Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A20-0918

Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action
against William Bernard Butler, a Minnesota
Attorney, Registration No. 0227912.
Filed: June 9, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts

______________________________

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Cassie Hanson, Senior Assistant Director, Office of Lawyers
Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

William B. Butler, Robbinsdale, Minnesota, pro se.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. The referee did not abuse her discre tion by reserving the admission of e-mail
correspondence that as offered lacked authentication.
2. The record supports the referee’s fi ndings of fact and conclusions that
respondent violated the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct and Rules on Lawyers
Professional Responsibility due to his criminal convictions for willful tax evasion, misuse
of an attorney trust account, holding himself out as auth orized to practice law while
suspended, and failure to cooperate with the Director’s investigation.

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3. Given the aggravating factors present, an indefinite suspension with no right
to petition for reinstatement fo r 4 years is the appropriat e discipline for respondent’s
criminal convictions for willful tax evasion, misuse of an attorney trust account, holding
himself as authorized to practice law while su spended, and failure to cooperate with the
Director’s investigation.
Suspended.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.
The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petition
for disciplinary action and a supplementar y petition for disciplinary action against
respondent William Bernard Butler. The petitions alleged that Butler was convicted of two
felonies for willfully failing to file federal income tax returns, misused a trust account,
failed to timely cooperate with the Director’s investigation, and held himself out as a
licensed attorney while suspended. The referee held a he aring and concluded that Butler
had violated the applicable rules, and that aggravating factors warranted disbarment.
Butler asserts that, despite his convictions, his failure to file tax returns did not violate the
Minnesota Rules of Professional Co nduct and Rules on Lawyers Professional
Responsibility. He also opposes the Director’s other charges on evidentiary grounds. After
reviewing the record, we conclude that the referee did not clearly err. We further conclude
that the appropriate discipline for Butler’s misconduct is an indefinite suspension with no
right to petition for reinstatement for 4 years.

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FACTS
Butler was admitted to practice in Minnesot a in 1992. Butler has been disciplined
twice before. On August 12, 2015, we suspended Butler from the practice of law with no
right to petition for reinstatement for at least 2 years.1 In re Butler, 868 N.W.2d 243, 252
(Minn. 2015). Butler’s 2015 discipline stemmed from a substantial pattern of misconduct
including pursuit of frivolous litigation on behalf of 40 clients, fraudulent joinder of parties,
refiling of previously dismissed cases, and failure to pay $300,000 in court-ordered
sanctions. Id. at 247–50. The Director further admonished Butler on January 27, 2017, for
identifying himself as “General Counsel” for a company that employed him and providing
legal advice while he was suspended from the practice of law.
This matter arises principally out of Bu tler’s March 20, 2019 convictions on two
counts of attempting to evade or defeat a ta x law by knowingly failing to file a tax return
(for tax years 2012 and 2013) when required to do so, in violation of Minnesota Statutes
§ 289A.63, subd. 1(a) (2020). The district court stayed imposition of the sentences and
placed Butler on probation for 3 years.2 Butler complied with the condition of his probation
that he file tax returns from 2012 through 2019.
After Butler was charged with willful tax evasion in 2018, th e Director began a
disciplinary investigation. On May 16, 2019, the Director sent Butler a letter informing
him that his law firm’s website, which stated that “William Bernard Butler is a Minnesota

1 Butler has not yet petitioned for re instatement and remains suspended.

2 If Butler completes his probation, his fe lony convictions will be deemed to be
misdemeanors. Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (2020).

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Attorney,” was misleading gi ven his suspended status at the time. Butle r responded on
May 30, 2019, that his website was “currently down” but if it went back up that he would
change it to state that he “is a non-practicing Minnesota attorney” and include a link to his
prior discipline.
The Director also sent Butler a notice of investigation on September 3, 2019, asking
him to explain an August 13, 2019 overdraft on his attorney trust account with Wells Fargo.
An automatic electronic payment for Butler’s personal car lease caused this overdraft. The
notice requested Butler’s trust account bank statements and other information. This notice
was mailed to the Minneapolis address that Butler maintained with the Minnesota Lawyer
Registration Office, one that the Director had previously used to successfully communicate
with Butler concerning his cr iminal convictions. The no tice was not returned as
undeliverable.
After receiving no response, the Director sent Butler another letter on September 18,
2019, to the same address as well as a residential addre ss associated with him. In this
second letter, the Director cited Butler’s fa ilure to respond to the first notice of
investigation. This letter was returned as undeliverable to Butler’s Minneapolis address,
but not his residential address.
Also on September 18, 2019, the Director requested an investigatory subpoena for
Butler’s trust account. The subpoena was then approved and served on Wells Fargo. At
this point, Butler still had not responded to the Director’s requests. After being notified of
the subpoena by Wells Fargo, Butler e-mailed the Director on October 19, 2019, explaining
that there were no client funds in the trust account and that he was using it for personal

