In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Anthony John Dentz.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1230

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Anthony John Dentz.

Filed January 19, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Frisch, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-PR-19-877

Daniel S. Kufus, Kufus Law, LLC, Roseville, Minnesota (for appellant Anthony Dentz)

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent Dakota County Social Services)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court misapplied the law and made clearly
erroneous findings in its order committing him as a sexually dangerous person. We reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
On December 31, 2019, r espondent Dakota County Social Services (the county)
petitioned the district court to order appellant Anthony John Dentz committed to the

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custody of the Minnesota Commissioner of H uman Services as a sexually dangerous
person (SDP). See Minn. Stat. §§ 253D.02, subd. 16 (defining sexually dangerous person),
.07, subds. 1 -2 (establishing petition procedure) (2018) . The county alleged that
commitment was necessary because Dentz: (1) had engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct based on convictions for criminal sexual conduct, solicitation of minors, and
possession of child pornography; (2) had been diagnosed with various disorders, including
paraphilic and pedophilic disorders ; (3) had violated the terms of his supervised release
and been discharged from outpatient sex -offender treatment; and (4) was highly likely to
engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future. The petition proceeded to a hearing before
the district court, where the following evidence was received.
Prior Convictions
In July 2014, t he state charged Dentz with fifth -degree criminal sexual conduct in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1(1) (2012), based on allegations that Dentz had
oral and vaginal intercourse with a minor. Dentz pleaded guilty, and in January 2015, the
district court stayed execution of a one -year sentence and plac ed Dentz on supervised
probation.
In February 2016, the state charged Dentz with solicitation of a child to engage in
sexual communication in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2) (2014) , and
solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.352,
subd. 2a(1) (2014). The underlying factual basis for the charges included allegatio ns that
Dentz used social media to exchange sexual messages with, and attempt to arrange sexual

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encounters with, underage girls. In June 2016, Dentz pleaded guilty to solicitation of a
minor to engage in sexual conduct.
On July 26, 2016, Dentz admitted that he violated probation in his fifth -degree
criminal-sexual-conduct case and the district court executed the remainder of his sentence.
Also in July 2016, the state charged Dentz with six counts of possession of a pornographic
work involving a minor in violation of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a) (2014) . The
factual basis for the charges included allegations that in February 2016, officers executing
a search warrant seized Dentz’s laptop from his home and discovered several pornographic
images of prepubescent girls.
In September 2016, the state charged Dentz with five additional counts of electronic
solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.352,
subd. 2a(1). The underlying basis for the charges included a llegations that between
November 2015 and February 2016, Dentz messaged underage girls through social media
in attempts to arrange sexual encounters. Later in September 2016, the district court
sentenced Dentz in his preexisting solicitation case, staying execution of a 20 -month
sentence and placing Dentz on supervised probation.
In April 2017, Dentz pleaded guilty to three counts of possession of a pornographic
work involving a minor and three counts of solicitation of a minor. The district court
imposed various concurrent sentences, the highest of which was 54 months’ imprisonment
for possession of a pornographic work involving a minor.

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Supervised-Release Violation and Report
In February 2019, the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) released Dentz
under supervision. Among other conditions, the DOC required Dentz to: (1) complete
outpatient sex -offender programming; (2) refrain from accessing sexually explicit
materials; (3) refrain from contacting any underage persons without approval; and
(4) maintain contact with, and follow directions from, his probation agent. On October 29,
2019, corrections filed a report alleging that Dentz violated his conditions of release
because he: (1) admitted to accessing pornographic materials; (2) admitted to contact with
minors in which he engaged in sexually explicit conversations and solicited a photograph
from an underage girl; (3) accessed the internet through an undisclosed cell phone and a
friend’s phone; and (4) had been terminated from sex-offender programming.
Evaluator Report and Testimony
The district court received the court-appointed evaluator’s written report and heard
her testimony. The evaluator diagnosed Dentz with an Other Specified Disruptive, Impulse
Control, or Conduct Disorder, a Rule Out Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder (teen and
preteen girls), and an Unspecified Personality Disorder with Histrionic, Narcissistic, and
Borderline Traits.
The evaluator administered the Hare Psychopathy Checklist -R Second Edition
(PCL-R), which indicated t hat Dentz’s risk of recidivism was “low” relative to other
incarcerated adult males. The Static-99R placed Dentz at an above -average risk level of
six, indicating that he is “about 3.77 times” more likely to reoffend relative to “a typical
sex offender” and falls within a group whose recidivism rate is between 18.4% and 22.5%

