Robert E. Cattanach v. City of St. Paul

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1167

Robert E. Cattanach,
Respondent,

vs.

City of St. Paul,
Appellant.

Filed September 8, 2026
Affirmed in part and remanded
Larson, Judge
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Wheelock, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-23-1549

Mahesha P. Subbaraman, Subbaraman PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent/cross-appellant Robert E. Cattanach)

Irene Kao, St. Paul City Attorney, Colin Laffey, Assistant City Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant/cross-respondent City of St. Paul)

Paul A. Merwin, Patricia Y. Beety, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
amici curiae League of Minnesota Cities and Minnesota County Attorneys Association)

Paul J. Bosman, PJB Law, St. Paul, Minnesota (for amicus curiae Minnesotans for Open
Government)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Following cross- motions for summary judgment, appellant City of St. Paul and
respondent Robert E. Cattanach challenge the district court’s summary-judgment decision
under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01-.991
(2024). The city argues the district court erred when it determined the city violated the
MGDPA and awarded Cattanach exemplary damages. Cattanach asserts the district court
erred when it did not decide his theory at summary judgment that the city violated the
MGDPA when it failed to issue a preservation notice, concluded he failed to set forth an
issue of material fact that he suffered “any damage,” and determined he was not entitled to
attorney fees. Because Cattanach raised the preservation-notice issue at summary
judgment and the district court did not decide it, we remand for the district court to consider
that issue in the first instance. We otherwise affirm.
FACTS1
The City’s MGDPA Website, Policy, and Procedure
The city maintains a website that includes a webpage designed for the public to
submit data requests under the MGDPA. The webpage provides the following instruction:
Departments within the [city] each process data practices
requests. Select a department below to submit a request. If
you do not know which department the data resides in, use the
“Keyword Search” option below. It may assist you in finding
the correct department and examples of documents that are
available.

1 The following undisputed facts are drawn from the summary-judgment record. See
Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC, 922 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Minn. 2019).

3
The webpage lists various departments with a short description of the data the department
might have. The city designed the webpage so data requests are department-specific, and
requesters cannot simultaneously submit a data request to multiple departments.
As a matter of procedure, the city clerk, the responsible authority,2 or their designee3
will help locate relevant data for a requester. The city clerk has designated various
department heads or directors as designees. When a request comes in, a designee from the
relevant department gets an email from the system that includes the text of the data request.
If a designee receives a data request and believes the data is located in a different
department, the designee can reassign the data request to another department. If a designee
believes the data request may involve data in multiple departments, the designee can make
a “child request” and open a “ticket” with both departments.4 Per city policy, a designee’s
decision to open a “child request” is fully discretionary. As a result, designees use the
“child request” process inconsistently.5 The webpage does not describe this procedure.

2 As relevant here, MGDPA defines “‘ responsible authority’ in any political subdivision
[to] mean[] the individual designated by the governing body of that political subdivision
as the individual responsible for the collection, use, and dissemination of any set of data
on individuals, government data, or summary data, unless otherwise provided by state
law.” Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 16(b).
3 The MGDPA defines “designee” to mean “any person designated by a responsible
authority to be in charge of individual files or systems containing government data and to
receive and comply with requests for government data.” Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 6.
4 A “ticket” is opened when a MGDPA request is submitted through the webpage. When
a designee selects another department that may have data, the vendor calls it a “child
request” and creates another “ticket.”
5 For example, the parks department and the public-works department received identical
data requests from Cattanach on February 5, 2023. The public-works department made a
“child request” to the financial-services department. The parks department did not make
any “child request.”

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When a designee receives a data request for communications or emails, the city’s
Office of Technology and Communication (OTC) conducts the search. OTC has the
capability to search all city emails. OTC executes search queries based on forms the
designees provide, which include keywords and can identify specific email addresses to
search. Very rarely will OTC alter keywords. When submitting the form to OTC,
designees defer to the data request if the requester specifies keywords. If the requestor
does not specify keywords, designees have discretion to formulate keywords. Typically,
more general keyword searches will return a larger quantity of emails, which designees
must review to determine if they contain data that must be produced; longer or more
specific keyword searches will return fewer emails that designees must review.
Cattanach’s MGDPA Requests
In 2022, the city was considering a proposal to construct a bike trail along Summit
Avenue (the project). From July 22, 2022, through March 9, 2023, Cattanach, as a citizen
interested in the project, submitted numerous data requests under the MGDPA to the city.
The data requests and the city’s responses are summarized below.
A. July 22, 2022 – Part III(A) in District Court Order
On July 22, 2022, Cattanach submitted his first five MGDPA requests seeking
information on the project. Cattanach selected the parks department on the webpage.
Cattanach broadly requested all “public data created, produced, received, maintained, or
disseminated” on broad topics concerning the project. His requests included, for example,
“all analysis studies, or documentations that were performed, if any, that compare the
hazards to cyclists of the proposed plan relative to the existing bike lanes, or that support

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the city’s assertion that the proposed two-way trail is in fact safer than the existing one-
way bike lanes,” and any “analysis, communications, or discussions that currently exist”
regarding plans to conduct environmental review.
The parks-department designee (parks designee) received the July 22, 2022
requests. The parks designee then met with parks-department staff members to identify
the staff in their department who might have relevant data. Subsequently, the parks
designee submitted a search request to OTC. The parks designee limited its OTC request
to search the emails of just five members of the parks-department staff. The city provided
Cattanach responsive data in September 2022, November 2022, and December 2022.
The parks designee also sent an email to the designee in the public-works
department (public-works designee) to informally flag the requests , meaning the “child
request” process was not used. The public-works designee only solicited information from
public-works-department staff on the third request, despite noting that the requests
“obviously [were] overlapping” with public-works matters. In March 2023, approximately
eight months after Cattanach sent the third request, OTC was asked to search for relevant
documents. That search produced 202 responsive emails. The record does not reflect
whether the city produced any data to Cattanach as a result of the March 2023 search.
B. December 26, 2022 – Part III(B) in District Court Order
On December 26, 2022, Cattanach submitted another MGDPA request, seeking data
regarding communications with specific groups—including “elected officials.” Cattanach
selected the parks department on the webpage. The parks designee again received the
request. The parks designee determined that OTC should use the same keyword searches

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it used to find data responsive to the July 22, 2022 requests. It does not appear that the
parks designee contacted any other department about this request. The city provided
Cattanach responsive data in February 2023. On April 12, 2023, following Cattanach’s
request for a temporary restraining order (TRO), the district court ordered the city to
supplement its responses to Cattanach’s MGDPA requests prior to an evidentiary hearing
on the TRO motion (April 2023 order). In response to this order, the city produced
additional data responsive to this request on April 20, 2023—almost four months after the
initial request.
C. January 16, 2023 – Part III(C) in District Court Order
Cattanach submitted another MGDPA request on January 16, 2023, seeking
documents, emails, and text messages from specific individuals “regarding the removal of
ash trees from Summit Avenue. ” Cattanach again selected the parks department on the
webpage. The parks designee requested that OTC search the emails of five specific
individuals for the phrase “removal of ash trees from Summit Avenue.” The parks designee
also informally asked one staff member in the parks department if they had responsive text
messages; the staff member responded that they did not. Based upon this search, the city
provided Cattanach 11 responsive documents in February 2023. Upon conducting a more
thorough search to comply with the April 2023 order, however, the OTC search uncovered
an additional 775 responsive emails. We have not located any record evidence to indicate
whether this search resulted in the city producing documents to Cattanach.

