State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1888

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Paul Andrew Youngstedt,
Appellant.

Filed December 14, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-18-1070

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County At torney, Kevin A. Hill, Assist ant County Attorney, Chaska,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Following a jury trial, appellant Paul Andrew Youngstedt was convicted of
first-degree assault and motor-vehicle theft. The district court imposed concurrent
sentences for the offenses and ordered Youngstedt to pay restitution.
In this direct appeal, Youngstedt advances several arguments. He argues that he is
entitled to a new trial based on: (1) the district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction on
his defense; (2) the district court’s refusal to declare a mistrial on the grounds that the
prosecutor elicited testimony from which jurors could infer that Yo ungstedt invoked his
right to silence; and (3) the prosecutor’s “vouching” for the victim’s credibility during the
state’s closing argument. Alternatively, Youngs tedt argues that this court should vacate
his concurrent sentence for motor-vehicle theft and vacate the restitution order for damage
to the victim’s car.
Because we conclude that the district c ourt did not abuse its discretion by refusing
to give the requested jury inst ruction, by refusing to decl are a mistrial, or by sentencing
Youngstedt for both offenses, and further c onclude that any prosecutorial misconduct did
not affect Youngstedt’s substantial rights, we affirm in part. But because the district court
erred in ordering Youngstedt to pay restitution for the damage he caused to the victim’s
car, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the restitution order.

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FACTS
The state charged Youngstedt with s econd-degree attempted murder, first-degree
assault, and motor-vehicle theft after a series of events involving Youngstedt and K.M., his
former girlfriend. The evidence at trial established the following.
On October 29, 2018, K.M. went to visit Youngstedt at his home. The two had been
in an on-again, off-again relationship for thre e or four years. A lthough K.M. had broken
up with Youngstedt a few months earlier, they continued to spend time together.
Youngstedt had been drinking. At one po int after K.M. arrived, Youngstedt drove
off in his truck. K.M. observed Youngstedt dr iving at high speeds on the streets near his
home and driving erratically on a nearby cornfiel d. When he returned, K.M. took his car
keys and hid them in a dresser located in the living room. Youngstedt then slept for most
of the day. After he awoke late that evening, he began searching for the car keys and told
K.M. to find them. Youngsted t eventually found the keys, and the two started to argue
about his driving. Youngstedt then threw the keys over his shoulder and yelled at K.M. to
find them.
At trial, K.M. and Youngs tedt offered differing accounts of what happened next.
K.M. testified that while she was looking for the keys in the living room, Youngstedt went
to the kitchen, grabbed two knives, and came toward her, holding one knife in each hand.
According to K.M., Youngstedt then stabbed he r in the abdomen with one of the knives.
Youngstedt testified that the stabbing was an accident—that he picked up a knife from a
coffee table in the living room and was going to the kitchen to return it when K.M. “just
turned [around] into it.”

4
After the stabbing, Youngste dt took K.M.’s car keys, got into her car, and attempted
to exit the driveway but crashed the car into a skid loader located at the end of the driveway.
He then ran to the house of a neighbor w ho works as an emergency medical technician
(EMT). He told the EMT that K.M. had been stabbed, and asked him to come help. The
EMT drove his car to Youngstedt’s house and began tending to K.M.’s wound. Youngstedt
arrived shortly after and the EMT asked him to wait outside. At some point while he was
helping K.M., the EMT heard sirens and shortly thereafter heard Youngstedt drive away in
the EMT’s car. Youngstedt drove the EMT’s car to a friend’s home, where he was later
arrested.
Youngstedt was charged with second- degree attempted murder, first-degree
assault—great bodily harm, a nd theft of a motor vehicle. 1 At trial, a key issue was
Youngstedt’s intent. The ju ry found him not guilty of a ttempted murder, but guilty of
first-degree assault and guilty of motor-vehicle theft. Th e district court sentenced
Youngstedt to concurrent 160- and 23-month prison terms and ordered him to pay $5,500
in restitution for the damage to K.M.’s car. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion when it denied Youngstedt’s
requested jury instruction.

