Shane Paul Schultz, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0407

Shane Paul Schultz, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Appellant.

Filed January 24, 2022
Reversed
Johnson, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-14-466

Kenneth R. White, Law Office of Kennet h R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jenna Marie Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
In 2015, Shane Paul Schultz pleaded guilty to first-degree test refusal based on his
admission that he refused to submit to a warrantless blood or urine test after being arrested
2
for driving while impaired. In 2017, Schultz petitioned for post-conviction relief, and his
petition was denied. In 2019, Schultz again petitioned for post-conviction relief. His
second petition was granted. The state appeals, arguing that the district court erred by not
concluding that the second petition is untimely because it wa s filed more than two years
after Schultz’s conviction an d because no exception to the two-year limitations period
applies. In light of a recent supreme court opinion, we conclude that Schultz’s second post-
conviction petition is untimely and that the district court erred by considering the merits of
the petition. Therefore, we reverse.
FACTS
On June 28, 2014, a Redwood County deput y sheriff arrested Schultz for driving
while impaired. The deputy requested that Schultz submit to a warrantless blood or urine
test pursuant to the implied-co nsent statute. Schultz refuse d to do so. The state later
charged him with three offenses, including first-degree refusal to submit to chemical
testing, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2012). In January 2015, the parties
entered into a plea agreement under which Schultz pleaded guilty to the test-refusal charge
and the state dismissed the two remaining charge s. In February 2015, the district court
imposed a 42-month prison sentence but stayed execution of the sentence for seven years
and placed Schultz on probation. Schultz did not pursue a direct appeal of his conviction
or sentence.
In June 2016, the United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless blood test is
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amen dment, that the sear ch-incident-to-arrest
doctrine does not apply, and that a person may not be criminally punished for refusing to
3
submit to such a search. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173-82 (2016). In
October 2016, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Birchfield applies to both blood tests
and urine tests and that it is unconstitutional to convict a person of test-refusal under section
169A.20, subdivision 2, for refusing to submit to either type of test. State v. Trahan, 886
N.W.2d 216, 221 (Minn. 2016); State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 233-34 (Minn. 2016).
In December 2016, Schultz violated a condition of his probation. In February 2017,
the district court revoked his probation and executed his prison sentence. That same month,
Schultz filed a petition for post-convictio n relief. He argued that, in light of Birchfield,
Trahan, and Thompson, his 2015 test-refusal conviction was unconstitutional. The post-
conviction court denied th e petition on the ground that Birchfield does not apply
retroactively. Schultz did not appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief.
In August 2018, the Minnes ota Supreme Court held that Birchfield, Trahan, and
Thompson apply retroactively to convic tions on collateral review. Johnson v. State, 916
N.W.2d 674, 684 (Minn. 2018). In Decemb er 2019, Schultz file d a second petition for
post-conviction relief. He argued that, in light of Johnson, his 2015 test-refusal conviction
is unconstitutional under Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson. The state opposed Schultz’s
second petition on the grounds that it is time-barred and procedurally barred by the Knaffla
doctrine.
In September 2020, while Schultz’s sec ond petition was pending, this court held
that a post-conviction petition based on Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson is timely under
the new-interpretation-of-law exception to the two-year statute of limitations if the petition
was filed within two years of the supreme court’s Johnson opinion. Edwards v. State, 950
4
N.W.2d 309, 318 (Minn. App. 2020) (subse quent history omitted). Approximately one
week later, the post-conviction court ruled that, in light of Edwards, Schultz’s second
petition is timely. The post-conviction court also ruled that Schultz’s second petition is not
procedurally barred by the Knaffla doctrine.
The post-conviction court later conduct ed an evidentiary hearing on Schultz’s
second petition. In February 2021, the post- conviction court filed an order in which it
granted Schultz’s second petition based on Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson and vacated
his test-refusal conviction.
The state filed a notice of appeal. In Au gust 2021, while this appeal was in the
briefing stage, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a post-conviction petitioner seeking
relief based on Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson more than two years after his conviction
may take advantage of the new-interpretation-o f-law exception to the two-year statute of
limitations only if the petition was filed within two year s of the supreme court’s Trahan
and Thompson opinions. Aili v. State, 963 N.W.2d 442, 449 (Minn. 2021). Approximately
