In re the Marriage of:

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A20-1250

Court of Appeals McKeig, J.
Dissenting, Hudson, J., Gildea, C.J., Anderson, J.

In re the Marriage of:

George Graham Pooley,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: September 14, 2022
Office of Appellate Courts
Barbara Lynn Pooley,

Appellant.
________________________

John C. Lillie, III, Kellie E. Hanck, Kelsey Law Office, P.A., Cambridge, MN, for
respondent.

Michael P. Boulette, Seungwon R. Chung, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP , Minneapolis,
MN; and

Heather A. Chakirov, Randen, Chakirov & Grotkin LLC, Bloomington, MN, for appellant.

Rana S. Alexander, Standpoint, St. Paul, MN; and

Kaitlyn J. Andren, Terzich & Ort, LLP, Maple Grove, MN, for amicus curiae Standpoint.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. The State of Minnesota sits as a third party in all marriage-dissolution
proceedings and must ensure parties’ divisions of their assets are fair and equitable.

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2. A party’s request to equitably divide an omitted asset is separate from a party
seeking relief from a dissolution decree under Minn. Stat. § 518.145 (2020).
3. On remand, the district court should consider the factors articulated in Minn.
Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2020) to divide the parties’ omitted asset.
Reversed and remanded.
O P I N I O N
MCKEIG, Justice.
This case involves the proper procedure for considering the division of omitted
assets from joint petitions for marriage dissolution. After the parties’ marriage was
dissolved through such a joint petition, appellant Barbara Pooley filed an action against
respondent Graham Pooley 1 seeking half of his retirement account, or, alternatively, an
equitable portion of the account. Graham objected, claiming that he and Barbara had
intentionally omitted his retirement account from their joint petition pursuant to an
unwritten side agreement, and that Barbara ’s sole ability to seek a portion of the omitted
asset is through satisfy ing the requirements to reopen a dissolution decree under Minn.
Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2020). The district court rejected Barbara’s contract and equity
arguments, concluding that the relief she sought was beyond the scope of a proper
enforcement or clarification order and was time-barred to the extent it sought to reopen the
decree under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2020). The court of appeals affirmed.

1 As both parties share a last name, this opinion will refer to the parties by their first
names, Barbara and Graham.

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On appeal, Barbara argues that the district court and court of appeals erred in not
applying the plain language of the joint petition—to “split equally” their property —to
Graham’s retirement account. She also argues that district courts have the power to address
omitted assets that fall outside the scope of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2’s grounds for
reopening a dissolution decree. We agree that district courts have the power to address
omitted assets, and the parties’ omission of their largest asset from the decree made it
impossible for the district court to execute its necessary function of determining that the
settlement was equitable. Accordingly, we reverse.
FACTS
Graham and Barbara Pooley were married in August 1989. During their 24-year
marriage, the couple had one child, born in 1997. The parties separated in January 2014.
In May 2014, the parties jointly petitioned the Washington County district court for
the dissolution of their marriage. The parties commenced the dissolution proceeding with
a more than 40-page, pre-printed form available on the Minnesota Judicial Branch website
entitled “Joint Petition, Agreement, and Judgment and Decree for Marriage Dissolution
With Children.” Both parties stated in the form that they were not represented by an
attorney.
In the form, the parties stated that Graham made between $6,212 and $6,268 a
month working for 3M. They stated that Barbara made $660 a month working part time at
Macy’s and received $1,307 in monthly disability payments. Graham agreed to assume
the marital debt of $3,200. He also agreed to provide medical and dental insurance and
pay all unreimbursed medical and dental expenses for their then- minor child , and for

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Barbara until the end of the year. Finally, the parties agreed that Graham would continue
to live in the marital home and pay the mortgage until it was sold, at which point the
proceeds would be split between them. Both parties waived any claim to spousal
maintenance.
One section of the form, entitled “Division of Marital Property,” instructed the
parties to list all their assets on an attached asset sheet. The form states that the asset sheet
is incorporated into the judgment and decree and that “Husband and Wife agree to divide
their marital property as listed by them” in the attached sheet. In this section of the form,
Barbara wrote “Will be split equally—we will work together.”
The attached asset sheet provides that “[e]ach person shall receive as their own all
assets in their column.” Graham and Barbara inserted zeros for several categories listed
on the asset sheet, including cash on hand, cash in bank accounts, stocks and bonds, money
owed to them, and business interests. They described and listed the values of vehicles,
furniture and furnishings, jewelry and watches, computers, and tools, entering the value of
some items in Graham’s column, and others in Barbara’s. The sum of all the items listed
totaled $49,000, with each person receiving property worth $24,500. Graham and Barbara
wrote nothing in the lines provided for “Retirement plans.” They did not check the box for
“Profit Sharing or Pension” or for “401(k), IRAs or other,” and the spots to fill in the
retirement plan value or account balance in each respective column were left entirely blank.
At the time of the dissolution, Graham had a 401(k) account with a value of approximately
$235,000 and an interest in a defined-benefit pension through his employment with 3M,