Youngstedt argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request
to give a jury instruction on his accident defense. We are not persuaded.

1 The state also charged Youngstedt with fi fth-degree drug possession and driving with a
restricted driver’s license. Later, those two charges were dismissed.

5
A district court has “considerable latitud e” in selecting the language for its jury
instructions. State v. Gatson , 801 N.W.2d 134, 147 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Nevertheless, an instruction must not “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law,”
State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn. 2014). On appeal, the jury instructions are
reviewed “in their entirety to determine whethe r they fairly and adequately explained the
law of the case.” State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 555-56 (Mi nn. 2001). We will not
reverse a trial court’s decision on jury inst ructions absent an abuse of discretion.
State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007).
Youngstedt asked the district cour t to instruct the jury as follows:
The defendant testified that [K .M.] was accidentally stabbed
and therefore this incident was an accident, not on purpose or
intentional. The State has th e burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that this inci dent was not an accident and
was, in fact, a criminal act.

The district court denied Youngstedt’s reque st on the grounds that the court’s intended
instructions incorporated the defense’s theory of the case. The court ultimately gave jury
instructions that defined the elements of ea ch crime and were cons istent with the Jury
Instructions Guide.
Generally, a district court must give an in struction on the defendant’s theory of the
case if there is evidence to support it. State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn. 2006).
In evaluating whether to give an instruction, “the evidence is view ed in the light most
favorable to the party reque sting the instruction.” State v. Edwards , 717 N.W.2d 405,
410 (Minn. 2006). Here, Youngst edt testified that he did not intentionally stab K.M. but
rather K.M. accidentally impaled herself on the knife. Viewed in the light most favorable

6
to Youngstedt, this testimony likely provided su fficient evidence to warrant an accident
instruction.
Nonetheless, even where the eviden ce supports giving a party’s proposed
instruction, “[t]he court need not give the instruction as requested by the party if it
determines that the substance of that request is contained in the court’s charge.”
State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567, 578 (Minn. 1977). In State v. Gustafson, the supreme court
specifically addressed the failure to give an accident instruction in a case involving
first-and second-degree assault charges. 610 N.W.2d 314, 316, 3 19 (Minn. 2000). The
supreme court noted that it has held that “the fa ilure to give an accident instruction is not
error if the trial court’s instructions adequately inform the jury that a finding of intent is a
prerequisite to a finding of guilt, and the arguments of the prosecutor and defense counsel
further explain this to the jury.” Id. at 319 (citing State v. Stapek , 315 N.W.2d 603,
604 (Minn. 1982); State v. Schluter, 281 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Minn. 1979)). Applying this
standard, the supreme court concluded that the trial court did not err when it failed to give
the jury an accident instruction. Id.
Youngstedt argues that th e standard announced in Gustafson was not met in this
case and therefore the district court erred by failing to give the acc ident instruction.
Youngstedt raised the accident defense for two of the charges—th e attempted murder
charge and the first-degree assault charge. We need only address his argument with regard
to the assault instruction because the jury did not convict Youngstedt of attempted murder.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the Gustafson standard was met and the district
court did not err by failing to give the accident instruction. First, the district court’s assault

7
instruction was sufficient to inform the jury that a finding of intent was a prerequisite to a
finding of guilt. Specifically, the court instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows:
The term assault, as used in this charge, is the intentional
infliction of bodily harm upon another. Intentional means that
the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result
specified, or believes that the act performed by the actor if
successful will cause the result. In addition, the actor must
have knowledge of those facts th at are necessary to make the
actor’s conduct criminal, and that are set forth after the word
intentional.