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D. January 29, 2023 – Parts III(D)-(E) in District Court Order
Cattanach submitted two MGDPA requests on January 29, 2023. Cattanach selected
the parks department on the webpage for both requests. The first request broadly sought
documents about “potential funding” for the project. The parks designee directed OTC to
search the emails of five parks-department staff for the terms “Summit Avenue Regional
Trail funding[,]” “summit funding[,]” “summit trail funding[,]” “summit bike finding[,]”
and “potential funding of the proposed bicycle facility on Summit Avenue.” Once again,
the parks designee did not ask any other department if they had responsive data. OTC’s
email search elicited no responsive emails. In March 2023, the city produced seven
documents to Cattanach. However, the search following the April 2023 order revealed 185
additional responsive emails. That month, in a separate response, the city produced seven
additional emails to Cattanach.
The second request broadly sought “[d]ocuments related to any historical review”
for the project. The parks designee directed OTC to search the emails of three specific
parks-department staff for the terms “Summit Avenue Historical review[,]” “106 Historical
Review[,]” “HPC Review[,]” and “Summit Avenue bicycle facility section 106 historical
review.” As with prior requests, the parks designee did not ask any other department if
they had responsive data. The OTC search uncovered no responsive emails. In February
2023, the city produced 16 documents and informed Cattanach that there were no
responsive emails. But in the search following the April 2023 order, OTC found another
65 responsive emails. The city produced 56 of the emails to Cattanach on April 17, 2023.

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E. February 5, 2023 – Parts III(F)-(G) in District Court Order
On February 5, 2023, Cattanach submitted three MGDPA requests. The first request
sought communications, including text messages, with a specific individual, and Cattanach
selected the public-works department. The public-works designee and Cattanach reached
an agreement on the emails that would be searched. After OTC conducted the search, the
public-works designee produced 78 emails. At some identified time, the public-works
designee asked for responsive text messages from specific employees; four text messages
were produced to Cattanach.
For the second and third requests, Cattanach made identical requests to the parks
department and the public-works department on the webpage, seeking all communications
with a nonprofit. The public-works designee contacted Cattanach to inform him that no
records were found, but that the request had been forwarded to the financial-services
department. The public-works designee opened a formal “child request” with the financial-
services department. The financial-services department opened a “General Multi-
Department Request,” but did not locate any responsive data. The parks designee emailed
Cattanach on February 6, 2023, to state that no relevant data was found. The parks designee
did not create any formal “child request,” and the record does not indicate where the parks
designee searched in response to this request.
F. February 13, 2023 – Parts III(H)-(I) in District Court Order
Cattanach submitted three more MGDPA requests on February 13, 2023. For the
first two requests, Cattanach made identical requests to the parks department and the
public-works department on the webpage, seeking all communications with an identified

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person. The public-works designee reached out to Cattanach to ask whether there were
any “specific city staff members” whose emails Cattanach believed should be included in
the search. OTC’s search per the public-works request was then limited to the individuals
Cattanach identified. The parks designee asked OTC to search the emails of the three
individuals they deemed to have the most relevant information. OTC broadly searched for
emails containing the identified person’s name in these three emails. These searches
returned 99 emails from the public- works department and 47 emails from the parks
department. The parks department produced 12 emails, and the public-works department
produced one email, to Cattanach.
For the third request, Cattanach submitted a request to the public-works department,
requesting information about the water infrastructure beneath Summit Avenue. The
public-works designee informed Cattanach that some of the data he requested was housed
in the water-services department, and the public-works designee entered a “child request”
with the water-services department. Ultimately, the public -works department produced
14 documents, and the water-services department produced two documents.
G. February 28, 2023 – Parts III(J)-(L) in District Court Order
On February 28, 2023, Cattanach made three MGDPA requests and selected the
public-works department on the webpage. For the first request, Cattanach broadly sought
all “[d]ocuments, communications, or analysis” supporting a statement made at a public
meeting regarding the project’s cost. The public-works designee did not seek data from
any other department and disclosed only one document—an excel spreadsheet.

10
For the second request, Cattanach asked for “documents, studies or analysis”
relating to another statement made at a public meeting regarding tree loss. Nothing in the
record indicates the public-works designee contacted the city forester, who is a staff
member in the parks department, regarding this request. Only one document —titled
“RSVP Projects”—was produced in response to this request.
The third request likewise sought information about the project’s impact on trees.
And, as with the second request, there is no indication that the public-works designee
sought information from the city forester. The public-works designee provided only the
same “RSVP Projects” document already in Cattanach’s possession and informed
Cattanach that “[p]ublic works has no other responsive data as we have not done any study
or analysis.”
H. March 9, 2023 – Part III(M) in District Court Order6
Cattanach submitted his final two MGDPA requests regarding the project on March
9, 2023, seeking “[a]ll communications in any way referencing” two specific individuals.
Cattanach submitted the requests to the parks department and the public-works department.
The public-works designee emailed Cattanach seeking to “confirm [the] search
parameters and key words” as the names of the two individuals and “Summit Ave Bike
Trail.” Cattanach responded affirmatively. Thereafter, the public-works designee
submitted the agreed-to search to OTC. The search returned only one responsive

6 We note the chart lists Part III(M) as occurring on February 28, 2023, but the district
court’s analysis relates to the March 9, 2023 requests.

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document, from an individual in the mayor’s office. As with prior requests, there is no
indication in the record that the public-works designee reached out to any other department.
The parks designee submitted a request to OTC to perform an email search for three
identified parks-department staff. The search returned 5,139 emails, and the parks designee
produced 55 emails and 31 other files to Cattanach.
A request was also submitted to OTC to search the email of the individual in the
mayor’s office. OTC’s search returned 274 emails, but the record does not indicate
whether the city produced any of these emails to Cattanach.
Procedural History
In March 2023, Cattanach, a licensed attorney who represented himself, sued the
city claiming it violated the MGDPA. Cattanach also requested an injunction compelling
the city to comply with the MGDPA and a TRO enjoining the city from taking further
action on the project until it complied.
As noted above, t he district court issued the April 2023 order. Citing Webster v.
Hennepin County, the district court observed that “government entities are required to
‘keep records containing government data in such an arrangement and condition as to make
them easily accessible for convenient use.’” See 910 N.W.2d 420, 427 (Minn. 2018). The
order also expressed concern about the city’s data-retention policies. Generally, the district
court was concerned with the city’s procedures, for example, the fact that “[t]he record
disclose[d] precious little about where the [c]ity searched and how it searched,” nor about
whether requestors were informed that, by selecting a department from a drop-down menu,
the resulting search would be limited to that department. Moreover, the order cast doubt

