In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Anthony John Dentz.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1155

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Anthony John Dentz.

Filed February 14, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-PR-19-877

Daniel S. Kufus, Kufus Law, LLC, Rosevi lle, Minnesota (for appellant Anthony John
Dentz)

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney , Heather Pipenhagen , Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent Dakota County Social Services)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presid ing Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Anthony John Dentz challenges the district court’s order committing him
to the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services as a Sexually Dangerous Person (SDP)
following this court’s reversal and remand of the district court’s prior commitment order.
Dentz argues that the district court again misapplied the law on remand and that respondent
Dakota County Social Services (the county) failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that he would engage in future harmful sexual conduct. We reverse and remand.
2
FACTS
In December 2019, the count y petitioned the district c ourt to indeterminately
commit Dentz as an SDP. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, s ubd. 2 (2020) (describing the
petition stage of civil commitment proceedings ). Minnesota law defines an SDP as an
individual who “(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct . . . ; (2) has
manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a
result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd.
16 (2020). According to the county’s petition, Dentz is an SDP because (1) he had engaged
in a course of harmful sexual conduct that led to convictions for fifth-degree criminal
sexual conduct, solicitation of minors, and possession of child porn ography; (2) he was
diagnosed with several disorders, including sexual disorders; (3) he had violated the
conditions of his supervised release and had been discharged from sex-offender treatment;
and (4) he is highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future.
The district court held a hearing on the county’s petition. In support of its petition,
the county submitted documentary exhibits detailing Dentz’s prior offenses, including the
criminal complaints, police reports, and pres entence investigations. It also submitted
several psychosexual evaluations that had been performed in connection with Dentz’s
convictions. And it submitted documents addressing Dentz’s performance in sex-offender
treatment and on supervised release.
Those exhibits established that in January 2015, when Dentz wa s 18 years old, he
was convicted of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct for orally and vaginally penetrating
a 14-year-old girl. See Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1(1) (2012). In June 2016, Dentz
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pleaded guilty to one count of electronic solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2) (2014). Finally, in April 2017, Dentz pleaded guilty
to three additional counts of electronic solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct,
id., and three counts of possession of child pornography, Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a)
(2014). For these offenses, the district court sentenced Dentz to a cumulative total of 54
months in prison and a five-year conditional-release period.1
The county’s exhibits also established that Dentz was released from prison in
February 2019 and was placed on supervised release. In October 2019, Dentz’s supervised-
release agent alleged that he violated the conditions of release by (1) accessing
pornography; (2) having contact with minors, including a sexually explicit discussion with
a girl online during which he asked her to send him a photograph; (3) accessing the internet
via an unidentified cell phone and a friend’s cell phone; and (4) being terminated from sex-
offender programming.
In addition to documents detailing Dentz’s history, the district court received the
report and testimony of Dr. Ma ry Kenning, who was appoin ted by the court to assess
Dentz’s risk of reoffending. Based on several standardized assessment tools, Dr. Kenning
determined that Dentz had a higher-than-average risk of committing additional noncontact
offenses. But she concluded that Dentz did not “appear to be among the group of offenders
whose risk level warrants the extraordinary intervention of civil commitment as [an SDP].”