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over a five -year period. The Static-2002R placed Dentz at a Level IVb (“Well Above
Average”) risk category, indicating that Dentz “is about [seven] times the risk of an average
sex offender” and falls within a group whose recidivism rate is between 36.5% and 51.2%
over a five -year period. The Static -99R results combined with the Structured Risk
Assessment-Forensic Version (SRA -FV) instrument revealed “an above average but not
high le vel of psychological or dynamic needs . . . [and] significant vulnerabilities to
re-offense.” The Sexual Violence Risk-20 instrument demonstrated the existence of 7 of
20 risk factors. Dentz also demonstrated 12 of 16 protective factors “thought to buffer the
individual against the destabilizing influence of risk factors.” In balancing risk factors and
protective factors, the evaluator concluded: “In the future, Mr. Dentz is at significant risk
to continue his most recent behaviors, which has been his acknowledged interest in sexual
talk with girls and multiple impersonal sexual encounters.”
The evaluator concluded that Dentz’s disorders impeded his ability to control his
sexual impulses. She also determined that Dentz posed a high risk of re -offense for non-
contact offenses but questioned whether his behavior was “harmful” as defined by law.
Despite indicators of risk, the evaluator noted that Dentz: (1) had no history of violent
offenses, (2) would be subject to heightened supervision if released , (3) had an interest in
treatment, and (4) had not committed any new criminal offenses upon release despite his
violations of supervised-release terms. The evaluator concluded that Dentz’s risk could be
managed with community-based intervention, and therefore, Dentz did not “appear to be
among the group of offenders whose risk level warrants the extraordinary intervention of
civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person.”

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Findings, Conclusions, and Order for Commitment
The district court found that Dentz had been convicted of fifth -degree criminal
sexual conduct, numerous counts of electronic solicitation of a minor, and numerous counts
of possession of child pornography. The district court explained that it “d[id] not consider
the viewing and possession of child pornography to be a victimless crime” and that the
offense fell “within the scope of violent crime.” In its conclusions of law, the district court
explained:
The evidence is clear and convincing that [Dentz’s]
convictions for Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Fifth Degree,
four counts of Electronic Solicitation of a Minor, and three
counts of Possession of Child Pornography raise the
presumption that the victims sustained serious physical and/or
emotional harm, which [Dentz] has failed to rebut. Therefore,
this conduct constitutes harmful sexual conduct as that term is
defined in Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, [s]ubd. 8.
The district court also found that Dentz “manifested sexual and personality disorders,” and
credited the diagnoses set forth in the court-appointed evaluator’s report.
The district court also found that “[t]he evidence is clear and convincing that [Dentz]
is highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future due to [his] history of
harmful behavior, base rate statistics, similarity of present and future contexts to past
[contexts], and sources of stress in the environment.” It found that Dentz had “view[ed]
child pornography” while on supervised release in the summer of 2019. It also found that,
despite the lack of any violent history, Dentz had a history of harmful sexual contact with
minors and “engaged in behavior evidencing escalating sexual contact with minors.” It
also noted that Dentz’s youth increased his likelihood to re -offend, a nd that he was

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“statistically more likely to re -offend than the typical sex offender.” It found that Dentz
was likely to face the same stressors he faced previously and that any release would be
subject to the same conditions that he violated while on supervised release in 2019.
The district court determined that Dentz is a sexually dangerous person, that he
requires treatment in a confined setting for public-safety purposes, and that Dentz failed to
establish any less-restrictive alternative to secure co nfinement. The district court granted
the county’s petition and ordered Dentz committed to the Minnesota Commissioner of
Human Services. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Dentz seeks reversal of the commitment order, arguing that the district court
misapplied the law in determining that he engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct ,
and the district court’s determination that Dentz is highly likely to engage in future harmful
sexual conduct either lacks clear and convincing support in the record or is premised on
clearly erroneous findings. “In order to commit someone as [an SDP], the district court
must find by clear and convincing evidence that the person: (1) has engaged in a course of
harmful sexual conduct; (2) has manifested a sexual, person ality, or other mental disorder
or dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.”
In re Civil Commitment of Ince , 847 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. 2014); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.02, subd. 16(a)(1)-(3). This appeal concerns the first and third elements.
Generally, we limit our appellate review of a commitment decision “to an
examination of the [district] court’s compliance with the statute,” and we consider whether
commitment is “justified by finding s based upon evidence at the hearing.” In re Knops ,