12
on the credibility of city-staff statements in their affidavits and noted that the staff
“show[ed] no urgency at all” in responding to some of Cattanach’s requests. In light of
these deficiencies, the district court ordered the city to supplement its responses to
Cattanach’s MGDPA requests by noon on April 26, 2023, prior to an evidentiary hearing
on the TRO motion on April 27, 2023.
In response to the April 2023 order, the city produced additional data. At the
evidentiary hearing on April 27, 2023, the city elicited testimony from several staff
members, including the city clerk, the parks designee, the public- works designee, and
OTC’s deputy director. On May 4, 2023, the district court issued an order concluding the
city “did not respond to the initial data requests using [a] procedure that would insure an
appropriate and prompt response” and thus likely violated the MGDPA.7 The district court
was troubled with the witness testimony regarding how the city had located the additional
documents that it produced before the evidentiary hearing. The district court had been
“hopeful” that the hearing would shed more light on the issue but concluded “that did not
happen.” The May 4, 2023 order concluded by requiring the parties to participate in a two-
week compliance-facilitation process overseen by a neutral third party.
On May 23, 2023, after the compliance-facilitation process, the district court issued
its order denying Cattanach’s request for a TRO. The district court noted that, based upon

7 On May 5, 2023, the city filed a notice of appeal from this order and on May 8, 2023, the
city filed a motion to stay the order pending appeal. We denied the stay motion on May
19, 2023, and on July 20, 2023, we dismissed the appeal based on the city’s voluntary
dismissal. City of St. Paul v. Cattanach, No. A23-0665 (Minn. App. July 20, 2023)
(order op.).

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the evidence, some of Cattanach’s requests still had not been fulfilled. Per the order, “the
[c]ity seem[ed] incapable or unwilling on its own to inform the [district] [c]ourt as to how
it planned to or did address the identified deficiencies.” The district court also found it
“perplexing” that the city maintained its position that it had complied with the MGDPA
even though, following the April 2023 order, the city’s “own efforts . . . created an ever
increasing quantity of evidence” suggesting the city had “not maintained its data in the
required ‘arrangement and condition,’ or for that matter in any consistent arrangement and
condition.” But a result of this continuing production of documents, the district court
noted, was that the public’s interest in transparency had been “increasingly addressed.”
For that reason, the district court denied Cattanach’s TRO request. Nonetheless, the district
court directed the city to conduct further searches for some requests and instructed the
parties to meet and confer to assess whether additional searches were required. Thereafter,
the city determined the planning and economic development department had an entire
folder titled “Summit Avenue Regional Trail Master Plan” that had not been produced to
Cattanach.
On June 26, 2023, Cattanach filed a motion to compel compliance. On June 27,
2023, the city requested a conference to discuss the issues remaining in the case. Cattanach
agreed. On July 25, 2023, the city filed a memorandum in response to Cattanach’s motion
to compel compliance. The district court held the hearing on August 8, 2023, during which
the remaining issues were narrowed. The district court then directed Cattanach to submit
a statement listing the violations for which he sought damages and asked the city to

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respond. On September 8, 2023, Cattanach submitted the requested memorandum,
requesting exemplary damages.8 On September 18, 2023, the city submitted its response.
On December 21, 2023, the district court issued an order. First, the district court
granted Cattanach’s motion to compel. Second, the district court determined Cattanach
was entitled to exemplary damages if the city willfully violated the MGDPA because a
“whole, separate, non-dependent liability” for exemplary damages is available even absent
“actual damages” under Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1. To support its decision, the district
court noted that “the requestor, more often than not, will be unable to quantify the value of
the loss of transparency and confidence that the MGDPA promotes .” See Minn. Stat.
§ 13.08, subd. 1. Relying on Demers v. City of Minneapolis, the district court explained
its view that, although exemplary damages are precluded by a good faith belief that material
is not public under the MGDPA, “[f]ailure to establish procedures that are in compliance
with the MGDPA or failure to follow procedures that are in compliance with the MGDPA
is not acting in good faith.” See 486 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. App. 1992).
After discovery concluded, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment,
and the district court issued its order on the motions in July 2024. The district court first
addressed Cattanach’s request for compensatory damages for both “the time any layperson
requestor would have been required to spend” in attempting to secure compliance, as well
as “the time required” of him as an attorney “to commence and prosecute an action seeking
compliance with the MGDPA.” The district court rejected both requests on the grounds

8 Cattanach also noted that he may be entitled to nominal damages, without argument or
analysis.

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that a non-attorney cannot receive attorney fees for advocating on their own behalf, and
that the purpose of attorney-fees provisions “is not served by allowing attorneys to recover
fees while appearing as both attorney and client.” The district court next considered
whether the city violated the MGDPA, either through its insufficient procedure producing
inappropriate responses, insufficient procedure producing untimely responses, or
production that was so untimely that an insufficient procedure was the only explanation
supported by the record. 9 The district court provided a detailed chart illustrating its
conclusions regarding the MGDPA requests.10

9 For the production that was so untimely that an insufficient procedure was the only
explanation supported by the record, the district court—at times—used the word
“inferred.” The city does not argue that, in using this language, the district court did not
appropriately draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Hix v. Minn. Workers’ Comp.
Assigned Risk Plan, 520 N.W.2d 497, 503 (Minn. App. 1994) (noting that “on cross-motion
for summary judgment each party benefits by a ‘view of the evidence most favorable to
him, and with doubts and inferences in his favor’” (quoting Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Snyder,
356 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Minn. App. 1984))).
10 The district court did not address Cattanach’s argument that the city’s failure to issue a
preservation notice constituted an MGDPA violation.

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The district court determined that, with respect to the 13 MGDPA violations
identified with an “X” in the first column, the city’s failures to conduct appropriate searches
were willful such that Cattanach was entitled to exemplary damages because the city
enacted policies and procedures directly at odds with the MGDPA. Specifically, the city’s

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failure to set forth a coherent policy for looking outside a single department and the
webpage’s “architecture” combined to create “a policy and practice” that—no matter the
nature of the request —a search for data would be limited “to a single department.”
According to the district court, this policy violated the MGDPA, which does not “allow a
government entity to unilaterally limit” a requester’s ability to search for data within the
entire government. In reaching this decision, the district court explicitly stated that not
every data request requires an entity-wide search. Instead, the search for records must be
an exercise of considered judgment as to the request made. The district court noted that
the starting point for the exercise of considered judgment must be that “the MGDPA
identifies all data of a government entity is public.” The district court also noted that the
MGDPA does not prohibit a government entity from asking the requester to narrow the
search or offer “an opinion as to a department where a search might commence.” The
district court was unpersuaded that the “child request” procedure resolved the inadequacies
with the city’s policy and practice, because— other than the response to the third July 22,
2022 request—there was no record evidence indicating the designees engaged in reasoned
decisionmaking to ascertain what departments might have responsive data.
11 In sum, the
district court concluded that a policy that eliminates considered judgment on the part of the
responsible authority or designee and, instead, creates a presumption that a government
entity need only search within a single department when it receives a data request violates
the MGDPA.

11 The district court also noted that the undisputed evidence showed that “‘child requests’
were the exception, not the rule.”