1 The record also shows that Dentz was ch arged in 2016 with an other offense involving
communicating with a minor about sexual conduct. That charge was ultimately dismissed,
but, in 2019, Dentz admitted to the conduct underlying the charge.
4
Dr. Kenning observed that Dentz’s young age increased his “risk of sexual and violent re-
offense” and that his recidivism risk was highe r than that of the av erage sex offender.
However, she also noted that he did not have a history of violent behavior, he would receive
“greater community scrutiny” and more superv ision as a result of his supervised-release
violation, he did not commit a new offense, and he “was not ordered to complete sex
offense specific treatment in the community prior to 2017 and was unable to do so in
prison.” Dr. Kenning testified that the sex-offender treatment program that had discharged
Dentz was willing to work with him again.
Following the hearing, the district court i ssued an order determining that Dentz is
an SDP and that confinement in a secure facility is necessary. The district court committed
Dentz to the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services.
Dentz appealed his commitment, arguing that the district court misapplied the law
and made clearly erroneous factual findi ngs. We reversed and remanded. See In re Civ.
Commitment of Dentz, No. A20-1230, 2021 WL 164521 (Minn. App. Jan. 19, 2021) (Dentz
I). First, we concluded that the district court had erroneously relied on a presumption that
Dentz’s prior offenses were “harmful sexua l conduct” even though Minnesota law does
not identify any of these offenses as presumptively harmful. 2 Id. at *4. Second, we
determined that the district court errone ously found that Dentz had viewed child

2 “Harmful sexual conduct” is “sexual conduct that creates a subs tantial likelihood of
serious physical or emotional harm to another.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8(a) (Supp.
2021). Some conduct—conduct that is describe d in several specific criminal statutes—is
presumed to be harmful sexual conduct, although the presumption can be rebutted. Minn.
Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8(b) (Supp. 2021).
5
pornography while on supervised release alth ough the record showed that it was adult
pornography. Id. at *6. And third, we concluded that the district court’s determination on
the third factor—the likelihood of reoffense— was impacted by its erroneous decision on
the first factor. Id.
On remand, the district court relied on the record from the earlier hearing and
prepared a new order. The dist rict court again concluded that Dentz is an SDP and that
confinement is necessary.
In the district court’s second order—the order now on appeal—it found that Dentz
had viewed adult pornography while on supervised release, correcting the error in its
previous order. The district court also rec onsidered whether Dentz satisfied the statutory
criteria for an SDP. It agai n determined that Dentz’s prio r conduct—“soliciting children
for sex, engaging in sex with a minor, vi ewing both adult and child pornography and
soliciting photos from minors”—was “the type of conduct that creates a substantial
likelihood of serious emotional or physical harm to the victims.” Although the district
court noted that “there is no legislatively cr eated rebuttable presumption,” it determined
that Dentz’s “course of conduct . . . create d . . . a substantial likelihood of harm.”
Additionally, the district court again concluded that Dentz is highly likely to commit future
acts of harmful sexual conduct.
Dentz appeals.
DECISION
To commit a person as an SDP, the count y must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the person: “(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct; (2) has
6
manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a
result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.” In re Civ. Commitment of
Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. 2014); In re Civ. Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803,
807 (Minn. App. 2014); see also Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a)(1)-(3). 3 D e n t z
challenges the district court’s determination that he satisfies the firs t prong of this test,
arguing that the district court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support its
conclusion that his conduct was harmfu l sexual conduct and relied on improper
presumptions in ruling that he had engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct.
In commitment cases, the district court must “find the facts specifically, and
separately state its conclusions of law.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2(a) (2020). “Where
commitment is ordered, the findings of fact and conclusions of law shall specifically state
the proposed patient’s conduct which is a basis for determining that each of the requisites
for commitment is met.” Id.
“[T]he commitment determination . . . is a difficult task often requiring
consideration of a voluminous and complex record followed by a careful balancing of all
the relevant facts,” and “the district court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and
assess credibility.” Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 23-24 (quotation omitted). We therefore afford
the district court “due deference” in assessing the credibility of witnesses. In re Civ.

