William O. Bradley, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1207

William O. Bradley,
Appellant,

vs.

Cody J. Haislet, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed July 6, 2021
Affirmed in part and remanded; motion denied
Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-17-7336

John S. Jagiela, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Sidney L. Brennan, Jr., Minnetonka, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant challenges findings and conclusions of the district court regarding the
existence of private nuisance s upon an access easement, the scope of injunctive relief
ordered, the preclusion of expert testimony, the related denial of a motion for a partial new
trial, and the denial of appellant’s request for attorney fees. We affirm in part and remand.
2
FACTS
Appellant William Bradley holds an easement “of ingress and egress for road
purposes” over Tract J: a 22-foot wide tract of land owned by respondents Cody and Brady
Haislet. In May 2017, Bradley initiated a private nuisance action against the Haislets,
alleging generally that they were maintaining permanent obstructions inte rfering with
Bradley’s easement rights. The relevant tract and obstructions are depicted as follows:

3
We summarize the history of the parties’ respective properties, prior litigation, and
the proceedings leading to this appeal as follows.
Underhill Circle and the Parties’ Properties
Frederick and Lydia Patch once owned all of the land constituting Underhill Circle
in Long Lake, Minnesota. In 1946, they conveyed a portion of the land to Gratia Clasen
“[s]ubject to and together with an easement for right o f way for road purposes over a strip
of land 44 feet in width” with a detailed description of metes and bounds. Later that year,
Frederick and Lydia conveyed another portion of the land to Carl and Alice Olson
“[s]ubject to and together with an easement f or right of way for road purposes over a strip
of land 44 feet in width” described by metes and bounds. In 1949, Frederick and Lydia
conveyed additional land to Roger Patch “[s]ubject to and together with an easement
granted and reserved for right of way for road purposes over a strip of land 44 feet in width”
with a description of metes and bounds. In 1958, a land survey designated various tracts
of land as Tracts A through L. Clasen’s land was not included in the survey; the land
transferred to the Ols ons comprised Tracts A and K while the land transferred to Roger
comprised Tracts B and J. In 1963, Frederick and Linda conveyed Tracts E and G to Roger
and Pauline Patch while “[r]eserving and granting an Easement over Tract G for road
purposes together with an easement for road purposes over Tracts H, I, J, K, and L.”
In 1966, Roger subdivided Tract B into separate tracts designated as Tract A and
Tract B in a separate survey. F or clarity, we refer to these subdivisions as “Sub -Tract A”
and “Sub -Tract B.” That same year, Roger and Pauline transferred Tracts E and G to
Walter and Phyllis Arnold “together with easement for right of way for road purposes as
4
shown in” Clasen’s deed. In 1968, the Arnolds transferred Tracts E and G to George and
Catherine Helmstetter “[s]ubject to restrictions, reservations and liens of record” and
“[t]ogether with easement for right of way for road purposes as shown in” the Clasen deed.
In 1968, Roger, Pauline, and Lydia Patch conveyed a deed of appurtenant easement to th e
Helmstetters granting an “easement of ingress and egress for road purposes” on Tracts H,
I, J, and L.
In 1973, the Helmstetters transferred Tracts E and G to John and Layn n Thomas
“together with all the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belongin g or in anywise
appertaining.” On November 1, 1975, the Thomases transferred Tracts E and G to
appellant William Bradley “[s]ubject to restrictions, reservations, and easements of record”
and “[t]ogether with all the hereditaments and appurtenances thereu nto belonging or in
anywise appertaining.” Bradley’s certificate of title indicates that his ownership of Tracts
E and G is “[s]ubject to and together with an easement for right of way for road purposes
as shown in [the Clasen deed ].”
Charles Webster purchased Tracts A and K in 1978. He subdivided the tracts into
northern and southern portions. Daniel Larson purchased the southern half of both parcels
from Webster sometime around 1999. The certificates of title indicate that both northern
and southern portions are “[s]ubject to and together with an easement for right of way for
road purposes, as shown in [the Olson Deed], as to Trac[t] K.”
Roger later transferred Sub -Tract A and Tract J to Charlene Blodgett. In 2006,
Blodgett transferred Sub -Tract A and Tract J to William and Carol Kelley, subject to
“easements, covenants and restrictions of record.”
5
The Kelley Litigation
After purchasing the property, the Kelleys made alterations on Tract J. They erected
a stone retaining wall around a first tree, planted a second tree approximately eight feet
from the boundary line dividing Tract J from Tract K, erected a fence, removed asphalt
from a portion of the road , and covered portions of the road with dirt and grass seed. In
March 2011, Bradley sued the Kelleys, alleging that the Kelleys were maintaining a private
nuisance upon the easement.
The case proceeded to a jury trial in 2012. The jury found that the Kelleys
“unreasonably interfered with [Bradley’s] easement for road purposes” ; the Kelleys
“created a nuisance that adversely affected [Bradley’s] use of the easement for road
purposes,” directly causing damages to Bradley; and $4,200 was sufficient to compensate
Bradley for the damages caused by the private nuisance.
In November 20 12, following the jury verdict, the district court issued its findings,
conclusions, and order for judgment. It explained that the jury was not asked “which of
the claims made by [Bradley] amounted to unreasonable interference or a nuisance” and
that it was “the exclusive role of the Court to determine what, if anything, amounted to an
unreasonable interference with or a nuisance in the easement, whether a legal remedy is
inadequate, and whether an injunction is necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.”