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The district court then explained why the city’s single-department policy did not
result in MGDPA violations for three of Cattanach’s data requests. The district court noted
the January 16, 2023 request and one of the February 5, 2023 requests did not result in
MGDPA violations because the requests “were sufficiently specific so as to reasonably
allow for a targeted search.” And the district court concluded the city did not violate the
MGDPA in response to one of the February 13, 2023 requests because Cattanach limited
his request by agreement.
With respect to the second column, the district court identified three instances with
an “X” where the city violated the MGDPA because its responses were not prompt. The
district court noted that these delays were caused by a designee selecting overly restrictive
initial searches. But the district court concluded that Cattanach failed to create an issue of
material fact that he was entitled to exemplary damages because a lack of policy and
training resulted in the untimely delays, not willful acts.
Finally, with respect to the third column, the district court found two requests,
identified with an “X,” that resulted in untimely responses “from which one can infer [a]
procedure that does not insure compliance with the MGDPA.” See Webster, 910 N.W.2d
at 431-32. The district court noted that an OTC email search related to the third July 22,
2022 request was not initiated until eight months after Cattanach submitted it. And the
OTC email search related to Cattanach’s December 26, 2022 request was not initiated for
nearly four months after Cattanach submitted it. The district court determined that these
violations were willful because the city’s procedures “allowed the [c]ity [to do] nothing to
meet the MGDPA’s requirements for too long.” In total, the district court determined that

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the city’s responses to 15 of Cattanach’s requests violated the MGDPA, and 14 of those
violations were willful.12
After the district court issued its summary-judgment order, the parties agreed to fix
exemplary damages at $30,000 and reserve all other issues for appeal. The city appeals,
and Cattanach cross-appeals the district court’s summary-judgment decision.
DECISION
Both parties challenge the district court’s summary-judgment decision. The district
court must grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact” and that the moving party is “entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. We review a district court’s summary-judgment decision
de novo. Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2014). On appeal
from summary judgment on undisputed facts, our review “is limited to determining
whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Marshall v. Inn on Madeline
Island, 631 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Minn. App. 2001).
The city raises three challenges to the district court’s summary-judgment decision,
arguing the district court erred when it determined: (1) the city violated the MGDPA; (2) a
district court can award exemplary damages absent proof that the plaintiff suffered “any
damage”; and (3) the city’s MGDPA violations were “willful.” In his cross-appeal,
Cattanach challenges the district court’s summary-judgment decision on the bases that the

12 The district court reached this number by counting multiple violations to the same request
as a single violation (to avoid double counting), for a total of 15 violations and 14 willful
violations.

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district court: (1) improperly declined to resolve his preservation-notice argument;
(2) concluded he failed to set forth an issue of material fact that he suffered “any damage”;
and (3) decided he was not entitled to attorney fees.
To resolve this case, we evaluate the issues in the following order. First, we examine
the arguments regarding the city’s alleged MGDPA violations. Second, we consider the
parties’ arguments with respect to damages.
I.
The parties both challenge the district court’s application of the MGDPA to the
city’s responses to Cattanach’s data requests. The city argues the district court legally erred
when it concluded the city violated the MGDPA. Cattanach asserts the district court
improperly failed to consider his argument that the city violated the MGDPA when it failed
to issue a preservation notice. We address each argument in turn.
A. MGDPA Violations
The city argues the district court erred when it concluded the city violated the
MGDPA. The MGDPA provides: “The responsible authority in every government entity
shall establish procedures, consistent with this chapter, to insure that requests for
government data are received and complied with in an appropriate and prompt manner.”
Minn. Stat. § 13.03, subd. 2(a). The MGDPA does not define “insure.” But the Minnesota
Supreme Court has concluded that the use of the word “insure” suggests that a government

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entity’s “‘established procedures,’ when followed, should result in appropriate and prompt
responses in all cases.” Webster, 910 N.W.2d at 431.
In Webster, the county conceded its responses to MGDPA requests were not prompt.
Id. But the county argued the procedures were, nonetheless, appropriate because Webster
failed to demonstrate that the county’s procedures caused the untimely response. Id. at
432. The supreme court concluded that the procedure the county employed did not “insure”
prompt and appropriate responses. Id. at 431-32. The supreme court noted that, despite
the county following its established procedure, “the record contain[ed] substantial evidence
of the [c]ounty’s missteps and failures in responding to Webster’s request at every juncture,
leading inexorably to the conclusion that the existing procedures were insufficient to meet
the statutory requirements.” Id. at 432; see also id. at 433 (noting “the record demonstrates
that the [c]ounty’s missteps and delays in responding to Webster’s request were not the
result of the arrangement of its records but the [c]ounty’s procedures, or lack thereof, for
gathering responsive data”).
Here, as illustrated above, the district court identified three categories of MGDPA
violations based upon the undisputed facts: (1) inadequate responses caused by the city’s
procedure; (2) untimely responses caused by the city’s procedure; and (3) production that
was so untimely that an insufficient procedure was the only explanation supported by the
record.
The city does not challenge any of the individual determinations or the facts
underlying the district court’s decision that the city violated the MGDPA. Instead, the city
asserts the district court misinterpreted the MGDPA when it required a government

22
entity—in all cases— to conduct “entity wide searches for responsive data.” This argument
mischaracterizes the district court’s decision. In fact, the district court explicitly said:
“This is not to say that every request requires a[n] [entity]-wide search or contact with
every . . . department.” Instead, the district court concluded that the search for records
must be tailored to the request made. The district court also noted that the MGDPA does
not prohibit a government entity from asking the requester to narrow the search or offer
“an opinion as to a department where a search might commence.” Thus, contrary to the
city’s argument, the district court did not conclude that a government entity must conduct
a government-wide search in response to every MGDPA request. Instead, it concluded
that a policy creating a presumption that a government entity need only search within a
single department, thereby eliminating considered judgment on the part of the responsible
authority, or designee , that results in inadequate or untimely disclosures violates the
MGDPA.
The city separately argues, specific to the 13 MGDPA violations identified in the
first column, that the district court legally erred when it concluded the city violated the
MGDPA because Cattanach provided no evidence “to show why other specific
departments should have been involved in any of the [c]ity’s responsive data searches.”
This is not supported by the record. We provide a few illustrations.
• The December 26, 2022 request specifically sought
information from “elected officials.” Yet, the city did
not produce any evidence to demonstrate anyone
reached out to a single elected official —or their
department—to ascertain whether they had responsive
data.

23
• Two of the February 28, 2023 requests asked for
information about tree loss. Yet, nothing in the record
indicates the public-works designee reached out to the
city forester who was organizationally housed in the
parks department.