3 If the district court finds that a person is an SDP, it must commit th e person to a secure
treatment facility “unless the person establishe s by clear and convincing evidence that a
less restrictive treatment program is availabl e, is willing to accept the [person] under
commitment, and is consistent with the pers on’s treatment needs and the requirements of
public safety.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3 (2020).
7
Commitment of Crosby , 824 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 27, 2013). And a reviewing court should not reweigh the evidence in such cases. In
re Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. App. 2017) (citations omitted),
rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2017); see In re Civ. Commitment of Fugelseth , 907 N.W.2d
248, 253 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018).
An appellate court applies a clear-error sta ndard in reviewing the district court’s
factual findings. Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 22. Th is standard requires the reviewing court to
view the evidence “in a light favorable to th e findings” and to de termine whether that
evidence “reasonably tends to support” th e district court’s findings of fact. In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221, 223 (Mi nn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
Then, applying de novo review, we consider whether the dist rict court’s factual findings
satisfy the statutory criteria for commitment as an SDP, which is a question of law. Spicer,
853 N.W.2d at 807.
1. Course of Harmful Sexual Conduct
The first statutory requirement for comm itting a person as an SDP is clear and
convincing evidence th at the individual “has engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a)(1). This requirement has two components:
“harmful sexual conduct” and a “course” of such conduct. Thus, to conclude that Dentz is
an SDP, the district court had to find by clear and convincing evidence both that he engaged
in “harmful sexual conduct” and that his cond uct constituted a “cours e” of that type of
conduct.
8
Harmful sexual conduct
“‘Harmful sexual conduct’ means sexual conduct that creates a substantial
likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd.
8(a). Certain conduct—conduct that violates specific criminal laws—creates a rebuttable
presumption of serious physical or emotional harm. That conduct in cludes conduct that
constitutes first-, second-, third-, and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, among other
delineated offenses. Id., subd. 8(b).
Here, however, none of Dentz’s past con duct is presumed to be harmful sexual
conduct.4 See Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8(b). T hus, the district court was required to
determine whether the county presented clea r and convincing evidence that Dentz’s
conduct was harmful sexual conduct under the statute—whether Dentz engaged in “sexual
conduct that create[d] a substantial likelihoo d of serious physical or emotional harm to
another.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8(a).
When making findings of fact, the distri ct court must “specifically state the
proposed patient’s conduct which is a basis for determining that each of the requisites for
commitment is met.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, s ubd. 2(a). It is not sufficient in such a
proceeding for a district court to make determinations on factors “in a conclusory fashion.”
In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994). Because an appellate court reviews a

4 At oral argument, counsel for the county argued that, although Dentz was ultimately
convicted of fifth-degree criminal sexual cond uct, his conduct technically amounted to
third-degree criminal sexual conduct, which is presumptively harmful under the statute.
See Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8(b). But because the district court did not make factual
findings to this effect or rely on such a presumption, we do not consider this argument.
9
district court’s decision in such matters with deference, it is criti cally important for the
district court to articulate its findings with particularity. See Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 809
(analogizing civil-commitment cases to custody cases and observing that specific factual
findings are necessary for meaningful appellate review in such cases). And Spicer makes
clear that, in addition to fa cilitating appellate review, sp ecific findings are crucial for
ensuring that all statutory factors are addre ssed and assuring the parties that the decision
was considered carefully and fairly. Id. Spicer notes that “a district court’s findings of fact
must ‘provide insight into which facts or opi nions were most persuasive of the ultimate
decision.’” Id. (quoting In re Welfare of M.M., 452 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1990)). Thus,
for a district court’s findings of fact to be adequate, appellate courts must be able to discern
both what decision the district court made, and why it made that decision. Hagen v.
Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212, 217-18 (Minn. App. 2010) (citing cases).
Here, regarding Dentz’s conduct, the district court found:
1/14/15 – Convicted of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Fifth
Degree. (Anoka County). In this offense [Dentz]
contacted a fifteen-year-old girl on a social
networking website, and en ded up having oral sex
and vaginal intercourse w ith her at her house.
[Dentz] knew her age. The child sent lewd pictures
of herself to [Dentz].

9/28/16 – Convicted of Electronic Solicitation of a Minor.
(Dakota County).

7/13/17 – Convicted of three counts of Electronic Solicitation
of a Minor. (Dakota County).

7/13/17 – Convicted of three counts of Possession of Child
Pornography. (Dakota County).