This instruction explained that intent is an element of assault—great bodily harm and
defined the word “intentional.” This instruction adequately informed the jury that, to find
Youngstedt guilty, it had to determine that Youngstedt intentionally stabbed K.M.
Youngstedt acknowledges that the district court specified that an assault is an
“intentional infliction of bodily harm” and defined the word “intentionally.” Nonetheless,
he contends that the district court’s assault instruction was “misleading and confusing” in
terms of the requisite intent because assault—great bodily ha rm is a general-intent crime
and the instruction referred to both the defin ition of general intent (“the actor . . . has a
purpose to do the thing”) as well as specific intent (“the actor . . . has a purpose to . . . cause
the result specified, or believes that the act performed by the actor if successful will cause
the result”). Youngstedt’s reasoning is not pe rsuasive. Assault—great bodily harm is, in
fact, a general-intent crime. See State v. Fleck , 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012)
(concluding that “assault-harm is a general- intent crime”). But the district court’s
instruction still sufficiently incorporated Youngstedt’s requested instruction. To find either
general intent or specific intent necessarily requires finding that the defendant’s conduct

8
was not an accident. Id. at 309 (“[R]egardless of whether an offense is described as a
specific- or general-intent crime, a defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail
to perform an act.” (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, the intent instruction was sufficient
to cause the jury to consider Youngstedt’s theory that he did not commit assault because
he did not intentionally stab K.M.
Second, both the prosecutor’s and defens e counsel’s closing arguments explained
to the jury that a finding of intent was a pr erequisite to a finding of guilt. Youngstedt
concedes that both the prosecutor and defense counsel focused their closing arguments on
the issue of intent. Indeed, both attorneys argued at length about whether Youngstedt had
the requisite intent, and the prosecutor specifically focused on Youngstedt’s post-stabbing
statements and conduct as circumstantial evidence of Young stedt’s intent to stab K.M.
Under Gustafson, these arguments were sufficient to further explain to the jury that it must
determine whether Youngstedt intentionally stabbed K.M. Accordingly, we conclude that
the assault instruction met the Gustafson standard.
Youngstedt reads Gustafson as requiring more—namely, that both the prosecutor
and defense counsel must acknowledge the validity of a defendant’s accident defense. He
argues that because the prosecutor in this case did not expressly mention Youngstedt’s
accident defense in his closing argument, th e district court erre d by not providing the
requested instruction. This is a misinterpretation of Gustafson and its predecessor cases,
which do not impose a requirement that the pr osecutor mention the defendant’s theory of
the case. See, e.g., State v. Boitnott, 443 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. 1989) (holding that the
district court did not err in refusing to give an accident in struction where the jury was

9
adequately instructed on the element of intent); State v. Schluter , 281 N.W.2d 174,
177 (Minn. 1979) (holding that the district court did not err in refusing to give an accident
instruction where the court inst ructed the jury on intent, and noting in dicta that the
prosecutor mentioned the defendant’s accident defense).
Youngstedt further takes issue with th e prosecutor’s repetition during his closing
argument of the phrase “you intend the natural consequences of your actions.” Because
assault—great bodily harm is a general-intent crime rather than a specific-intent crime,
Youngstedt asserts that the prosecutor’s use of the phrase misled the jury to believe it could
infer that Youngstedt had the re quisite intent for the crime “merely because the stabbing
occurred,” when in fact the state had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Youngstedt intended to do the act of stabbing.
Youngstedt takes the prosecutor’s use of th e phrase out of context. The prosecutor
used the phrase “you intend the natural cons equences of your actions” in the course of
arguing that Youngstedt’s intent to stab K. M. could be inferred from his post-assault
statements and flight from the scene of the offense. Placed in the proper context, the
prosecutor’s use of the phrase posed little risk of confusing the jury about its obligation to
determine whether Youngstedt intentionally stabbed K.M. Moreover, any potential
confusion as to the burden of proof was remedied by the district court’s various instructions
that the state had the burden to prove beyo nd a reasonable doubt each element of the
charged offenses.
In sum, the district court’ s jury instructions informed the jury of its obligation to
determine whether Youngstedt intentionally stabbed K.M., and the prosecutor and defense

10
counsel’s closing arguments further explained th at requirement to the jury. We therefore
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give an instruction
on Youngstedt’s accident defense.
II. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by refusing to declare a mistrial.