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purposes. Butler did not incl ude in this e-mail the bank statements requested by the
Director. Butler eventually provided the Director a screenshot of the trust account balance
on November 13, 2019.
The subpoenaed bank records showed that Butler had used his attorney trust account
to make monthly car lease payments and to pay for car insurance. Butler also used the trust
account to deposit personal funds, including a $10,000 personal check, and disbursed
payments to himself. This us e resulted in five overdrafts, including a $725.35 shortage.
Butler did not provide the Director with info rmation showing that he has corrected the
overdrafts. There were never any third-part y funds in the account during the disputed
period, nor any comingling. Butler explained to the Director that he used the trust account
for personal purposes because his criminal convictions prevented him from opening a new
bank account.
The Director petitioned for disciplinary action against Butler. The Director alleged
that Butler’s convictions for knowingly failing to file his tax returns violated Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 8.4(b) and (d); his misuse of the trust account violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct
1.15(a); his holding of himself out as authorized to practice law while suspended violated
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(b)(2) and 7.1; and his failure to cooperate with the disciplinary
investigation violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(b) and Rule 25, Rules on Lawyers
Professional Responsibility (RLPR). A hearing was held before the referee.
At the hearing, Butler offered Exhibit 40, which consisted mostly of e-mail
communications between him and the Director that occurred after Butler did not respond
to the first two notices of investigation. The Director objected primarily on authentication

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grounds, because the exhibit was offered with numerous redactions. Butler explained that
he did not have access to a printer, and so he forwarded these e-mails to personal friends
for them to print off. He cl aims that the redactions were of the persona lly identifying
information of those friends. The referee reserved receiving Exhibit 40 on authentication
grounds and it was ultimately not admitted into evidence.
The Director called Butler to testify; he refused by citing religious beliefs. 3 The
referee stated that Butler could affirm the truth of his testimony. Butler rejected that option
and said he would not testify. Butler did not call any witnesses on his behalf.
The referee issued her findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation.
She made findings consistent with the facts described above. She concluded that Butler
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a), 5.5(b)(2), 7.1, 8.1(b), and 8.4(b) and (d) and Rule
25, RLPR. The referee also found several aggravating factors. First, Butler had a
substantial prior disciplinary history. S econd, Butler lacked re morse by maintaining
“unreasonable and widely rejected legal pos itions regarding the government’s right to
taxation,” failing to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his misuse of the trust account and
the restrictions placed on him as a suspended attorney, and blaming the Director for failed
communication despite him not updating his address with the Lawyer Registration Office.
Third, the referee found that Butler failed to cooperate with the disciplinary hearing by
refusing to testify, and did so in bad faith. The referee then found that Butler offered no

3 For example, Butler cited th e Bible verse that states: “But I tell you not to swear at
all; neither by heaven, b ecause it is the throne of God; No r by the earth, because it is the
footstool of His feet.” Matthew 5:34–35 (Recovery Version).

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evidence of mitigating factors. In light of this, the referee recommended that Butler be
disbarred.
ANALYSIS
Butler challenges the referee’s failure to admit the e-mail correspondence, her
findings of fact and conclusions, and her re commended discipline. We address each in
turn.
I.
At the hearing, Butler sought to admit into evidence Exhibit 40, a series of e-mails
between him and the Director that principally occurred after issuance of the Wells Fargo
subpoena. The Director objected to admission of Exhibit 40 because the exhibit contained
multiple redactions, and several pages contained settlement negotiations. Butler explained
that he had no printer and had to forward the e- mails to other persons to print, and so he
redacted the identifying information of those persons. The referee was concerned with the
redactions and believed that the redactions could be addressed by testimony. Accordingly,
the referee reserved decision on the admission of Exhibit 40. Butler, however, did not
testify or attempt to authenti cate Exhibit 40. Ultimately, Ex hibit 40 was not entered into
evidence.
Butler claims that the e-ma il correspondence in Exhibit 40 rebuts the Director’s
assertion, and the referee’s conclusion, that he failed to respond to the first notice of
investigation and failed to cooperate with th e disciplinary investigation. The Director
asserts that Butler was on notice prior to the hearing that the Director would object to