The district court indicated that the 1946 conveyance to Clasen was “the genesis of
the easement that is the subject of this litigation.” It explained that “[t]he division between
Tracts J and K is the centerline of the 44 -foot side easement des cribed in 1946.” The
district court reasoned that “[t]he easement on Tract J and Tract K is ingress and egress for
6
road purposes,” (emphasis added) which was unambiguous as to purpose but ambiguous
as to the specifics of its construction and laneage. It undertook to “resolve the ambiguities,”
noting that part of the road was maintained on Tract J (on the west) and the other on Tract K
(to the east), that the property owners had agreed to the routing of the road, and that the
road’s configuration “met [Bra dley’s] rights as a dominant holder of the easement” prior
to October 2010.
The district court determined that the fence was a nuisance and ordered its removal.
As for the retaining wall and first tree, the district court credited William Kelley’s
testimony that he had not removed asphalt when building the wall. The district court
concluded that the wall neither substantially changed nor interfered with Bradley’s use of
the access easement and was not a nuisance. Regarding added topsoil/grass and remov ed
asphalt, the district court determined that the conditions constituted a nuisance and ordered
the Kelleys to remove the soil and grass and repair the asphalt. The Kelleys removed the
fence but failed to comply with the remainder of the district court’s order.
Kelley Litigation: Appeal, Stay, and Disposition
Bradley appealed, challenging the district court’s dismissal of a trespass claim, its
denial of a motion to disqualify counsel, and its denial of his motion for attorney fees.
Bradley v. Kelley , No. A13 -0063, 2014 WL 3557922, at *1 (Minn. App. July 21, 2014),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2014). Bradley raised no oth er issues on appeal, and the
parties completed written briefing on April 18, 2013, when Bradley submitted his reply
brief. On May 20, 2013, the Kelleys notified this court that they had initiated bankruptcy
proceedings. On May 23, 2013, we issued an order staying appellate proceedings pursuant
7
to 11 U.S.C. § 362. The bankruptcy court terminated the automatic stay relating to
Bradley’s appeal and this court dissolved the stay in appellate proceedings by order filed
January 22, 2014. On July 21, 2014, we affirmed on each issue. Id.
Partial Compliance, Foreclosure, Clearing of Certificate of Title
After the Kelleys dec lared bankruptcy, the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) foreclosed on Sub-Tract A and Tract J. On November 30, 2015, Fannie Mae
conveyed Sub-Tract A and Tract J to the Haislets. On January 23, 2017, the district court
in a separate proceeding adopted a report of the Hennepin County Examiner of Titles and
issued findings, conclusions, and an order stripping the money judgment s for the Haislets’
certificate of title and directing the creation of a new certificate of title.
Bradley Commences Action Against the Haislets
In February 2017, Bradley’s counsel sent the Haislets a letter asserting Bradley’s
easement rights and requesting authorization
to remove the permanent obstructions that have been placed on
the Easement on Tract J and to contrac t with [an asphalt
company] to install an asphalt surface over the East 20 feet of
the 22 foot wide Bradley Easement and thereby allow Bra dley
the full use and enjoyment of his Easement.

Bradley then commenced this action, alleging that the Haislets had been unresponsive and
were maintaining nuisances interfering with his easement rights.
Preclusion of Expert Testimony Regarding Tract K
Before trial, the parties disputed the admissibility of evidence regarding Bradley’s
use of, or right to use, Tract K. The district court heard motions in limine in January 2019.
A transcript of the hearing was not produced on appeal, but other portions of the record
8
indicate that Bradley sought to introduce expert evidence to tell the district court “about
the law of easements” and Torrens titles as it concerned his disputed rights with respect to
Tract K. The district court apparently rejected the requ est, concluding that it alone would
decide the law.
Court Trial
The case proceeded to a court trial. We have already summarized m uch of the
undisputed evidence and testimony . We summarize additional evidence as follows .
A civil engineer and land surv eyor testified that Bradley’s easement over Tract J is
22 feet wide from east to west. He testified that the retaining wall extended 10.7 feet into
the access easement, (2) the second tree’s drip line encroached 17 feet into the access
easement, and (3) t he asphalt on Tract J was 5 feet at its narrowest point, measured from
the second tree’s drip line, and 15 feet at its broadest.
The Haislets’ mother, a real estate agent, testified that she represented the Haislets
in their purchase of Sub -Tract A and Tract J from Fannie Mae. She testified that she was
aware that there was an easement on Tract J and that she was aware that there had been an
easement dispute between the property’s previous owners and Bradley, but she advised her
sons to go ahead with the purchase regardless.
Brady Haislet testified that he was aware of the existence of an easement on
Underhill Circle for road purposes that included the paved area in front of Sub -Tract A.
Brady claimed there were safety issues with having almost the entire easement paved and
that it was important to have some lawn in front of the house to prevent traffic from driving
9
mere feet from the front door. Brady also confirmed his understanding that Bradley had
an easement over the entirety of Tract J “[f]or ingre ss, egress, and utilities.”
Cody Haislet testified that he and Jen Haislet, his wife, occupied the house on
Sub-Tract A. He acknowledged that, were a car parked on the road in front of the Haislets’
home, Bradley might have to drive around the parked ca r and onto Tract K. Jen Haislet
testified that the Underhill Circle road was occupied by only seven houses and that it was
“very rare that you even pass another car a lot of the times coming down the road.”
