State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0113

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Angelica Shantel Easterling,
Appellant.

Filed September 8, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-2170

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul City Attorney, Clifford R. Berg, Assi stant City Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Stephen V. Grigsby, Northfield, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for driving under the influence
of marijuana, appellant argues that the ev idence was insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that she was impaired by marijuana. We affirm.

2
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Angelica Shantel Easterling with
third-degree driving while im paired (DWI), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20,
subd. 1(2) (2018), alleging th at she operated a motor vehi cle under the influence of
marijuana. Easterling proceeded by court trial. Before trial began, Easterling stipulated to
four facts:
1. On January 7, 2019 at approximately 5:27 p.m., Angelica
Shantel Easterling was driving a motor vehicle in the area of
Payne Avenue and Tedesco in the City of Saint Paul, Ramsey
County, Minnesota.

2. A sample of Angelica Shan tel Easterling’s blood taken at
7:03 p.m. revealed the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol and a
metabolite of tetrahydrocannabino l in her system within two
hours of driving.

3. Tetrahydrocannabinol and the metabolite of
tetrahydrocannabinol are Schedule 1 controlled substances per
Minn. Stat. § 152.02.2 (h)(1)(2).

4. Angelica Shantel Easterling has a previous conviction for
driving while under the influence from November 23, 2013.

Easterling also expressly agreed on the record that she was stipulating to all elements of
the offense except that she was driving under the influence of marijuana.
The state called one witness, a Saint Paul police officer. The officer testified that
he had training in field sobriety testing, in cluding training in the detection of “impaired
driving with unknown controlled substances.” He was also a field sobriety instructor and
a drug recognition evaluator. The officer testified that poor driving conduct is an indicator
that a driver is under the influence. Specif ically, things like speeding, failing to stop for

3
stop signs, and failing to yield for vehicles that have the right-of-way are indicators that a
person might be driving under the influence.
On January 7, the officer and his partne r observed a vehicle driven by Easterling
make a left turn in front of a school bus at an intersection when the school bus had the
right-of-way. Both the school bus and Easterling had a green light. The school bus had to
stop to avoid a crash, and the vehicle came cl ose to the bus. The o fficers caught up to
Easterling’s vehicle to conduct a traffic stop. As the officer approached Easterling’s
vehicle, she rolled her windows down and a large amount of smoke vented out of the
vehicle. The officer detect ed a strong odor of burnt ma rijuana. The officer asked
Easterling how much marijuana she had smoked that day. Easterling responded that she
had smoked a marijuana cigarette about an hour before the traffic stop.
Believing that this was a good opportunity for trainee officers to perform field
sobriety tests, the officer called for a trainee squad to come to the location. A trainee officer
conducted field sobriety tests. The trainee officer conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus
test, the walk-and-turn test, the one-leg stand test, and the lack-of-convergence test.1 After
observing the tests that the trainee officer conducted, the officer concluded that Easterling
should be arrested for DWI.

1 The lack-of-convergence test, according to th e officer’s testimony, is designed to detect
whether the suspect is under the influence of certain drugs, including “cannabis.”

4
The officer testified that he was also a “certified DRE.”2 He did not conduct a “DRE
exam,” however, because he believed that th ere was “more than enough” information to
arrest Easterling for DWI based on her dr iving conduct, her admission to smoking
marijuana, and the results of the field sobriety tests.
For her case-in-chief, Easterling called a friend who was riding in her car during the
incident. The friend testified that he did not see Easterling smoke marijuana. He testified
that he smoked marijuana in Easterling’s car that day. Easterling did not testify.
The district court issued wr itten findings of fact, conclusi ons of law, and an order
determining that Easterling drove under the influence of marijuana and was therefore guilty
of third-degree DWI. Easterling appeals.
D E C I S I O N
The sole issue in this app eal is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that
Easterling drove while under the influence of ma rijuana. It is a cr ime to drive a motor
vehicle while under the influence of a contro lled substance. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20,
subd. 1(2). A person is under the influence of a substance “when a person does not possess
that clearness of intellect and control of himself that he otherwise would have.”
State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 686 (M inn. App. 2012) (quota tion omitted). Easterling
maintains that the evidence is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she
drove while under the influence of marijuana.

