William O. Bradley, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0813

William O. Bradley,
Appellant,

vs.

For Life Home Development LLC,
Respondent.

Filed February 3, 2025
Affirmed; motion denied
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-23-4220

John S. Jagiela, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Daria Banerjee, The Baner Law Firm, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Respondent, a property owner, was granted summary judgment against appellant,
the holder of an easement on the property, on grounds of res judicata. Appellant challenges
the grant of summary judgment, arguing that the circumstances have changed so that res
judicata does not apply . Because we see no change in the relevant circumstances, we
2
affirm. We also deny respondent’s motion to strike portions of appellant’s principal brief
and reply brief as moot.
FACTS
In 1946, a 44 -foot-wide strip of land leading to a cul de sac was granted as a road
easement to owners of property surrounding the cul de sac. It was later divided into two
22-foot-wide strips of land, Tract J on the west and Tract K on the east. In 1968, the owners
of Tracts H, I, J, and L granted the owner of Tracts E and G an “easement of ingress and
egress for road purposes and an easement for gas, sewer, and water facilities.” The
easement provided that “the parties hereto will cooperate in the maintenance in the 44-foot
roadway to Tract E of the Grantee herein, and share the cost thereof on a proportionate
basis.”
In 197 5, appellant William Bradley acquire d Tracts E and G, together with the
easement. Like the residents of the other tracts, he uses the roadway on Tracts J and K to
get to and from his home. This is the third action he has brought against the successive
owners of Tract J and the adjoining Subtract A.
In 2011, the Kelleys owned Tract J and Subtract A . They made alterations that
appellant believed interfered with his easement rights and created a nuisance. Specifically,
they erected a stone retaining wall around a tree, planted a second tree, erected a fence,
removed some asphalt from the road, and covered parts of the road with dirt and grass seed.
Appellant brought an action against them asserting trespass and nuisance claims (the Kelley
case). Appellant moved for partial summary judgment, and the Kelleys sought summary
judgment on appellant’s trespass claim. The district court denied appellant’s motion and
3
granted the Kelleys’ motion, on the ground that appellant’s easement gave him the right to
use, not to possess, the land. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury awarded appellant
$4,200 in nuisance damages . The district court denied the Kelley’s posttrial motions for
judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, granted in part appellant’s motion for
injunctive relief by requiring the Kelleys to remove some obstructions they put on the
easement and to replace asphalt they had removed, and denied appe llant’s request for
attorney fees. Appellant challenged the dismissal and the denials of his motions on appeal,
but did not challenge either the district court’s holdings that the easement’s reference to
cooperative maintenance of a 44 -foot-wide roadway was “obviously referencing the road
purpose of the side -by-side easements granted for Tracts J and K ” and that “the
configuration of the road prior to October 2010, [which traversed or straddled both Tracts
J and K] met [appellant’s] rights as a dominant holder of the easement” or its determination
that the wall was not a nuisance. This court affirmed the dismissal of appellant’s trespass
claim and the denials of his motions. Bradley v. Kelley, No. A13-0063, 2014 WL 3557922,
at *1 (Minn. App. July 21, 2014) (affirming dismissal and denials), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 24, 2014).
The Kelleys declared bankruptcy, and i n 2015, the Haislets acquired Tract J and
Subtract A. Appellant’s attorney wrote to the Haislets, asking them to authorize the
removal of a wall and a tree on the easement on Tract J and the installation of asphalt on
the east 20 feet of the 22 -foot-wide easement. The Haislets did not provide the requested
authorization, and appellant brought an action against them, (the Haislet case), alleging
private nuisance and seeking injunctive relief.
4
In 2020, the district court: (1) acknowledged that the Kelleys had reduced the usable
portion of appellant’s easement by building a wall, planting a second tree, removing some
asphalt, and adding dirt and grass seed; (2) declined to reconsider the 2012 Kelley case
holding that the retaining wall and the first tree were not a nuisance; (3) noted that appellant
had been using the paved roadway on Tracts J and K for many years to access his property;
(4) required the Haislets to remove some topsoil and repla ce some asphalt, which would
restore the road to its October 2010 condition and give appellant the full use of his
easement; and (5) denied appellant’s request for an injunction permitting him to install an
asphalt road over the easement.
On appeal, appellant challenged the determinations that there was no nuisance, the
scope of the injunctive relief, the exclusion of expert testimony with the related denial of a
motion for a partial new trial, and the denial of attorney fees. This court (1) affirmed the
