State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1094

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jesse Paul Kaska,
Appellant.

Filed June 23, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-23-299

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Christopher Florey, Assistant County
Attorney, Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for driving while impaired
(DWI), appellant Jesse Paul Kaska argues that his conviction must be reversed for
insufficient evidence that he was impaired by a controlled substance. We conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and therefore affirm.
2
FACTS
The following relevant facts were elicited at a jury trial. Kaska pulled up to a pump
at a gas station in Virginia, Minnesota, at about 7:30 p.m. on March 16, 2023, but he did
not immediately exit the car to fill the tank. That drew the attention of an employee, who
heard “a lot of screaming” coming from the vehicle. The employee testified that Kaska was
acting “aggressive” and “weird.” He described Kaska as appearing “[v]ery lethargic and
rolling his head and arm around, and punching the steering wheel in front of him, and then
leaning down to his lap and then coming back up and rubbing his face.” After observing
Kaska for a bit, the employee called the police.
When the responding officer arrived and approached the car, it was still running and
the driver’s-side window was slightly open. The officer observed Kaska, who was the only
occupant in the vehicle, speaking in a “loud voice” with an open Bible in his hands. When
the officer asked Kaska what he was doing, Kaska said, “Just reading my Bible,” and he
indicated that he was livestreaming.
The officer directed Kaska to step out of his car and asked if he had used any illegal
substances that day. Kaska responded, “Nope. Just my prescription.” He told the officer
that he had last smoked cannabis, for which he had a prescription, “some hours ago.” Kaska
also explained that he had a Vyvanse prescription for his attention- deficit/hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) and said, “Those are my two prescriptions, the only things I take.”
At trial, the officer, who is a trained “drug recognition evaluator,” testified that he
noticed the following signs and symptoms of impairment while interacting with Kaska:
Kaska’s eyes were “bloodshot”; “the vein along the side of his neck was bulging out”; he
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“couldn’t stand still” and “had some trouble tracking [the] conversation and focusing”; his
movements were “very exaggerated”; and his speech was “agitated, loud and rapid.” Based
on his observations of potential impairment, the officer asked Kaska if he would submit to
field sobriety tests. Kaska agreed.
The officer administered five tests and testified to the following observations.
During the convergence and horizontal gaze nystagmus tests, Kaska’s eyes “did not stay
converged,” and Kaska “had trouble focusing on the stimulus” and “sway[ed]” during these
tests, which can all be signs of impairment. During the walk-and-turn test, Kaska partially
lost his balance a few times, “flailing his arms around and at one point . . . grabb[ing] on
to the push bumper of [the] squad car to steady himself.” He was also “very stiff and rigid”
and “completed an improper turn.” During the one-leg-stand test, Kaska “[h]ad trouble
finding his balance initially and was swaying” but eventually caught himself. Finally, for
the modified Romberg test, Kaska “estimated the passage of 30 seconds as approximately
38 seconds,” when the “typical[]” accepted range is “plus or minus 5 seconds.” During the
Romberg test, the officer also noticed eyelid tremors, which can be “another sign of
impairment.”
The officer testified that a determination of impairment requires examining “the
totality of the circumstances,” i.e., “looking at everything combined rather than just one
specific clue.” This included, as the officer testified, the fact that it was snowing outside
during his interaction with Kaska. The officer affirmed that, “based on [his] training and
experience,” Kaska “was . . . impaired by a drug.”
4
During a search of Kaska’s vehicle, the officer found a container of prescribed
cannabis and a bottle of Vyvanse. The Vyvanse bottle was missing 19 capsules, even
though the prescription had been filled 11 days prior. The officer testified that he expected
only 11 missing capsules because the label instructed Kaska to take one capsule per day.
Kaska provided a blood sample. The forensic scientist who tested the sample
testified that it contained amphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. She also
testified that Vyvanse “metabolizes into amphetamine,” and that she could not determine
whether the presence of amphetamine in the blood would “affect[] a person’s ability to
operate a motor vehicle.” Another forensic scientist testified that the sample tested positive
for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which “is the main active component of marijuana that is
responsible for causing a high or . . . impairment.” The results indicated that THC had
entered Kaska’s system within 24 hours of the test.
Kaska testified in his own defense. H e stated that he was prescribed medical
cannabis to treat his post-traumatic stress disorder and Vyvanse to treat his ADHD. On the
day of the offense, he took Vyvanse, as prescribed, at around 10 a.m., and smoked cannabis
about four hours before arriving at the gas station. According to Kaska, the nurse
practitioner who prescribed the medication told him that it was “perfectly fine on those
prescriptions to drive” so long as he used them “within the limits.” Kaska also testified that
he could not feel the effects of those substances while interacting with the officer and that
he had left the eight missing pills of Vyvanse with his mother as a “backup plan” if
“something happens to [the rest of his] medication.” Kaska stated that he was homeless at
the time.
5
The jury found Kaska guilty of two counts of first- degree DWI, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(2) (the person is under the influence of
a controlled substance), and 1(7) (the person’s body contains any amount of a controlled
substance listed in Schedule I or II other than, as relevant, THC) (2022). The district court
dismissed the DWI count under subdivision 1(7), and other driving -related charges. 1 On
the remaining DWI count of driving while under the influence of a controlled substance,
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2), the district court convicted Kaska and sentenced him to
62 months’ imprisonment and five years of conditional release.
Kaska appeals.
DECISION
Kaska argues that his DWI conviction must be reversed because there was
insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he was “under the influence of a controlled
substance” at the time of the offense. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2). To prove that
someone was “under the influence,” the state must establish that the person did not “possess
that clearness of intellect and control of himself that he otherwise would have.” State v.
Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).