Bradley testified that it was his understanding that he had an easement to travel over
Tracts H, I, J, and L, but that he had no legal right to travel over Tract K. Bradley recalled
observing William Kelley making various alterations on his property and to the road,
including chopping up asphalt , covering portions of the road with dirt and grass , and
planting the second tree . After the Haislets moved in, Bradley photographed various
instances of the Haislets’ parked vehicle extending a short distance into the roadway , as
well as guests’ vehicles parked on the side of the road .
Findings of Fact, Co nclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment
On January 21, 2020, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and order for judgment. The district court found that the Kel leys had made various
alterations on Tract J, which included building the retaining wall, planting a second tree,
erecting a fence, removing portions of asphalt, and covering other portions of asphalt with
dirt and grass. The district court found that the se actions “reduced the usuable portion of
the surface of Tract J for driving to approximately eight[ ]feet of width at its narrowest
point.”
10
The district court declined to reconsider the 2012 determination that the retaining
wall and first tree were not a nuisance. As for the added topsoil and grass seed, and the
removal of certain asphalt, the district court acknowledged that “the present obstructions
were considered a nuisance . . . in the Kelley Litigation ” and found “that the topsoil and
grass seed p laced on the asphalt road, and the portions of the asphalt road that were
removed are private nuisances.”
Regarding Bradley’s request for injunctive relief, the district court reasoned that it
“must balance the[] competing rights” of the Haislets as fee owners and Bradley as
easement owner “to construct an equitable remedy that gives necessary assurances to the
current and future owners of the subject property.” The district court then explained:
[Bradley] argues that twenty feet of pavement over
Tract J is necessary for him to drive to and from his house
because he has no existing right to travel over the neighboring
Tract K. The current roadway on Underhill Circle runs over
the center of Tracts J and K. The record does not support the
claim that [Bradley] is prohibited from driving down the
portion of the roadway that’s located on Tract K. Whether
Bradley has a legal right to drive over Tract K is not properly
before the Court in this litigation, and in any event is not ripe
for adjudication. . . . Bradley’s claim that he has no legal right
to drive over Tract K is based upon his fear that the property
owners of Tract K could, at some point in the future, prevent
him from driving down Tract K. As such, Mr. Bradley wishes
the Court to construct its e quitable relief for his full use [and]
enjoyment over Tract J as if he has no ability to use any portion
of Tract K.
In fact, the record demonstrates that the paved roadway
over Tracts J and K has been used for ingress and egress by all
residents of Underhill Circle, including Mr. Bradley, for many
years before the Kelleys began making alterations. There are
no actions pending that seek to prevent Mr. Bradley from using
the roadway as it exists, nor is there any evidence or testimony
11
from any of the proper ty owners of Underhill Circle that they
are seeking or anticipating to prevent Mr. Bradley from driving
along the roadway as it exists. Further, past use of this roadway
by Mr. Bradley for ingress and egress cannot be ignored by the
Court in considering w hether these alterations to Tract J
“substantially changed” his use of the easement for the
purposes of determining whether, and to what extent,
injunctive relief is necessary.
The district court found that paving 20 feet of Tract J was “not required to prevent great
and irreparable injury” and was un necessary for Bradley to reach his home.
The district court concluded that “the most equitable remedy is for an injunction in
accordance with” the injunctive relief or dered in the Kelley litigation because such relief
“would remedy the unresolved issues from the prior litigation[] while allowing [Bradley]
full use and enjoyment of the easement for ingress and egress purposes.” The district court
ordered the Haiselts to (1) remove the topsoil and grass placed by the Kelleys atop asphalt
after October 1, 2010, (2) replace the portions of removed asphalt, and (3) not make any
other alterations to the asphalt road as it existed in October 2010.
The district court denied Bradley’s request for attorney fees in the absence of a
contractual or statutory provision allowing such fees. It also found that “there has been no
showing that [the Haislets] violated Minn. R. Civ. P. 11 or Minn. Stat. § 549.211 [(2020)]
such that sanctions [of attorney fees] would be merited.”
Motion for Amended Findings and Partial New Trial
Bradley filed a motion for a partial new trial pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.03 and
a motion for amended findings pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02. He contended that a
partial new trial was warranted so the district court could hear expert testimony clarifying
12
that Bradley had no right to drive on Tract K. Bradley also sought amended findings and
conclusions regarding the creation of an easement in the Clasen deed, the grant of an
easement to the Arnolds, the grant of an easement to the Helmstetters, the portion of usable
roadway with regard to the second tree, the district court’s decision not to revisit the 2012
determination, and the non-existence of Bradley’s easement over Tract K.
Order Denying Motions for New Trial and Amended Findings & Conclusion
The district court denied Bradley’s motions. It concluded that the exclusion of
expert testimony regarding the existence of a Tract K easement was not prejudicial because
Bradley’s legal rights regarding Tract K were not properly before the district court , and it
made no findings or conclusions related to Bradley’s legal rights as to Tract K. The district
court rejected Bradley’s request to measure the usable portion of the easement from the
second tree’s dripline as an improper measurement. Regarding the prior district court’s
determinations, the district court reaffirmed that “this matter has already been decided . . .
and the Court will not reconsider this issue.” Last, the district court declined to amend its
finding that the record did not support Bradley’s claim that he was prohibited from driving
on the road on Tract K as follows:
The[re] are no facts in the record that indicate that Mr. Bradley
is prohibited from driving down Tract K. There was no
testimony from any of the numerous residents of Underhill
Circle indicating any present intention to prohibit Mr. Bradley
from driving down Tract K. None of the claims for reli ef in
[Bradley’s] Complaint seek any remedy involving Tract K.
