In re the Marriage of: Helena Koivu, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0814

In re the Marriage of:
Helena Koivu, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Mikko Sakari Koivu,
Appellant.

Filed March 8, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded;
motion denied
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-20-872

M. Sue Wilson, James R. Todd, M. Sue Wilson Law Offices, P.A. Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

John M. Jerabek, Alexandra Michelson Connell, Tuft, Lach, Jerabek & O’Connell, PLLC,
Maplewood, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-husband argues that the district court erred by (1) concluding that service
of process was proper, (2) concluding that Minnesota is a more a ppropriate forum than
Finland under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),
(3) determining that Minnesota is not an inconvenient forum to litigate the parties’ property
issues, and (4) ordering husband to dismiss his dissolution case in Finland. We affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand. Husba nd also moved to strike the documents in
respondent-wife’s addendum. We deny husband’s motion.
FACTS
Appellant-husband Mikko Sa kari Koivu and respondent-wife Helena Koivu were
married in Finland in 2014. Husband is Finnish and wife is Estonian. The day before their
marriage, the parties signed a prenuptial agreement, agreeing that “Finnish law will be
applicable to our matrimonial property rights, regardless of where our habitual residence
or domicile at the time is.” The parties moved to Hennepin County, Minnesota, where they
have been living for the last eight years. They have three young children together. Wife
is a stay-at-home mother, and husband is a professional hockey player.
Wife filed her petition for the dissoluti on of the parties’ marriage in Hennepin
County on February 7, 2020. Wife later moved the distri ct court to determine whether it
had jurisdiction over the dissolution. In wife’s affidavit, she st ated that her attorney sent
husband’s attorney the summons and petition on January 29, 2020 , but husband did not
sign the admission of service. Wife’s atto rney then arranged for personal service on

3
husband in Minnesota on Februa ry 12, 2020, the suffi ciency of which is now in dispute.
Husband filed his Finnish dissolution action on February 4, 2020, and served wife with his
documents in that case on February 10, 2020.
The district court granted wife’s motion and recognized jurisdiction and venue in
Hennepin County. Husb and appealed and later moved to strike the documents in wife’s
addendum.
DECISION
Motion to strike
Husband moved this court to strike the doc uments in wife’s addendum because they
were not part of the district court record.
“The documents filed in the [district] cour t, the exhibits, and the transcript of the
proceeding, if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.” Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01. Generally, appellate courts will st rike any documents that are not part of the
record. Fabio v. Bellomo , 489 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. App. 1992), aff’d, 504 N.W.2d
758 (Minn. 1993). But “when the evidence is documentary evidence of a conclusive nature
(uncontroverted) which supports the result obta ined in the lower court,” appellate courts
may take judicial notice of the documents and consider them when deciding the issue on
appeal. In re Livingood, 594 N.W.2d 889, 895-96 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).
Because we do not rely on the documents wife included in her addendum, we deny
husband’s motion to strike as unnecessary.

4
Service of process
Husband argues that the district court erre d by rejecting his motion to dismiss for
insufficient service of process.
Whether service of process was proper is a question of law that appellate courts
review de novo. Ayala v. Ayala , 749 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn. App. 2008). Service is
proper against an individual “by delivering a copy to the individual personally.” Minn. R.
Civ. P. 4.03(a). Service is generally made when “the process server and the defendant are
within speaking distance of each other, and such action is taken as to convince a reasonable
person that personal service is being attempted, service cannot be a voided by physically
refusing to accept the summons.” Nielsen v. Braland, 119 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Minn. 1963).
The process server described the incident at issue in this case in his affidavit:
[I made service on husband a]t the Xcel Energy Center
by saying his name, making eye contact with him and holding
the documents out towards him. [Husband] tried to avoid
service by putting his head down and continuing to walk. The
documents were dropped in front of [husband] and he was told
“you have been served.”

Husband acknowledged in his affidavit that wi fe’s attorney requested that he sign an
admission of service. He described his vers ion of the purported service of process as
occurring during a National Hockey League game as follows:
As I was exiting the ice and going into the tunnel that was
packed with loud fans surrounding it, I heard someone yell,
“You’ve been served,” and I saw papers fall from the top of the
tunnel onto the floor in the area where I was walking. I did not
make eye contact with the pers on that yelled; the top of the
tunnel is high enough that I cannot sign jerseys for fans that are
up there, and there were so ma ny people that I did not know
who yelled or dropped the papers. The security guard rushed

5
over to pick up the papers since people are not allowed to throw
things at players. I stopped and asked the security guard what
they were, and I saw that they were divorce papers. The
security guard brought the papers to a team staff member to
hold for security purposes until the game concluded.