10
09/165 – Charged with one count of Engaging in electronic
communication relating to or describing sexual
conduct with a child. (D odge County). Charge
dismissed, but [Dentz] admitted sexual contact with
this victim during a 2019 interview with
Dr. Kenning.6

The district court did not discuss the facts underlying Dentz’s prior convictions or charges.
In addition to listing Dentz’s prior offenses, the district court noted that Dentz violated the
terms of his treatment program and superv ised release “by viewing pornography on
multiple unauthorized devices, smoking a CBD cigarette, chatting with minor females, and
‘sexting.’” It also observed that Dentz “was not truthful to his agent.”
As to the harmful-sexual-conduct criterion, the district court found:
55. While there was no direct testimony from victims of
[Dentz], this Court believes it is an undeniable truth that
children who are forced into posing for or participating in child
pornography suffer serious emotional and likely serious
physical harm.

56. This Court also agrees with the Minnesota Court of
Appeals’ decision in the Matte r of the Civil Commitment of
David Josef Lovejoy 2017 WL 562624. Therein, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals affi rmed the decision of the trial
court finding that “children depicted in images of child
pornography suffer significant emotional and physical harm”
and that those who view it create a market that results in the
sexual exploitation of children. This Court does not need to
hear direct testimony from the ch ildren depicted to know that
they suffered harm.

5 This date in the district court’s order appears to refer to the month and year that the charge
was dismissed.

6 We clarify that the record shows that the “sexual contact” Dentz acknowledged was
sexual communication and not physical contact.
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57. To conclude that the St ate must locate a child or
children who are depicted in th e sexual images that are being
distributed nationally, and perhaps around the globe, and force
that child or children to te stify about the harm they
experienced, would be an ab surd requirement that would
subject the victims to yet more emotional harm or distress.

58. [Dentz]’s conduct, between soliciting children for sex,
engaging in sex with a minor, viewing both adult and child
pornography and soliciting photos from minors was the type of
conduct that creates a substantial likelihood of serious
emotional or physical harm to the victims.

59. While there is no legislatively created rebuttable
presumption, [Dentz]’s course of conduct nonetheless created,
at the very least, a substantial likelihood of harm.