And the Court noted later . . . that whether [Bradley] has a legal
right to drive down Tract K is not properly before the Court,
and in any event is not ripe for adjudication.
This appeal follows.
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DECISION
Bradley challenges the district court’s findings and conclusions, its decision to order
limited injunctive relief, its preclusion of expert testimony and the related denial of a
motion for a partial new trial, and its denial of his request f or attorney fees.1 The Haislets
urge us to affirm in all respects.
I. The district court did not err in its private nuisance analysis , but a limited
remand for findings and conclusions regarding the second tree and the parked
vehicles is necessary.
The district court found that the added topsoil/grass and the removed asphalt were
nuisances. Bradley argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in several respects.
But in essence, he contends that the district court erred by failing to find that the first tree,
the retaining wall, the second tree, the remainder of the Haislets’ lawn, and parked vehicles
are private nuisances.

1 After this appeal was argued and taken under advisement, Bradley moved to remand the
matter with directions for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing addressing recent
alleged factual developments. Without moving to supplement the record on ap peal and
based on apparent hearsay, Bradley asserts that the Haislets “have applied for a Demolition
Permit . . . to completely demolish the house” because it was destroyed by fire. Bradley
then predicts that “[i]f a new house is constructed . . . the new house will comply with”
current building codes, “the front door will not be facing Underhill Circle Road,” and “the
side of the new house . . . will be set back at least 10 feet from the Boundary Line.” The
Haislets did not file a response to the motion.

The facts on which Bradley relies are not in the record on appeal and we have no
reason to join in Bradley’s speculation about the siting and orientation of a new home.
Further, jurisdiction will return to the district court as a matter of course after the conclusion
of this appeal. Accordingly, we deny Bradley’s motion to remand for an evidentiary
hearing, without prejudice to Bradley’s right to bring a motion for relief in the district court.
We express no opinion about the merits of such a motion.
14
An action for private nuisance is governed by Minn. Stat. § 561.01 (2020), which
provides:
Anything which is . . . an obstruction to the free use of
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of
life or property, is a nuisance. An action may be brought by
any person whose property is injuriously affected or whose
personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance, and by the
judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated, as well as
damages recovered.
“For an interference with the enjoyment of life or property to constitute a nuisance, it must
be material and substantial.” Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen’s Club, Inc.,
624 N.W.2d 796, 803 (Minn. App. 2001). “ A court measures the degree of discomfort by
the standards of ordinary people in relation to the area where they reside. ” Id. “Whether
a private nuisance exists . . . presents a q uestion of fact. To establish that fact, proof is
necessary as to the effect and consequences of the thing claimed to affect such person or
his property injuriously.” Hill v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. , 109 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Minn.
1961). “We give a [district ] court’s findings of fact great deference and will not set them
aside unless they are clearly erroneous.” Citizens, 624 N.W.2d at 803.
A private nuisance action “is limited to real property interests.” Anderson v. State,
Dep’t of Nat. Res., 693 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Minn. 2005). An easement is “an interest in land
in the possession of another which entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or
enjoyment of the land in which the interest exists.” Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler ,
177 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Minn. 1970). “An easement appurtenant is one that is granted for
the benefit of the grantee’s land. ” Block v. Sexton , 577 N.W.2d 521, 525 (Minn. App.
1998). An easement appurtenant runs with the land and transfers to subsequent land
15
owners. See Swedish-Am. Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 86 N.W.
420, 422 (Minn. 1901).
A. The district court properly declined to reconsider the 2012
determination regarding the first tree and retaining wall.
Bradley argues that the district court erred by declining to reconsider the 2012
determination that the retaining wall and first tree do not constitute a nuisance because the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are inapplicable. The Haislets disagree.
“Res judicata and collateral estoppel are related doctrines. Fundamental to both
doctrines is that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same
parties or their privies.” Hauschildt v. Beckingham , 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004)
(quotation omitted). “Collateral estoppel . . . applies to specific legal issues that have been
adjudicated and is also co mmonly and accurately known as ‘issue preclusion.’” Id.
Res judicata is a broader doctrine applicable to a set of circumstances, and “[o]nce there is
an adjudication of a dispute between parties, res judicata prevents either party from
relitigating claims arising from the original circumstances, even under new legal theories.”
Id. Minnesota courts do not rigidly apply either doctrine, and “the focus is on whether their
application would work an injustice on the party against whom the doctrines are urged.”
Id.
For collateral estoppel to apply, all of the following prongs
must be met: (1) the issue must be identical to one in a prior
adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits;
(3) the estopped party was a party or was in privity with a party
to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given
a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.
16
Id.; see also Rucker v. Schmidt, 794 N.W.2d 114, 122 (Minn. 2011) (setting forth elements
governing application of res judicata).