district court’s decision declining to reconsider the 2012 determination as to the first tree
and the retaining wall on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel , (2) affirmed the
findings and conclusions as to easement rights genera lly, (3) remanded for findings and
conclusions on the second tree and parked vehicles , (4) affirmed the district court’s
decision not to address appellant’s right to drive over Tract K, (5) affirmed the district
court’s order for limited injunctive relief, (6) determined that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by precluding expert testimony or denying appellant’s motion for a partial
new trial, and (7) affirmed the denial of appellant’s request for attorney fees. Bradley v.
Haislet, A20-1207, 2021 WL 2793723 , at *7-14 (Minn. App. July 6, 2021) , rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 30, 2021).
5
In September 2021, the house on Subtract A was destroyed by fire. A year later,
respondent For Life Home Development, LLC, acquired Tract J and Subtract A. Appellant
moved for an order to vacate the 2020 judgment . He also requested, in a lette r, that
respondent authorize clearing obstructions and installing asphalt so appellant could
experience “full use and enjoyment of his [e]asement.” Respondent refused authorization.
Appellant then brought this action, in which he: (1) alleges interference with easement; (2)
seeks injunctive relief, enjoining respondent from actions that interfere with appellant’s
full use and enjoyment of the easement, in particular his right to install asphalt; (3) seeks
declaratory relief, authorizing him to remove grass and dirt and install asphalt ; and (4)
seeks damages of $10,000. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted respondent’s motion and denied appellant’s motion on the ground that appellant’s
claims were barred by res judicata.
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion for summary judgment and the grant
of summary judgment to respondent, arguing that, because there has been a change in
circumstances, res judicata does not apply. Appellant requests a remand to the district
court for findings of fact on the new house built on Subtract A; respondent moves to strike
portions of appellant’s brief and reply brief, and appellant in his opposition to that motion
reiterates his request for a remand.
DECISION
I. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is reviewed de novo to determine “whether there are genuine
issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law.”
6
Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017). The application
of res judicata is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Hauschildt v. Beckingham,
686 N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
Appellant raised three claims: (1) interference with an easement; (2) injunctive relief
enjoining respondent from interfering with appellant’s ability to install asphalt on the road
surface of the easement on Tract J; and (3) declaratory relief , i.e., a declaration authorizing
appellant to remove grass and dirt and to install asphalt on the road surface of Tract J. The
district court agreed with respondent that these “claims are barred in their entirety by res
judicata.”
Res judicata requires (1) an earlier claim involving the same set of circumstances ,
(2) the earlier claim involving the same parties or their privies, (3) a final judgment on the
merits, and (4) that a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter was available to the
estopped party. State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322, 327 (Minn. 2001). “When these four
requirements have been satisfied, res judicata bars claims regarding matters actually
litigated and every matter that might have been litigated in the prior proceeding.” Schober
v. Comm’r of Revenue, 853 N.W.2d 102, 111 (Minn. 2013).
The only disputed requirement is the first: the set of circumstances. The unchanged
circumstances here are that appellant has always wanted and continues to want to apply
asphalt to most of Tract J; he has unsuccessfully sued the two prior owners of that tract in
an effort to get an injunction enabling him to do this. Appellant now argues that the
circumstances are not the same because of the demolition and removal of the house that
burned on Subtract A and the clearing and excavating of land on Subtract A and Tract J.
7
The district court, having reviewed the district court decisions and this court’s decisions in
the Kelley and Haislet cases, “conclude[d] that the circumstances are identical warranting
the application of res judicata.”
The district court’s conclusion is based on the fact that appellant’s complaints in the
Haislet case and this case are virtually identical . Although the Haislet complaint stated a
claim for private nuisance and this complaint states a claim for interference with easement,
both complaints seek removals of items that prevent asphalt from being installed on Tract
J and an injunction authorizing appellant to install asphalt on Tract J. The Haislet court
denied an injunction, and this court affirmed:
[Appellant] urges us to reverse the district court’s denial
of his request for an order requiring the Haislets to authorize
the removal of various obstructions and the paving of almost
all of Tract J. . . .