Youngstedt argues that the district court erred by refusing to declare a mistrial on
the grounds that the prosecutor elicited te stimony from which the jury could infer that
Youngstedt invoked his right to silence. We conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial.
One critical dispute that arose during Yo ungstedt’s trial concerned what Youngstedt
said to police officers during his arrest. One of the arresting officers testified that he heard
Youngstedt’s statements, and on cross-examination, defense counsel inquired into whether
the officer had recorded any of them. The following exchange resulted:
Q. All right. Now, did you record any of this?
A. No, sir.
Q. Don’t you have lapel recordings?
A. They activate when my squad car camera is turned on.
Q. Only then?
A. It can be manually activated, but it was not.
Q. While you were taking th is person in and—but you didn’t
manually activate your recording device so that we could hear
if he really said this?

A. I did not.
Q. Why not?

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A. I just didn’t think to activate it.
Q. You’re not trained to activate it when you arrest somebody?
A. I don’t usually activate my recorder, it activates by my
camera.

Q. No. I asked you a question, are you not trained to activate
it when you’re arresting somebody?

A. I was not trained specifically in activating my recorder
while arresting someone.

Q. When do they tell you to activate it?
A. My recorder activates when I start my camera.
Q. Why do you think they have the manual on there?
A. I assume in case we decide we want to start our camera or
our recorder.

On redirect, the prosecutor asked several follow-up questions:
Q. You took custody of the defendant. Were you planning on
taking a statement from him?

A. No, sir.
Q. Why wouldn’t you as the arresting officer taking custody
of—

Defense Attorney: Objection, Your Honor.
The Court: Overruled.
Q. Why wouldn’t you, as an arresting officer taking custody of
someone that you believe stabbed someone, take a statement?

A. I was advised there were de tectives awaiting us our [sic]
arrival at the jail to take a statement from the suspect.

Q. Were you planning on talking to the defendant at all?

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A. No, sir.
Following the officer’s testimony, Youn gstedt moved for a mistrial. Defense
counsel argued that the prosecutor’s questions “went straight to the heart of whether or not
Mr. Youngstedt had remained silent” and that, because no statement from Youngstedt
would ultimately be introduced, “the jury is going to know he did not give a statement,
which is his right.” The dist rict court denied Youngstedt’s motion because it determined
that defense counsel’s questions implied that the officer “somehow violated protocol or
engaged in some other wrongdoing by failing to record Mr. Youngstedt” and the purpose
of the prosecutor’s questions “was to outline th e fact that [the police officer] was not the
person that was charged with attempting to take a statement from Mr. Youngstedt.”
This court reviews a denial of a motion fo r mistrial for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2016). “A mistrial should be granted only if
there is a reasonable probability, in light of the entirety of the trial . . . that the outcome of
the trial would have been different had the in cident resulting in the motion not occurred.”
Id.
Youngstedt argues the district court abused its discretion by not declaring a mistrial
“because jurors would readily have inferred from [the officer’s] testimony, and the fact that
no statement from Youngstedt was introduced at trial, that Youngstedt had exercised his
constitutional right not to talk to the polic e.” Youngstedt further contends that the
admission of the challenged testimony requires reversal because it could reasonably have
influenced the jury’s verdict. We are not persuaded that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing the testimony.

13
It is well established that a defendant’s choice to exercise his right to remain silent
may not be used against him at trial. State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Minn. 2002).
This rule is premised on the notion that “a jury would be likely to infer from the testimony
that [the] defendant was concealing his guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, there is no
direct testimony that Youngstedt exercised his right to silence. Instead, to conclude that
Youngstedt had chosen to remain silent, the jury would need to draw a rather indirect
inference based solely on (1) the arresting officer’s testimony that other officers were
waiting at the jail to take Youn gstedt’s statement and (2) th e fact that no statement was
ultimately introduced. But the officer’s testimony in this case does not lend itself to the
inference that Youngstedt invoked his right to silence any more than the typical case in
which a defendant was arrested and no statement is introduced at trial. Because the record
does not support Youngstedt’s c ontention that the jury was likely to infer that he had
exercised his right to silence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying a mistrial.
Second, even if the jury inferred from the officer’s testimony that Youngstedt
invoked his right to silence, the prosecutor’s questioning was permissible because defense
counsel opened the door to the prosecutor’s questions. Defense counsel repeatedly asked
the officer about whether he had been trained to manually activate his recording device
during an arrest. On redirect examination, the prosecution may elicit testimony that
“explains, contradicts, or refutes” the witness’s prior testimony. State v. Gutierrez ,
667 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Minn. 2003). This questioning can involve otherwise inadmissible
matters if necessary to prevent the defens e from obtaining an “unfair advantage” or