1 Those charges were (1) driving after cancellation of a license, Minn. Stat. § 171.24,
subd. 5 (2022); (2) being in physical control of a motor vehicle that is not equipped with a
certified, functioning ignition interlock device, Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 1(g) (2022);
(3) being in physical control of a motor vehicle while in violation of a restriction relating
to the possession or consumption of alcohol or controlled substances imposed in a restricted
driver’s license, Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 1(f)(1) (2022); and (4) driving an uninsured
vehicle, Minn. Stat. § 169.797, subd. 2 (2022).
6
A review for sufficiency of the evidence entails a “painstaking analysis of the
record,” State v. Kremmin, 889 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn. App. 2017) (quoting State v.
Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989)), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2017), to
determine “whether . . . a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of
the offense,” State v. Jones, 4 N.W.3d 495, 501-02 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). There
are “two tests for evaluating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim,” and the appropriate test
depends on whether the offense is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 501.
“Direct evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that,
if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Id. (quotation omitted). On the
other hand, circumstantial evidence is “based on inference and not on personal knowledge
or observation and all evidence that is not given by eyewitness testimony.” State v. Clark,
739 N.W.2d 412, 421 n.4 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). It is “evidence from which the
factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris ,
895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
If the state relied on both direct and circumstantial evidence to prove a disputed
element, a reviewing court considers whether the element “is sufficiently proven by direct
evidence alone.” Jones, 4 N.W.3d at 500 (quoting State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn.
2016)). If not, the heightened circumstantial-evidence standard applies. Id. Here, we apply
the circumstantial-evidence standard without deciding whether the direct evidence alone
was sufficient to prove Kaska’s impairment and conclude that the evidence was sufficient.
See, e.g., State v. Easterling, No. A20-0113, 2020 WL 5361078, at *3 n.3 (Minn. App.
Sept. 8, 2020) (applying circumstantial-evidence standard because defendant’s sufficiency
7
challenge failed under that heightened standard); State v. Westgaard, No. A17-0717, 2018
WL 1149774, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 5, 2018) (same), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2018).2
Appellate courts use “a two-step process” to review the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence. State v. Cruz, 997 N.W.2d 537, 551 (Minn. 2023). First, an appellate court must
“identify[] ‘the circumstances proved.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hassan, 977 N.W.2d 633, 640
(Minn. 2022)). In doing so, it may consider “ only those circumstances that are consistent
with the verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted). This requires “winnow[ing] down the evidence
presented at trial to a subset of facts that is consistent with the jury’s verdict and
disregard[ing] evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quotations
omitted). Second, the court must determine “whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. Mere “‘conjecture’ or ‘speculation’” is not enough to set
aside a verdict. Id. (quoting State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 480 (Minn. 2010)).
To identify the circumstances proved, we consider the body-worn camera footage,
the results of Kaska’s blood test, and the trial testimony of the officer, the cashier, and the
forensic scientists. We must disregard Kaska’s testimony that he could not feel any
impairing effects of Vyvanse or cannabis because that evidence is inconsistent with the
verdict. See id.
With that lens, the circumstances proved are as follows. Kaska pulled into a gas
station near a gas pump, but did not exit the car to fill up his tank. He was in the driver’s