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Exhibit 40 due to the redactions and the referee gave Butler an opportunity to authenticate
the exhibit, which he did not do.
A referee’s evidentiary rulings will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. In
re Moulton, 945 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn. 2020). No tably, the referee did not explicitly
exclude Exhibit 40, but instead reserved admission of the exhi bit. This action provided
Butler an opportunity to later offer testimony to authenticate the e-mails. See Minn. R.
Evid. 901(a). He did not do so; thus, the exhibit was not admitted. As the Director correctly
notes, the petition alleged that Butler failed to cooperate based only on his response to the
Director’s initial inquiries, and these e-mails are not relevant to that count. That is, these
e-mails have no bearing on the relevant pe riod of non-cooperation as alleged by the
Director; the correspondence raised by Butler that discusses the requested trust account
records occurred only after he failed to respond to the initia l notice of investigation and
subsequent issuance of the investigatory subpoena. The referee therefore did not abuse her
discretion by not admitting Exhibit 40 into evidence. See State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592,
599 (Minn. 2010) (concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to
admit unauthenticated transcripts into evidence).
II.
We turn now to the referee’s findings of fact. Because Butler timely ordered a
transcript, the referee’s findings of fact are not conclusive. See Rule 14(e), RLPR. We
defer to the referee and will not reverse the referee’s findings when the findings “have
evidentiary support in the record and are not clearly erroneous.” Moulton, 945 N.W.2d at
405 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). A fi nding of fact is clearly

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erroneous only if upon review of the entire evidence, we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Butler asserts that Finding ¶ 7 is false. 4 This finding details that Butler “currently
maintains that he is not legally required to f ile his taxes and that he continues to rely on
unreasonable and widely rejected legal positions as the basis for his belief.” The finding
also observes that because Butler refused to testify at the disciplinary hearing, it is unclear
if Butler will file his tax returns after his probation ends. Butler does not explain why this
finding is false, but he contends that it cann ot serve as the basis for a Rule 8.4 violation
because no “act” has occurred. Th is argument is directed at the legal conclusion of the
referee and is therefore discussed below.
Butler argues that Finding ¶ 15 is inconsistent with the record, lacks foundation, or
is irrelevant. This finding details the dates on which the car lease payments were processed
from Butler’s trust account. These details derive from a spreadsheet admitted into evidence
as Exhibit 7. Butler originally objected to admission of th is document into evidence, but
withdrew his objection at the hearing. We have reviewed the record and all of the dates in
Finding ¶ 15 and Exhibit 7 di rectly correspond to Butler’s trust account bank records in
Exhibit 26. This finding is supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous. Moulton,
945 N.W.2d at 405.

4 Butler disputes, but provides no argument for, the following findings: ¶¶ 2, 4, 8 −12,
16, 18–21, 23–27, 29, 32–36, 39, 40. His ch allenge to these findings is accordingly
forfeited. See In re Eichhorn-Hicks, 916 N.W.2d 32, 38 n.9 (Minn. 2018).

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III.
Butler next challenges the referee’s conclusions that he violated the asserted rules.
The referee’s conclusion that Butler violated a rule is reviewed for clear error. In re
Ulanowski, 800 N.W.2d 785, 793 (Minn. 2011). A nd the referee’s interpretation of the
rules is reviewed de novo. Id. We address each conclusion in turn.
A.
Butler disputes the referee’s conclusion th at his 2019 convictions for tax evasion
are conclusive evidence that he violated Rule 8.4(b) and (d). Butler maintains that his
failure to file income taxes is an omission, not an “act” under Rule 8.4(b), and also not
“conduct” under Rule 8.4(d).5 He suggests that the referee was required to make a specific
factual finding regarding how his criminal convictions for tax evasion were “prejudicial to
the administration of justice” and that this court’s decision in In re Selmer, 749 N.W.2d 30
(Minn. 2008), precludes such a summary conclusion. Butler cites Selmer to argue that his
conviction is not conclusive evidence of a Rule 8.4(b) violation because it does not
necessarily reflect on his “honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.”
The Director maintains that our preced ent has “consistently precluded [such]
arguments.” She argues that since 1972, we have held that a conviction for tax evasion is
a per se violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d) or its predecessor rule. She also asserts
that we have found a conviction for tax evasion to be a violation of Rule 8.4(b). On Butler’s

5 “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (b) commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects . . . [or] (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b), (d) (emphasis added).

