
court is not expressly authorized to ente r summary judgment sua sponte, but that its
inherent power allows it to do so in certain cases). Nevertheless, this case is, as the factual
recitation above suggests, unique. The only specific and legally recognized damage claims
argued by appellant to the district court are in the nature of damages for defamation, a cause
of action which appellant did not plead at th e district court. And the summary-judgment
record reveals no other injury or compensable item of damages suffered by appellant that
could lead to a recovery of money under the MGDPA.

23
might reasonably be que stioned, a petitioner’s subjective be lief that the judge is biased
does not necessarily warrant removal.” Id.
Appellant moved for removal of the district court j udge on April 27, 2019—just
after the district court judge denied his motion for an in-camera review. The district judge
determined that it was appropriate to deny appellant’s request because the Rules of Judicial
Conduct did not require her to recuse herself and because no prejudice had occurred.
From the record, it seems that the district judge’s spous e formerly worked for the
University at its Duluth campus. The spouse is retired. In the order of the Chief Judge of
the Sixth Judicial District affirming the denial of appellant’s motion, the Chief Judge found
that “[n]othing in the record indicates bias or prejudice towards either party on the part of
[the district court judge].” The Chief Judge fu rther explained that “[t]he mere fact that a
party does not like the way a court rules does not demonstrate bias.”
There is no indication in the record that the district j udge was disqualified in this
circumstance because of bias or prejudice. Both the district court and the Chief Judge acted
within their discretion in denying appellant’s motion to remove the district court judge.
VI. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying appellant’s motion
for relief from judgment.

Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying appellant’s motion for relief
under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.
In denying appellant’s motion under rule 60.02(a), and as discussed at length above,
the district court explained that appellant was not surpri sed by the summary adjudication
of his claims because he had notice of the di strict court’s discretion to act on its own in

24
granting summary judgment for a nonmoving party and had a “chance to reply before and
during the hearing on February 11, 2019.”
In denying appellant’s motion under rule 60.02(c), the district court found that
appellant failed to demonstrate how the Univ ersity’s statement th at it had provided
appellant with all of the requested data “p revented him from presenting his case.” The
district court also addressed appellant’s cl aim for relief under rule 60.02(f), which ruling
appellant does not seem to challenge on appeal. The district court found appellant’s claim
under 60.02(f) to be “essentially a rehash[ing] of his previous arguments and filings.”
“We review a district court’s denial of a rule 60.02 motion for an abuse of
discretion.” In re Commitment of Hand, 878 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Minn. App. 2016), review
denied (Minn. June 21, 2016). Rule 60.02 allo ws for relief from judgment for one of the
following reasons:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
. . . ;
(c) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party;
. . . ; or
(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment.
“Rule 60.02 can be utilized only if one of the grounds specified in the rule exists.” Carter
v. Anderson , 554 N.W.2d 110, 11 3 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23,
1996).
The district court’s findings and conclu sions concerning appellant’s motion for
relief from judgment are supported by the record. Appellant fails to demonstrate on appeal

25
that he was entitled to relief from judgment ba sed on surprise, fraud, or any other basis
recognized by the rule. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s
motion.
Affirmed.