Matthew William Edwards, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1943

Matthew William Edwards, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 31, 2022
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-11-724

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks and Chelsie
Willett, Assistant Public Defender s, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD , Judge
In 2011, appellant was convicted of driving while impaired (DWI) —test refusal. In
2019, appellant petitioned for pos tconviction relief , seeking to vacate his conviction .
Appellant’s petition relied on United States Supreme Court and Minnesota Supreme Court
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decisions that held a test-refusal conviction based on a warrantless blood or urine test was
unconstitutional unless a valid exception to the warrant requirement applied. After the
district court denied postconviction relief , appellant filed an appeal . In 2020, we ruled in
appellant’s favor after concluding his postconviction petition was timely and he was
entitled to relief. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for review ,
stayed the appeal, and later vacated our opinion and remanded for reconsiderati on in light
of two recent supreme court decisions . On remand, we conclude appellant’s petition is
untimely. For that reason, we affirm and do not reach the merits of the petition.
FACTS
In 2011, a Sherburne County deputy sheriff stopped appellant Matthew Edwards’s
van after the deputy saw it roll through a stop sign and cross into the opposite lane of traffic
as it went around a curve. As he spoke with Edwards, the deputy noticed “a strong odor of
an alcoholic beverage and the faint odor of marijuana, [Edwards’s] eyes were glassy, and
his speech was slurred.” As Edwards exited the van, he dropped a marijuana pipe. Edwards
told the deputy he consumed two-and-a-half beers about an hour before driving, he smoked
marijuana the day before , and there was marijuana in the van. Edwards submitted to a
preliminary breath test, which detected the presence of alcohol.
The deputy arrested E dwards and read the implied -consent advisory, and Edwards
spoke with an attorney. A second deputy, who had drug-recognition certification, asked
Edwards to perform additional tests . The second deputy concluded Edwards was “under
the influence of cannabis” and unable to safely operate a motor vehicle. The second deputy
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then asked Edward s to take a blood test , and Edwards refused. The deputy also asked
Edwards to take a urine test , and Edwards refused.
The state charged Edwards with third -degree DWI—test refusal , under Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 2 (2010) . Edwards pleaded guilty. On December 15, 2011, the district
court convicted Edwards and sentenced him according to the plea agreement to one year
in jail with 30 days stayed for four years. Edwards did not appeal his conviction. Edwards’s
probation was later discharged when he was sentenced to prison for another offense.
On July 26, 2019, Edwards petitioned for postconviction relief. Edwards argued his
2011 test -refusal conviction “is illegal and void because the test -refusal statute” is
unconstitutional as applied to him. He reasoned that “[t]he rules in Birchfield, Trahan, and
Thompson apply retroactively” to his 2011 conviction and prohibit the state from
prosecuting him for test refusal without first obtaining a warrant for his blood and urine .
Edwards also argued his petition was timely because it was filed within two years of
Johnson v. State, 916 N.W.2d 674 (Minn. 2018) (Johnson I), which held the Birchfield rule
applied retroactively to postconviction review of test-refusal convictions. Alternatively,
Edwards asked the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing and determine whether the
totality of the circumstances justified a warrantless search of his blood or urine.
The state opposed postconviction relief, contending Edwards’ s petition was
untimely because it was filed more than two years after the supreme court announced the
Birchfield rule. Alternatively, t he state argued , under the controlling caselaw when
Edwards’s conviction was final in early 2012, the natural dissipation of alcohol or drugs
was a single-factor or per se exigency that justified a warrantless search of blood or urine.
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The state also contended the undisputed facts showed probable cause to believe Edwards
was driving while impaired and, therefore, a single-factor exigency justified the warrantless
search of Edwards’s blood or urine.
In October 2019, the district court denied postconviction relief without an
evidentiary hearing. The district court did not explicitly address the timeliness of the
petition. The district court reasoned, first , that Edwards is only entitled to relief if Missouri
v. McNeely applies retroactively because McNeely was decided after Edwards’s conviction
and held the dissipation of alcohol is not a categorical or per se exigent circumstance
supporting a warrantless search. See Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013).
Second, the district court stated, “case law is clear that McNeely is not to be applied
retroactively.” Third, the district court concluded , under caselaw released before McNeely,
that the state “has shown that an exigent circumstance, as it was understood at the time,
existed to justify the warrantless search” of Edwards’s blood or urine. Edwards appealed.
In a precedential opinion, we held that Edwards’s petition for postconviction rel ief
was timely because he filed his petition within two years of the supreme court ’s decision
in Johnson I that the Birchfield rule applies retroactively to final convictions on collateral
review. Edwards v. State , 950 N.W.2d 309, 315, 319–20 (Minn. App. 2020), vacated
(Minn. Sept. 21, 2021) (mem.) . We therefore determined the district court erred by
declining to apply McNeely retroactively to Edwards’s test -refusal conviction. Id. at 320.
Finally, we reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing where the state could show
whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of Edwards’s blood and urine.
Id. at 319–20.
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The supreme court granted the state’s petition for review and stayed proceedings
pending final dispositions in related appeals. The supreme court later vacated the stay,
vacated our opinion, and remanded the matter for reconsideration under Johnson v. State,
956 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 2021) ( Johnson II), and Aili v. State, 963 N.W.2d 442 (Minn.
2021). The parties submitted supplemental briefs .
DECISION
A district court’s denial of postconviction relief is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). A district court abuses its
discretion by exercising its discreti on in an arbitrary or capricious manner, basing its
decision on an erroneous view of law, or making clearly erroneous factual findings. Id . An
appellate court reviews legal issues de novo and reviews factual issues to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the district court’s findings. Id.