• After the compliance- facilitation process and denial of
the TRO, the record shows the city determined the
planning and economic development department had an
entire folder, named Summit Avenue Regional Trail
Master Plan, with data responsive to Cattanach’s
requests.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not err when it
concluded the city violated the MGDPA.
B. Preservation Notice
Cattanach argues the district court erroneously disregarded his theory that the city
violated the MGDPA when it failed to issue a preservation notice in response to his
multiple requests that the city insure that documents, emails, text messages, and other data
relating to his requests were not lost. 13 The city argues Cattanach’s argument fails as a
matter of law. In the alternative, the city asserts that we should remand to the district court
to decide the issue in the first instance. The record demonstrates that Cattanach argued the
city had an obligation to issue a preservation notice at summary judgment, and the district
court did not decide the issue. “Our review is limited to those issues decided by the lower
court.” Jorgensen v. Knutson, 662 N.W.2d 893, 904 (Minn. 2003). Accordingly, we

13 To support the theory that the MGDPA required the city to issue a preservation notice,
Cattanach relies on Minn. Stat. § 13.03, subd. 1, the supreme court’s interpretation of that
statute in Halva v. Minnesota State Colleges & Universities, 953 N.W.2d 496, 506 (Minn.
2021), and several advisory opinions from the agency charged with enforcing the MGDPA.

24
remand to the district court to decide this issue in a manner consistent with this opinion.
See id. (remanding undecided issue in context of summary-judgment decision).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision that the city
violated the MGDPA, and remand for the district court to consider Cattanach’s
preservation-notice theory.
II.
Because we conclude the district court correctly granted summary judgment in
Cattanach’s favor on the ground that the city violated the MGDPA, we next consider three
legal arguments regarding Cattanach’s entitlement to damages under section 13.08,
subdivision 1. The statute provides:
Notwithstanding section 466.03, a responsible authority
or government entity which violates any provision of this
chapter is liable to a person . . . who suffers any damage as a
result of the violation, and the person damaged . . . may bring
an action against the responsible authority or government
entity to cover any damages sustained, plus costs and
reasonable attorney fees. In the case of a willful violation, the
government entity shall, in addition, be liable to exemplary
damages of not less than $1,000, nor more than $15,000 for
each violation.

Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1 (emphases added).
First, Cattanach argues the district court misinterpreted the phrase “any damage”
when it concluded that he failed to raise an issue of material fact that the city’s MGDPA
violations caused him damage. Second, the city asserts the district court erred when it
concluded the statute permits a requester to recover exemplary damages absent proving

25
“any damage.” Third, the city contends the district court erred when it interpreted the
phrase “willful” and applied it to the MGDPA violations that occurred here.
These arguments present questions of statutory interpretation that we review
de novo. Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 2014). When
interpreting a statute, our goal is to “effectuate the intention of the legislature, reading the
statute as a whole.” Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted). “When legislative intent is clear from the statute’s plain and
unambiguous language, we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning.” City of
Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. 2013). When assessing
whether a statute is plain and unambiguous, we look to the statute’s “text, structure, and
punctuation” and apply the preambiguity canons of interpretation. State v. Lee, 22 N.W.3d
608, 614 (Minn. App. 2025) (quoting State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 921 (Minn.
2019)); see also State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (distinguishing
between preambiguity “canons of interpretation” and postambiguity “canons of
construction”). The preambiguity canons of interpretation include the ordinary- meaning
canon, the whole -statute canon, the canon against surplusage, and the presumption of
consistent usage. Lee, 22 N.W.3d at 614. “Only when [a statute’s] language is subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation may we ‘consider extrinsic sources and canons.’”
Id. (quoting State v. Woolridge Carter, 9 N.W.3d 839, 844 (Minn. 2024)).
We address each argument in turn.

26
A. “Any Damage”
Cattanach first agues the district court erred when it concluded that he did not prove
that he suffered “any damage as a result of the [city’s] violation[s].” See Minn. Stat.
§ 13.08, subd. 1. According to Cattanach, the word “any” is expansive and includes two
types of damages the district court disregarded: nominal damages and lost-time damages.
Beginning with nominal damages, Cattanach did not include a request for nominal
damages in his complaint, he did not make any argument for why nominal damages might
be included in the phrase “any damage” in district court, and the district court never decided
the issue. Therefore, we need not consider whether “nominal damages” are included in the
phrase “any damage” because the issue was not meaningfully raised in district court. See
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (noting that we consider “only those
issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the [district] court in
deciding the matter before it”).
Regarding lost-time damages, we assume without deciding that lost- time damages
may be compensable under the MGDPA. See Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1 (“any damage”);
see also O’Neill v. Johnson, 55 N.W. 601, 602 (Minn. 1893) (allowing recovery for loss of
time defending malicious prosecution). But under existing precedent, a plaintiff is only
entitled to lost-time damages if they prove a loss of earnings, not a loss of personal time.
See Cox v. Chicago Great W. R. Co., 223 N.W. 675, 677 (Minn. 1929) (“[I]t would not
seem that both loss of time and loss of earnings or wages, treated as separate items and
covering the same period of time, should be allowed.”); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

27
420 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Minn. 2006) (applying Cox and concluding that “[a] plaintiff can
only recover for loss of time in terms of earning capacity or wages”).
Here, Cattanach submitted an affidavit indicating he spent seven hours on non-
litigation efforts to obtain the data he requested. 14 In the affidavit, he did not allege any
lost earnings during these seven hours.15 At summary judgment, Cattanach had the burden
to demonstrate an issue of material fact that he lost earnings during this time in order to
sustain a claim for lost -time damages. Because Cattanach did not meet his burden, the
district court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to Cattanach’s claim for
lost-time damages. See Adams v. Harpstead, 947 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn. App. 2020)
(“Proof of damages is an essential element of a claim for compensatory relief under the
MGDPA.”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2020).

14 On appeal, Cattanach also argues that he is entitled to “reasonable attorney fees” under
Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1. But the record reflects that Cattanach did not seek attorney
fees in district court; rather, he argued his attorney time met the definition of “any damage.”
Accordingly, we conclude that the issue of whether Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1, would
allow a self-represented attorney to seek attorney fees is forfeited on appeal. See Thiele,
425 N.W.2d at 582 (noting that we consider “only those issues that the record shows were
presented and considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it” and that a
party cannot “obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a
different theory”).
15 Cattanach’s affidavit asserted that he resigned from the partnership at his law firm to
litigate his claims. But this assertion goes to the time he spent litigating the case. And
Cattanach did not argue in this appeal that his attorney time met the definition of “any
damage.”