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act versus omission argument, the Director notes that Comment 2 to Rule 8.4 specifically
identifies “willful failure to file an income tax return” as a violation of the rule.
The Director is correct. A lawyer’s criminal conviction is “conclusive evidence that
the lawyer committed the conduct for which the lawyer was convicted,” Rule 19(a), RLPR,
and conclusive evidence of the lawyer’s mental state. In re Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d 153,
159 (Minn. 2004) ( “Rule 19(a)’s presumption lends itself to the additional presumption
that, as here, when the criminal conduct includes a specific state of mind, the conviction is
conclusive evidence that the lawyer acted with that state of mind.”). We have specifically
and consistently applied Rule 19(a), RLPR, when a lawyer is convicted of tax evasion.
See, e.g., In re Morris, 827 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Minn. 2013); In re Peterson , 718 N.W.2d
849, 855, 859 (Minn. 2006); In re Barta, 461 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Minn. 1990). Minnesota
attorneys have been on notice si nce 1972 that intentional viola tion of tax laws is a per se
violation of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. In re Bunker, 199 N.W.2d 628,
632 (Minn. 1972) (“Lawyers in this state sh ould henceforth understand clearly that . . .
disciplinary proceedings are mandatory in all cases of failure to file income tax returns.”).
Butler’s act versus omission distinction collapses because Butler’s conviction conclusively
shows that he affirmatively decided not to file his taxes when he knew he was required to
do so. See Rule 19(a), RLPR.
Similarly, Butler’s Selmer argument fails because we noted in Bunker that
intentional violation of tax laws necessarily reflects on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness,
and fitness to practice law. 199 N.W.2d at 631–32 (citing the predecessor rule of Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 8.4(b), which stated that a lawyer shall not “engage in illegal conduct

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involving moral turpitude”). Moreover, the distinction we drew in Selmer was based on
the lawyer’s conviction for fifth-degree assa ult, not tax evasion. 749 N.W.2d at 39
(concluding “there is no conn ection between Selmer’s fifth- degree assault conviction for
punching another man at a ba sketball game and his practice of law”). Accordingly, the
referee’s conclusion that Butler’s criminal convictions for tax evasion violated Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 8.4(b) and (d) was not clearly erroneous.
B.
Butler next challenges the referee’s conclusion that he violated Rule 1.15(a). Butler
does not substantively address the merits of the referee’s conclusion here, but he suggests
that the Director “abandoned” the Rule 1.15(a) claim. His argument is as follows: (1) the
Director’s original petition contained only an allegation that his convictions for tax evasion
violated Rule 8.4(b) and (d); (2) the Director had reason to know at the time of the original
petition that he had violated ad ditional rules due to his misuse of a trust account and his
misrepresentation on his website ; (3) by not including these la tter claims in the original
petition, the Director abandone d them and thus could not ra ise them in a supplementary
petition, as she did. He cites no authority to support this argument.
The Director maintains that Butler’s consistent use of his attorney trust account for
personal purposes, including multiple overdrafts, violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a)
and asserts that we have held such personal use to be a violation of the rule. She also rebuts
Butler’s implicit laches and forfeiture argu ments by noting that th e initial disciplinary

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petition was filed pursuant to Rule 10(c), RLPR, due to Butler’s felony convictions.6 And
further investigation revealed additional misconduct, including his misuse of his attorney
trust account, thus warranting the supplementary petition.
Butler’s summary argument that because the trust account contained no client or
third-party funds, he did not violate Rule 1.15 (a), is not correct. This rule provides that
“[n]o funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited” in to an attorney trust
account except for sufficient funds to pay service charges associated with the account and
funds belonging both in pa rt to the client and lawyer. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a).
Personal use of a trust account is a violation of Rule 1.15(a). See In re Edinger ,
700 N.W.2d 462, 464–67 (Minn. 2005). Butle r’s argument that no client or third-party
harm occurred due to his personal use goes instead to the level of discipline warranted. See
id. at 468 (“We recognize that the underlying trust account violations presented no risk of
harm to clients and, thus, by themselves, might justify lesser discipline.”).
Similarly, we have never held that the Director may be barred from petitioning for
discipline merely because she may have reason to believe that more than one rule has been
violated, but did not bring all a llegations in an initial petition. Instead, the attorney must
show that the Director’s delay resulte d in actual and substantial prejudice, see In re
Overboe, 867 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Minn. 2015), which Butler has not done. In contrast, the
rules explicitly permit the Dir ector to file a supplemental petition “to include additional

6 Rule 10(c), RLPR, provides that if an a ttorney is convicted of a felony, then “the
Director may either submit the matter to a Pane l or, with the approval of the Chair of the
Board, file a petition under Rule 12.”