The district court concluded that wife properly served husband because husband
“acknowledge[d] being in speaking distance of the server b ecause he heard someone yell
‘you’ve been served,’ and he was advised by the security guard who picked up the papers
that they were ‘divorce papers.’” The district court also noted that the evidence suggested
that husband “was aware that his wife was seeking to initiate a divorce case,” and “a
reasonable person would have und erstood that service was being attempted.” We agree
with the district court’s reasoning. The fa cts listed in husband’s affidavit are enough “to
convince a reasonable person that personal service is being attempted.” See id. Husband
has not shown that the service of process was ineffectual.
1

1 While we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss in this case for lack
of proper service, we limit our ruling to the facts presented by the record. We do not
condone the method of service employed here. Throwing objects at players leaving the ice
is forbidden by the rules of the arena wher e the service occurred, and doing so could be
dangerous. Further, serving legal documents in this manner allows the inference that the
method of service was selected in an ex traordinarily unprofessional attempt to
sensationalize the proceedings, as well as to humiliate or embarrass a professional athlete
in the presence of teammates and fans. While this record does not describe all of the
circumstances leading to the type of servic e described here, we strongly encourage all
associated with the litigation of legal disp utes, and especially those involved with the
litigation of family and custo dy matters, which can be uni quely delicate, to conduct
themselves with dignity and a commitment to fair dealing. Cf. Am. Standard Ins. Co. v.
Le, 551 N.W.2d 923, 925 n.3 (Minn. 1996) (expressing displeasure with lack of
professional courtesy).

6
More appropriate forum
Husband argues that the district court erre d in concluding that Minnesota was a more
appropriate forum than Finland based on the UCCJEA.
We review a district court’s decision whether to decline jurisdiction as an
inconvenient forum for an abuse of discretion. Levinson v. Levinson, 389 N.W.2d 761, 762
(Minn. App. 1986). “A district court abuses its discretion by misapplying the law.” Sanvik
v. Sanvik, 850 N.W.2d 732, 737 (Minn. App. 2014). The UCCJEA provides eight factors
to weigh in determining the appropriate forum when dual jurisdiction exists:
(1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to
continue in the future and whic h state could best protect the
parties and the child;
(2) the length of time the child has resided outside this state;
(3) the distance between the court in this state and the court
in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
(4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) any agreement of the parties as to which state should
assume jurisdiction;
(6) the nature and location of the evidence required to
resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;
(7) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue
expeditiously and the procedur es necessary to present the
evidence; and
(8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts
and issues in the pending litigation.

Minn. Stat. § 518D.207 (b) (2020).
The district court determined that Minnes ota is the appropriate forum after finding
that the first, fifth, sixth, and eighth factor s are neutral; the fourth and seventh factors are
neutral or slightly favor Minnesota; and th e second and third factors favor Minnesota.

7
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion in not finding that the second,
fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth factors favor Finland.
Second factor
Husband first argues that the district c ourt abused its discre tion in weighing the
second factor in favor of Minnesota. The di strict court made this determination because
“[t]he parties agree that the children have primarily lived in Minnesota,” traveling to
Finland over summer breaks and holidays. Husband argues that (1) Minnesota is only a
temporary home because of his career, (2) the parties have a house in Finland, (3) the
children are in Finland between husband’s seasons, and (4) wife indicated she plans to “fly
to Finland [with the children] and move on with [their] own lives.” We can fairly
summarize husband’s argument as being based, mainly, on future possibilities. The statute,
however, requires consideration of “the length of time the child has resided outside this
state.” See id. (b)(2) (emphasis added).
The only portion of husb and’s argument that relates to where his children have
resided is that they travel to Finland on summer break and holidays. But the district court
properly weighed this in stating that the ch ildren “have spent at le ast 75 percent of their
lives in Minnesota.” Husband has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in
concluding that this factor favors Minnesota being the a ppropriate forum to litigate
custody.
Fifth factor
The fifth factor is “any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume
jurisdiction.” Id. (b)(5). The parties signed a prenuptial agreement that states, “We agree

8
that the Finnish law will be applicable to our matrimonial property rights, regardless of
where our habitual residence or domicile at the time is. We agree to enter into agreement
of this kind in any place of our habitual reside nce or domicile.” Th e district court noted
that the agreement determined only the governing law, not venue. The district court added
that the language in the agreement “seem[s] to assume that venue may be located outside
of Finland.”
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that this
factor is neutral because the prenuptial agreement assumed Finland would be the forum for
any marriage dissolution because it designated Finnish law as th e governing law, was
written in Finnish, and was written by Finnish attorneys. But the prenuptial agreement has
no forum-selection clause, and the district c ourt correctly noted that the governing-law
clause assumes that venue may be located outside of Finland. Simila rly, the language of
the agreement and the nationality of the drafting attorneys ha ve no effect in narrowing
appropriate forums. Husband has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in
finding this factor neutral.
Sixth factor
Husband also argues that the district cour t abused its discretion in finding that the
sixth factor was neutral. The sixth factor analyzes “the nature and location of the evidence
required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child.” Id. (b)(6). The
district court reasoned that most of the fi nancial information is in Finland, but the
“[e]vidence regarding social is sues such as child custody a nd parenting time is primarily
located in Minnesota because that is where the children live and their schools and

