State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0429

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Edward Nixon,
Appellant.

Filed April 5, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-76

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant was convicted of second-degr ee burglary under Minn. Stat. § 609.582,
subd. 2(a)(4) (2016), for breaking into a Zantigo restaurant. In this direct appeal, he argues
that (1) the underlying charge was not brou ght to trial within th e deadline for speedy

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disposition under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), (2) the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence against him, and (3) the
district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of another burglary that occurred
on the same night in the same general area. We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by finding good cause to extend the deadline under the UMDDA. We
also conclude that the district court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress
and did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the other burglary. Therefore, we
affirm.
FACTS
This case is one of several related a ppeals brought by appellant Daniel Edward
Nixon. The related appeals all involve burglary convictions arising from charges filed on
the same day. The procedural facts underlying this case and the related appeals are more
fully set forth in State v. Nixon , No. A20-0414, 2021 WL 669 069 (Minn. App. Feb. 22,
2021). The following summarizes the facts relevant to this case.
The Zantigo Burglary
In 2018, the St. Paul police department investigated a string of commercial
burglaries in the city. One of the burglaries occurred in the early morning hours of May 9,
2018, at a Zantigo restaurant. A surveillance video showed that the burglar used a tool to
break the drive-through window of the restaurant around 2:40 a.m. The burglar checked
the cash registers, unsuccessfully attempted to open the restaurant’s safe, and then exited
through the restaurant’s back door. The video showed that the burglar was a man wearing
a black jacket, a black baseball cap with a ci rcular white emblem, a white surgical mask,

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and distinctive red and black gloves embossed with the word “Hardy.” He was also
carrying a yellow-green bag with black handles.
The Ha Tien Market Burglary
Earlier that same night, a burglary occurre d at Ha Tien Market. A video recording
of that burglary revealed that the Ha Tien Market burglar wore the same clothing and
carried the same bag. After the burglar left the building, he entered the passenger seat of a
vehicle—a white Chevrolet Impala with a black rubber strip along its side, a trunk spoiler,
and unique rust-like marks on the wheels.
The Information Alert and Resulting Seizure of the Vehicle
On May 22, 2018, St. Paul po lice distributed a department-wide information alert.
The alert provided that a “suspect has burglarized the HA TIEN MARKET . . . and
Augustines . . . and possibly other businesses. Suspect usually has another person with him
waiting in the area of the burgla ry and then picks suspect up.” The alert also contained
video stills of the suspect and the suspect’s ve hicle, which were captured by surveillance
cameras.1 One of the video stills showed the burglar weari ng a black jacket, a black
baseball cap, a white surgical mask, and distinctive red and black gloves. The video stills
of the vehicle showed an early-model, white Impala with a trunk spoiler, tinted windows,
and a horizontal black strip running along the side of the vehicle.

1 The video stills of the burglar y suspect in the information alert were captured during an
earlier burglary of the Ha Tien Market on April 10, 2018. The video stills of the suspect’s
vehicle came from the second Ha Tien Market burglary and a burglary of Augustine’s Bar
& Bakery a few days before. Given the similarities between the burglaries—including the
suspect’s appearance, clothing, and method of entry—the St. Paul police believed that the
same suspect committed all three burglaries.

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On May 25, 2018, a St. Paul police officer stopped a wh ite Chevrolet Impala that
he believed matched the suspect’s vehicle. Li ke the Impala depicted in the information
alert, the car had a trunk spoiler, dark tinte d windows, a black rubber strip running along
its side, and “unique holes” in its wheels. The offi cer identified Nixon as the driver and
saw a passenger in the front passenger seat. Because the car’s windows were heavily tinted,
the officer asked Nixon to roll down the rear driver’s-side window so that he could ensure
that there were no other passengers in the ca r. On the backseat, the officer saw a black
baseball cap, multicolored gloves consistent with those pictured in the information alert,
and a “yellow band-type thing which was later determined to be a slingshot.” Based upon
his observations, the officer believed that Ni xon and his passenger were involved in the
string of burglaries. He then identified Ni xon’s passenger as Nixon’s brother, and, after
another officer arrived, arrested both of the men.
The police impounded the Impa la and obtained a warrant to search the car. In the
car, the officers found red and black “Hardy” brand gloves, a slingshot, a set of
walkie-talkies, and two black baseball caps, one of which ha d a circular white Converse
emblem. In the trunk of the Impala, officers found a black jacket, a reciprocating saw, and
a “yellow RYOBI” bag with “black handles that matche[d] consistently with the bag used
during the burglaries.” The bag contained various tools, including a sledgehammer, a
screwdriver, and multiple reciprocating saw blades. A laboratory analysis identified
Nixon’s DNA on one of the gloves recovered from the car.

