In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0504

In the Marriage of:

Erin Marie Adams, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Cody Dan Adams,
Appellant,

County of Blue Earth,
Intervenor.

Filed June 8, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-FA-24-1374

Kenneth R. White, Law Office of Kenneth R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Paul W. Brink, Jacob M. Birkholz, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
In this marital-dissolution dispute, appellant challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion to reopen the dissolution judgment and decree. Appellant argues that the district
court (1) erred by determining that he was properly served, (2) erred as a matter of law and
abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the dissolution judgment, (3) erred as a matter
of law and abused its discretion by failing to address inequities in the dissolution judgment
under Pooley v. Pooley, 979 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 2022), and (4) abused its discretion
by awarding respondent conduct-based attorney fees. Because we conclude that service
was proper and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s
motion or by awarding respondent attorney fees, we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2024, respondent-wife Erin Marie Adams informed appellant-husband
Cody Dan Adams that she was filing for divorce. After drafting the initial pleadings, wife
hired a process server, L.B., to personally serve husband with the summons and petition
for dissolution. On April 5, 2024, L.B. attempted to serve husband at his home but was
unsuccessful.
According to L.B, she returned to husband’s home on April 7, 2024, to attempt
service again. L.B. turned into husband’s driveway and drove up to the house, where she
saw a young man, later identified as husband, working outside. L.B. rolled down her
window and called out “Cody Adams.” Husband made eye contact with L.B. and told her
to get off the property. L.B. got out of her car and told husband that he was being served.
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Husband continued to yell at L.B., saying that she was trespassing and that he would call
the sheriff. Husband went inside the house, and an older man came outside. The older
man was later identified as husband’s father, D.A. L.B. told D.A. that husband had been
served and then secured the papers between a pole and an electrical box on the property.
D.A. watched as L.B. secured the papers between the pole and electrical box. L.B. notified
wife and her attorney that she completed service but that she had to “drop serve the papers
because [husband] would not take them.” L.B. also filed an affidavit of service confirming
that she served husband, but that husband “refused to take the papers,” and she “told his
father [that she] secured the papers in-between the pole and the electrical box.”
According to D.A., L.B. drove partially up the driveway but did not come up to the
house. D.A. stated that L.B. was around 100-150 feet away from him when she rolled her
window down and told D.A. to “come here.” D.A. stated that he did not walk up to L.B.’s
car because it was raining. D.A. said that L.B. declined to drive up to the house and
eventually drove away without speaking to him. D.A. denied receiving any legal papers
or seeing papers between the pole and the electrical box.
Husband also denied having any conversation with L.B. According to husband’s
affidavit, he was working outside wearing earbuds when a “strange unknown woman”
showed up at his house. Husband stated that his dog was outside, and he was concerned
that his dog might bite L.B., so he brought the dog inside. Husband stated that he was
inside his house when he saw L.B. drive away. Husband claimed that he “never got any
paperwork in the mail or email or any notice,” and only learned of the divorce after wife
notified him in July 2024.
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But in his responsive affidavit, husband noted that he told L.B. “if you are
trespassing, I will call the sheriff. I can’t hear you, but I am bringing my dog in and I will
be out.” Husband claimed that he could not hear what L.B. was saying because the dog
was barking and he had music playing in his earbuds. Husband also denied that he ever
contacted the sheriff.
The next day, L.B. contacted wife’s attorney about whether wife had spoken with
husband about the papers. L.B. told wife’s attorney that she secured the papers between
the pole and the electrical box. L.B. also recounted her conversation with D.A., and that
husband threatened to call the sheriff. L.B. noted that it was sprinkling when she delivered
the papers and that the papers could be “soggy.” L.B. recommended that wife contact the
sheriff if the papers needed to be served again, as husband had threatened to call the sheriff.
Over the next week, the sheriff unsuccessfully attempted to re -serve husband on four
occasions. The sheriff also left husband voicemails and left business cards at husband’s
home. Husband never answered or otherwise responded to wife’s summons and petition
for dissolution. Husband also denied that the sheriff ever contacted him.
In April 2024, the district court mailed to husband a notice of case filing. In May
2024, the district court mailed to husband a notice of remote hearing setting the matter for
a scheduling conference. And i n July 2024, wife served and filed documents seeking a
default because more than thirty days had passed since the date of service and husband did
not serve an answer. The district court filed a document titled “Notice of Judicial
Determination” in which it stated that the scheduling conference would proceed, and that
scheduling a default hearing would be addressed at that time. After the scheduling hearing,
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the district court mailed a notice for a default hearing. At the default hearing wife appeared,
but husband did not. The district court received testimony from wife and discussed the
proposed order. The district court then filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order for judgment. Later, the district court administrator entered judgment on the order.
Husband moved to void the judgment and decree for lack of jurisdiction and lack of
proper service and to reopen the judgment under Minnesota Statutes section 518.145,
subdivision 2 (2024). Husband also sought an award for reasonable attorney fees. In a
memorandum supporting his motion, husband argued that service was improper because
he and L.B. were not within speaking distance. Husband also denied refusing service,
maintaining that L.B. made “zero actual attempt at physical service.” In response, wife
requested that the district court deny husband’s motion in its entirety and award conduct-
based attorney fees.
After a hearing, the district court denied husband’s motion in its entirety. The court
found that L.B. actions, including stating that she had papers to serve, calling the name of
the person she was attempting to serve, and posting those papers on the property, would
convince a reasonable person that personal service was being attempted. The district court
concluded that husband’s refusal to speak to L.B. or come back outside did not defeat
personal service because service may not be avoided by physically refusing to accept the
summons. The district court determined that husband failed to prove at least one statutory
ground by the preponderance of the evidence to support reopening the judgment under
section 518.145. And, the district court ordered husband to pay wife $2,500 in conduct -
6
based attorney fees for unreasonably contributing to the length and expense of the
proceeding by attempting to evade service and refusing to engage in the proceedings.
Husband appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by determining that husband was properly
served.