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536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). “This court reviews de novo whether the record
contains clear and convincing evidence that each element of the standard for commitment
has been met.” In re Civil Commi tment of Jackson , 658 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Minn. App.
2003), review denied (Minn. May 20, 2003) . “We review the district court’s factual
findings under a clear error standard to determine whether they are supported by the record
as a whole.” Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 22.
I. The district court misapplied the law in finding that Dentz engaged in a course
of harmful conduct.
Dentz argues that the district court erred by applying a statutory presumption of
harm to the conduct underlying his convictions and by improperly r equiring him to rebut
that presumption. We agree.
To commit an individual as an SDP, the district court must find that the individual
“has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct .” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02,
subd. 16(a)(1). “‘Harmful sexual conduct’ means sexual conduct that creates a substantial
likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another. ” Id., subd. 8(a) (2018). The
legislature has defined certain types of conduct that carry a rebuttable presumption of a
substantial likelihood of serious harm:
There is a rebuttable presumption that conduct
described in the following provisions creates a substantial
likelihood that a victim will suffer serious physical or
emotional harm: section 609.342 (criminal sexual conduct in
the first degree), 609.343 (criminal sexual conduct in the
second degree), 609.344 (criminal sexual conduct in the third
degree), or 609.345 (criminal sexual conduct in the fourth
degree). If the conduct was motivated by the person’ s sexual
impulses or was part of a pattern of behavior that had criminal
sexual conduct as a goal, the presumption also applies to

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conduct described in section 609.185 (murder in the first
degree), 609.19 (murder in the second degree), 609.195
(murder in the third degree), 609.20 (manslaughter in the first
degree), 609.205 (manslaughter in the second degree), 609.221
(assault in the first degree), 609.222 (assault in the second
degree), 609.223 (assault in the third degree), 609.24 (simple
robbery), 609.245 (aggravated robbery), 609.25 (kidnapping),
609.255 (false imprisonment), 609.365 (incest), 609.498
(tampering with a witness), 609.561 (arson in the first degree),
609.582, subdivision 1 (burglary in the first degree), 609.713
(terroristic threats), or 609.749, subdivision 3 or 5 (harassment
or stalking).
Id., subd. 8(b) ( Supp. 2019 ). A “course” means a “systemic or orderly succession; a
sequence.” In re Civil Commitment of Ramey , 648 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. App. 2002)
(quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002). Interpretation of commitment
statutes presents a question of law that we review de novo. Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 20.
Here, the district court specifically found that Dentz’s convictions “raise the
presumption that the victims sustained serious physical and/or emotional harm.” But none
of the statutes under which Dentz was convicted appear in subdivision 8( b). The county
concedes this fact. Accordingly, the statutory presumption did not apply , and the district
court erred by applying the presumption to Dentz’s prior convictions.
The county nonetheless suggests that the district court might have properly found a
course of harmful sexual conduct under subdivision 8(a) because it made findings
regarding the violent nature of child -pornography crimes and referenced the presumption
of harm only in its conclusions of law. Although we agree with the district court that child
pornography is not a victimless crime and is a serious offense, t he district court used
unambiguous language erroneously applying the presumption and noted Dentz’s failure to

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rebut the presumption. And although the district court might have made conduct -specific
findings and conclusions regarding the likelihood of serious harm under subdivision 8(a),
it did not do so and instead relied on an erroneous application of the law.
Dentz suggests that the error requires reversal without remand. At oral argument,
counsel argued that the county failed to produce any evidence of actual harm, precluding
the district court from finding on remand that Dentz engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct as defined by law. But the statutory definition of “harmful sexual conduct” does
not require proof of actual harm; instead, “harmful sexual conduct” is defined as “sexual
conduct that creates a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to
another.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8(a) (emphasis added) . And where the county
presented evidence regarding the underlying bases for Dentz’s prior crimes, we cannot say
that the record precludes the district court from finding that Dentz’s conduct “create[d] a
substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm” to others. Id. Accordingly,
remand is appropriate.
II. The district court made clearly erroneous findings and misapplied the law to
find it highly likely that Dentz will engage in future harmful sexual conduct.
Dentz also argues that the county failed to prove that he i s highly likely to engage
in harmful sexual conduct in the future, that the district court clearly erred by finding that
he viewed child pornography while on supervised release, and that the district court
misapplied the presumption of harm to that conduct. We agree in part.
Before a district court can civilly commit an individual as an SDP, it must find that
an individual “is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct as defined in