14
“present[ing] a misleading or dist orted representation of reality.” State v. Valtierra ,
718 N.W.2d 425, 436 (Minn. 2006) (quo tation omitted). Here, defense counsel’s
questioning on cross-examination tended to im ply that the testifying police officer was
doing something wrong by not turning on his recorder during the arrest. Thus, on redirect,
it was proper for the prosecutor to elicit test imony that further explained why the officer
did not activate his recorder and refuted the implication that he somehow did not follow
protocol. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Youngstedt’s motion for a mistrial.
III. The prosecutor did not commit miscondu ct that entitles Youngstedt to a new
trial.

Youngstedt asserts that the prosecutor twice improperly vouched for the victim’s
credibility during his closing argument. The prosecutor’s first statement was:
The other day in court, that’s eight months after the event
happened, sure there are small inconsistencies, but she was
truthful. You saw her. You sa w her demeanor. I’ll get into
that in a little bit, but I think it’s pretty obvious for some reason
she even cares for this guy still.

The prosecutor’s second statement was:

In determining the reasonablen ess and unreasonableness of a
person’s testimony, [K.M.], in the State’s view, was extremely
credible.

The district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the second statement but
made no comment as to the first. Although Youngstedt did not object at the time to either
statement, he now argues that the prosecuto r’s statements amount to misconduct and
warrant a new trial. We disagree.

15
When the defendant fails to object during trial, alleged prosecutorial misconduct is
reviewed under a modified plain-error standard. State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294,
302 (Minn. 2006). The appellant-defendant bear s the burden of estab lishing an error by
the prosecutor that is plain. Id. If the appellant makes th e required showing, the burden
then shifts to the state to prove that the error did not affect the appellant’s substantial rights.
Id. “The court looks at the closing argument as a whole when c onsidering claims of
prosecutorial misconduct.” State v. Rucker , 752 N.W.2d 538, 551 (Minn. App. 2008),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008).
Prosecutors are prohibited from “injecting [their] personal opinion[s] concerning
the veracity of a witness during closing argument.” State v. Williams , 210 N.W.2d 21,
26 (Minn. 1973). Statements in closing arguments that “impl[y] a guarantee of a witness’s
truthfulness” constitute im permissible vouching. State v. Patterson , 577 N.W.2d 494,
497 (Minn. 1998) (quo tation omitted). However, “pros ecutors are not prohibited from
arguing that certain witnesses are believable.” Rucker, 752 N.W.2d at 552. In
State v. Swanson, the supreme court held that the prosecutor’s statement that a witness was
“very believable” was not impermissible vouchi ng, but that the stat ement “[t]he state
believes [the witness] is very believable” was impermissible vouching. 707 N.W.2d 645,
656 (Minn. 2006). The Swanson court further held that the state may discuss “factors
affecting the credibility of the witnesses,” but may not suggest that the state endorses a
witness’s credibility. Id.
Here, considered in context, the prosecutor’s first statement that K.M. “was truthful”
falls within the category of perm issible statements set forth in Swanson. The prosecutor