2 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority except as law of the case, but they
may be cited for their persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
8
seat screaming aggressively and hitting the steering wheel of his car. He appeared “[v]ery
lethargic” and exhibited “weird” behaviors, like “rolling his head and arm around . . . and
leaning down to his lap and then coming back up and rubbing his face,” which led the
employee at the gas station to call the police. Earlier that day, Kaska took an undetermined
amount of Vyvanse and smoked marijuana. His blood sample contained both amphetamine
and THC. Kaska’s bottle of Vyvanse was short eight capsules based on the prescribed
dosage. During the field sobriety tests, Kaska showed the following signs of impairment:
bloodshot eyes, a bulging vein along the side of his neck, swaying, a lack of convergence
of his eyes, loss of balance, and eyelid tremors. He also exceeded the typical accepted range
on the Romberg time- estimation test. Kaska exhibited a lack of balance, “agitated, loud
and rapid” speech, and “rigid” and “very exaggerated” movements. He was unable to stand
still, and he had “some trouble tracking [the] conversation and focusing.” In the officer’s
opinion, these observations were “indicators that based on [his] training and experience
would lead [him] to believe [Kaska] was . . . impaired by a drug.”
“Next, we consider whether the circumstances proved are consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other
than guilt.” Id. (citing State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013)).
The circumstances proved are consistent with guilt. That is, the jury reasonably
could have concluded that Kaska was impaired. There is no dispute that Kaska took
controlled substances on the date of the offense and that eight pills of Vyvanse were
missing. The officer testified that Kaska showed multiple signs of impairment, even taking
into account Kaska’s ADHD diagnosis and the inclement weather. Assuming, as we must,
9
that the jury believed the officer’s testimony, see State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 477
(Minn. 1999) , the jury could reasonably have concluded that Kaska was impaired by
controlled substances, see State v. Teske, 390 N.W.2d 388, 390- 91 (Minn. App. 1986)
(holding there was sufficient evidence to sustain DWI conviction where jury “evidently
believed the testimony of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved [defendant’s] contradictory
testimony”).
We next consider whether the evidence excludes any reasonable inference that
Kaska was not under the influence. Kaska argues that we can infer from the circumstances
proved that, even though he had substances in his system, he was not under the influence .
He focuses on the lack of evidence of poor driving conduct and, relying on the case State
v. Elmourabit, 373 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1985), he argues that there is a rational hypothesis
based on the circumstances proved that his ability or capacity to drive was not impaired.
With respect to Kaska’s argument that the record lacks evidence of poor driving
conduct, we typically do not consider a lack of evidence to support an alternative
reasonable inference under the circumstantial-evidence test. See Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at
480 (stating that a defendant must “point[] to evidence in the record that is consistent with
a rational theory other than guilt” for it to rise beyond “mere conjecture or speculation”
(quotation omitted)). Especially where there is no evidence of good driving, any inference
drawn from the lack of evidence of bad driving would be speculative. See Cruz, 997
N.W.2d at 551 (providing that a defendant may not rely on conjecture or speculation).
The circumstances proved here are also distinct from Elmourabit, where the
supreme court held that the evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol
10
was insufficient to sustain a DWI conviction. 373 N.W.2d at 291. There, the field sobriety
tests did not reveal any signs of impairment. Id. There was no “direct proof of actual
consumption,” other than the defendant’s admission of having “one beer and a few sips of
another,” because the defendant did not take any chemical or breath tests. Id. at 293. The
undisputed “chronological sequence of events . . . [disproved] any prolonged access to or
opportunity” for the defendant to consume alcohol to the point of impairment. Id. And the
defendant had an undiagnosed medical condition that could account for the “outward
manifestations of intoxication” that the officers and others observed. Id.
Here, there was direct evidence of actual consumption of controlled substances. In
addition to his own admission that he smoked cannabis hours before his arrest and took
Vyvanse on the morning of his arrest, Kaska’s blood sample contained amphetamine and
THC metabolites. Multiple field sobriety tests showed signs of impairment. Eyewitnesses
observed other signs of impairment, including aggressive screaming, loss of balance, and
swaying— for which there is no explanation consistent with non-guilt. And, unlike in
Elmourabit, where the officers and paramedics could not “say authoritatively that
defendant had no medical problems or was not experiencing pain, ” id., such that his
behavior could be explained by reasons other than impairment, the officer here testified
that his training and experience led him to believe Kaska was impaired by a drug despite
knowing about Kaska’s ADHD diagnosis.
3 Elmourabit is “fact-bound,” Teske, 390 N.W.2d

3 We note that Kaska did not argue that we could infer from his ADHD diagnosis that his
performance on the field sobriety tests resulted from a medical condition and not
impairment. In any event, the only evidence in the record about his medical condition was
his own testimony and the prescription bottle found in the car. Without more, any inference
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at 390 (discussing Elmourabit), and distinguishable from Kaska’s case. It is inapposite
here.
We are also not persuaded that the weather provides a basis to infer that Kaska was
not under the influence. The weather does not explain much of Kaska’s conduct, such as
the yelling, loss of balance, and swaying, nor does it explain his bloodshot eyes. Moreover,
the officer testified that he did not have any problems walking around despite the snow.
And, even considering the inclement weather, the officer still opined, based on his
experience and considering “the totality of the circumstances,” that Kaska showed signs of
impairment. Presuming that the jury believed the officer, as we must, see Chambers, 589
N.W.2d at 477, the weather does not support a rational alternative theory that Kaska was
not impaired. Moreover, in “consider[ing] whether the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the circumstances proved . . . are consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt ,” appellate
courts “view[] [the circumstances proved] as a whole and not as discrete, isolated facts.”
State v. Smith, 9 N.W.3d 543, 565 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). Considered with the
other circumstances proved as a whole, the weather does not support the conclusion that
there is a rational hypothesis other than guilt here. See id.
In sum, the circumstances proved are “consistent with the hypothesis that [Kaska]
is guilty,” i.e., was under the influence of a controlled substance, and “inconsistent with

about how his condition might have affected his performance on the field sobriety tests
would have amounted to “conjecture or speculation.” Cruz, 997 N.W.2d at 551 (quotations
omitted). Therefore, even if this argument had been raised, it would be insufficient to set
aside the verdict on this record. Id.
12
any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Cruz, 997 N.W.2d at 551 (quotation omitted). We
therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict.
Affirmed.