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subdivision 8.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a)(3). “Likely” means “highly likely.”
Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 20 (quotation omitted). The district court must consider:
(a) the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
education, etc.); (b) the person’ s history of violent behavior
(paying particular attention to recency, severity, and frequency
of violent acts); (c) the base rate statistics for violent behavior
among individuals of this person ’s background (e.g., data
showing the rate at which rapists recidivate, the correlation
between age and criminal sexual activity, etc.); (d) the sources
of stress in the environment (cognitive and affective factors
which indicate that the person may be predisposed to cope with
stress in a violent or nonviolent manner); (e) the similarity of
the present or future c ontext to those contexts in which the
person has used violence in the past; and (f) the person’s record
with respect to sex therapy programs.
In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994) (the Linehan factors). The district court
should also consider any additional factors important to predicting harmful sexual conduct.
Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 23 -24. Although the district court applied the Linehan factors, its
ultimate conclusion was based on a misapplication of the law and a clearly erroneous
factual finding.
As a threshold matter, we discern no error in the rejection of the evaluator’s ultimate
conclusion by the district court. It is the district court’s role to weigh the Linehan factors
and make relevant findings. See id. (“As the trier of fact, the district court will be in the
best position to determine the weight to be attributed to each factor . . . .”). The district
court is also tasked with determining the credibility of experts. Id. Here, the district court
acknowledged the evaluat or’s testimony , weighed the Linehan factors, and set forth
reasons why it diverged from the evaluator’s assessment of the same factors.

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We also note that c lear and convincing evidence supports many of the district
court’s Linehan findings. The district court found that Dentz’s youth increased his risk of
re-offense, and the finding is supported by the evaluator’s report . The district court’s
findings regarding statistical and actuarial risks are likewise supported by clear and
convincing evidence. S everal assessments indicated that Dentz posed a high or greater -
than-average risk of re -offense.1 Dentz argues that the district court erred by
“disregard[ing] the testifying expert witness and rel[ying] upon actuarial reports,” but the
district court was not bound to credit the evaluator’s ultimate conclusion over other
evidence. See Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 23-24.
But other findings by the district court warrant reversal and remand. The district
court determined that Dentz is highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the
future, in substantial part, based on his “history of harmful behavior.” This finding was
premised on the same erroneous application of the statutory presumption of harm. Because
Dentz’s prior conduct carried no statutory presumption of a substantial likelihood of
serious harm, the district court erred in presuming that similar sexual conduct in the future
would be “harmful sexual conduct.”
The district court also premised its determination that it was highly likely that Dentz
would engage in future harmful sexual conduct in part on a clearly erroneous finding that

1 Dentz argues that the district court erred by finding a lack of protective factors
counterbalancing risk factors. Although the evaluator did note the presence of numerous
protective factors, we cannot determine that the potential error by the district court is
prejudicial where the district court merely noted its “concern” over a lack of protective
factors.

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Dentz accessed child pornography while on supervised release in the summer of 2019. The
parties agree that the record does not support this finding. The evidence instead showed
that Dentz viewed other types of pornography. The district court specifically referen ced
this erroneous factual finding in support of its determination that “it is likely that, if given
the opportunity, [Dentz] would locate unauthorized devices to obtain and use child
pornography.”
The county suggests that th is factual error is harmless because Dentz did possess
child pornography in 2016 while on probation. But the district court’s finding that Dentz
would access more child pornography was premised explicitly on the clearly erroneous
finding of access to child pornography in 2019 . The district court also relied on its
erroneous finding when it considered whether the conditions of supervised release would
be sufficient to safeguard against further criminal behavior.
We again reject Dentz’s argument that reversal without remand is appro priate.
Although t he district court made clearly erroneous findings and misapplied the law to
determine that Dentz is highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future, we
cannot say that the county failed to produce evidence suffici ent to support such a finding.
Remand is therefore appropriate.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.