16
made the statement in the cour se of a lengthy discussion ab out K.M.’s testimony, minor
inconsistencies in her statements, her demeanor during her testimony, and the notion that
she would have told the police the stabbing was an accident if that were true because she
still cares for Youngstedt. Like the prosecutor’s statement in Swanson that the witness was
“very believable,” the statement that K.M. “was truthful” was not a direct endorsement of
K.M.’s credibility. This statement was therefore not impermissible vouching.
Conversely, as the state concedes, th e prosecutor’s seco nd statement was
impermissible vouching. This statement—that K.M., “in the State’s view, was extremely
credible”—is very similar to the statement addressed in Swanson in which the prosecutor
said “[t]he state believes [the witness] is very believable.” Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 656.
The Swanson court determined that the statement was impermissible vouching because it
suggested that the state endorsed the witness’s credibility. Id. The statement at issue here
similarly implied that the state endorsed K.M.’s credibility. Accordingly, under Swanson,
the prosecutor’s second statement constituted plain error.
Having concluded that the second statement constitutes an error that is plain, we
next consider whether the state has met its bur den to show that the error did not affect
Youngstedt’s substantial rights. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. To meet its burden, the state
must show that “there is no reasonab le likelihood that the absence of the
misconduct . . . would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.”
Id. (quotation omitted). In evaluating the effect on substantial rights, this
court “consider[s] various factors, including the pervasiveness of improper suggestions
and the strength of evidence against the defendant.” State v. Parker , 901 N.W.2d 917,

17
926 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). We further c onsider a prosecutor’s closing
argument as a whole to ensure that no single wo rd or phrase is “taken out of context and
used as a basis for reversal.” State v. Schwartz, 122 N.W.2d 769, 774 (Minn. 1963).
Here, the state has met its burden to show that the improper statement did not affect
Youngstedt’s substantial right s. The evidence presented ag ainst Youngstedt at trial was
strong. Moreover, viewing th e prosecutor’s closing argumen t as a whole, the statement
was just one sentence contained in a closing argument that spans over 13 pages of the trial
transcript. The district court immediately inst ructed the jury to disr egard this statement,
and the prosecutor reinforced the court’s corrective instruction by saying to the jury, “It’s
your determination of credibility. You saw her. You viewed her. You determine her
credibility and whether she was cr edible or not.” In addition, the district court’s general
jury instructions included directions “to disr egard all evidence I have ordered stricken or
have told you to disregard” and further instru cted that the jurors “a re the sole judges of
whether a witness is to be belie ved.” In light of the presum ption that juro rs abide by a
district court’s instructions, the district court’s corrective instructions remedied any
prejudice to Youngstedt that may have resulted from the prosecutor’s improper statement.
See State v. Hall , 764 N.W.2d 837, 845 (Minn. 2009) (presuming that jurors will follow
instructions from the district court).
Accordingly, based on our application of the modified plain-error standard of
review, we conclude that the prosecutor’s closing argument does not warrant a new trial.

18
IV. The district court did not err by impo sing separate senten ces for the assault
and motor-vehicle theft.

Youngstedt argues that the district court erred by sentencing him for both
first-degree assault and the motor-vehicle thef t because the two offenses were part of a
single behavioral incident. We conclude that the district court did not err by imposing
separate sentences for Youngstedt’s two offenses.
Under Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (20 18), “if a person’s conduct constitutes more
than one offense under the laws of this stat e, the person may be pu nished for only one of
the offenses.” This means that a court ge nerally may not impose separate sentences for
offenses that arose from a “single behavioral incident.” State v. Williams, 608 N.W.2d 837,
841 (Minn. 2000). Because the question of “[w]hether the offe nses were part of a single
behavioral incident is a mixed question of law and fact,” we review findings of fact for
clear error and the district court’s appli cation of the law to the facts de novo.
State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn. 2016).
Youngstedt contends that he should not have been sentenced for his theft of the
EMT’s car because “the state’s own theory of the case is th at he was using the car to
escape.” He cites to the general rule that courts cannot impose multiple sentences for two
offenses if the second offense was committed contemporaneously and for the purpose of
avoiding apprehension for the first offense. See, e.g., State v. Gibson , 478 N.W.2d 496,
497-98 (Minn. 1991) (vacating sentence for l eaving the scene of an accident where
defendant immediately left the scene in order to avoid apprehension for criminal vehicular
operation); State v. Boley, 299 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1 980) (holding that escape from