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charges based upon conduct committed before or after the petition was filed.” Rule 10(e),
RLPR. Butler’s implicit argument is therefore without merit, and the referee’s conclusion
that his use of the trust account for pers onal purposes—and the resulting overdrafts—
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a), was not clearly erroneous.
C.
Butler maintains that his failure to respond to the notices of investigation cannot be
a violation of the rules when he never received the notices. The Director responds in three
ways. First, she asserts that it was Butler’s responsibility under Rule 13(B) of the Rules of
the Supreme Court on Lawyer Registration to update his address with the Lawyer
Registration Office. Second, she notes that th e first notice of inves tigation sent to his
Minneapolis address was not returned as u ndeliverable, and so she had no actual notice
that Butler had not received it, and the second notice, sent to his residential address in Saint
Paul, was also not returned as undeliverable. Third, she points out that she had previously
successfully communicated with Butler at the Minneapolis address during the investigation
of his criminal complaint that same year. The Director also asserts that when Butler finally
responded to her, he failed to include the reque sted trust account reco rds. The Director
further maintains that Butler’s subsequent cooperation does not negate his initial
noncooperation.
By asserting that he never received the not ices of investigation, Butler effectively
challenges the referee’s conclusion that he “knowingly” failed to respond to the Director’s
request. See Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(b) (stating th at “a lawyer . . . in connection with
a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowing ly fail to respond to a lawful demand for

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information from [a] . . . disciplinary authority”). We reject the Director’s suggestion that
because Butler failed to keep an updated address with the Lawyer Registration Office, he
could violate Rule 8.1(b) if he never actua lly received the notices of investigation and
therefore had no knowledge that the Director was requesting information from him. That
would effectively convert the “knowing” mental state requirement to a “negligent” one.
See In re Anderson, 759 N.W.2d 892, 897 (Minn. 2009) (“Under the Rules of Professional
Conduct, ‘knowingly’ ‘denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question,’ which may ‘be
inferred from circumstances.’ ” (quoting Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.0(g))).
While the referee did not explicitly find that Butler knowingly failed to cooperate,
such a finding is implicit in, for example, her findings that the Director’s notices were sent
to addresses that Butler had previously used with the Director and that the relevant notices
had not been returned as undeliverable. Acco rdingly, there is evidence inferred from the
circumstances to support the implicit finding that Butler received the relevant notices and
thus had actual knowledge as required by Rule 8.1(b). See In re Mathias, 495 N.W.2d 413,
414–15 (Minn. 1993) (suggestin g that a finding of intentio nal conduct could be implied
from the recommended discipline and other findings made regarding the lawyer’s conduct).
The Director also correctly notes that noncooperation, even if only partial, is a violation of
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(b) and Rule 25, RLPR. See In re Nelson , 733 N.W.2d 458,
463 (Minn. 2007). Accordingly, we hold that the referee did not clearly err by concluding
that Butler violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(b) and Rule 25, RLPR.

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D.
The referee concluded that Butler’s labelling of himself as “a Minnesota attorney”
on his website while suspended violated Rules 5.5(b)(2) and 7.1. Ru le 5.5(b)(2) of the
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct prohi bits a lawyer who is not authorized to
practice in Minnesota from “hold[ing] out to the public or otherwise represent[ing] that the
lawyer is admitted to practice Minnesota law. ” And Rule 7.1 of the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from making “false or misleading
communication[s] about the lawyer or the lawy er’s services.” A communication is false
or misleading if it “omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not
materially misleading.” Id. The Director asserts that Bu tler’s website signage, without
any means for the public to determine that he was not licensed, violated both rules. Butler
makes no argument in response outside of the previously discussed abandonment theory.
We have disciplined a lawyer in part for “displaying signage and utilizing law firm
and other designations falsely implying that [the lawyer] continued to be licensed to
practice law while he was suspended.” In re Stockman, 826 N.W.2d 530, 530 (Minn. 2013)
(order). The signage and website at issue in Stockman labelled him as “Attorney Louis A.
Stockman” and an “Attorney at Law” despite his suspended status. Butler’s labelling of
himself on his law firm’s website as “a Minneso ta attorney” is substantively identical to
Stockman’s misconduct in labelling himself an “Attorney.” The referee’s conclusion that
Butler violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5. 5(b)(2) and 7.1 was therefore not clearly
erroneous.

