Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Petersen 910 N.W.2d 1
- State of Minnesota v. Heather Leann Horst 880 N.W.2d 24
- State of Minnesota v. Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin 887 N.W.2d 257
- State v. Mems 708 N.W.2d 526
- State v. Landa 642 N.W.2d 720
- State of Minnesota v. Marcus Michael Barshaw 879 N.W.2d 356
- State v. Foreman 680 N.W.2d 536
- State v. Huss 506 N.W.2d 290
- State v. Welfare of C. M. S. 268 N.W.2d 76
- State v. Moore 481 N.W.2d 355
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0406
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Sullivan Michael,
Appellant.
Filed May 3, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-22739
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jordan W. Rude , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appel late Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. We affirm.
2
FACTS
The state charged appellant Sullivan Michael with two counts of first -degree
criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2016) (sexual
penetration or defined contact , complainant under 13 ), a nd Minn. Stat. § 609.342,
subd. 1(h)(iii) (2016) (sexual penetration , complainant under 16, significant relationship,
multiple acts over time ), based on allegations that Michael sexually abused his step-
granddaughter on numerous occasions over a two-year time frame. The matter proceeded
to a court trial, where the district court heard the following evidence.
The State’s Case-in-Chief
The victim testified that when she was between the ages of eight and nine years old,
she lived in Minnesota in a two -bedroom apartment with her older brother, her paternal
grandmother, and Michael —her grandmother’s husband. She testified that, on multiple
occasions, Michael touched her “[e]verywhere” on her body using “[h]is boy part” and that
“[w]hite stuff would come out” of Michael’s penis when he was touching her genitalia.
The victim also testified that her mouth and hands touched Michael’s penis and that
Michael’s penis penetrated inside her mouth. Sometime in 2 018, the victim moved to
Chicago, Illinois to live with her mother. The victim testified that she wrote her mother a
note informing her about the sexual abuse.
Mother testified that the victim returned to mother’s home in Chicago in June 2018.
She took the victim to the hospital after discovering the victim’s note. On the drive, the
victim told mother that Michael “made [the victim] put her mouth on him, he made her
play with him, white stuff came out of his penis.” Mother testified that she was presen t
3
when the victim described the sexual abuse to a hospital nurse , and mother recalled that
the victim showed the nurse how Michael “made her [lie] down” by lying “flat on her back
and . . . open[ing] her legs.” Mother also testified that grandmother came to Chicago to
visit in June or July of 2018 and told mother how she could not believe that “[t]his sick
bastard did this to [her] grandchild.” According to mother, grandmother also claimed she
was planning on divorcing Michael.
The registered nurse who examined the victim testified that the victim reported that
Michael sexually penetrated her vaginally and anally. The nurse examined the victim
externally but observed no physical signs of injury. The nurse testified that 10 to 20 percent
of reported victims exhibit injuries at the time of examination. The nurse did not perform
an internal vaginal examination because the victim reported that the last instance of sexual
abuse had occurred over one week prior and it was unlikely that any DNA evidence could
be recovered.
On July 30, 2018, a forensic interviewer conducted a recorded interview of the
victim, and the district court received that recording into evidence. During the interview,
the victim described repeated instances of sexual contact and penetra tion. She recalled
that, right before she left Minnesota, Michael told her to lie down on his bed, instructed her
to “touch his boy parts,” and grabbed her hand and “put [her] hand on his boy part.” The
victim stated that Michael then “went up and down” while “breathing hard” and that
something that “looked like slime” came out of Michael’s “boy part.” She explained that
Michael then took the “slime” and “put it in the sink” in the bathroom. The victim also
described how Michael touched her breasts “[e] very[ ]day” and told her she would get in
4
trouble if she told on him. The victim recalled that, on her last day at Michael’s house, he
touched her breasts while she was lying on the living -room floor with her shirt off. The
victim also reported that Michael had touched her vagina “[m]ore than once,” recalling that
he “put his boy parts” inside of her and that “slime stuff” came out “[i]n [her] private part.”
