A19-1839 Precedential Affirmed Processed

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed June 8, 2020

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Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1839

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cameron Pierre Richmond, Sr.,
Appellant.

Filed June 8, 2020
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-18-3527

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Nathaniel T. Stumme , Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles F. Clippert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FRISCH, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction of aiding and abetting second-degree
aggravated robbery, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying

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his request to be sentenced at the low end of the range prescribed by the sentencing
guidelines. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Cameron Richmond, Sr., with one
count of aiding and abetting first -degree aggravated robbery and one count of financial -
transaction card fraud. The complaint provided that on October 15, 2018, the victim went
to a residence in Duluth to obtain a “personal lap dance.” After he arrived at the residence,
Richmond and two other individuals stripped the victim naked, forced the victim to sit in
a chair, stole his money, and demanded that the victim disclose his pin number or that they
were “going to ‘smoke him.’” One of the individuals had his hand in his pocket, “implying
that he had a gun.” The group stole several items from the victim, including his ATM card,
and then used the card to withdraw $480.
Richmond pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree aggravated robbery.
The parties also agreed that the state would seek a guidelines sentence not to exceed the
middle of the guidelines range and Richmond would argue for a sentence at the bottom of
the guidelines range.
At the plea hearing, Richmond admitted that he, along with two other individuals ,
took money from the victim. Richmond also acknowledged that one of the other
individuals in his group “made a reference to smoking” the victim , implying the presence
of a gun.
The pre sentence investigation report (PSI) contained a recommendation that
Richmond receive a middle -of-the-box guidelines sentence. In the report, the probation

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officer noted that she relied on the allegations set forth in the complaint because she was
unable to speak personally with Richm ond. At the sentencing hearing, Richmond
requested a bottom-of-the-box guidelines sentence. The district court denied Richmond’s
request and sentenced him to a middle -of-the-box guidelines sentence of 51 months in
prison. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Richmond challenges the decision by the district court to impose a middle -of-the-
box guidelines sentence rather than a bottom-of-the-box guidelines sentence. A defendant
may directly appeal from final judgment and raise only a sentencing issue. State v. Thomas,
371 N.W.2d 533, 534-35 (Minn. 1985).
“All three numbers in any given cell [on the sentencing guidelines grid] constitute
an acceptable sentence based solely on the of fense at issue and the offender’ s criminal
history score —the lowest is not a downward departure, nor is the highest an upward
departure.” State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 359 n.2 (Minn. 2008). We “generally will
not interfere with sentences that are within the presumptive sentence range.” State v.
Freyer, 328 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Minn. 1982) . While we may, in our discretion, modify a
sentence that is within the presumptive range, we “generally will not exercise that authority
absent compelling circumstances.” Id. “Only in a ‘rare’ case will a reviewing court reverse
imposition of a presumptive sentence.” State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App.
2010) (quoting State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981)), review denied (Minn. July
20, 2010).

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Here, Richmond pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree aggravate d
robbery under Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 2 (2018). With five criminal-history points,
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentencing range of 44 to 61 months in
prison, with a presumptive sentence of 51 months. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2018)
(sentencing guidelines grid).
Richmond asserts that the author of the PSI based her recommendation that
Richmond be sentenced to 51 months in prison on the probable-cause statement set forth
in the complaint, which indicated that Richmond plan ned the robbery and possessed a
weapon at the time of the offense. Richmond argues that, because the facts as alleged in
the complaint are not supported by his admissions at the plea hearing, the comments by the
probation officer in the PSI “improperly interfered with the [district court’s] discretion by
recommending a sentence based on facts not admitted during the plea hearing.” Richmond
also argues that the probation officer referenced his “extensive criminal record,” which
apart from his criminal -history score has “no bearing on what an appropriate sentence
should be.” Thus, Richmond argues that “there are compelling circumstances in this case”
warranting resentencing “at the low end of the guidelines range.”
We are not persuaded. The district court expressly acknowledged the discrepancies
between the facts as alleged in the PSI, which were based on the complaint, and the sworn
testimony from Richmond at the plea hearing:
The facts that I’m relying on for sentencing here today are
those that Mr. Richmond disclosed during the plea inquir y, as
opposed to what’s in the Complaint, so to the extent there’s any
discrepancy, I’m di sregarding any language in the C omplaint

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and only considering that which was provided as a factual basis
for the plea.

In sentencing Richmond, t he district court properly relied on facts to which Richmond
admitted at the plea hearing when imposing a presumptive sentence pursuant to the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion
in the imposition of a guidelines sentence.
Finally, the record does not show that the district court improperly relied upon any
comment in the PSI regarding criminal history. Minnesota law does not require a district
court to explain every reason in support of the imposition of a guidelines sentence. See
State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17,
2013) (stating that when a district court sentences within the presumptive range, it is not
required to “explain its reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence”). And th is court
generally does not conclude that a sentence within the presumptive range is an abuse of
discretion. Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428 . Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion by the
district court in the imposition of the presumptive 51-month sentence.
Affirmed.