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while Barbara had a 401(k) account with a zero balance and an unvested interest in a
pension plan.
The form also included language that “[e]ach of us states that nothing has been held
back, and that we have honestly included everything we could think of in listing our
assets . . . and that we believe the other has been open and honest in writing this
agreement.” Both parties also signed before a notary public, attesting to the truth of the
statements in the petition.
Graham appeared at a hearing in June 2014 and confirmed under oath, among other
things, that he had income from full-time employment, that Bar bara was receiving social-
security disability benefits, and that the parties had agreed to sell their home and divide the
proceeds. Barbara was not present at the hearing. At the hearing, the dissolution court 2
also asked Graham, “With regards to your personal effects and assets, the two of you have
agreed to just divide them up equitably?” Graham responded, “Yes.” The presiding judge
signed the dissolution decree, and judgment was entered.
In February 2020, Barbara moved to enforce, clarify, or amend the dissolution
decree. She sought an order awarding her half of the value of the retirement accounts that
Graham possessed in 2014, or, alternatively, for an equitable division of an omitted asset.
Both parties were represented by counsel in this proceeding and submitted affidavits and
exhibits to the district court.

2 This opinion refers to the district court that signed the dissolution decree in 2014
as the “dissolution court” and the district court that heard Barbara’s motion to enforce,
clarify, or amend in 2020 as the “district court.”

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Graham and Barbara presented conflicting evidence about their intentions regarding
the retirement accounts in 2014. Barbara stated in her affidavit that her handwritten
statement that they would split the marital property “equally” applied to the couple’s
retirement accounts. But Graham stated in his affidavit that he and Barbara had specifically
discussed their retirement accounts and agreed that they would each keep their own.
Graham explained that they had reached an unwritten agreement to keep their own
retirement accounts, in part, because he had agreed to assume extra expenses and debt.
The district court explained that it was “logical” that Graham would keep his
retirement accounts “as consideration for assuming all marital debts and expenses.” The
district court therefore denied Barbara’s request to enforce or clarify the dissolution decree
to give her a division of the retirement assets, reasoning that “[t]o substantially change
what appears to be a full and equitable division of the marital estate would be inappropriate,
even if one piece of that agreement was not made in writing.”
Although the district court stressed that “the retirement accounts should have been
disclosed as part of the overall settlement,” the court found that “the omission does not
make the parties’ agreement unfair or no longer equitable.” According to the district court,
“[t]o now go back and divide the retirement accounts as though those debts and other
expenses did not exist is to give [Barbara] an unfair windfall.”
Barbara appealed the district court’s order. The court of appeals affirmed. Pooley
v. Pooley, No. A20-1250, 2021 WL 2910246, at *6 (Minn. App. July 12, 2021). The court
of appeals concluded that the district court did not err by denying Barbara’s request to
enforce or clarify the dissolution decree by awarding her half of the retirement accounts

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because the dissolution decree “does not unambiguously state that the parties agreed to
equally divide” their retirement accounts, and the district court found that the parties had
intentionally omitted the retirement accounts from the joint petition. Id. at *3–5. The court
of appeals further held that the district court did not err by denying Barbara’s motion to
reopen the dissolution decree because Barbara did not satisfy the statutory requirements
for such a motion. Id. at *5–6; see Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (providing that a court
may reopen a dissolution decree based on reasons including mistake, inadvertence, or
fraud, when the motion is made within a year of the dissolution decree).
The court of appeals expressed “some discomfort with the implication that it is
permissible and acceptable for parties seeking a stipulated dissolution to intentionally file
a joint petition containing false information.” Pooley, 2021 WL 2910246, at *4 n.1.
Nonetheless, because Barbara had “not argued that an agreement to intentionally omit
retirement assets from a jointly filed petition should be deemed invalid as a matter of law,”
the court of appeals “assume[d] without deciding that parties to a stipulated dissolution
proceeding may agree to omit marital property from their joint petition.” Id.
This court granted Barbara’s request for further review.
ANALYSIS
Marriage-dissolution stipulations are a judicially favored means of simplifying and
expediting dissolution litigation and are “accorded the sanctity of binding contracts.” Shirk
v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997). Once the parties have reached an agreement
on property distribution, the court, sitting as a third party, must approve that distribution
by making sure it is fair and equitable. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2020) (defining