19
custody sentence should be vacated where defendant fled police officer to avoid
apprehension for burglary and the offenses occurred within minutes of one another).
According to Youngstedt, if the state’s own theory was that Youngstedt stole the EMT’s
car in order to avoid apprehension for his assault of K.M., he cannot be sentenced
separately for the two offenses.
Although Youngstedt correctly notes the general rule in avoidance-of-apprehension
cases, he neglects to mention an important judicially-created exception under which courts
may impose multiple sentences for “crimes aris ing out of a single be havioral incident
if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly
exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” See State v. Ferguson ,
808 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Minn. 2012) (quoting State v. Skipintheday , 717 N.W.2d 423,
426 (Minn. 2006)).
We conclude that the multiple -victim exception applies in this case. First, there is
no dispute that two victims were involved. Youngstedt committed the assault against K.M.,
who was stabbed, and the car theft against th e EMT, who came to assist K.M. Second,
imposing multiple sentences for the two o ffenses does not unfairly exaggerate the
criminality of Youngstedt’s conduct because the concurrent sentence for the car theft
acknowledges Youngstedt’s distinct culpability for the offense he committed against the
EMT. Thus, even if Youngstedt took the EMT’s car to avoid apprehension for the assault,
as is the state’s theory, th e multiple-victim exception pe rmits the imposition of multiple
sentences for the two offenses. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not

20
abuse its discretion by senten cing Youngstedt for both the assault and the motor-vehicle
theft.
V. The district court abused its discre tion by ordering Youngstedt to pay
restitution for the damage to K.M.’s car.

Youngstedt argues that the district cour t abused its discreti on by ordering him to
pay $5,500 in restitution to K.M. for the damage that he caused to her car. Based on binding
supreme court precedent, we agree.
This court reviews the decision to award restitution for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Anderson, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). A district court generally has broad
discretion to order restitution. Id. But a district court “may order restitution only for losses
that are directly caused by, or follow naturally as a consequence of, the defendant’s crime.”
State v. Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d 376, 381 (Minn. 2019) (emphasis added).
Here, the district court ordered Youngsted t to pay $5,500 to K.M. in restitution to
compensate her for the damage that Youngs tedt caused to her car. After Youngstedt
stabbed K.M., he took K.M.’s car and crashed it into a skid loader parked at the end of his
driveway. Youngstedt’s testimony implied that he took K.M.’s car with the intent to drive
to the EMT’s house to get help . Youngstedt contends that the district court abused its
discretion by ordering him to pay restitution because the damage to the car was not a “direct
result” of the assault.
We conclude that under the direct-result st andard, the damage to K.M.’s car was not
“directly caused by” and did not “follow na turally as a conseque nce of” Youngstedt’s
assault of K.M. Assault—great bodily harm is defined as “the intentional infliction of or

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attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(2) (2018).
The types of losses that follow naturally as a consequence of this offense include economic
losses such as medical expenses, lost wages, or therapy costs. In contrast, the economic
loss to K.M. caused by Youngstedt crashing her car is too attenuated from the assault
because it did not directly resu lt from Youngstedt’s criminal act of stabbing K.M. This
conclusion holds whether Youngstedt took K.M.’s car to get help or to flee the scene of the
crime.
The state argues that the restitution orde r was appropriate because the stabbing was
a “substantial factor” in causing the damage to K.M.’s car. But Minnesota courts apply the
direct-result standard, not the substantial factor standard, to determine whether losses result
from a crime. Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d at 380-81 . The state’s attempt to distinguish this
case is unpersuasive.
We recognize that the district court conc luded that K.M. should receive restitution
because Youngstedt caused damage to K.M.’s car. But, based on Boettcher, we are
compelled to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by ordering Youngstedt
to pay restitution for the damage to K.M.’s car because the damage was not directly caused
by Youngstedt’s assault of K.M. See State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018)
(stating that the court of appeals is requi red to follow supreme court precedent).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instru ctions for the district court to vacate the
restitution order in its entirety.
Affirmed in part, revers ed in part, and remanded.