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IV.
After finding that Butler committed the misconduct alleged in the petition and
supplementary petition, the referee agreed with the Director and recommended that Butler
be disbarred. Butler maintains that his conduct violated no rules and thus does not warrant
any discipline.
We retain “ultimate respon sibility for determining ap propriate discipline” and
discipline is imposed “to deter future misconduct, both by the attorney subject to discipline
and by other attorneys.” Moulton, 945 N.W.2d at 408 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). But we give “great weight ” to the referee’s recommended discipline. In
re Rebeau, 787 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Minn. 2010). To determine th e appropriate discipline,
we consider four factors: (1) the nature of the misconduct, (2) th e cumulative weight of
the violations, (3) the harm to the public, and (4) the harm to the legal profession. Id. We
will also consider aggravatin g and mitigati ng factors. Id. at 173–74. Appropriate
discipline, while unique to each case, should be consistent with that imposed in similar
cases. Id. at 174.
A.
We first consider the nature of Butler’s misconduct. Butler’s misconduct consists
of: (1) conviction of two felony counts of ta x evasion; (2) misuse of an attorney trust
account; (3) failure to cooperat e with the Director’s disciplinary investigation; and
(4) misrepresenting himself as a licensed attorney while suspended.
We may consider the severity ranking a ssigned to a felony offense under the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. See In re Strunk, 945 N.W.2d 379, 385 (Minn. 2020).

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Butler’s felony convictions are an offense severity level 3 out of a maximum of 11. Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 5.A (2012 and 2013).7 Other crimes with an offense level 3 include theft
crimes of over $5,000. Id. And we have consistently treated convictions for tax crimes as
serious. See Bunker, 199 N.W.2d at 632 (stating that fu ture convictions for tax-related
crimes “will consist of either suspension or disbarment”); Selmer, 749 N.W.2d at 38 (“We
impose harsh discipline when tax violations result in criminal charges . . . [and] the failure
to file tax returns altogether is a more serious violation than a mere failure to timely file.”);
In re Bonner, 896 N.W.2d 98, 113–14 (Minn. 2017) (“We have imposed lengthy periods
of suspension on lawyers convicted of felonies for filing false tax returns.”).
Misuse of an attorney trust account is also serious misconduct, even when the
misuse does not result in harm to clients. In re Schulte, 869 N.W.2d 674, 678–79 (Minn.
2015). Notably though, Wells Fargo was harm ed because the trust account was closed
with a negative balance of over $700.8
Failure to cooperate is also serious misconduct. See In re Brooks, 696 N.W.2d 84,
88 (Minn. 2005) (“We have stressed that failure to cooperate with a disciplinary

7 Butler received a stay of imposition of sentence under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.13, subdivision 1. Under that stat ute, if Butler completes his probation, then
his convictions will be deemed misdemeanors. We have noted, however, that when a jury
finds that an attorney has committed a felony offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then even
if the felony is later deemed to be a misdemeanor under section 609.13, we may
nevertheless treat the conduct as a felony offense. In re Bonner , 896 N.W.2d 98, 113
(Minn. 2017).

8 At oral argument, Butler asserted that he had attempted to pay off the remaining
balance, but that Wells Fargo had written off much of the loss. That evidence, however, is
not in the record before us.

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investigation, in and of itsel f, constitutes an act of miscondu ct that warrants indefinite
suspension.”). And holding oneself out as licensed to practice while suspended is similarly
serious. See In re Van Beek , 887 N.W.2d 31, 32 (Minn. 2016) (orde r). The nature of
Butler’s misconduct thus warrants serious discipline.
B.
We next consider the cumulative weight of Butler’s misconduct. We treat a brief
lapse in judgment or a single, isol ated incident more leniently. Bonner, 896 N.W.2d at
108. Butler’s pattern of misconduct was neith er. Instead, his misconduct spread over
multiple years. He was convicted of tax evasion for tax years 2012 and 2013, and his more
recent misconduct was also extensive. He misused his attorney trust account over a period
of at least 5 months. And he recently held himself out as a lice nsed attorney while
suspended and failed to cooperat e with the Director’s discip linary investigation. This
factor weighs in favor of heavier discipline.
C.
We next consider the harm to the public and the legal profession. Butler’s
misconduct caused some harm to the public. Butler’s misuse of his attorney trust account
deprived Wells Fargo of over $700. His misuse of the trust account, however, did not harm
any clients. And while Butler did initially deprive the public of tax revenue due to his
knowing failure to file income taxes, he did ultimately repay these taxes and subsequently
filed income taxes through 2019 consistent with the terms of his criminal probation.
Butler’s criminal convictions for tax evas ion caused serious harm to the legal
profession. See Moulton , 945 N.W.2d at 409 (“[B]ecause Moulton’s violation of tax