2 In this context, “DRE” mean s “Drug Recognition Expert.” See State v. Klawitter ,
518 N.W.2d 577, 578 (Minn. 1994).

5
There are two standards of review that might apply to a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
challenge. The nature of th e evidence supporting the convic tion dictates which standard
applies. When a conviction is based on direct evidence alone, we undertake a “painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when view ed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the [fact-finder] to reach the verdict
which [it] did.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). We
assume that “the [fact-finder] believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence
to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
“A conviction based on circumstantial ev idence, however, warrants heightened
scrutiny.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 4 73 (Minn. 2010). When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we conduct
a two-step analysis. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). First, we identify
the circumstances proved at trial, disregardi ng evidence that is not consistent with the
fact-finder’s verdict. Id. Second, we consider the infere nces that can be drawn from the
circumstances proved. Id. We give no deference to the fact-finder’s choice among
reasonable inferences at this second step. Id. The evidence is sufficient if the
circumstances proved, viewed as a whole, are “consistent with a reasonable inference that
the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.
To overturn a conviction, th e hypothesis of innocence must be rational given the
circumstances proved, and not “too speculative to create a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Hughes, 355 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Minn. App. 1984) (quotation omitted), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 2, 1985); see also State v. Stein , 776 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. 2010)

6
(“To successfully challenge a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, a defendant
must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than his
guilt. However, possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long
as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” (quotation
omitted)).
In this case, we apply the circumstantial-evidence standard.
3 We first determine the
circumstances proved. The circumstances proved include the four stipulated facts
identified above. The other circumstances proved include: (1) the police officer had been
trained in sobriety testing, including the detection of “i mpaired driving with unknown
controlled substances”; (2) the officer testified that driving conduct, including failing to
yield for vehicles that have the right-of-way, may indicate that a pe rson is driving under
the influence of a substance; (3) the officer saw Easterling turn left in front of a school bus
that had the right-of-way at an intersection; (4) Easterling’s vehicle came close to the bus,
and the bus had to slow down to avoid a collision; (5) when th e officer approached
Easterling’s vehicle after stopping her, he sa w a large cloud of smoke vent out of the
vehicle; (6) the officer detected a strong odor of burnt marijuana; (7) Easterling admitted
that she smoked marijuana about an hour before the traffic stop; (8) the officer observed a

3 We have previously held that the traditional direct-e vidence standard applies when
reviewing a DWI conviction when the state pr esents direct eviden ce of the defendant’s
alcohol consumption and direct evidence of impaired driving. See State v. Olson , 887
N.W.2d 692, 700 (Minn. App. 2016). Because the parties agreed at oral argument that the
circumstantial-evidence standard applies, and because we ultimately conclude that
Easterling’s sufficiency challenge fails even under the heightened circumstantial-evidence
standard, we apply the heightened standard and therefore do not need to determine which
standard applies.

7
trainee officer conduct field sobriety tests, including a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the
walk-and-turn test, the one-leg stand test, a nd the lack-of-convergence test; and (9) after
watching the tests that the trainee officer co nducted, the officer concluded that Easterling
should be arrested for impaired driving.
Next, we determine whether the circumst ances proved, viewed as a whole, are
“consistent with a reasonable inference that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. Here, the only
element at issue is whether Easterling was im paired by marijuana, meaning that she did
“not possess that clearness of intellect and c ontrol of [herself] that [s]he otherwise would
have” absent substance use. Ards, 816 N.W.2d at 686 (quotation omitted).
The circumstances proved are clearly consis tent with a reasonable inference that
Easterling drove while under the influence of marijuana. Easterling admitted that she used
marijuana about an hour before the traffic stop. The offi cer observed Easterling nearly
cause an accident by driving in front of a school bus that had the right-of-way at an
intersection. The officer saw smoke vent out of Easterling’s vehicle, and detected the odor
of burnt marijuana. Easterling performed poorly on field sobriety tests. And Easterling’s
blood sample contained tetrahydrocannabinol and a metabolite of tetrahydrocannabinol.
These circumstances are consistent with the reasonable inference that Easterling ingested
marijuana and that she did not “possess that clearness of intellect and control of [herself]
that [s]he otherwise would have” had she not ingested marijuana. Id. (quotation omitted).
Easterling argues, however, that the circ umstances proved are consistent with the
rational hypothesis that she was not under the influence of marijuana. She asserts that