Husband first argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to void the
judgment and decree for ineffective service of process.
Effective service of process is a question of law that we review de novo. Shamrock
Dev. Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008). “But in conducting this review,
we must apply the facts as found by the district court unless those factual findings are
clearly erroneous.” Id. “[T]he Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to Family
Law actions except where they are in conflict with applicable statutes.” Gen. R. Prac.
301.01(a). To the extent that a conflict between the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
and the family court rules exists, the family court rules govern. Minn. Gen. R. Prac.
301.01(d). Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.03(a) states that an individual may be
served with a summons “personally or by leaving a copy at the individual’s usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion.”
Minnesota Statutes section 518.11 (2024) governs service of process in marriage
dissolutions. Section 518.11(a) provides that in a dissolution proceeding, “copies of the
summons and petition shall be served on the respondent personally.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.11(a).
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“Personal [service] ‘is satisfied if the process server and the defendant are within
speaking distance of each other, and such action is taken as to convince a reasonable person
that personal service is being attempted’ because ‘service cannot be avoided by physically
refusing to accept the summons. ’” Drews v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 850 N.W.2d 738,
742 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted). When a respondent challenges service of
process, “the plaintiff must submit evidence of effective service.” DeCook v. Olmsted Med.
Ctr. Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 271 (Minn. 2016) . “An affidavit of service is usually strong
evidence of proper service.” Drews, 850 N.W.2d at 743-44 (quotation omitted). “Once
the plaintiff submits evidence of service, a [respondent] has the burden of showing that the
service was improper.” DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 271 (quotation omitted).
In determining that wife properly served husband, the district court relied on our
nonprecedential decision in Koivu v. Koivu, A20-0814, 2021 WL 856105 (Minn. App.
Mar. 8, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. May 26, 2021).1 In that case, the process server attempted
to serve appellant, a professional hockey player, at a hockey arena. Koivu, 2021 WL
856105, at *2. As Koivu entered the tunnel to the locker room, the process server said his
name, made eye contact with him, and held out the documents. Id. Koivu put his head
down and continued walking. Id. The process server then dropped the documents in front
of Koivu and said, “you have been served.” Id. Koivu heard someone yell “you’ve been
served,” and saw the papers fall onto the ground. Id. The security guard rushed over to
pick up the papers and Koivu saw that the documents were divorce papers. Id. The district