The victim reported a separate incident in which Michael told her to go into his bedroom,
pulled her pants down, “put his boy parts” in her “front . . . [p]rivate part,” and moved his
body “up and down” until “slime” came out of his “boy parts” in her “private part.”
The forensic interviewer testified at trial and described the difference between
episodic and script memories; script memories are more general and typically concern
repeated events while episodic memories concern specific episodes and incorporate
sensory details. The interviewer testified that the victim’s res ponses were indicative of
script-like memory as opposed to episodic memory, which was not uncommon in cases of
long-term, multiple-incident abuse.
A sergeant with the Minnetonka Police Department testified that she was assigned
to investigate the victim’ s allegations and arrested Michael a fter her initial investigation.
At the police station, Michael told the sergeant “that he didn’t want [the victim and brother
at the home] to begin with, but specifically with [the victim] that he didn’t want her near
him because he was afraid something like this would happen.” Michael also told the
sergeant that “the way [the victim] wanted to be around him was inappropriate and it made
him frustrated.”
5
Michael’s Defense
The principal of the victim’s school testified that he was familiar with Michael,
grandmother, brother, and the victim. He testified that neither he, the school’s teachers,
nor the school counselor saw any reason for concern regarding the victim. The principal
described Michael and grandmother as “more involved than many parents” and interested
in ensuring the best situation possible for the victim.
Grandmother testified that Michael and the victim did not spend a lot of time
together. She claimed that she disciplined the victim and that Michael disciplined brother.
She also testified that there was never a time during the two years when Michael and the
victim were truly alone together. Grandmother contradicted mother’s testimony and
denied calling Michael a “sick bastard” or claiming that she was going to divorce him.
An acquaintance of Michael and grandmother testified that she accompanied
grandmother on a September 2018 church road trip when she overheard a phone call from
the victim and brother. The acquaintance testified that the children were excited to see
grandmother.
The victim’s aunt testified that she stayed at Michael’s home on the night of June
27, 2018, and that she, grandmother, and the victim took a road trip to Chicago the next
day. She testified that everyone was in “good spirits” and that she never had any concerns
about the victim.
Michael testified and denied any sexual abuse. He claimed that he and the victim
did not get along, that she did not listen to him, and that she mostly annoyed h im by
interrupting his routines and pestering him. Michael claimed he was never alone with the
6
victim, but he also testified that the victim would often “call her grandmother” whenever
there was a problem. He claimed that his work as a journeyman carpent er kept him busy
and that, during the relevant time period, he was “more out of town doing 60, 70 hours per
week.” The state questioned Michael regarding his interview with police, during which he
told officers that he had “never” been accused of “anything like this” before. Michael
admitted that statement was not true and that he had been arrested for sexual battery in
1989.
Findings, Guilty Verdict, Convictions & Sentence
The district court issued a written verdict finding Michael guilty of both counts of
criminal sexual conduct. It then issued a 30 -page memorandum in which it m ade
exhaustive findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court credited the victim’s
testimony describing how Michael touched her breasts; how his penis contacted her hands,
mouth, and genitalia; and how he penetrated her orally and vaginally with his penis. It
found that grandmother was not a credible witness, observing that she had little knowledge
of the allegations against Michael; that she “was inconsistent, evasive, and contradictory
throughout her testimony”; and that “[i]n light of all the other testimony received in the
trial, [her] version of events simply does not make sense.” The distric t court similarly
found that Michael was not credible, explaining:
The Court finds Mr. Michael not credible. His testimony that
he was never alone with [the victim] is not credible and highly
implausible taken into consideration with his own testimony
that [the victim] would repeatedly call her grandma to tell on
him when they would get in fights. The Court also finds
Mr. Michael not credible due to his testimony regarding when
[he] said he was never alone with [the victim], when what he
7
meant was [the gr andmother] may have been gone, but
[brother] . . . was home and, therefore, Mr. Michael was not
alone with [the victim]. The inconsistencies between the hours
he works, where he works, who he works for, how often he is
home and his very specific after -work routine demonstrate
inconsistencies which bolster s his lack of credibility. The
Court does not find Mr. Michael credible when discussing his
time alone or not alone with [the victim].