9
caretakers are located.” Husband argues that the district court “ignored that it is uncertain
how long the parties will be able to remain in Minnesota” and “that nearly all of the parties’
family, including the children’s grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousin s, and other extended
family are located in or around Finland.” Husband concludes that “many potential
witnesses are in Finland.” But this does not negate the fact that, because Minnesota is
where the children currently liv e, there are several witnesse s in Minnesota. Testimony
from the children’s current teachers and caretaker s will likely be relevant to trial, not to
mention possible input from the children them selves. Husband has not shown that the
district court abused its discretion in findin g this factor neutral by simply leaving out
extended family that live in or near Finland.
Seventh factor
Husband next argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion in finding the
seventh factor “neutral or shaded slightly to Minnesota.” The seventh factor considers “the
ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures
necessary to present the evidence.” Id. (b)(7). The district court noted that “it appears that
the courts in Finland may ta ke longer to resolve dissolu tions because of a mandatory
‘cooling off’ period.” The district court’s or der supports this statement by citing one of
husband’s attorney’s affidavits that states, “The spouses sha ll have the right to a divorce
after a reconsideration period, and the recons ideration period begins when the petition of
one spouse is served on the other spouse.” It is not clear what this reconsideration period
is, how long it will last, or whether it is still going on.

10
Husband argues that “[t]here is no eviden ce in the record and the [district] court
cites no Finnish law suggesting that the recons ideration period affects the Finnish court’s
ability to determine child custody issues.” We agree that the district court abused its
discretion by relying on a sentence in an affida vit to interpret Finni sh law and slightly
favoring Minnesota for this element.
Husband also argues that this factor should favor Finland because most of the
written evidence is in Finnish, and “[i]n additi on to the time and expe nse of translating,
there is an inherent risk that translations will not fully convey the nuance of the original
language.” But Minnesota courts provide tran slators, and, as husband points out, “The
parties have already had to obtain translatio ns of several documents.” Minnesota courts
have the necessary procedures to handle the documents originally in Finnish, just like
Finland likely has the procedures to handle the evidence originally in English. Because
the district court did not support its conclusion that this factor slightly favored Minnesota,
the district court abused its discretion, and we consider this factor neutral.
Eighth factor
Finally, husband argues that the district court abused its discre tion in determining
that the eighth factor was neutral. The eighth factor considers “the familiarity of the court
of each state with the facts and is sues in the pending litigation.” Id. (b)(8). The district
court reasoned, “Neither court is familiar with the facts and issues in this matter yet.”
We agree with the district court. B ecause the statute includes both “facts and
issues,” and because husband has failed to show that any of the facts and issues surrounding
this matter have been investigated and developed, we find this factor to be neutral.

11
Changing the seventh factor to neutral does not change the outcome of weighing the
factors. Husband has not met his burden in showing that the district court abused its
discretion in determining that Minnesota is a more convenient forum to determine the
child-custody issues.
Inconvenient forum
Husband next argues that the district cour t abused its discretion in determining that
Minnesota is not an inconvenient forum to litigate the parties’ property issues. Husband’s
main argument is that the district court accepted jurisdiction over the property dispute after
determining that Minnesota is a more conven ient forum to determ ine the child-custody
issues rather than conduct an inconvenient-forum analysis.
Appellate courts rarely consider matters or theories not argued to and considered by
the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). However, this court
may address issues not properly before it in the in terest of justice. Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
103.04.
Husband responded to wife’s motion by aski ng the district court to “defer to the
Finnish court to determine whether Finland sh ould retain jurisdiction.” Husband also
makes arguments that relate to an inconvenient-forum analysis—such as Finnish finances,
property, and family—but husband did not m ove for a forum non conveniens or use its
analysis in his responsive memorandum. Th e district court concluded, “Based on an
analysis and weighing of the statutory factors above, as well as a consideration of judicial
and litigation economy, it is clear that Minnesota is not an inconvenient forum in which to
try all aspects of this matter.”

12
Because husband did not argue for an inconvenient forum, and because the district
court did not consider the issue, it is not properly before us for review.
International antisuit injunction
Finally, husband argues that the district court erred by sua sponte ordering husband
to “take appropriate actions to dismiss the dissolution matter in Finland.” Husband claims
that this amounts to an international antisuit injunction.
“No temporary injunction shall be granted without notice of motion or an order to
show cause to the adverse party.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.02(a). Wife concedes that the district
court erred by ordering husband to dismiss the case in Finland, stating, “After careful
review of the case law cited by [husband] in his Brief on ap peal, [wife] must agree with
[husband] that the district court erred by issuing what is effectively an international antisuit
injunction without providing proper notice to [husband] pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P.
65.02.” We agree and remand the issue to the di strict court to vacate this portion of the
order.2
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion denied.

2 The court recognizes and appreciates the candor of wife and her attorney on this point.