Edwards makes two arguments in his supplemental brief to support reversal. First,
Edwards argues that Johnson II “does not sink Edwards’ case” because the district court
“erred even under pre -McNeely precedent.” Edwards acknowledges that Johnson II held
McNeely “is not retroactive to cases on collateral review ,” but contends “there was no
probable cause to believe . . . that he was under the influence of alcohol ” when the deputy
requested blood and urine tests from Edwards. Rather, Edwards argues the officer had
probable cause to believe Edwards was under the influence of cannabis and “no warrant
exception exists for the natural dissipation of mar ijuana.” Second, Edwards argues the
timeliness of his petition “is not before this court.” We begin with Edwards’s second
argument because it is a threshold issue and, in this case, is dispositive.
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A postconviction petition must be filed within two years of the entry of judgment of
conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1)
(2018). Edwards was convicted and sentenced on December 15, 2011, and no direct appeal
was filed. His conviction became final 90 days later on March 14, 2012, when the time for
filing a direct appeal expired. See Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 488 n.6 (Minn. 2012).
Thus, Edwards had until March 14, 2014, to file a timely postconviction petition. Edwards
filed his petition on July 26, 2019, and therefore his petition is untimely under subdivision
4(a)(1).
This does not end our analysis because Minnesota’s postconviction statute
recognizes f ive exceptions that permit a court to hear an untimely petition for
postconviction relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2018). Edwards relies on one such
exception: he claims his petition assert ed a new interpretation of federal or state
constitutional law by the United States Supreme Court or a Minnesota appellate court and
he established the interpretation is retroactively applicable to his case. Id., subd. 4(b)(3).
Even when an exception to the two -year deadline in subd ivision 4(a)(1) applies,
however, “[s]ubdivision 4(c) creates the additional requirement that a petition invoking an
exception provided in [4](b) must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.”
Sanchez v. State , 816 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). The two- year
time limit in subdivision 4(c) applies to all subdivision 4(b) exceptions. Id. at 5 57–58
(applying subdivision 4(c) to the interests-of-justice exception). The two- year time limit
under subdivision 4(c) begins to run when the petitioner “knew or should have known” that
an exception applies. Id. at 560.
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To determine whe n Edwards’s new-interpretation-of-law claim arose, we first
recognize that his claim is based on the Birchfield rule, which the supreme court has
summarized as “in the DWI context, the State may not criminalize refusal of a blood or a
urine test absent a sea rch warrant or a showing that a valid exception to the warrant
requirement applies.” Johnson I, 916 N.W.2d at 679. The Birchfield rule rests on three
opinions: (1) Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185–86 (2016), which held the
Fourth Amendment prohibits a driver from being convicted of refusing a blood test unless
the officer obtained a search warrant or exigent circumstances justified a warrantless
search; (2) State v. Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216, 224 (Minn. 2016), which applied Birchfield
to conclude Trahan could not be prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional
warrantless blood test; and (3) State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 233 (Minn. 2016),
which extended Birchfield to warrantless u rine tests and concluded Thompson could not
be prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional warrantless blood or urine test.
The supreme court’s remand instruct ions direct us to reconsider the timeliness of
Edwards’s petition under Aili, where the supreme court held a postconviction
new-interpretation-of-law claim arises when the United States Supreme Court or a
Minnesota appellate court announces a new interpretation of law that supports a claim that
the new rule applies retroactively. 963 N.W.2d at 449. In other words, the date a claim
arises under subdivision 4(c) is not when a postconviction petitioner knew or should have
known that they would prevail, but when the petitioner knew or should have known
information that would allow them to assert a claim that a subdivision 4(b) exception
applied. Id. at 447. Aili also instructs that when a petitioner claims a test-refusal conviction
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is unconstitutional because it is based on a wa rrantless blood or urine test, the decisions
“that announced a new retroactive rule of law are the opinions that announced the
Birchfield rule.” Id. at 449.
Based on the supreme court’s analysis in Aili, we conclude Edwards’s
new-interpretation-of-law claim arose no later than when the Birchfield rule was
announced on October 12, 2016, which is the date the supreme court issued its decisions
in Thompson and Trahan, and applied Birchfield to test-refusal convictions based on
blood and urine tests. See Aili, 963 N.W.2d at 449 n.6 (stating the two -year time limit in
subdivision 4(c) on a new-interpretation-of-law claim started running when the supreme
court decided Thompson and Trahan). Thus, for his postconviction petition to be timel y,
Edwards had to file it no later than October 12, 2018. Edwards, however, filed his
postconviction petition on July 26, 2019, well past the two -year time limit allowed for his
new-interpretation-of-law claim. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2018).
Edwards asserts the timeliness of his petition is not properly before this court
because the district court did not rule on the issue when it denied relief on the merits.
Edwards is correct that the district court did not consider the timeliness of his petition when
it denied relief . An appellate court, however, may affirm a district court’s decision on
alternative grounds if “there is legal support for the arguments, and the alternative grounds
would not expand the relief previously granted.” State v. Grunig, 660 N.W.2d 134, 137
(Minn. 2003).
We conclude that a ffirming the district court’s decision on the alternative ground
that Edwards’s petition is untimely does not expand the relief previously granted. The state
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preserved its challenge to the timeliness of Edwards’s petition because the state argued
during district court and prior appellate proceedings that the petition was filed more than
two years after Edward’s claim arose under the Birchfield rule.
Thus, we determine Edwards’s postconviction petition was untimely because he
filed his petition more than two years after the supreme court announced the Birchfield
rule. Because Edwards’s petition is untimely, we need not decide whether the district court
correctly decided the validity of the state’s warrantless request for Edwards’s blood or urine
under pre-McNeely caselaw.
Affirmed.