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“marital property”); Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2020) (addressing division of marital
property upon dissolution); see Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn. 1989).
As dissolution stipulations are “binding contracts,” a party cannot repudiate or withdraw
from a stipulation without the consent of the other party, except “by leave of the court for
cause shown.” Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 521–22 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Barbara has alleged that the plain language of the marriage dissolution decree
entitles her to half of the parties’ retirement accounts. Alternatively, she claims that the
court failed to consider how to divide the omitted asset under section 518.58. We agree
that the district court erred in not considering how to equitably divide the parties’ omitted
asset and remand for it do so.
I.
Both parties agree that Graham’s retirement account, the second-largest asset at the
time of their divorce, was omitted from the stipulation. But the parties differ in their
interpretations of this omission. Barbara argues the omission means the plain language of
the parties’ stipulation—that their assets would be “split equally”—should apply to
Graham’s retirement account, thereby entitling her to half. Graham counters that the blank
line next to retirement accounts is ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence reveals that the
parties agreed to keep their own retirement accounts.
Courts treat stipulated marriage-dissolution judgments as contracts for purposes of
construction. See Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 521 (stating that stipulations to dissolve marriages
are “accorded the sanctity of binding contracts”). We would therefore typically start with

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determining whether a contract is ambiguous and proceed from that determination. See
Emp. Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Morse , 111 N.W.2d 620, 624 (Minn. 1961). But even
though we treat dissolution stipulations as contracts, they have unique features. One such
feature is that dissolution stipulations are not simply contracts between two private parties;
the State of Minnesota sits as a third party in all dissolution proceedings to make sure that
all property divisions are fair and equitable. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d at 165 (“In dissolution
cases, the court sits as a third party, representing all of the citizens of the State of Minnesota
to see that a fair property distribution is made.”). Recognizing the State of Minnesota as a
necessary party to dissolution proceedings provides the State with the power to prevent
abuse between spouses and helps prevent unnecessary strain on state resources by ensuring
each spouse is provided for financially.

Under Minnesota law, the extent of each spouse’s interest in marital property “shall
be determined and made final by the court pursuant to section 518.58.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.003, subd. 3b. 3 The rules of statutory interpretation command that “ ‘[s]hall’ is
mandatory,” meaning that the court’s participation in effectuating such property divisions
is not optional. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2020) (defining “shall”). Here, the

3 Section 518.58, subd. 1, requires that:

Upon a dissolution of a marriage . . . the court shall make a just and equitable
division of the marital property of the parties without regard to marital
misconduct, after making findings regarding the division of the property.
The court shall base its findings on all relevant factors including the length
of the marriage, any prior marriage of a party, the age, health, station,
occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability,
estate, liabilities, needs, opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets,
and income of each party.

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dissolution court was unable to consider the division of the retirement accounts under
section 518.58 due to the parties’ omission, thereby directly violating the requirements of
section 518.003 that the court make sure all property divisions are fair and equitable.
By omitting the asset from the stipulation, Graham and Barbara prevented a
necessary party from signing off on any agreement regarding the retirement accounts.
Because any agreement between Graham and Barbara regarding their retirement accounts
is missing a necessary party, we must turn our analysis to what role the district court plays
in dissolution decrees involving omitted assets.
II.
In determining what role the district court plays in dissolution decrees involving
omitted assets, we first clarify what it may not do. Barbara styled her motion, in part, as a
motion for the district court to enforce or clarify the dissolution decree. But because the
dissolution court itself was never permitted to pass on whatever agreement existed
regarding Graham’s retirement accounts, there was no dissolution decree on that issue for
the district court to enforce or clarify.
We next turn to the question of whether a district court has the power to amend an
incomplete decree. The jurisdiction of the district court in dissolution matters is limited to
the powers “delegated to the court by statute.” Kienlen v. Kienlen, 34 N.W.2d 351, 354
(Minn. 1948). The question is therefore whether the court has the statutory authority to
amend a dissolution decree to address omitted assets. This issue is a question of law, which
we review de novo. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022); see also