1 We cite this nonprecedential opinion as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
8
court determined that Koivu was within speaking distance of the process server because he
could hear someone say “you have been served.” Id. The district court also noted that
Koivu was aware that his wife was seeking a divorce. Id. We concluded that service was
proper because under these facts a reasonable person would be convinced that service was
being attempted. Id
Similar to Koivu, L.B. called out “Cody Adams.” Husband made eye contact with
L.B. before telling her to get off the property. Husband nevertheless asserts that L.B.’s
actions would not convince a reasonable person that personal service was being attempted
because she was never within speaking distance of him and simply left the documents
“outside in the rain .” We disagree. Husband yelling at L.B. and threatening to call the
sheriff demonstrates that they were within speaking distance of each other. Notably, L.B.’s
affidavit stated that husband “completely leaves out [my] verbal contact with him, me
telling him I had papers to be served, and him then threatening to call the sheriff’s
department on me for trespassing.” And while L.B. placed the documents between the pole
and the electrical box, she did so after husband physically refused to accept them.
Husband also claims he was unaware service was being attempted because L.B. was
merely “a stranger driving onto [husband’s] property uninvited.” But evidence in the
record establishes that husband knew wife was seeking a divorce. Like in Koivu, wife
mailed copies of the summons and petition to husband on March 6, 2024, and on April 17,
2024, which husband received. Wife also sent husband text messages explicitly stating
that she was filing for divorce.
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We see no clear error in the district court’s finding that husband understood that
service was being attempted when L.B. arrived at his home. Therefore, the district court
did not err in determining that husband was properly served and denying husband’s motion
to void the judgment.
II. The district court acted within its discretion when it denied husband’s motion
to vacate and reopen the dissolution judgment under Minnesota Statutes
section 518.145, subdivision 2.