Res judicata applies as an absolute bar to a subsequent claim
when (1) the earlier claim involved the same set of factual
circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties
or their privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits;
(4) the estopped party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the matter.
Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840. 2 The applicability of collateral estoppel or res judicata is
a question of law we review de novo, but if applicab le, we review the district court’s
decision to apply either doctrine for an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Perrin , 796
N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. App. 2011).
Bradley argues that the district court’s 2012 determination was factually and legally
unsupported and that its analysis mistakenly presumed that Bradley held an easement over
Tract K. But his argument regarding errors in the 2012 determination does not address the
applicability of the legal doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata, and so his argument
fails.

2 Minnesota recognizes an exception to the mutuality requirement in the application of
res judicata.

[W]here the liability of defendant is altogether dependent upon
the culpability of one exonerated in a prior suit upon the same
facts, when sued by the same plaintiff, in such cases the
unilateral character of the estoppel is justified by the injustice
which would result in allowing a recovery against a defendant
for conduct of another, when that other had been exonerated in
a direct action.

Myhra v. Park, 258 N.W. 515, 519 (Minn. 1935) (quotation omitted).
17
First, the circumstances in the Kelley and Haislet cases are functionally identical.
In both cases, Bradley claimed that the retaining wall and first tree were a private nuisance
interfering with his access easement. Bradley’s present claim is premised on the same facts
as the claim resolved against him in 2012. The issue is identical to the one already litigated.
Second, Bradley does not dispute that he was a party in the first a ction. Bradley
sued the Kelleys and lost on the issue of the retaining wall and first tree . Title to Tract J
passed from the Kelleys to Fannie Mae, and from Fannie Mae to the Haislets . “‘Privies’
to a judgment are those who are so connected with the parties in estate or in blood or in
law as to be identified with them in interest, and consequently to be affected with them by
the litigation.” Rucker, 794 N.W.2d at 118 (quotation omitt ed).
Third, Bradley does not dispute that the Kelley litigation resulted in a final judgment
on the merits. For the purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel, “a judgment
becomes final when it is entered in the district court and it remains final, despite a pending
appeal, until it is reversed, vacated or otherwise modified.” Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v.
Copeland Buhl & Co., P.L.L.P. , 732 N.W.2d 209, 221 (Minn. 2007). The district court
concluded that the retaining wall and first tree were not a nuisance. Judgment was entered
in December 2012, and we affirmed on appeal.
Fourth, Bradley had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. His claims
proceeded to a jury trial and the parties submitted post -verdict memoranda in which they
disputed whether the district court should ord er the retaining wall removed.
18
The elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel were met, and the application
of the doctrines was permissible. Nothing in the record indicates that the district court
abused its discretion by declining to reconsider the 2012 determination. 3
B. The district court did not misapply the law or modify Bradley’s
easement rights, but a limited remand is necessary for findings and
conclusions regarding certain alleged nuisances .
Bradley contends that the district court erred as a matter of law because the deed of
appurtenant easement affords him the right to travel over all of Tract J and therefore a
permanent obstruction on any portion of the easement is a nuisance. He also suggests that
the dist rict court’s findings and conclusions effectively modified his easement rights ,
allowing the Haislets to appropriate over half of Tract J for their exclusive use .
At the outset, we observe that Bradley’s arguments regarding permanent
obstructions relate, i n part, to the first tree and retaining wall. Because the district court
properly declined to reconsider the 2012 final determination that those conditions were not
nuisances, we do not address those conditions further. We consider Bradley’s arguments
with regard to the other alleged obstructions: the remaining portion of the Haislets’ lawn ,
the parked vehicles, and the second tree.

3 For the first time in his reply brief, Bradley contends that the principles of res judicata
and collateral estoppel should not apply because a separate district court concluded in
proceedings s ubsequent that the Haislets were not bound by the Kelley litigation.
Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief which exceed the scope of the
respondents’ brief are not properly before us. See Minn. Sands, LLC v. County of Winona,
940 N.W.2d 18 3, 199 n.15 (Minn. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Minn. Sands, LLC v.
County of Winona, Minnesota , 141 S. Ct. 1054 (2021) . We strike the argument but note
that, even were we to consider it, the relevant decision concerned a money judgment and
injunctive relief ordered against the Kelleys specifically.
19
The construction of an easement is a questio n of law that we review de novo.
Lindberg v. Fasching, 667 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 18, 2003). An easement created by express grant “is dependent entirely upon the
construction of the terms of the easement agreement.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When the
terms of an easement grant are unclear, extrinsic evidence may be used to aid in the
interpretation of the easement grant; however, when the language granting the easement is
clear and unambiguous, the court’ s power to determine the extent of th e easement granted
is limited.” Bergh & Misson Farms, Inc. v. Great Lakes Transmission Co. , 565 N.W.2d
23, 26 (Minn. 1997).
The parties dispute whether and to what extent the deed of appurtenant easement is
ambiguous; they agree that the easement language is unambiguous as t o its purpose
(“ingress and egress for road purposes”) but disagree as to whether ambiguity exists as to
the “specifics,” such as lanes and road coverage. The deed of appurtenant easement is
unambiguous in the dimensions of its grant; it conveyed an easement “in, over, and upon”
Tract J without any limitation on its width or length . That is, the easement exists on the
entirety of Tract J. The district court recognized this fact, stating, “The record demonstrates
that [Bradley] owns an easement for ingress and egress purposes over Tract J.” (Emphasis
added.) Nothing in the district court’s decision, or this opinion, alters the terms of the
easement.