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Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 521 (“[W]e are neither bound by, nor required to give deference to
the trial court's determination of purely legal issues.”).
The court of appeals concluded, and Graham argues on appeal, that the district court
has no power to amend a decree independent from the statutory grounds for relief from a
decree under Minn. Stat. § 518.145 (2020).4 Because Barbara’s arguments to amend the
decree do not fall under any of the grounds listed in section 518.145, Graham argues that
Barbara is unable to seek relief from the court. The court of appeals agreed , finding that

4 Section 518.145, subdivision 2, provides:
On motion and upon terms as are just, the court may relieve a party from a judgment
and decree, order, or proceeding under this chapter, except for provisions dissolving
the bonds of marriage, annulling the marriage, or directing that the parties are legally
separated, and may order a new trial or grant other relief as may be just for the
following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
59.03;
(3) fraud, whether denominated intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment and decree or order is void; or
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment and
decree or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment and decree or order should have prospective
application.
The motion must be made within a reasonable time, and for a reason under clause
(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the judgment and decree, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. . . .

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the sole means to obtain the relief Barbara seeks is through satisfying the requirements of
section 518.145, subdivision 2. Pooley, 2021 WL 2910246, at *5.
Barbara acknowledges that none of the grounds listed in section 518.145 apply to
her case but argues that the statute serves an entirely different function from the court’s
power and responsibility to divide omitted assets. She claims that section 518.145 provides
the bases to seek relief from items actually contained in a decree, but that the statute does
not address the procedure for deciding things that are omitted from a decree . Under
Barbara’s interpretation of section 518.145, the court retains the power and responsibility
to divide omitted assets in accordance with section 518.58.
We agree that with Barbara that a party’s ability to seek division of assets not
divided per the requirements of sections 518.003 and 518.58 exists outside of the confines
of section 518.145. District courts are mandated, per section 518.58, to divide parties’
marital property justly and equitably. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (“[T]he court shall
make a just and equitable division of the marital property of the parties without regard to
marital misconduct, after making findings regarding the division of the property.”
(emphasis added) ). Once the district court has fulfilled this statutory mandate, a party
seeking to change anything that has been decided must move for relief under, and be able
to fulfill the requirements of section 518.145. But section 518.145 governs relief from a

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decree that has already been entered; it does not apply to assets that have been omitted, as
a district court first has a responsibility to pass upon those assets.5
Our precedent is consistent with the view that dividing what has not yet been divided
is not the same as reopening a dissolution decree under section 518.145. See, e.g., Searles
v. Searles, 420 N.W.2d 581, 583 n.1 (Minn. 1988) (“[T]he claim here is not to change what
has been decreed but rather to decide what was left undecided.”); Steele v. Steele, 304
N.W.2d 34, 35 (Minn. 1981) (“If it be true, as the parties claim, that there were interests in
real estate and outstanding obligations to which the trial court did not address itself
specifically, the appropriate remedy is application to the district court for amendment of
the decree.”).6 The court of appeals acknowledged that our decisions in Searles and Steele

5 The dissent argues that our decision conflicts with case law providing that district
courts lack the jurisdiction to amend incomplete dissolution judgments. The cases the
dissent cites for this proposition focus on awards of spousal maintenance, the grant of
which are permissive under the governing statute. Compare Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd.
1 (2020) (“[T]he court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse . . . .”) (emphasis
added) with Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (“[T]he court shall make a just and equitable
division of the marital property of the parties . . . .”) (emphasis added). A district court has
no obligation to award spousal maintenance , whereas it is obligated to divide marital
property. Therefore, our conclusion in Eckert v. Eckert that “there can be no modification
of something that never existed” does not apply to an omitted portion of marital property;
here, Barbara had an existing interest in Graham’s retirement account that matured at the
time of dissolution and needed to be determined. 216 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Minn. 1974); see
Searles v. Searles, 420 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1988).