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regulations is a failure to abide by the ru le of law, his conduct harmed the legal
profession.”). His misuse of his attorney tr ust account also harmed the legal profession,
Schulte, 869 N.W.2d at 679, as did his failure to cooperate with the Director’s disciplinary
investigation, id. at 678–79. Butler’s misconduct caused some harm to the public and great
harm to the legal profession and thus warrants serious discipline.
D.
Having considered the four factors, we now look to the existence of any aggravating
or mitigating factors. The referee found th ree aggravating factors: (1) Butler’s prior
disciplinary history; (2) his lack of remo rse; and (3) his noncooperation during the
disciplinary hearing.9
“Prior disciplinary history is an aggravating favor, and a particularly weighty one if
the prior discipline was for similar misconduct.” In re Quinn, 946 N.W.2d 583, 592 (Minn.
2020). Butler has been disciplined before and for similar conduct. Butler was previously
admonished by the Director for the unauthorized practice of law while suspended and for
holding himself out as the general counsel of a corporation. Here, he held himself out to
the public as a licensed Minnesota attorney while suspended. His prior, similar misconduct
shows that he has not demonstrated a “renewed commitment to comprehensive ethical and

9 We commend the referee for her extens ive attempts to accommodate Butler’s
religious objections to providing sworn tes timony. We decline, however, to consider
Butler’s alleged noncooperation at the discip linary hearing as an aggravating factor
because his refusal to testify presents potential First Amendment concerns and because the
presence or absence of this particular a ggravating factor does not alter our ultimate
conclusion concerning the appropriate discipline for him.

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professional behavior after a disciplinary proceeding.” Nelson, 733 N.W.2d at 464
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Butler also shows no remorse for his misconduct. Indeed, he does not acknowledge
any wrongdoing. He instead portrays himsel f as the victim in these disciplinary
proceedings. See Rebeau , 787 N.W.2d at 176 (concluding that an attorney’s lack of
remorse was an aggravating factor).
Butler did not present evidence of mitigating factors, and the referee found none. In
sum, these aggravating factors, and the lack of any mitigating factors, warrant more severe
discipline.
E.
We now turn to similar cases. The Director asserts that none of our prior cases fully
encompass Butler’s misconduct and aggrava ting factors. She suggests that the
combination of serious misconduct here, current suspension for similar misconduct, prior
admonition, and other significant aggravating factors compel disbarment. The Director
offers In re Albrecht as an example in which we disbarred an attorney because the attorney
had not heeded the message of prior disciplin e. 845 N.W.2d 184, 19 3 (Minn. 2014). In
Albrecht, the attorney had been privately admonished by the Director 13 times, placed on
supervised probation by this court three times, and suspe nded three times, including an
indefinite suspension with no right to petition for rein statement for 2 years. Id. at 187.
While the most recent indefin ite suspension was still in e ffect, the attorney had a sexual
relationship with a client, practiced law while suspended, lied to the Director about a wire
transfer, and misled the Director and refe ree about his petition fo r reinstatement. Id. at

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187–91. While Butler’s misconduct here is in some respects more serious—Albrecht had
not been convicted of any felonies—Butler’s disciplinary history is also far less substantial
than Albrecht’s.
The Director also offers In re Ray, in which we disbarred an attorney for the repeated
unauthorized practice of law while suspended, including prior discipline for the same.
610 N.W.2d 342, 347 (Minn. 2000). Ray, however, actually practiced law while
suspended, id. at 344–45, as opposed to Butler, whose relevant misconduct was leaving up
a website labelling him as a Minnesota attorney. That said, Butler is like Ray in that he is
completely without remorse for his misconduct. See id. at 347 (noting that Ray did not
“acknowledge that he ha[d] committed a ny misconduct”). Based on the differences
between these two cases and Butler’s misconduct and disciplinary history here, we disagree
with the Director that these cases support Butler’s disbarment.
When a Minnesota attorney si mply fails to file tax returns, we ordinarily suspend
the attorney within a range of 30 to 180 days. See In re Green, 887 N.W.2d 33, 33 (Minn.
2016) (order); In re Smith, 852 N.W.2d 253, 253–54 (Minn. 2014) (order); In re Converse,
926 N.W.2d 913, 913 (Minn. 2019) (order); In re Butler, 915 N.W.2d 754, 754–55 (Minn.
2018) (order).
We recognized in In re Singer, however, that when an attorney both fails to file tax
returns (even if not criminally charged fo r it) and commits other serious misconduct,
suspension for longer than 1 year is warra nted. 541 N.W.2d 313, 316 (Minn. 1996)
(collecting cases). Singer failed to file tax re turns, failed to keep proper trust account
records, failed to deposit advance fees into trust, failed to timely refund unearned fees, and