Husband next argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
request to reopen the dissolution judgment under Minnesota Statutes section 518.145,
subdivision 2, because (1) surprise, mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect of fact
required the decree to be reopened, (2) there was newly discovered evidence, and (3) wife
committed fraud by misrepresenting the parties’ assets and debts. We address each
argument in turn.
“Minnesota law generally precludes parties from reopening marital judgments and
decrees after they exhaust their appellate remedies.” Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257,
262 (Minn. 2022). “Subject to the right of appeal, a dissolution judgment and decree is
final when entered, unless in a timely motion a party establishes a statutory basis for
reopening the judgment and decree.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424 , 428
(Minn. App. 2007) (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subds. 1, 2 (2006)). “The sole relief from
a dissolution judgment and decree lies in meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat.
§ 518.145, subd. 2.” Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation
omitted). “The moving party must prove at least one of the statutory grounds for vacating
by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
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“An appellate court will not reverse a district court’s decision to grant or withhold
relief under section 518.145 . . . except for an abuse of discretion.” Bender, 971 N.W.2d
at 262. “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are
unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against
logic and the facts on record.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A district judge’s findings of fact
are not set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 835 (quotation omitted).
A. Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the
dissolution judgment based on surprise, mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect
under section 518.145, subdivision 2(1).
“On motion, a district court ‘may relieve a party from a judgment and decree’ based
on ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.’” Id. (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 518.145, subd. 2). Relief may be granted if the movant establishes “(1) a debatably
meritorious claim, (2) a reasonable excuse for the movant’s failure or neglect to act, (3) the
movant acted with due diligence after learning of the error or omission, and (4) no
substantial prejudice will result to the other party if relief is granted.” Safeco Ins. Co. v.
Holmgren Bldg. Repair, Inc., 946 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Minn. App. 2020) (quoting Gams v.
Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016)), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 15, 2020); see
also Bender, 971 N.W.2d at 263 (“Because Rule 60.02 and section 518.145 are virtually
identical, we use cases evaluating Rule 60.02 when addressing the application of section
518.145.” (quotation omitted)). “It is generally for the district court to determine whether
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the excuse offered by the movant is true and reasonable under the circumstances.” Cole v.
Wutzke, 884 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. 2016).
The district court determined that husband did not meet his burden to show that
relief was warranted based on surprise, mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect under
section 518.145, subdivision 2(1). The district court concluded that husband’s refusal to
engage in the process, despite having a full and fair opportunity to present evidence, did
not warrant reopening of the judgment.
Husband claims that his failure to act was based on improper service and insufficient
notice of the court hearings. Because this argument is based on husband’s assertion that
he was not properly served, and because, above, we rejected that assertion, we need not
further address this argument.
B. Newly Discovered Evidence
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider
newly discovered evidence regarding the correct value of the homestead. Alternatively,
husband argues that wife owed him a fiduciary duty under Minnesota Statutes section
518.58, subdivision 1(a) (2024) to provide accurate financial information, and failure to do
so warrants reopening of the judgment.
Minnesota Statutes section 518.145, subdivision 2(2), allows courts to “relieve a
party from a judgment and decree” based on “newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.145, subd. 2(2). The district court may reopen a judgment if the moving party shows:
(1) the newly discovered evidence was not discoverable before the relevant proceeding,
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despite exercising reasonable diligence, (2) the evidence is “relevant and admissible,” and
(3) the evidence is likely to affect the outcome of the case, and is not “cumulative,
contradictory or impeaching.” Bender, 971 N.W.2d at 263 (quotations omitted). “Whether
these factors have been met is within the [district] court’s sound discretion.” Id.
The district court found that husband did not identify any newly discovered
evidence that warranted the reopening of the dissolution judgment. Rather, husband
merely asserted that the financial figures presented at the default hearing were incorrect.
The district court also determined that husband’s reliance on section 518.58,
subdivision 1(a), was improper because husband did not engage in the dissolution
proceedings and failed to show what marital debts or assets were allegedly transferred,
encumbered, concealed, or disposed of without his consent.
On appeal, husband does not point to any newly discovered evidence in the record.
Instead, husband appears to suggest that any alleged inaccuracies at the default hearing
were new to him. But husband’s argument overlooks the district court’s finding that he did
not engage in the proceedings. And section 518.145 does not relieve a party from a
judgment when that judgment is the result of a process in which they actively chose not to
participate.
Husband’s claim that wife violated her fiduciary duty under section 518.58,
subdivision 1(a), also lacks merit. The purpose of this section is to prevent the disposal of
marital assets during the pendency of a marital dissolution without consent of the other
party. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1(a). Husband does not identify any marital asserts or
debts that were transferred, encumbered, concealed, or disposed of by wife during the
13
dissolution proceedings. Rather, husband appears dissatisfied with the property division
upon default. Thus, the district court acted within its discretion by denying husband’s
motion to reopen the judgment based on newly discovered evidence.
C. Fraud
Next, husband contends that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to
reopen the dissolution judgment based on fraud or misrepresentation under section
518.145. subdivision 2(3).
In a dissolution proceeding, ordinary fraud does not require an affirmative
misrepresentation or an intentional course of concealment, unlike fraud upon the court,
because parties to a marriage dissolution have a duty to disclose all assets and liabilities
completely and accurately. Bollenbach v. Bollenbach, 175 N.W.2d 148, 155 (Minn. 1970).
The district court found that husband failed to establish by the preponderance of the
evidence that wife intentionally misrepresented or failed to disclose the parties’ debts and
assets. The district court noted that because the dissolution proceeded in default, no formal
discovery was completed. Accordingly, the district court concluded that wife provided the
most accurate information possible at the default hearing without husband’s participation
in the proceedings.
Husband asserts that wife committed fraud by intentionally misrepresenting their
debts and assets, and by misleading the court into believing that the dissolution decree was
fair or equitable. We are not convinced. Our review of the record establishes that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that wife provided it with the best
information she had. At the default hearing, wife did not testify that the information she
14
provided was precise. Instead, she confirmed that the information regarding the parties’
debts, assets, real property, spousal maintenance, child support, and parenting time was
accurate to the best of her knowledge. And husband did not provide evidence to rebut
wife’s financial information. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
husband’s motion to reopen the judgment and decree based on fraud.
III. The district court acted within its discretion by denying husband’s motion to
reopen the dissolution judgment based on alleged inequities pursuant to
Pooley.