6 Many other court of appeals cases, both published and unpublished, have recognized
a district court’s ability to divide omitted assets. See Blomberg v. Blomberg, 367 N.W.2d
643, 644 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating that a party may “seek amendment of a dissolution
decree when marital property has been omitted from the decree”); Brink v. Brink, 396
N.W.2d 95, 97–98 (Minn. App. 1986); Neubauer v. Neubauer , 433 N.W.2d 456, 461 n.1
(Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 1989); Danielson v. Danielson, 721

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“appear to provide Barbara with an opportunity to obtain her requested relief.” Pooley,
2021 WL 2910246, at *5. But the court claimed our decision in Shirk clarified that Barbara
cannot obtain relief simply by showing a marital asset was omitted from the dissolution
decree. Pooley, 2021 WL 2910246, at *5. In Shirk, we held that “[t]he sole relief from the
judgment and decree lies in meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.”
561 N.W.2d at 522. The court of appeals held that this statement meant that Barbara’s sole
means to address the omitted retirement accounts was through section 518.145. Pooley,
2021 WL 2910246, at *5.
Our holding in Shirk was that section 518.145 provides the sole relief for reopening
a decree. 561 N.W.2d at 522. Shirk involved a woman seeking to change the district
court’s division of marital property and spousal maintenance determinations based on her
lawyer’s alleged misconduct. Id. at 520–21. We held that the ethical violations of Ms.
Shirk’s attorney did not meet the requirements of section 518.145, subd. 2, and therefore
were not grounds to reopen the judgment and decree. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522. We also

N.W.2d 335, 339–40 (Minn. App. 2006); Sela v. Sela, No. A14-1285, 2015 WL 4714811,
at *5 (Minn. App. Aug. 10, 2015).
The dissent attempts to dismiss our precedent in Searles by pointing out that the
case involve d a partition action over which state—Minnesota or Missouri —had in rem
jurisdiction over land held by a divorced couple. Searles, 420 N.W.2d at 584. But this
attempted distinction overlooks the multiple questions we were addressing in Searles. The
first question we answered was a general question of whether a dissolution of marriage
decree extinguishes a spouse’s claim to undivided marital property; we held it did not
because parties have a common ownership interest in marital property which is not
extinguished upon dissolution. Id. at 583. It is this question that informs our decision
today, not the later question of whether Minnesota had jurisdiction to divide a Missouri
couple’s ownership of Minnesota land.

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held that a party may not attack a stipulation following the court’s judgment and decree.
Id. But to extend this reasoning to apply to the omitted asset at issue in this case is an
overbroad reading of Shirk.
Where a decree fails to include all major assets, requesting the court to divide the
omitted assets is asking the court to consider property that was not included in the decree.
Parties do not attack a stipulation by asking for consideration of items that were never part
of that stipulation. If a court’s decree is a box that contains everything the parties agreed
to and what the court has approved as equitable, that box can only be reopened if the
factors of section 518.145 are met. But it is not reopening the box to address items that
were never inside the box. Multiple items in this case, including waivers of spousal
maintenance, are inside the box and cannot be altered unless a party satisfies the
requirements of section 518.145. But the retirement assets were never inside the box, as
the dissolution court never approved any division as equitable, and it is therefore not
reopening the decree to equitably divide those assets.7 We are not therefore, as the dissent
claims, overruling Shirk, but rather delineating the situations to which Shirk applies by
recognizing that section 518.145 does not control the division of omitted assets.
Perhaps most importantly, the court of appeals’ interpretation of Shirk runs afoul of
our principles of statutory interpretation. “We are to read and construe a statute as a whole

7 The dissent claims that we are expanding the jurisdictional limits on reopening a
dissolution judgment and decree under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. But there is no
separation of powers concern as we are not expanding these limits; we are simply
recognizing that these limits are inapplicable to omitted marital property. Omitted marital
property is governed by the district courts’ mandate under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1, to
divide marital property equitably. This mandate has no explicit statutory time limit.

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and must interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting
interpretations.” Am. Fam. Ins. Grp . v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000).
Reading section 518.145 to foreclose district courts from dividing undivided assets would
frustrate the statutory requirement that district courts divide marital property justly and
equitably under section 518.58 by creating a situation in which the court would be unable
to complete that necessary duty. Simply put, the court of appeals’ interpretation creates an
irreconcilable conflict between two provisions of the dissolution chapter.
The importance of recognizing the court’s power to divide omitted assets cannot be
overstated. The very purpose of requiring district courts to review stipulations is to ensure
a fair distribution of all marital assets. See Maranda, 449 N.W.2d at 165; see also
Ronnkvist v. Ronnkvist, 331 N.W.2d 764, 765–66 (Minn. 1983) (“[P]arties to a martial
dissolution proceeding have a duty to make a full and accurate disclosure of all assets and
liabilities to facilitate the trial court's property distribution.”). Allowing for unwritten side
agreements that evade review of the district court completely circumvents the entire
purpose for the S tate’s review of such stipulations. Though not alleged in this case,
enforcing such unwritten side agreements could allow financially abusive spouses to force
their victims to agree to extremely inequitable divisions of property while leaving them no
recourse to challenge those divisions. The district court’s oversight is vital to ensure