But “the grant of an easement over land does not preclude the grantor from using
the land in a manner not unreasonably interfering with the special use for which the
easement was acquired.” Minneapolis Athletic, 177 N.W.2d at 789 (emphasis added); see
20
also Grinnell Bros. v. Brown, 171 N.W. 399, 400 (Mich. 1919) (“I t is elementary that an
easement once granted is an estate which cannot be abridged or taken away, either by the
grantor or his subsequent grantees. On the other hand, the grantor of the easement of a
right of way may use the way in any manner he sees fit, provided he does not unreasonably
interfere with the grantee’ s reasonable use in passing to and fro .” (quotation omitted)).
Further, a landowner and easement grantor “ may make any use of his land whi ch does not
interfere with a reasonable use of the way. ” Minneapolis Athletic, 177 N.W.2d at 790.
Here, the clear and unambiguous language of the deed of appurtenant easement
specified the “special use” for which the easement was acquired: “ingress and eg ress for
road purposes.” Accordingly, the Haislets are prohibited from unreasonably interfering
with that special use. See id. at 789.
Bradley presumes that any interference over any of the 22-foot width of Tract J is a
de facto nuisance because he is en titled to use its entire width for ingress and egress.
Bradley fails to cite any binding authority standing for the proposition that any impediment
lying within the boundaries of an access easement automatically constitutes a private
nuisance without rega rd to the plaintiff’s ability to utilize the easement for its intended
purpose of ingress and egress.
Bradley’s persuasive authorities do not support that premise. Bradley cites
Athanasakoupolous v. Bogart , claiming that we “held that the Easement Holder was
entitled to the full use and enjoyment [of the easement] without ‘impediments’ of his entire
24 feet in width . . . for purposes of ingress and egress to his house.” No. A18-0045, 2018
WL 6729752 (Minn. App. Dec. 24, 2018), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2019). Bradley
21
mischaracterizes our analysis and holding. In Athanasakoupolous, the district court
concluded that sodding over a portion of a drive did not impede the use of the driveway.
Id. at *4. The appellants argued “that the district court’s reasoning ignores other explicit
language in the [easement document], which mandates that there be unfettered vehicular
traffic on all 24 feet of the easement.” Id. (quotation omitted). We rejected the argument,
explaining:
The [easement document] does not provide a right to
unfettered vehicular traffic on all 24 feet of the driveway
easement. The purpose of the driveway easement, as described
in the [easement document] , is to allow “pedestrian and
vehicular ingress to and egress from public streets and the
applicable group of Benefitted Lots.” Appellants, as owners of
lots benefitted by the driveway easement, have a privilege to
use the easement for that limited purpose. To hold that
appellants have a right to unfettered vehicular traffic on all 24
feet of the driveway easement would impermissibly enlarge the
scope of that easement beyond the purpose expressly agreed
upon by the parties.
Id. Our reasoning in Athanasakoupolous merely clarifies that “unreasonable interference”
concerns interference with an easement’s purpose and use . The same is true of Dunkley v.
Hueler, in which we explained that the property owners’ “ ability to modify and use the
driveway . . . is limited only by the terms of the drivewa y agreement and the common-law
prohibition on unreasonable inter ference with an easement holder’ s use of the easement. ”
No. A19 -2047, 2020 WL 5507847, at *4 (Minn. App. Sept. 14, 2020), review denied
(Minn. Dec. 15, 2020).
We discern no misapplication of law in the district court’s analysis generally. The
district court’s findings and conclusions were properly aimed at addressing Bradley’s
22
claims that specific permanent conditions upon Tract J interfere with his use of the tract
for ingress and egress. Relatedly, we reiterate that nothing in the district court’s findings
and conclusions altered the express terms of the deed of appurtenant easement. The district
court recognized that Bradley held an easement upon Tract J.
We turn next to the remaining alleged obstructions. Bradley characterizes all of the
lawn on Tract J as a permanent obstruction interfering with his right of ingress and egress
(not just the grass which encroached upon the asphalt, which the district court ordered
removed). But he fails to cite (1) any evidence that the other grass substantially interferes
with his ability to travel to and from his property, (2) any caselaw in which grass was held
to be a private nuisance, or (3) any provision of the deed of appurtenant easement indicating
the way in which the ground was to be maintained. The situation is more comparable to
Athanasakoupolous, in which we explained, “ The rec ord supports the district court’ s
determination that the sod on the unpaved portion of the easement has not unreasonably
interfered with that purpose. ” 2018 WL 6729752 , at *5. We see no error in the district
court’s decision to limit its nuisance determination to the added grass/topsoil.
As for the second tree, the district court made no findings and conclusions regarding
whether it is a nuisance. The district court found that the Kelleys altered the property by
planting the second tree and acknowledged Bradley’s claim that the second tree is a
nuisance. It indicated that the “present obstructions were considered a nuisance by the
Court in the Kelley Litigation,” but in 2012 the district court similarly did not find whether
the second tree amounts to a nuisance. And ultimately, the district court’s nuisance
determination in this case did not refer to the second tree ; it found “that the topsoil and
23
grass seed placed on the asphalt road, and the portions of the asphalt road that were
removed are private nuisances.”