Alternatively, husband contends that the district court abused its discretion and
failed to meet its statutory obligation under Minnesota Statutes section 518.58 (2024) to
ensure the dissolution decree was “just and equitable,” as set forth under Pooley, 979
N.W.2d at 875-78.
In Pooley, the district court granted the parties’ dissolution without knowledge that
the parties had not disclosed their retirement accounts. 979 N.W.2d at 871-72. At the time
of the dissolution, husband’s 401(k) account was worth $235,000, while wife’s 401(k) had
a zero balance. Id. Wife moved to “enforce, clarify, or amend the dissolution decree,” and
sought half the value of husband’s retirement accounts or equitable division of the omitted
asset. Id. at 872. Wife asserted that the parties agreed to split the retirement accounts
equally. Id. But husband maintained that the parties agreed to keep their own retirement
accounts, and in exchange, husband agreed to assume extra expenses and debt. Id. The
district court denied wife’s motion, holding that dividing the omitted asset after the fact
would create an “unfair windfall.” Id. This court affirmed. Id. The supreme court
reversed, reasoning that the district court not only had the power to divide the omitted asset,
15
but that it was statutorily mandated to do so under Minnesota Statutes section 518.58. Id .
at 877-78. Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that by failing to consider the
omitted retirement account, the district court violated its duty to ensure that all property
divisions are fair and equitable. Id. at 879.
Relying on Pooley, husband asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to reopen the dissolution judgment because it “made no attempt to ensure that the
property division was done justly and equitably” under section 518.58. Husband’s reliance
on Pooley is misplaced. As an initial matter, Pooley involves the omission of assets. The
facts before us do not involve omitted assets, nor does husband point to any. Furthermore,
the district court here based its findings on the relevant facts provided under section 518.58
before making “a just and equitable division of the marital property.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58,
subdivision 1. The district court considered each party’s age, health, occupation, income,
and individual needs in its dissolution decree. The district court met its statutory
obligation. Any inequities contained in the dissolution decree are directly attributed to
husband’s failure to participate in the proceedings. “[A] party cannot complain about a
district court’s failure to rule in [the party’s] favor when one of the reasons it did not do so
is because that party failed to provide the district court with the evidence that would allow
the district court to fully address the question.” Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 431 (quoting
Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn.
Nov. 24, 2003)). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion
by denying husband’s motion to reopen the dissolution judgment based on inequity under
Pooley.
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IV. The district court acted within its discretion by awarding wife conduct -based
attorney fees.

Lastly, husband contends that the district court abused its discretion by awarding
wife conduct-based attorney fees.
Conduct-based attorney-fee awards “are discretionary with the district court.”
Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007). “In proceedings under
chapter 518, a district court may, in its discretion, award attorney fees against a party who
unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Brodsky v. Brodsky,
733 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted) (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.14,
subd. 1 (2006)). “An award of conduct -based attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Id.
The district court awarded wife $2,500 in conduct-based attorney fees. The district
court determined that husband unreasonably contributed to the length of the proceedings
by attempting to evade service when he knew wife was filing for divorce, failing to appear
at the hearings despite being notified by mail, and bringing a motion to reopen the judgment
for reasons that were solely attributable to his refusal to engage in the proceedings.
Husband argues that he did not evade service because “no personal service was ever
attempted.” Husband also asserts that he did not refuse to engage in proceedings because
he only learned about the dissolution when the district court entered its judgment. Husband
denies ever receiving the court’s hearing notices, despite evidence in the record confirming
they were mailed to him. Husband’s arguments are unavailing.
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The record establishes that L.B. properly served husband at his home. Moreover,
husband knew wife was filing for divorce because she informed him on several occasions
and mailed him copies of the summons and petition. The record also shows that husband
received the hearing notices. Husband may not claim inadequate notice of the hearings
because he did not read his mail. See In re. License of W. Side Pawn, 587 N.W.2d 521,
522 (Minn. App. 1998) (“The city cannot be held responsible for relator’s failure to read
his mail.”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 1999).
While the district court’s order does not point to specific facts to support its
determination that husband evaded service, we conclude that its award for conduct-based
attorney fees is substantially supported by the record. Therefore, we discern no abuse of
discretion.
Affirmed.