We conclude for three reasons that the di strict court’s findings that Dentz engaged
in harmful sexual conduct do not satisfy the specificity requirements discussed in Linehan
and Spicer. First, it is unclear from the district court’s findings exactly what facts the
district court considered when it concluded that Dentz’s conduct created “a substantial
likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd.
8(a).
Second, some of the district court’s factual findings and conclusions of law suggest
that the district court presumed that Dent z’s conduct was harmful sexual conduct rather
than relying on the facts in the record to reach that conclusion. Although the district court’s
order notes that “there is no legislatively created rebuttable presumption,” it also states that
“it is an undeniable truth that children who are forced into posing fo r or participating in
child pornography suffer serious emotional and likely serious physical harm.” And the
district court concluded that Dentz engaged in harmful sexual conduct because he engaged
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in “the type of conduct that creates a substantial likelihood of serious emotional or physical
harm to the victims.” The order makes no findings of fact to support these conclusions—
such as a finding that the images in Dentz’s child pornography case depicted children being
sexually abused or findings about the facts underlying the solicitation offenses. Therefore,
the district court’s conclusions on these matters appear to be presumptions that the relevant
sexual conduct was harmful sexual conduct (despite the lack of a legislative authorization
for that presumption), rather than determinations based on the record presented to the court.
To be clear, we agree with the district court that it would be absurd to require victims
of child pornography to testify about the actual harm suffered. We are aware of no such
requirement, and we adopt no such requirement here. But the legislature has authorized a
presumption that sexual conduct is harmful sexual conduct for only certain types of sexual
conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8(a). The sexual conduct at issue here is not
among those types of sexual conduct. Theref ore, any determination that it is harmful
sexual conduct under the statute must be based on findings of fact specifically addressing
the conduct at issue in this case and cannot be based merely on the “type” of conduct that
occurred.
Third, the district court suggested that an unpublished (or nonprecedential) opinion
of this court decided as a matter of law that “children depicted in images of child
pornography suffer significant emotional and ph ysical harm.” The district court misread
this court’s opinion. In the cited case, we me rely concluded that the record supported the
district court’s factual finding to that effect. See In re Civ. Commitment of Lovejoy , No.
A16-1442, 2017 WL 562624 at *6 (Minn. App. Feb. 13, 2017). And in any event, we are
13
not bound by our unpublished d ecisions. Minn. R. Civ. Ap p. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c)
(“Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions are not binding authority except as law of
the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel, but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as
persuasive authority.”). To the extent that the district court applied our unpublished
decision for the proposition that possession of child pornography is harmful sexual conduct
as a matter of law, it erred.
Course of conduct
To determine that Dentz is an SDP, the di strict court was also required to find that
Dentz engaged in a “course” of harmful sexua l conduct. A “course” is a “systemic or
orderly succession; a sequence.” In re Civ. Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 268
(Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002). Thus, to find
that Dentz engaged in the requi red “course” of harmful sexual conduct, the district court
had to determine Dentz engaged in a successi on or sequence of individual acts, each of
which was an act of harmful sexual conduct.
We reject the district court’s determina tion that Dentz engage d in a “course” of
harmful sexual conduct for two reasons. First, the district court found that “[Dentz’s]
course of conduct . . . created, at the very least, a substantial like lihood of harm.” The
district court’s statement suggests that, in stead of finding that Dentz had engaged in a
sequence of events, each of which was an act of harmful sexual conduct, it considered his
conduct cumulatively, and concluded that it was a harmful course of sexual conduct. This
latter approach is erroneous because each inde pendent event that comprises the course of
harmful sexual conduct must be, in and of itself, harmful sexual conduct.
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Second, and more fundamenta lly, the district court’s findings are unclear about
exactly what conduct the district court found to be part of the “course” of harmful sexual
conduct. Specifically, it appears that the district court included viewing adult pornography
as part of the course of harmful sexual conduct without explaining how or why that would
be the case here.
We recognize that sex-offender commitment decisions are difficult. See Spicer, 853
N.W.2d at 811. Often, as here, the parties supply the district court with a voluminous paper
record with the expectation that the district court will hunt for the salient facts. See id. at
811-12. The underlying facts in these cases can be uncomfortable to write about in detail.
But the law requires specificity. Mi nn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2(a); Ince, 847 N.W.2d at
26.
“An order does not permit meaningful appell ate review if it does not identify the
facts that the district court has determined to be true and the facts on which the district
court’s decision is based.” Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 811; see also Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 26;
Linehan, 518 N.W.2d at 614. Because the district court’s factual findings are not sufficient
for meaningful appellate review, we reverse and remand for furthe r findings and further
consideration of the issue of whether Dentz engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct.
2. Likelihood of Reoffense
Dentz also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the district court’s
finding on the third statutory factor—that he is highly likely to reoffend. According to
Dentz, he cannot be committed because the only expert witness who testified opined that
he was not likely to engage in future harmful sexual conduct.
15
We addressed this argument in Dentz I. See Dentz I, 2021 WL 164521 at *5. There,
we determined that there was “no error in the rejection of th e evaluator’s ultimate
conclusion by the district court.” Id. Because we are bound by our previous decision on
this issue, we cannot reconsider it. See Sigurdson v. Isanti County , 448 N.W.2d 62, 66
(Minn. 1989) (stating that appellate rulings on legal issues may not be reconsidered in a
second appeal).
But the district court’s decision regardin g the third factor may be based on its
determinations regarding the first factor, wh ich we now reverse. Accordingly, in its
discretion, the district court may reconsider its findings and conclusions on the third factor.
Reversed and remanded.