The district court likewise failed to make findings and co nclusions regarding
obstructions of the easement by the Haislets’ vehicle or their guests’ vehicles. Bradley
presented evidence regarding these alleged obstructions and the Haislets testified regarding
the parked vehicles. O n appeal, Bradley contends tha t the vehicles substantially interfere
with his easement rights by reducing the asphalt portion of the easement “to less than one
foot.”
Whether and to what extent the second tree or parked vehicles interfere with
Bradley’s easement rights of ingress and egress on Tract J are questions of fact for the
district court’s determination. See Hill, 109 N.W.2d at 753. And we are in no position to
decide whether the second tree or parked vehicles are private nuisances. See Kucera v.
Kucera, 146 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1966) (“It is not within the province of this court to
determine issues of fact on appeal.”). “Resolution of factual disputes is uniquely a district
court function ” and “r emand is the appropriate remedy when the district court has made
insufficient findings to enable appellate review. ” Gams v. Houghton, 869 N.W.2d 60, 65
(Minn. App. 2015), aff’d as modified , 884 N.W.2d 611 (Minn. 2016). Accordingly,
remand to the district court is appropriate for determination as to whether the second tree
or the parked cars are private nuisances, and if so, what relief is appropriate.
24
C. The district court did not presume or decide that Bradley had a legal
right to use Tract K.
Bradley contends that the district court erred by considering Bradley’s use of Trac t
K (the tract adjacent to Tract J) in determining whether obstructions on Tract J
unreasonably interfere with Bradley’s use of the access easement. The Haislets argue that
the district court correctly concluded that the issue of Bradley’s rights regardin g Tract K
was neither before the court nor ripe for adjudication, but they also argue that there is
evidence that Bradley has an easement over Tract K .
The extent to which the district court considered Tract K is unclear. But the district
court’s analysis clarifies that it did not reach its decision in consideration of Bradley’s right
to use, or his actual use of, Tract K. Reading the district court’s analysis in context, it is
clear that the district court attempt ed to address Bradley’s request that the court “construct
its equitable relief for [Bradley’s] full use [and] enjoyment over Tract J as if he has no
ability to use any portion of Tract K.” Further, the district court expressly stated, “Whether
Bradley has a legal right to drive over Tract K is n ot properly before the Court in this
litigation, and in any event is not ripe for adjudication .” (Emphasis added.)
The district court rightly declined to make any determination regarding Bradley’s
right to use Tract K. The owners of the two portions of Tract K were not parties to the
lawsuit, and the record does not indicate that any action regarding Tract K was pending
contemporaneously with this action . Bradley’s nuisance action was premised upon his
easement rights to Tract J , and it is c lear that the district court sought to limit its
25
consideration to whether the Haislets had unreasonably interfered with Bradley’s right to
use Tract J for ingress and egress to his home.
We are mindful of the facts that the preexisting roadway occupies a portion of Tract
J and Tract K and that Bradley’s easement has been encroached upon in the past by certain
nuisances in the roadway created by the Kelleys and maintained by the Haislets (as found
by two district courts). We clarify that our review today is limited to the alleged nuisance
conditions upon Tract J as litigated at trial. We express no opinion regarding the parties’
(or their successors’) rights or remedies in the event of further encroachment or obstruction.
Because the district court did not err by relying on Bradley’s right to use, or actual
use of, Tract K, we see no basis for reversal. 4
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering limited injunctive
relief.
Bradley urges us to reverse the district court’s denial of his reque st for an order
requiring the Haislets to authorize the removal of various obstructions and the paving of
almost all of Tract J. He contends that the district court erroneously balanced his easement
interest against the Haislets’ interests as fee owners, violated his equal -protection rights,
and “[e]rred as a [m]atter of [l]aw in determining [that the Haislets] are entitled to a
[w]indfall [p]rofit in the amount of $100,000 on their property at the expense of [Bradley].”
The Haislets disagree.

4 The parties present various substantive arguments regarding Bradley’s right to drive on
Tract K. We do not reach the issue because, as set forth above, the district court did not
decide the issue. Further, we see no principled reason to reach the question when the
owners of that tract were not joined in district court and are not parties to this appeal.
26
Minn. Stat. § 561.01 provides that “ by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined
or abated.” We review a district court’s decision regarding injunctive reli ef for an abuse
of discretion. Citizens, 624 N.W.2d at 806. “This court will not set aside a district court’s
findings regarding entitlement to injunctive relief unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id.
at 807. We review legal questions de novo. See id. at 802.
A. The district court did not err by considering both the Haislets ’ interests
as fee owners and Bradley’s interest as an easement holder.
In its portion of analysis addressing injunctive relief, the district court indicated that
it needed to “balance the[] competing rights” of the Haislets as owners in fee simple against
Bradley’s “entitle[ment] to the full use and enjoyment of th[e] easement” in order “to
construct an equitable remedy that gives necessary assurances to the current and future
owners of the subject property.” Bradley argues that the district court misapplied the law
because there is no balancing test in the case of an express easement and that the district
court violated Bradley’s right to equal protection by allowing the Haislets to maintain
permanent obstructions despite his easement.
Bradley’s first argument rests on the mistaken premise that any obstruction upon
the tract is per se a nuisance. More importantly, Bradley ignores the fact that Minn. Stat.