28
B. “In Addition”
Because Cattanach did not demonstrate that he suffered “any damage,” we must
address the city’s argument that the district court erred when it awarded exemplary
damages. We begin with the parties’ arguments.
The city contends that the legislature’s use of the phrase “in addition” contemplates
that exemplary damages must be added on top of a damages award under the first
sentence.
16 To support its argument, the city contends: (1) the phrase “in addition” has no
meaning if it does not mean on top of damages awarded under the first sentence and (2) the
legislature would have created a separate subdivision to include exemplary damages if it
did not intend exemplary damages to be tied to an award of “any damage.”
17
In contrast, Cattanach argues the phrase “in addition” means “also” and, thereby,
plainly provides that a government entity is subject two kinds of liability: liability for “any
damage” and liability for exemplary damages if the plaintiff proves a willful violation. For
support, Cattanach observes that: (1) the sentence relating to “any damage” targets “a

16 For support, the city relies on our decisions in Krampf v. University of Minnesota,
No. A19-1753, 2020 WL 3410191 (Minn. App. June 22, 2020) and Madison v. Todd
County, No. A20-0794, 2021 WL 1344021 (Minn. App. Apr. 12, 2021). But “[w]e are not
bound by nonprecedential opinions.” State v. Smeby, 4 N.W.3d 165, 169 n.2 (Minn. App.
2024). And, because neither Krampf nor Madison engaged in any textual analysis of the
statute, we conclude they are not persuasive on this point. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (noting that nonprecedential decisions “may be cited as persuasive
authority”).
17 Amicus Minnesotans for Open Government observes that, prior to the legislature adding
additional remedies into the MGDPA, the headnote for this subdivision was “civil
remedies.” While one might read the original headnote to provide some indication as to
why the legislature structured the provision in this manner, as the amicus admits, headnotes
are “mere catchwords to indicate the contents of the section or subdivision and are not part
of the statute.” See Minn. Stat. § 645.49.

29
responsible authority or government entity” and the sentence regarding “exemplary
damages” affects only “the government entity” and (2) the phrase “compensatory or
exemplary damage” appears throughout the MGDPA, which suggests there are two are
separate forms of liability, see Minn. Stat. §§ 13.072, subd. 2, 13.085, subd. 5(f), 13.32,
subd. 8(f).
We begin with the common and ordinary meaning. See City of Brainerd, 827
N.W.2d at 755. The relevant provision provides “a responsible authority or government
entity which violates [the MGDPA] is liable to a person . . . who suffers any damage as a
result of the violation . . . . In the case of a willful violation, the government entity shall,
in addition, be liable to exemplary damages . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1 (emphasis
added).
Both parties contend that the phrase “in addition” resolves the statutory
interpretation question. Where, as here, the statute does not define the operative phrase,
“we may look to dictionary definitions to determine . . . common and ordinary meanings.”
In re E.M.B., 987 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Minn. App. 2023). The dictionary defines the phrase
“in addition” to mean “besides” or “also.” Merriam- Webster Collegiate Dictionary 20
(12th ed. 2026); see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 449
(5th ed. 2018) (defining “in addition” as “[a]lso; as well”).
Applying the definition, the operative phrase reads: “In the case of a willful
violation, the government entity shall, [also], be liable to exemplary damages . . . .” Thus,
one reasonable interpretation of this phrase is that the second sentence “also” provides a
separate basis for liability, distinct from the liability established in the first sentence. And

30
another reasonable interpretation of the phrase is that the second sentence “also” permits
damages once liability is established under the first sentence. Based upon this plain
meaning, we conclude the phrase “in addition” does not resolve the question presented.
And reading the statute as whole does not resolve the question. See State v. Johnson,
995 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Minn. 2023) (noting whole-statute canon “provides that a statute
should be read and construed as a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts”).
There is some appeal to the city’s contention that other remedies are available if a
government entity fails to produce relevant data and, therefore, allowing exemplary
damages absent proof of “any damage” is illogical. See Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 4
(providing civil penalty up to $1,000 in action to compel compliance);
18 Minn. Stat.
§ 13.085, subd. 5(a)(3) (providing for civil penalty of up to $300 following administrative
hearing). But there is also textual support for Cattanach’s proposed interpretation, given
that the MGDPA repeatedly refers to “compensatory or exemplary damages.” See Minn.
Stat. §§ 13.072, subd. 2, 13.085, subd. 5(f), 13.32, subd. 8(f) (emphasis added). If a court
can only impose exemplary damages after finding the existence of compensatory damages,
the statute would provide “compensatory and exemplary.” Yet, the legislature used the
disjunctive, “or,” which generally connotes two separate factual situations. See State v.
Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 2000).
For these reasons, like the district court, we conclude the statute is ambiguous.
When a statute is ambiguous, we may consider the post-ambiguity canons of construction

18 Subdivision 4 provides that this civil penalty is “in addition to the remedies provided in
subdivisions 1 to 3.” Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 4.

31
and other indicia of legislative intent. See Spann v. Minneapolis City Council, 979 N.W.2d
66, 73-76 (Minn. 2022); Minn. Stat. § 645.16. These include:
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law;
(2) the circumstances under which it was enacted;
(3) the mischief to be remedied;
(4) the object to be attained;
(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same
or similar subjects;
(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation;
(7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and
(8) legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.

Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024).
“The MGDPA governs public access to information maintained by governmental
agencies in Minnesota.” Demers v. City of Minneapolis, 468 N.W.2d 71, 72 (Minn. 1991).
The MGDPA is “part of a fundamental commitment to making the operations of our public
institutions open to the public.” Prairie Island Indian Cmty. v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
658 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. App. 2003). The “heart of the act” is that all government
data shall be public unless limited by statute. Demers, 468 N.W.2d at 73. Accordingly,
we construe the MGDPA “in favor of public access.” Prairie Island Indian Cmty., 658
N.W.2d at 884.
Upon considering this purpose, we conclude that Cattanach presents the “better”
interpretation of the statute. See State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 804-05 (Minn. 2013)
(resolving ambiguity by determining which interpretation of ambiguous language is
“better”); see also In re Civ. Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711, 716-17 (Minn. 2024)
(assessing the “better” interpretation of an ambiguous statute). Given that a primary
purpose of the MGDPA is government transparency, we resolve the ambiguity in a manner

32
that encourages government entities to comply with the MGDPA and favors public access.
Accordingly, the phrase “[i]n the case of a willful violation, the government entity shall, in
addition, be liable to exemplary damages” provides a second type of liability separate from
liability for “any damage.”
We conclude the district court did not err when it decided that—despite failing to
prove he suffered “any damage”— Cattanach could sustain a claim for exemplary damages
if he proved the city willfully violated the MGDPA.
C. “Willful Violation”
Because we conclude Cattanach could sustain an exemplary- damages claim absent
proof that he suffered “any damage,” we consider the city’s challenge to the district court’s
decision that it willfully violated the MGDPA. As described above, a government entity
is only liable for exemplary damages “[i]n the case of a willful violation.” Minn. Stat.
§ 13.08, subd. 1. We begin by summarizing the undisputed facts, which the district court
determined demonstrated willful violations.
The district court concluded the undisputed record confirmed that “the [c]ity
affirmatively enacted procedure both in the architecture of its data request [webpage] and
in its policies . . . that are directly at odds with what the MGDPA requires.” (Emphases
added.) To reach this decision, the district court interpreted several MGDPA provisions to
conclude the statute requires “a responsible authority or designee to respond on behalf of
the entire government entity” and does “not allow a government entity to unilaterally limit
a response to a single sub-group within the government entity.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 13.02,
subds. 7a, 16(a), 13.03, subds. 2(a), 3(a). And, despite this clear statutory directive, “the