23
failed to cooperate in disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 314–15. Singer also had prior
disciplinary history and had been on pr obation for similar tax violations. Id. at 314. We
indefinitely suspended him, with no right to petition for reinstatement for 2 years. Id. at
316.
Likewise, when an a ttorney is actually convicted of tax crimes, we have imposed
more severe discipline. See In re Thedens , 557 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Minn. 1997) (“[T]his
court often has imposed harsh sanctions when [tax code] violations have resulted in
criminal prosecutions.”); In re Wylde , 454 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn. 1990); see also
Bonner, 896 N.W.2d at 113–14 (recognizing that conviction warrants greater discipline).
While we have said that “[t]he presumptive sanction for a lawyer convicted of a felony is
disbarment,” we have also said that we “will not automatically disbar attorneys convicted
of felonies . . . and will consider the ci rcumstances surrounding the criminal act to
determine if any discipline short of disbarment is appropriate.” Strunk, 945 N.W.2d at 387
(stating that the analysis is “fact intensive” and involves “numerous factors,” including
“the nature of the criminal conduct, whether the felony was directly related to the practice
of law, and whether the crime would seriously diminish public confidence in the legal
profession”). For example, we disbarred an attorney who was convicted of federal mail
fraud and income tax evasion. In re Ostfield, 349 N.W.2d 274, 275 (Minn. 1984) (order)
(stating that the attorney, who was also an accountant, admitted that he prepared tax returns
for his clients, “received checks from clients to pay their determined tax liability,” and then
“did not send to taxing author ities [the] correct returns, and . . . converted to his own use
proceeds from the checks”).

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But in In re McGee, we suspended an attorney for only 1 year for the same criminal
conviction as Butler when that attorney also failed to timely file 4 years of income tax
returns, failed to appear at two court hearings, and failed to cooperate with the disciplinary
investigation. 856 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Minn. 2014) (order). McGee, however, had no prior
disciplinary history. Id. We suspended the attorney in In re Sax for 1 year because the
attorney was convicted for failing to file taxes, then failed to file again. 321 N.W.2d 902,
903–04 (Minn. 1982). We al so suspended the attorney in In re Diesen for 3 years for a
federal conviction of tax evasi on when the attorney had no prior disciplinary history.
217 N.W. 356, 356–57 (Minn. 1928). In sum, while we often susp end an attorney for
between 1 to 3 years for a conviction such as willful tax evasion, the aggravating factors—
including Butler’s prior similar misconduct a nd lack of remorse—warrant more severe
discipline.
Accordingly, we order that:
1. Respondent William Bernard Butler rema ins indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law with no right to petition for reinstatement for a minimum of 4 years,
effective as of the date of this opinion.
2. Respondent shall pay $ 900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24(a), RLPR, and
comply with the requirements of Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspension to clients,
opposing counsel, and tribunals).
3. Respondent shall timely file his fe deral and state income tax returns.
4. Respondent may petition for reinstat ement pursuant to Rule 18(a)–(d),
RLPR. Reinstatement is conditioned on the following:

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a. respondent’s successful comp letion of the written examination
required for admission to the practice of law by the State Board of Law Examiners
on the subject of professional responsibility. See Rule 4.A.(5), Rules for Admission
to the Bar (requiring eviden ce that an applicant has su ccessfully completed the
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination);

b. respondent’s satisfaction of contin uing legal education requirements.
See Rule 18(e)(4), RLPR;

c. respondent’s compliance with the te rms of his criminal probation, as
set out in the district court’s May 8, 2019 sentencing order;

d. respondent’s compliance with the terms of his 2015 suspension, see
Butler, 868 N.W.2d at 252–53; and

e. respondent’s demonstration to the Di rector that he has timely filed his
federal and state income tax returns from the date of this opinion and providing to
the Director such releases as may be appropriate to pe rmit the Director to obtain
verification from the taxing authorities.

Suspended.