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The state charged Nixon with second-degree burglary for the burglary of the Zantigo
restaurant. The state also charged Nixon, by separate complaints, with seven other
burglaries. The complaints were all filed on the same day.
On January 9, 2019, Nixon requested final disposition of the Zantigo burglary
charge and his other burglary charges within the six-month timeline set forth in the
UMDDA. See Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subds. 1, 3 (2020) (providing that upon receipt of a
prisoner’s request, the prisoner must be brought to trial within six m onths or within such
additional time as the court may grant for good cause shown).2 Due to Nixon’s UMDDA
request, the district court planned “to get all [eight burglary] cases tried in time before
July.” The district court also granted Nixon’s petition to proceed pro se in all eight cases,
allowing him to represent himself. Nixon thereafter moved to suppress the evidence that
was seized from the Impala. Nixon’s motion applied to all eight burglary cases.
At a contested omnibus hearing in May 20 19, the district court denied Nixon’s
motion to suppress. The district court concluded that the police had reasonable, articulable
suspicion to stop Nixon’s vehicle and probable cause to seize and later search the vehicle
pursuant to a search warrant. At that same hearing, the district court addressed the state’s
intention to introduce Spriegl evidence3 during each of Nixon’s burglary trials. The Spriegl
evidence that the state sought to introduce was evidence of similar burglaries that occurred
close in time to each other. The district court granted the state’s motion but, for purposes

2 Nixon was in prison for an unrelated conviction at the time of the request.
3 Spreigl evidence refers to evidence of prior crimes or other bad acts. State v. Kennedy,
585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998) (citing State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965)).

6
of the Zantigo-burglar y trial, limited the Spriegl evidence to evidence of the Ha Tien
Market burglary that occurred the same night as the Zantigo burglary.
After Nixon’s first two trials resulted in convictions, Nixon became uncooperative.
Soon thereafter, Nixon waived his right to a jury trial on the remaining burglary charges
(including the Zantigo charge) and agreed to submit those charges to the district court for
a trial on stipulated evidence. To facilitate the process, the parties agreed that the state
would mail stipulation packets for each of th e cases to Nixon in one-week intervals and
Nixon would sign and return the information, which would then be submitted to the district
court. Under the agreed-upon schedule, the district court still expected to be able to issue
its decisions in the remaining six burglary cases within the UMDDA’s six-month timeline.
The state sent the first two stipulation packets to Nixon at the Department of
Corrections (DOC) prison wher e Nixon was incarcerated. Nixon had returned the first
stipulation packet, but the state never received the second pa cket. The state then stopped
sending stipulation packets to Nixon under th e assumption that Nixon was again refusing
to cooperate. And, on June 20, 2019, the state filed a motion reque sting an extension of
the six-month time limit imposed by the UMDDA for the remaining five cases (including
the Zantigo case) on the basis of good cause. In its motion, the state argued that Nixon’s
“failure to communicate with the state has ca used a delay in having the pending matters
reach a final determination” and that a conti nuance was “necessary to give the parties an
opportunity to fully develop th e stipulations for the agreed upon court trials that are
pending before the court.”