33
undisputed evidence in this case” showed the city designed “the web[page] and
accompanying [c]ity policy” to limit searches in a manner not contemplated by the
MGDPA, which resulted in the city violating the MGDPA in its responses to 13 of
Cattanach’s requests— identified in the first column above.
The district court also referenced Webster’s conclusion that a government entity
fails to “insure” compliance with the MGDPA when a government entity’s “missteps and
failures in responding to [a] request at every juncture, lead[s] inexorably to the conclusion
that the existing procedures were insufficient to meet the statutory requirements.” 910
N.W.2d at 432. The district court then concluded the undisputed evidence documented
two willful violations of the MGDPA (identified in the third column above): one where
the city waited eight months to respond to a July 22, 2022 request and the other where the
city waited four months to respond to the December 26, 2022 request. The district court
determined these undue delays documented a “considered choice” to not respond promptly
to Cattanach’s MGDPA requests.
The city argues the district court legally erred when it concluded these facts
demonstrate a willful violation. Primarily, 19 the city asserts the district court applied an
incorrect legal standard when it relied on Demers to conclude a “willful” violation occurs
when a government entity fails to act in good faith. See 486 N.W.2d at 832. Instead, the

19 The city also cites Backlund v. City of Duluth, 176 F.R.D. 316, 324-25 (D. Minn. 1997)
for the proposition that we should interpret the phrase “willful” consistent with the use of
the term in the context of common-law official immunity. Given that the legislature
explicitly “waived any immunity to a cause of action brought under this chapter,” Minn.
Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1, we are not persuaded that this opinion is instructive on the meaning
of the phrase.

34
city contends we should apply the supreme court’s interpretation of “willful violation”
from In re A.D., 883 N.W.2d 251 (Minn. 2016).
In A.D., the supreme court interpreted the phrase “willful violation” in the context
of the Pupil Fair Dismissal Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 121A.40-56 (2014). Id. at 253. Beginning
with the dictionary, the supreme court noted the word “willful” means: “[s]aid or done on
purpose; deliberate,” id. at 257 (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 1982 (5th ed. 2011)); “done deliberately: not accidental or without purpose;
intentional,” id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2617 (2002)); and
“intentional; deliberate,” id. (quoting The New Oxford American Dictionary 1931 (10th ed.
2001)). Consistent with these definitions, the supreme court concluded the phrase “willful
violation” plainly meant that a student must “be aware of the policy and make a deliberate
decision to violate it.” Id.
Based upon the undisputed facts, even if the city’s proposed interpretation of the
phrase “willful violation” is correct, there is no issue of material fact that the city’s
MGDPA violations met the A.D. standard. The district court noted the MGDPA set forth
requirements, the city created a policy knowing the MGDPA’s requirements, and—despite
knowing the requirements—affirmatively made a considered choice to adopt a policy that
would not insure compliance with the MGDPA. And, as a result of this affirmative policy,
combining the violations in the columns above, the city willfully violated the MGDPA in
its responses to 14 of Cattanach’s data requests. Thus, the undisputed facts demonstrate
that the city knew the MGDPA’s requirements, knowingly decided to implement a policy

35
that—in some instances—would result in noncompliance with the MGDPA, and this
caused the MGDPA violations in response to Cattanach’s data requests.20
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s summary-judgment decision
regarding damages.
Affirmed in part and remanded.

20 The city also challenges the district court’s interpretation of the word “willful” on the
ground that it failed to consider the “impact this definition would have on government
employees in light of Minn. Stat. § 13.09, which declares that ‘any person’ who commits
a willful violation of the MGDPA is guilty of a crime and is subject to termination for just
cause.” First, as discussed above, applying the definition the city proposed from A.D., the
city’s conduct met the “willful” requirement. Moreover, the city’s argument disregards
that section 13.08, subdivision 1, applies to government entities, not people. Thus, any
potential application of the criminal provision in section 13.09 will require consideration
of due process. Minn. Stat. § 13.09(a), (b); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”);
Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7 (“No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law”). Therefore, we are not persuaded that the presence of criminal
penalties warrants a different conclusion in this case.

C/D-1
WHEELOCK, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I would conclude that the district
court erred by concluding that the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA),
Minn. Stat. §§ 13.001- .991 (2024 & Supp. 2025), allows for exemplary damages in the
absence of actual damages and, because this determination would be dispositive of other
issues raised on appeal by appellant City of St. Paul, I would not reach the issues of whether
the district court erred in determining that the city violated the MGDPA and that the city’s
violations were “willful” within the meaning of Minnesota Statutes section 13.08,
subdivision 1 (2024). Because I conclude that exemplary damages are not available here,
I would reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent Robert E. Cattanach
on these issues. As to Cattanach’s cross-appeal, I agree with the majority’s conclusions
that the district court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to his claims for
actual damages —in the form of lost-time damages—and that Cattanach forfeited the
arguments that he was entitled to nominal damages and attorney fees. I also agree with the
majority’s decision to remand to the district court to allow it to consider in the first instance
Cattanach’s preservation-notice argument.
The city asserts that the district court erred by concluding that section 13.08,
subdivision 1, of the MGDPA allowed Cattanach to recover exemplary damages in the
absence of actual damages. To resolve this question, we must interpret the language of the
MGDPA. Appellate courts consider issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Larson v.
Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 2014). If the statute’s language is
unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning. Id. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible

C/D-2
to more than one reasonable interpretation. Marks v. Comm’r of Revenue, 875 N.W.2d
321, 324 (Minn. 2016). “Multiple parts of a statute may be read together so as to ascertain
whether the statute is ambiguous.” Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn.
2013). “A statute should be interpreted, whenever possible, to give effect to all of its
provisions; no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or
insignificant. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000)
(quotation omitted).
The MGDPA provides:
Notwithstanding section 466.03, a responsible authority
or government entity which violates any provision of this
chapter is liable to a person . . . who suffers any damage as a
result of the violation, and the person damaged . . . may bring
an action against the responsible authority or government
entity to cover any damages sustained, plus costs and
reasonable attorney fees. In the case of a willful violation, the
government entity shall, in addition, be liable to exemplary
damages of not less than $1,000, nor more than $15,000 for
each violation.

Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1. The precise question raised here is whether the statute
provides for exemplary damages for willful violations absent a showing of actual damages.
In other words, we must answer whether the statute makes an award of exemplary damages
dependent on or independent of an award of actual damages. The statutory phrase at issue
reads: “In the case of a willful violation, the government entity shall, in addition, be liable
to exemplary damages . . . .” Id.
1

1 For purposes of this analysis, I assume without deciding that the city violated the MGDPA
and at least one of those violations was “willful.”

C/D-3
The city contends that the use of the term “in addition” contemplates that exemplary
damages for willful violations are necessarily “in addition” to actual damages and are not
independently available. In support, it cites nonprecedential caselaw from this court stating
that “[i]t is clear from the statute that exemplary damages are only available to individuals
who have suffered damages.” Krampf v. Univ. of Minn., No. A19-1753, 2020 WL
3410191, at *9 (Minn. App. June 22, 2020). The district court considered Krampf
unpersuasive. It determined that section 13.08, subdivision 1, could also be read to create
separate liability for exemplary damages and that the statute is therefore ambiguous. After
it determined the statute is ambiguous, the district court reasoned that independent liability
for exemplary damages is appropriate in light of the value that the MGDPA places on
transparency. The majority adopts this reasoning based on its interpretation of the phrase
“in addition.” I disagree because I conclude that the city’s proposed interpretation is the
only reasonable one.
First, I reject the alternative interpretation that Cattanach proposes on appeal.
Cattanach asserts that the phrase “in addition” does not condition an exemplary-damages
award on an award of actual damages; rather, the phrase works to distinguish a government
entity from a responsible authority. Specifically, the first sentence of subdivision 1
provides that “a responsible authority or government entity” is liable for damages but the
second sentence identifies only government entities as liable for exemplary damages. He
contends that “in addition” refers to additional liability that applies only to government
entities instead of referring to the damages identified in the first sentence.