. . . We review a district court’s decision regarding
injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion. . . .

. . . [T]he district court indicated that it needed to
“balance the competing rights” of the Haislets as owners in fee
simple against [appellant’s] “entitlement to the full use and
enjoyment of the easement” in order to construct an equitable
remedy that gives necessary assurances to the current and
future owners of the subject property. [Appellant] argues that
the district court misapplied the law because there is no
balancing test in the case of an express easement . . . .

[This] argument rests on the mistaken premise that any
obstruction upon the tract is per se a nuisance. More
importantly, [appellant] ignores the fact that Minn. Stat.
§ 561.01 codifies an equitable cause of action; consequently, it
implicitly recognizes a need to balance the social utility of
defendants’ actions with the harm to the plaintiff. Given the
equitable nature of a private nuisance action, the district court
8
did not err by balancing the Haislets’ interests as owners in fee
simple against [appellant’s] interest as an easement holder.

Haislet, 2021 WL 2793723, at *12 (emphasis omitted) (citation and quotation omitted).
Appellant also argued in the Haislet case that the district court’s balancing test
violated his equal-protection rights. This court disagreed:
[Appellant’s] equal-protection argument likewise fails.
The Minnesota Constitution provides, “No member of this
state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the rights
or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law
of the land or the judgment of his peers.” Minn. Const. art. 1,
§ 2. [Appellant] contends that there are “no Minnesota [c]ases
or other authorities which have allowed the Fee Simple Owner
of Property subject to an Express Written Deed of
Appurtenant Easement to maintain permanent obstructions on
the easement which block the use of the easement for its
intend purposes. ” As set forth herein, the district court
properly declined to reconsider whether the first tree and
retaining wall were nuisances, and [appellant] fails to support
his assertion that the remainder of the Haislets’ lawn
substantially interferes with his easement rights. . . .

The district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding
the appropriate scope of injunctive relief as to the alleged
nuisance conditions it expressly addressed. We therefore
decline to reverse on these grounds.

Id. at *12-13.
Appellant again seeks an injunction permitting him to install asphalt on T ract J,
arguing that the absence of asphalt deprives him of the “full use and enjoyment” of his
easement. “Generally, injunctions are granted only in cases where an interference with or
obstruction of the easement substantially changes or unreasonably interferes with the
owner’s use of its easement.” See, e.g., Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 177 N.W.2d
9
786, 790 (Minn. 1970) (construction of skyway over alley did not interfere with right -of-
way easement to use alley). The district court here noted that:
The Haislet court did not award injunctive relief because it held
that even with removal of the nuisance conditions, there was
no unreasonable interference warranting injunctive relief.
Now, even though the site conditions appear to be less of an
impediment to construction, the Haislet decision still applies.
The current condition does not unreasonably interfere with
[appellant’s] [e]asement.

. . . .

. . . Finally, the Haislet appellate court outright rejected
[appellant’s] argument that any interference with any portion
of his Easement is unreasonable.

(Emphasis omitted .) Thus, the district court did not err in applying res judicata to
appellant’s request for injunctive relief because appellant’s claims are based on the same
set of circumstances as appellant’s earlier claim in the Haislet case.
Appellant also argues, as he argued in Haislet, that because the current road runs
over both Tract J and Tract K and he has no easement over Tract K, the current road is not
adequate for his access. In that appeal, t his court noted that “the [ Haislet] district court
declined to amend its finding that the record did not support [appellant’s] claim that he was
prohibited from driving on the road on Trac t K,” and quoted the Haislet district court’s
statement that ‘“whether [appellant] has a legal right to drive down Track K is not properly
before the Court, and in any event is not ripe for adjudication. ’” Haislet, 2021 WL
2793723, at *5.
The district court here concluded that:

10
The true gravamen of [appellant’s] Complaint is
[respondent’s] refusal to allow a road over Tract J. And
[appellant’s] true issue with the prior litigation is that he
believes it is flawed on this point. The Kelley Court held that
[appellant’s] [e]asement rights were fully satisfied by his
access to the current road that straddles Tracts K and J. He
attacked this outcome in Haislet by arguing that he has no
easement right over Tract K and therefore the access to his
property that his Easement protects ca nnot possibly be
protected by his access to the current road. He made this
argument in Haislet and he has made it in the instant matter.

. . . [I]t is an argument that was fully litigated in Haislet
. . . .

. . . [G]iven that res judicata applies, this Court must
conclude as the Haislet Court did: [appellant’s] [e]asement is
not unreasonably interfered with by either the current condition
of Tract J or by [respondent’s] refusal to authorize the
construction of an asphalt road over Tract J. And
consequently, [appellant] is not entitled to either the injunctive
or declaratory relief that he seeks.

We agree and therefore conclude that the district court’s application of res judicata
in granting summary judgment for respondent was not erroneous.
II. Respondent’s Motion to Strike
Because we are affirming the grant of summary judgment to respondent, we deny
the motion to strike as moot.
Affirmed; motion denied.