Regarding the violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), the district court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the victim was under 13 years old, (2) Michael was
more than 36 months older than the victim, (3) Michael engaged in genital -to-genital
contact with the victim, and (4) Michael sexually penetrated the victim’s mouth and vagina
with his penis. As for the violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii), the district
court found that (1) the victim was under 16 years old, (2) Michael had a significant
relationship to the victim, (3) Michael sexually penetrated the victim’s mouth and vagina
with his penis, and ( 4) the sexual abuse involved multiple acts over a two -year period,
including “multiple instances of oral and vaginal penetration.” In addition to its written
verdict and findings, the district court orally adjudicated Michael’s guilt on both counts. It
sentenced Michael to 172 months in prison for the violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342,
subd. 1(a).
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Michael challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his c onvictions,
arguing that there are “grave doubts” as to whether he committed the crimes and insisting
8
that the victim’s testimony and forensic interview cannot sustain the district court’s
verdicts.
“We use the same standard of review in bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Petersen , 910 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018)
(quotation omitted). If the state relies upon direct evidence to prove disputed elements, we
apply traditional scrutiny in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Horst, 880
N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016). “ Under the traditional stan dard, we limit our review to a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the [fact-finder] to reach the
verdict which [it] did.” Id. at 40 (quotation omitted). “The evidence must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact -finder
disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d
257, 263 (Minn. 2016). “The verdict will not be overturned if the fact -finder, upon
application of the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proving an offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the
charged offense.” Id.
A person who engages in sexual penetration with
another person, or in sexual contact with a person under 13
years of age as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 11,
paragraph (c),[1] is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree if any of the following circumstances exists:
1 “‘Sexual contact with a person under 13 ’ means the i ntentional touching of the
complainant’s bare genita ls or anal opening by the actor’ s bare genitals or anal opening
with sexual or aggressive intent or the touching by the complainant’s bare genitals or anal
9
(a) the complainant is under 13 years of age and the
actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant. . . .
. . . .
[or]
(h) the actor has a significant relationship to the
complainant, the complainant was under 16 years of age at the
time of the sexual penetration, and:
. . . .
(iii) the sexual abuse involved multiple acts
committed over an extended period of time.
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (h)(iii). On appeal, Michael challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence regarding (1) the sexual -penetration-or-contact element of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(a), and ( 2) the penetration and multiple -acts elements of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii).
Michael acknowledges that the victim testified to numerous instances of sexual
penetration. But he contends that inconsistencies in her version of events, weighed against
other evidence in the record, render her testimony and statements insufficient to sustain the
convictions. In essence, Michael challenges the district court’s credibility determinations.
We begin by recognizing that “[a]ssessing the credibility of a witness and the weight
to be given a witness’s testimony is exclusively the province of the [fact-finder].” State v.
Mems, 708 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Minn. 2006); see also State v. Landa, 642 N.W.2d 720, 725
(Minn. 2002). Accordingly, we typically defer to a fact-finder’s credibility determinations.
State v. Barshaw , 879 N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 2016). And “[i]n a prosecution under
[Minn. Stat. § 609.342 (2016)] . . . the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated. ”
opening of the actor’s or another’s bare genitals or anal opening with sexual or aggressive
intent.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11(c) (2016).
10
Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2016); see also State v. Foreman , 680 N.W.2d 536, 539
(Minn. 2004) (“[A] conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible
witness.” (quotation omitted)).
In some exceptional circumstances, a victim’s unc orroborated testimony is
insufficient to sustain a conviction if there are strong reasons to doubt credibility. In State
v. Huss, for example, the supreme court reversed a conviction for criminal sexual conduct
where the only direct evidence of guilt was a child’s testimony that was internally
inconsistent, contradicted prior statements and verifiable facts, and came only after the
child was exposed to a highly suggestive book. 506 N.W.2d 290, 292 -93 (Minn. 1993).