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On June 26, 2019, the district court held a hearing on the state’s motion. At the
hearing, Nixon explained that he had signed and attempted to return the second stipulation
packet, but the DOC had confiscated it as cont raband. After hearing from the parties, the
district court granted the state’s request for a continuance. The district court determined
that “based on everything that we’ve discussed, and the reality of this timeline, in order to
give this Court an appropriate length of time . . . to render a thoughtful decision in the five
remaining matters, the Court does find there is good cause to extend all of these matters.”
The original six-month deadline estab lished by Nixon’s UMD DA request expired
on July 9, 2019. On August 9, 2019, Nixon signed the state’ s stipulation related to the
burglary charge in this case, and returned th e packet to the state. The district court
subsequently filed its Order, Fi ndings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law on September 3,
2019. The court found Nixon guilty of the charged offense and sentenced him to 90 months
in prison. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Nixon makes three alternative arguments on appeal. First, he argues that his
conviction for the Zantigo burglary must be reversed and the charge dismissed because the
district court abused its discretion by ex tending the deadline for disposition under the
UMDDA. Second, he argues that his conviction must be reversed because the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress the evid ence found in his car. Third, he argues
that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused its discretion by admitting
Spreigl evidence of the Ha Tien Market burglary. We address each of Nixon’s arguments
in turn.

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I. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by granting the state’s motion to
extend the six-month disposition deadline under the UMDDA.

The UMDDA allows an incarcerated pers on to “request fina l disposition of any
untried indictment or complaint pending ag ainst the person in this state.” Minn.
Stat. § 629.292, subd. 1(a). Once the request is received, the prisoner is entitled to a trial
“[w]ithin six months after the re ceipt of the request . . . or w ithin such additional time as
the court for good cause shown in open court may grant.” Id., subd. 3. If a trial is not held
within that period, “no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction . . . and the court
shall dismiss [the indictment] with prejudice.” Id.
Here, the district court found that go od cause existed to extend the UMDDA’s
six-month deadline for dispositio n of the case. Nixon challe nges that decision, arguing
that good cause did not exist to extend the six-month deadline and that his conviction must
therefore be reversed.
We have previously addressed Nix on’s argument concerning the UMDDA in Nixon,
2021 WL 669069, at *3-6. That case involved nearly identical facts to those in this case
with respect to the UMDDA issue, with the only difference being the time between Nixon’s
request for speedy disposition and his burgl ary conviction in each case. Nixon was
convicted in that case one month after his convi ction in this case. There, we concluded
that the district court did not abuse its di scretion by finding that g ood cause existed to
extend the UMDDA deadline. Nixon, 2021 WL 669069, at *5. We reasoned that the
parties’ agreed-upon process for disposing of all eight cases within the statutory period was
frustrated by the DOC’s seizure of the second stipulation packet, a nd that the resulting

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delay in disposing of the remaining five cases was the fault of neither the prosecution nor
the defense. Id. at *4-5. We noted that the charges were interrelated and the state’s proof
was based on circumstantial and Spreigl evidence, making the necessary factual findings
more complicated. Id. at *5. Therefore, we concluded that it was not unreasonable for the
district court to allocate sufficient time to c onsider and make written findings in each of
the remaining cases. Id.; see Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. Based on the unique
circumstances presented, we concluded in Nixon that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by finding good cause to extend the dispositio n deadline under the UMDDA.
Nixon, 2021 WL 669069, at *5.
We further determined the district court did not violate Nixon’s constitutional right
to a speedy trial. Id. at *5-6 (applying the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972)). We highlighted that Nixon’s defense was not prejudiced by
the relatively short delay and noted that there was no indication that the state acted in bad
faith. Id.
We discern no reason for reaching a diffe rent conclusion in this case, and we
therefore rely on the analysis set forth in our prior opinion. The district court did not abuse
its discretion by granting the state’s motion to extend the six-m onth deadline under the
UMDDA.
II. The district court did not err by deny ing Nixon’s motion to suppress evidence
against him.

Nixon next argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
evidence found in his car. He concedes that the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct

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the traffic stop. But he argues that the police lacked probable cause to seize his car because
the police did not have reason to believe that “the car Nixon was driving contained
contraband or evidence of a crime when they seized it.”
As with the UMDDA issue, we also addressed Nixon’s argument regarding the
evidence found in his car in our prior opinion in Nixon, 2021 WL 669069, at *6-7. There,
we concluded that the police had probable cause to seize the Impala under the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop. Id. at *7. Specifically, we determined that
the police had probable cause to seize the Impala based on the similarities between the car
and the Impala depicted in the informati on alert, the similarities between Nixon’s
appearance and that of the bur glary suspect, the fact that Nixon was travelling with a
passenger, and the police officer’s observation of items in Nixon’s backseat that resembled
items used and worn by the suspect during the burglaries. Id. at *6-7. We again rely on
our analysis in our prior opinion and conclude that the district court did not err by denying
Nixon’s motion to suppress the evidence found in his car.
III. The district court did not ab use its discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence of
the Ha Tien Market burglary.