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abusers are not able to enforce unfair side agreements merely because the abuser was able
to make their victim agree to it at the time.8
III.
Having determined the district court has a statutory mandate to divide omitted assets
under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, we turn our review to the district court’s actions in this case.
The district court should have applied the factors listed in section 518.58, subd. 1, to divide
the omitted asset. Here, there is no indication the district court did so.9
Instead, the sole, conclusory statement in the record that “the agreement the parties
made was an equitable division of the marital estate” is adopted verbatim from Graham’s
proposed order. We generally disfavor adopting findings submitted by a party verbatim
because it can make it more difficult to determine whether the district court “exercised its

8 Though no fraud or misconduct is alleged in this case, we are troubled by the
multiple references to an attorney who reviewed the stipulation for dissolution. In
Graham’s affidavit, he claims “I did take the documents to an attorney to have them looked
over before submitting them to the Court to make sure everything was in order, and I
encouraged Barbara to do the same.” Yet in an e-mail from Graham to Barbara at the time
of the divorce, he stated “I will take the papers to a lawyer and have him go over everything
. . . I am not retaining a lawyer, just an independent, to make sure everything is legal and
correct, [sic] for us both.”
At oral argument, Graham’s attorney stated that “[Graham] went and saw an
attorney, and [] spoke with him, and the attorney said courts really like these asset columns
to kind of match up equally, and if there’s going to be an unequal division there, leave it
blank.” While this does not drive our decision in this case, we are concerned at the
implication that the “independent” attorney Graham had review the parties’ submission
may have recommended leaving out the retirement assets to create the impression of
fairness.

9 Although it has no impact on our decision in this case, we are also troubled by the
district court’s decision to make significant credibility determinations based on affidavit
submissions, without the benefit of live testimony or cross examination.

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own careful consideration of the evidence, of the witnesses, and of the entire case.” Dukes
v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 258 (Minn. 2001) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Furthermore, based on context, as well as the court’s conclusions of law, the district
court’s determination appears to rest on the understanding that the parties had a side
agreement, and that refusing to honor that agreement would change the substantive rights
of the parties, resulting in a “windfall” for Barbara. In enforcing or clarifying a dissolution
decree, a district court may not change the parties’ substantive rights. Kornberg v.
Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 388 (Minn. 1996). In other words, a district court may not,
without re-opening a decree, change the amount of marital property actually awarded to
either party in the divorce decree. See Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Minn. App.
2011). Substantive changes in a final property division may only be ordered under the
circumstances set forth in section 518.145, subd. 2. But here the retirement accounts were
not awarded to either party, leaving the parties’ interests in the accounts undetermined.
Dividing the undivided property could not affect the parties’ substantive rights in the decree
already entered, as it would not change the amount of marital property already awarded to
either party by the dissolution court. See Nelson, 806 N.W.2d at 871.
10

10 The dissent asserts that “the record is clear that the dissolution court thoroughly
considered the disposition of the retirement assets and specifically awarded them to
Graham.” Yet the dissent does not identify precisely when this award happened because
it cannot—the retirement assets were neither divided by the court at the time of dissolution
nor were they divided by the court when Barbara brought a motion to clarify or amend
years later. Instead, the court found that the retirement assets had been omitted and refused

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Graham has argued that paying the couple’s outstanding debt and paying mortgage
payments while he continued to live in their house was a fair exchange for him keeping the
parties’ single largest asset for himself. But while Graham found such an agreement fair
and Barbara allegedly agreed, the dissolution court had a requirement under the law to pass
upon it. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. By omitting the asset altogether, the dissolution
court was prevented from exercising that necessary responsibility.11 Accordingly, Barbara
is entitled to the equitable division of the retirement accounts pursuant to the factors listed
in section 518.58, subd. 1.12

to clarify or amend the decree to include the omitted assets. This is not the proper
procedure contemplated by section 518.58.