C/D-4
Cattanach’s interpretation does not give meaning to the phrase “in addition.” If all
the legislature intended to do with the phrase was distinguish responsible authorities from
government entities for purposes of exemplary damages, the statute need not have included
“in addition” at all. It would have the same effect to omit the phrase entirely, reading: “In
the case of a willful violation, the government entity shall be liable to 2 exemplary
damages.” Cattanach’s reading fails to give effect to all of the words of the statute. See
Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 277 (“A statute should be interpreted, whenever possible, to give
effect to all of its provisions . . . .”). Moreover, the city’s interpretation allows for a reading
of the statute as a whole. The statutory phrase that creates a cause of action for damages
states that “a responsible authority or government entity which violates any provision of
this chapter is liable to a person . . . who suffers any damage as a result of the violation,
and the person damaged . . . may bring an action against the responsible authority or
government entity to cover any damages sustained.” Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1.
Subdivision 1 establishes liability “to a person . . . who suffers any damage” and creates a
cause of action allowing “the person damaged” to bring a claim. But if no showing of
actual damages is necessary to seek exemplary damages for a willful violation, a cause of
action should exist under the statute not only for a “person damaged” but for any person

2 I observe here that it is likely that the legislature intended this provision to say: “In the
case of a willful violation, the government entity shall, in addition, be liable for exemplary
damages,” rather than “to exemplary damages.” I infer this from the structure of the two
sentences in the subdivision. The first sentence says the responsible authority or
government entity is liable to a person who suffers any damages—the “whom”—a nd must
pay damages sustained—the “what.” The second sentence, which is the focus of our
analysis here, leaves off the “whom” and says the government entity shall “be liable to
exemplary damages,” which are the “what” and thus results in the unusual phrasing.

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who can successfully establish a willful violation. And, based on the first sentence, that is
not the case. See Adams v. Harpstead, 947 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn. App. 2020) (“Proof
of damages is an essential element of a claim for compensatory relief under the MGDPA.”),
rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2020). In addition, nothing in the second sentence alters to
whom the government entity is liable or explicitly creates another cause of action.
Second, I disagree with the majority’s reliance on a dictionary definition to establish
ambiguity. The majority cites a dictionary definition of “in addition” to mean “besides” or
“also” and concludes that this plain meaning does not resolve the question presented
because the phrase could refer to either an additional type of liability or additional damages.
This ignores the initial clause of the sentence, however, that specifies that exemplary
damages are reserved for “willful violations”—violations that go beyond non-willful
violations in some material way. Because a willful violation is logically a more egregious
violation than a non-willful violation, the second sentence of subdivision 1 of section 13.08
allows a district court to award damages that go beyond those already listed in the first
sentence—beyond “damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.” This
indicates that the only reasonable reading of the language, “In the case of a willful
violation, the government entity shall, in addition, be liable” for exemplary damages is that
these are damages “besides” those identified in the first sentence. Thus, an individual who
is able to establish those actual damages identified in the first sentence is “also” able to
claim exemplary damages when the violation is willful in nature. It is not reasonable to
read “in addition” to mean “a different kind of liability” that is independent of actual
damages.

C/D-6
Ultimately, the majority reaches for post-ambiguity canons of construction to rely
on the purpose of the MGDPA to conclude that exemplary damages may be awarded
independent of actual damages. And while I agree that the heart of the act is to ensure that
all government data is public unless limited by statute, Demers v. City of Minneapolis,
468 N.W.2d 71, 73 (Minn. 1991), I am not persuaded that the legislature’s intention in
enacting the MGDPA led it to provide for exemplary damages in the absence of actual
damages, particularly given that the statute provides for other remedies in other parts of
the MGDPA when the act is violated.
Indeed, the MGDPA provides a separate remedy to those simply seeking to enforce
compliance—they can move to compel compliance pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
section 13.08, subdivision 4 (2024), which provides a civil penalty for failure to comply.
This alternative relief mechanism more squarely fits Cattanach’s scenario, enabling a party
to enforce compliance in the absence of actual damages and allowing the district court to
impose penalties for compliance failures. In my view, the language of section 13.08,
subdivision 1, that provides an action for damages for a person “who suffers any damage
as a result of the violation” more appropriately applies to someone who suffers actual harm
from a violation such as an unlawful disclosure of private data that results in actual
damages. See Navarre v. S. Washington Cnty. Schs., 652 N.W.2d 9, 30 (Minn. 2002)
(concluding that emotional-distress damages are recoverable under the MGDPA).
I also reject the argument that other sections of the MGDPA support a determination
that subdivision 1 is ambiguous, such as the use of the phrase “compensatory or exemplary
damage” elsewhere in the MGDPA, because those instances are not inconsistent with my

C/D-7
interpretation of section 13.08, subdivision 1. The phrase “compensatory or exemplary”
in those sections pertains to exclusions from liability and enumerates to what forms of
liability the exclusion extends. For example, Minnesota Statutes section 13.085,
subdivision 5(f) (2024), states that “[a] government entity or person that acts in conformity
with an order issued under this section to the government entity or to any other person is
not liable for compensatory or exemplary damage or awards of attorney fees for acting in
conformity with that order in actions under this section or section 13.08 . . . . ” It is not
inconsistent with my reading of section 13.08, subdivision 1, for the legislature to specify
that such exclusions apply to exemplary damages, even if a showing of actual damages is
a prerequisite for an award of exemplary damages. The legislature made it explicit that, in
situations when a person brings a cause of action that indisputably states a claim for both
compensatory damages and exemplary damages for a willful violation but is precluded
from recovery by only a statutory exclusion, the exclusion extends to exemplary damages.
For the same reason, the use of the disjunctive “or” in the phrase “compensatory or
exemplary damage,” when used in the other instances in the MGDPA that the majority
cites, also does not persuade me that there are two separate forms of liability. I thus
conclude that section 13.08, subdivision 1, unambiguously does not provide for exemplary
damages absent a showing of actual damages and the district court erred when it
determined otherwise.
In sum, reading the multiple parts of the statute together, see Henke, 831 N.W.2d at
537, subdivision 1 is unambiguous that establishing actual damages is a prerequisite for an
award of exemplary damages. Having determined that section 13.08, subdivision 1, of the

C/D-8
MGDPA does not provide for exemplary damages independent of an award of actual
damages, and because I agree that Cattanach failed to establish any other form of damages
that would allow his exemplary-damages claim to survive, I would reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Cattanach and remand the
preservation-notice issue.