8
without evidence of how she would act while sober, the trial evidence does not foreclose
the reasonable inference that she was operating as she ordinarily would. And Easterling
maintains that there was no evid ence in the record supporting that the field sobriety tests
that she took could accurately detect whether she was impaired by marijuana.4 We are not
persuaded.
We conclude that it is not reasonable to infer from the circ umstances proved that
Easterling was not under the influence of mariju ana. It is not disputed that Easterling
ingested marijuana about an hour before the traffic stop. Moreover, the officer observed
smoke vent out of her vehicle and detected th e odor of marijuana during the traffic stop.
Easterling also showed signs of impairment . The basis of the traffic stop was that
Easterling took a left turn in front of a school bus with the right-of-way at a stoplight. The
officer testified at trial that poor driving condu ct, including failure to yield for those with
the right of way, may indicate impairment. Furthermore, according to the officer,
Easterling’s performance on field sobriety tests showed “impairment.” In isolation, each
of these facts may be insufficient to prove that Easterling drove under the influence of

4 Easterling also maintains th at the evidence is insuffici ent to support her conviction
because the officer did not testify that he believed that Easterling was under the influence
of marijuana. This assertion is inconsiste nt with the record. While the officer never
expressly testified that he believed that East erling was under the influence of marijuana,
he did testify that after observing the trainee officer administer field sobriety tests, he
“concurred with the [trainee officer] that he had enough to show impairment and to make
an arrest.” In context with the officer’s other testimony about the indicia of marijuana use
during the traffic stop, and the officer’s specifi c testimony that one of the field sobriety
tests that the trainee officer administered was designed to detect whether the suspect was
under the influence of certain drugs, including cannabis, it is clear to us that the officer’s
testimony establishes his opinion that Easterling was impaired by marijuana.

9
marijuana. But viewed as a whole, the circumstan ces proved foreclose any reasonable
inference that Easterling “possess[ed] that clearness of intellect and control of [herself] that
[s]he otherwise would have” had she not ingested marijuana. Ards, 816 N.W.2d at 686
(quotation omitted).
Relying primarily on an unpublished, non-precedential opinion, Easterling also
asserts that the state failed to prove that she did not have some other condition that might
explain her driving conduct and sobriety -test performance, other than marijuana
impairment. See State v. Suber , No. A06-2438, 2008 WL 942622, at *5 (Minn. App.
Apr. 8, 2008). But unlike in Suber, there is no evidence in th e record that Easterling had
some other condition that would explain the behavior that supports an inference of
impairment. Thus, in this case, the premis e that Easterling had a condition that could
negate the inference of impairment is merely speculation and is insufficient to establish a
rational hypothesis. See State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008) (holding that
a defendant “may not rely on mere conjecture” and instead must “point to evidence in the
record that is consistent with a rational th eory other than guilt”). Easterling’s conviction
for DWI survives the circum stantial-evidence standard of review because the
circumstances proved are “consistent with a reasonable inference that the accused is guilty
and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at
601.

10
Finally, Easterling appears to argue that expert testimony—specifically, testimony
regarding the drug-recognition protocol addressed in Klawitter5—is required to prove that
a defendant was under the influence of mariju ana. But Easterling c ites no authority that
establishes such a requirement. We are unawa re of any statute or appellate decision that
requires the state to introduce expert test imony to establish marijuana impairment and
decline to establish that requirement here.
Affirmed.

5 In Klawitter, the supreme court held that tes timony regarding the drug-recognition
protocol was admissible at trial in appropriate circumstances. 518 N.W.2d at 586.