one month later, the Minnesota Supr eme Court vacated this court’s Edwards opinion.
Edwards v. State, No. A19-1943 (Minn. Sept. 21, 2021) (order).
DECISION
The state argues that the post-convicti on court erred by granting Schultz’s second
post-conviction petition for two r easons. First, the state ar gues that Schultz’s second
petition is untimely because it was filed more than two years afte r his conviction and
sentencing and because no exception to the two-year statute of limitations applies. Second,
5
the state argues that Schultz’s second petition is procedur ally barred by the Knaffla
doctrine. We begin our analysis by considering the state’s first argument.
In general, a person seek ing post-conviction relief mu st file a post-conviction
petition within a two-year limitations period. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2018). The
two-year limitations period begins upon the latter of “(1) the entry of judgment of
conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition of
petitioner’s direct appeal.” Id. If the two-year limitations pe riod has expired, the post-
conviction court nonetheless may consider th e post-conviction petition if any one of five
exceptions applies. Id., subd. 4(b). The exception at i ssue in this appeal allows a post-
conviction court to consider an otherwise untimely petition if “the petitioner asserts a new
interpretation of federal or state constitutional or statutory law by either the United States
Supreme Court or a Minnesota appellate cour t and the petitioner establishes that this
interpretation is retroactively applicable to the petitioner’s case.” Id., subd. 4(b)(3). But a
petition relying on any exception to the two-year statute of limitations is subject to another
limitations period, which provides that the petition “must be f iled within two years of the
date the claim arises.” Id., subd. 4(c). The date on which a “claim arises” is determined
by an objective “knew or sh ould have known” standard. Sanchez v. State , 816 N.W.2d
550, 558-60 (Minn. 2012).
The state contends that the post-convictio n court’s determination of timeliness is
inconsistent with the supreme court’s recent opinion in Aili. The four petitioners in Aili
sought to withdraw their gu ilty pleas, which were entere d in 2014 and 2015, based on
retroactive applications of Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson. 963 N.W.2d at 444. The
6
supreme court framed the issue on appeal as “when a petitioner knows or should know that
a subdivision 4(b)(3) ‘claim arises,’ thus triggering the 2- year time limit in subdivision
4(c)” that applies to exceptions to the two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 447. The
supreme court stated that the knew-or-should-have-known standard is satisfied when “the
petitioner knew or should have known of the information that would allow him to assert a
claim that an ex ception applied.” Id. More specifically, the supreme court held, “A
postconviction petitioner knows or should know he has a clai m on the date that a court
decision announces an interpretation of law th at provides the basis for a claim that the
petitioner is entitled to relief because the interp retation is a new rule of law that applies
retroactively to the petitioner’s conviction.” Id. at 449. The supreme court concluded that,
because the petitioners were relying on Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson, the two-year
limitations period in subdivisio n 4(c) for the new-interpreta tion-of-law exception to the
two-year statute of limitations expired on Oc tober 12, 2018, two ye ars after the supreme
court issued its opinions in Trahan and Thompson. Id. Because all four of the petitioners
had filed their post-conviction petitions in late 2019, they were una ble to establish the
exception in subdivision 4(b)(3). Id.
In this case, Schultz’s second petition was filed in December 2019, more than four
years after his conviction and sentencing. Th e post-conviction court applied this court’s
Edwards opinion and determined that Schultz’s second petition is timely because it was
filed within two years of the supreme court’s Johnson opinion. But, as indicated above,
this court’s Edwards opinion no longer is good law; it was effectively overruled by the
supreme court’s Aili opinion, and it later was vacated by the supreme court. See Threlkeld
7
v. Robbinsdale Fed’n of Te achers, Local 872, AFL-CIO , 316 N.W.2d 551, 552 (Minn.
1982) (stating that vacated opinion is “without force or effect”); In re Hallbom’s Estate ,
249 N.W. 417, 418 (Minn. 1933 ) (stating that vacated opinion is “of no effect”). The
applicable law now is found in Aili, in which the supreme court held that a post-conviction
petitioner seeking relief based on Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson after the two-year
statute of limitations has lapsed must have filed a post-conviction petition by not later than
October 12, 2018. 963 N.W. 2d at 449. Because Schultz filed his petition in December
2019, he cannot establish the timeliness of his petition under the new-interpretation-of-law
exception in subdivision 4(b)(3).
Schultz has not invoked any other excepti on to the two-year limitations period in
subdivision 4(a). Accordingly, his second post-conviction petition is untimely. Therefore,
the district court erred by ruling that the petition is timely and by considering the merits of
the petition. Because that conclusion is a sufficient basis for reversing the district court’s
decision, we need not consider the state’s Knaffla argument.
Reversed.