§ 561.01 “ codifies an equita ble cause of action; consequently, it implicitly recognizes a
need to balance the social utility of defendants’ actions with the harm to the plaintiff .”
Highview N. Apartments v. Ramsey County , 323 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Minn. 1982) (emphasis
added) . Given the e quitable nature of a private nuisance action, the district court did not
27
err by balancing the Haislets’ interests as owners in fee simple against Brad ley’s interest
as an easement holder.
Bradley’s equal -protection argument likewise fails. The Minnesota C onstitution
provides, “No member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights
or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment
of his peers.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 2. Bradley contends that there are “no Minnesota Cases
or other authorities which have allowed the Fee Simple Owner of Property subject to an
Express Written Deed of Appurtenant Easement to maintain permanent obstructions on the
easement which block the use of the easement for its intended purposes.” As set forth
herein, the district court properly declined to reconsider whether the first tree and retaining
wall were nuisances, and Bradley fails to support his assertion that the remainder of the
Haislets’ lawn substantially in terferes with his easement rights. The status of the second
tree and vehicles are meanwhile the subjects of a limited remand.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the appropriate scope of
injunctive relief as to the alleged nuisance conditions it expressly addressed . We therefore
decline to reverse on these grounds.
B. The district court did not determine that the Haislets were entitled to a
$100,000 windfall.
Bradley argues that the district court erred by determining that the Haislet s were
entitled to a windfall profit of $100,000 by allowing them to maintain obstructions on
Tract J. Construed generously, the argument appears directed at the equity of the district
court’s ordered injunctive relief, which was les s than what Bradley requested. We reject
28
the argument because the district court never made findings regarding changes in the
Haislets’ property’s value or any unscrupulous motives by the Haislets or their mother.
Further, Bradley cites no authority requiring the di strict court to consider the collateral
consequences of its decision with respect to the values of dominant and servient properties.
We decline to reverse on this gro und.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by precluding expert testimony
regarding Tract K or by denying Bradley’s motion for a partial new trial.
Bradley argues that the district court abused its discretion by precluding expert
testimony regarding the existence of an easement on Tract K, thereby denying him the right
to a fair trial. The Haislets argue otherwise.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Doe v.
Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 164 (Minn. 2012). We review a district court’s
denial of a motion for a partial new trial for an abuse of discretion. See Larson v. Gannett
Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 131 (Minn. 2020). “Entitlement to a new trial on the grounds of
improper evidentiary rulings rests upon the complaining party’s ability to demonstrate
prejudicial erro r.” Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines , 933 N.W.2d 45, 62 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted).
In denying Bradley’s posttrial motion, the district court concluded that Bradley
failed to demonstrate any prejudice “ [b]ecause the Court did not base its findings or
conclusions on whether Mr. Bradley had a legal right to drive over Tract K.” As set forth
above, the district court did not presume or conclude that Bradley had an easement over
29
Tract K, and so the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bra dley’s motion
for a partial new trial.
Further, the district court properly precluded expert testimony in the first instance.
Expert testimony is admissible to the extent it assists the district court in understanding the
evidence or determining an issue of fact. Minn. R. Evid. 702. Testimony that embraces
legal analysis or mixed questions of law and fact is “not deemed to be of any use to the
trier of fact.” Conover v. N. States Power Co., 313 N.W.2d 397, 403 (Minn. 1981). Expert
testimony regarding a legal right as to Tract K was of no use to the district court in its
capacity as fact -finder, and it was the district court’s province to determine legal rights.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by precluding expert testimony on the issue.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bradley’s request for
attorney fees.
Bradley contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for attorney fees because counsel for the Haislets “have advanced frivolous claims in this
action that [the Haislets] are entitled to the exclusive use and enjoyment of more than one
half of [Bradley’s] Easement” and “have advanced known baseless arguments.”
Sanctions in the form of attorney fees are permissible for frivolous conduct pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subds. 2(2), 3, and Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02(b), .03. “Whether to
award sanctions requires determining whether counsel had an objectively reasonable basis
for making the factual or legal claim.” Gibson v. Tr s. of Minn. State Basic Bldg. Trades
Fringe Benefits Funds , 703 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Minn. App. 2005), vacated in part ,
No. A05-39, 2005 WL 6240754 (Minn. Dec. 13, 2005) (order). We review a district
30
court’s denial of a motion for attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Minn. Humane Soc’y
v. Minn. Federated Humane Soc’ys, 611 N.W.2d 587, 590 -91 (Minn. App. 2000).
Bradley fails to demonstrate how the district court abused its discretion by denying
an award of attorney fees. T he mere fact that the Haislets disputed whether and to what
extent they were maintaining nuisances did not amount to frivolous conduct. We have
carefully reviewed the record, and nothing in the Haislets’ submissions to the district court
rose to the level of frivolous or baseless arguments. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Bradley’s motion for attorney fees.
Conclusion
In summary, the district court’s findings are supported by the record. The district
court’s analysis and concl usions comport with caselaw and the terms of Bradley’s
easement, which afford s him the right of ingress and egress for road purposes. The terms
of the injunctive relief ordered by the district court were properly aimed at affording
Bradley the full use and enjoyment of his easement for that special use. We affirm in part
and remand to the district court for the limited purpose of issuing findings and conclusions
regarding whether the second tree and vehicles constitute nuisance s and, if so, the
appropriate relief.
Affirmed in part and remanded; motion denied .