Lastly, Nixon argues that the di strict court erred by ad mitting evidence of the
burglary of Ha Tien Market. This court reviews a district court’s decision to admit
evidence of prior bad acts for an abuse of discretion. State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609,
615 (Minn. 2014). The defendant bears the burden of showing that an abuse of discretion
occurred and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result. Id.
Evidence of a defendant ’s other bad acts, or Spreigl evidence, is “not admissible to

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demonstrate that the defendant (a) has a pr opensity to commit crimes and (b) acted in
accord with that propensity.” State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257, 26 6 (Minn. 2019) (citing
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)). But such evidence may be admitted for “limited, specific purposes,
including showing motive, intent, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or
a common scheme or plan.” Id. (quotation omitted). To admit Spreigl evidence, the
following conditions must be satisfied:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indi cate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.

State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn. 2006).
Here, Nixon focuses on the third factor of the analysis—the “clear and convincing
evidence” factor. He challenges the district court’s determination that this factor was met,
arguing that the state failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he burglarized
the Ha Tien Market. On that basis, he contends that the district court abused its discretion
when it admitted the evid ence of the Ha Tien Market burglary as Spriegl evidence.
4 We
are not persuaded.

4 The state does not directly counter Nixon’s argument regarding the clear and convincing
standard. Instead, the state contends that Nixon’s involvement in the Ha Tien Market
burglary was shown “beyond a reasonable doub t” because the district court found Nixon
guilty of the Ha Tien Market burglary prior to its disposition of the Zantigo burglary case.
But because Nixon’s conviction of the Ha Tien Market burglary occurred after the district
court’s decision to admit the Spreigl evidence, we agree with Nixon that the conviction is
not relevant to our analysis of whether Ni xon’s involvement in the Ha Tien Market
burglary was established by clear and convinci ng evidence. In any event, we need not

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The record in this case supports the di strict court’s conclusion that clear and
convincing evidence demonstrat ed that Nixon was involved in the Ha Tien Market
burglary. Surveillance footage from the Ha Tien Market burglary identified the burglar as
a male wearing a black baseball cap, a black jacket, and distinctive red gloves. The burglar
was also carrying a yellow bag. The burglar fled on foot to a white Chevrolet Impala with
a black rubber stripe along the side and a spoiler on the back. On May 25, 2018, Nixon
was found driving a white Chevrolet Impala that shared distinctive characteristics with the
car captured in the Ha Tien Market surveillance video; his physical appearance was
consistent with the burglary suspect; and the police found in the car black baseball caps, a
black jacket, a yellow-green ba g with black straps; and dis tinctive black, red, and yellow
gloves, all of which matched the items the burgl ar was seen with in the Ha Tien Market
surveillance video. Based on this information in the record, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discre tion by determining that the st ate had shown by clear and
convincing evidence that Nixon participated in the Ha Tien Market burglary.
Nixon argues that the district court err oneously relied on similarities between the
two burglaries to establish clear and convincing evidence that Nixon participated in the Ha
Tien Market burglary. He argues that similarity between the two incidents “does not prove
by clear and convincing evidence that Nixon burglarized Ha Tien” and that, by focusing
on the similarities between th e burglaries, the court “conf lated” two parts of the Spreigl
analysis: the relevance requirement (the f ourth factor) and the clear-and-convincing-

address the state’s argument because the record supports the district court’s conclusion that
the clear and convincing standard was met.

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evidence requirement (the third factor). We di sagree. In deciding to admit the evidence
of the Ha Tien Market burglary in this case, the district court applied the correct legal
standard. The court expressly found both that the evidence was relevant and that Nixon’s
involvement in the Ha Tien Market burglar y was established by clear and convincing
evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of the
Ha Tien Market burglary.
In sum, Nixon has not identified any basi s for reversal of his conviction of the
Zantigo-burglary charge.
Affirmed.