And in State v. Langteau, the supreme court reversed a conviction and ordered a new trial
because the record failed to explain the victim’s actions or the defendant’s motives and
there was no other evidence connecting the defendant to the crime. 268 N.W.2d 76, 77
(Minn. 1978). But the record here does not contain the type of exceptional circumstances
present in Huss and Langteau, and none of Michael’s arguments persuade us otherwise.
Michael emphasizes that the state presented no physical evidence to corroborate the
victim’s claims of sexual abuse. But the nurse explained that she did not expect to discover
any physical evidence of sexual abuse given the time of the reported abuse, and the district
court found the nurse credible. Further, the forensic interviewer testified that delayed
disclosures of sexual abuse were “very common” and happened “more often than not,”
contextualizing the reason for a lack of physical evidence of sexual abuse.
11
Michael also argues that the victim’s recorded statement contradicted aunt’s
testimony; the victim reported that Michael sexually abused her the last day before she left
for Chicago, whereas aunt testified that she stayed in Michael’s home and slept in the living
room with the victim that night. We note that, even though the district court found aunt
credible generally, it did not refer to or specifically credit her claim that she slept at
Michael’s home that night. But the district court did find that the victim claimed that
Michael “touched her boobs the last day she was leaving,” and it found the fo rensic-
interview video “to be credible in all respects.” The task of determining which witness to
believe and what particular testimony to credit is also properly within the role of the fact-
finder. See Mems, 708 N.W.2d at 531; State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. 1992).
Michael fails to explain how the district court erred by crediting the victim’s specific claims
when it did not explicitly credit the relevant testimony from aunt. “Inconsistencies or
conflicts between one witness and another do not necessarily constitute false testimony or
serve as a basis for reversal. ” Mems, 708 N.W.2d at 531. We add that any contradiction
is merely one of timing, and t he district court found the forensic interviewer credible and
noted her testimony that she g enerally refrained from inquiring about specific dates
because children typically do not develop that type of understanding until age 11.
Similarly, Michael argues that the victim’s claim that sexual abuse started in the
“old” apartment is contradicted b y grandmother’s testimony that they occupied the
apartment for only three days and that she took vacation days to facilitate the move into
the new apartment. But the district court found that grandmother was not credible, and her
12
testimony therefore provides no ground to undermine the district court’s findings crediting
the victim’s testimony. See id.
Michael cites his own testimony and statements as demonstrating his consistent
denial of the victim’s allegations. But again, Michael essentially invites u s to revisit and
second-guess the credibility determinations of the district court. We decline to do so
because the district court was in the best position to resolve credibility contests and weigh
the evidence before it. See id.
In his supplemental brie f, Michael offers additional reasons why the district court
should have rejected the victim’s version of events, emphasizing the absence of some
evidence, potential conflicts in the victim’s testimony, and inconsistencies in record
evidence.2 As set forth herein, credibility determinations and the choice of which evidence
to credit is within the province of the fact-finder, and our review of the record reveals no
basis for reversal. See id.
Finally, we emphasize that the victim testified in detail about numerous instances
of sexual contact and penetration and that her forensic interview similarly and consistently
described the abuse. On this record, the district court could have reasonably found that
2 In an apparent attempt to contextualize record evidence, Michael refers to evidence not
introduced into the record in the district court and offers to supplement the record. But
“[t]he documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings,
if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01.
13
Michael was guilty of both counts of crim inal sexual conduct. The evidence is therefore
sufficient to sustain the convictions.3
Affirmed.
3 Michael hints at other arguments in his supplemental brief, suggesting that the fact of his
1989 arrest should not have been introduced and that officers read him a Miranda advisory
only after he spoke to officers. But the prosecutor referred to the fact of Michael’s arrest
to impeach him, see Minn. R. Evid. 613, and the recording of Michael’s discussion with
police indicate he was given a Miranda advisory before he was questioned about the
allegations against him. We have carefully revie wed Michael’s supplemental brief and
discern no basis to reverse his convictions.