11 The court of appeals assumed without deciding that parties may agree to omit
marital property from their joint petition for dissolution. Pooley, 2021 WL 2910246, at *4
n.1. Despite the court’s “discomfort with the implication that it is permissible and
acceptable for parties seeking a stipulated dissolution to intentionally file a joint petition
containing false information,” it stated that Barbara did not advance the argument that
agreements between parties to omit assets are invalid as a matter of law. Id. Barbara may
not have used that precise phrasing, but it is implicit in her argument that omitting assets
prevents district courts from performing their necessary equity determinations. Therefore,
the question of whether parties can omit assets from dissolution decrees is directly before
us.

12 The dissent claims that our holding creates an “unrestrained judicial carve-out” that
will destabilize the finality and reliability of dissolution judgments by “allowing a party to
obtain relief at any time from a stipulated dissolution judgment.” But our holding is
actually quite narrow. It applies o nly to marital property under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, and
only to those assets which were entirely omitted from a dissolution judgment. Finality is
of the utmost importance in dissolution proceedings, but where parties’ failure to adhere to
explicit instructions prevents district courts from discharging their mandatory duties under
statute, we are not required to stand idly by. See John v. John, 322 N.W.2d 347, 348 (Minn.
1982) (“[I]f the stipulation was improvidently made and in equity and good conscience
ought not to stand it may be vacated.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

20

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

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D I S S E N T
HUDSON, Justice (dissenting).
In 2014, Graham Pooley and Barbara Pooley agreed to end their marriage and
resolve all issues through a written stipulation. Nearly 6 years later, Barbara asked the
district court to reopen the stipulated dissolution judgment and decree and award her half
of Graham’s retirement accounts. Although the parties’ stipulation did not address the
retirement accounts, the dissolution court was fully aware of these assets and specifically
found that they intended to keep their own retirement accounts at the time of their
dissolution. The district court ultimately declined to “alter the parties’ agreement six years
later,” finding that their agreement “was equitable at the time and remains equitable now.”
The district court also ruled that Barbara’s motion fell “well outside” the 1-year time limit
to reopen a dissolution judgment under Minn. Stat. § 518.145 (2020). The court of appeals
affirmed. Today, the court concludes that the courts below erred by following our holding
that the “sole relief” from a dissolution judgment “lies in meeting the requirements of
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997). The
court’s decision (1) ignores express statutory limits on jurisdiction and the importance of
finality in dissolution proceedings; (2) effectively overrules our precedent; and
(3) substitutes the majority’s judgment for that of the district court. For these reasons, I
respectfully dissent.
I.
The court’s analysis ignores the jurisdictional limits on reopening a dissolution
judgment and decree under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. Although Minn. Stat.

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§ 518.145, subd. 2, allows the district court to grant relief from a final dissolution judgment
under circumstances like those alleged here, critically, the Legislature has specified that
the motion must be made within “a reasonable time, and for a reason under clause (1), (2),
or (3), not more than one year after” the dissolution judgment.1 Barbara has acknowledged
that she was aware of the retirement accounts long before she brought her motion.
According to Barbara, “much of the reason” for her delay in bringing the motion was that
she did not have the money to hire an attorney. The district court found that Barbara’s
assertion was not credible, in part because she received 50% of the proceeds from the sale
of the home ($36,417.29) in June 2016, leaving her with “more than enough to bring her
motion had she wanted to at the time.” There is no question that waiting almost 6 years to
challenge a final dissolution judgment is “not a reasonable time” under section 518.145,
subdivision 2. And as she must, Barbara also admits that her motion did not meet the

1 The district court found that the parties’ failure to disclose their retirement accounts
“as part of the overall settlement” was a “mistake.” Claims of “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect” are covered under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1), which
is subject to the 1-year time limit. In addition, even if Graham had engaged in fraud or
other misconduct, the 1-year time limit would apply. See Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(3)
(addressing “fraud, whether denominated intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party”).
Barbara has not challenged the district court’s finding that there was no fraud on the
court. Nevertheless, the majority devotes a two-paragraph footnote expressing its concern
that Graham may have received advice from an attorney to omit the retirement assets from
the parties’ submission, creating the impression of unfairness. But the record on this issue
is, at best, inconclusive. More importantly, the district court reviewed the parties’
respective affidavits, heard oral argument on this issue from Graham’s current counsel, and
took no action—strongly suggesting that the district co urt agreed with Graham’s position:
that the parties intentionally omitted the retirement accounts from the stipulation because
they had separately decided that he would keep them in exchange for taking on the parties’
other marital debt, as well as responsibility for the mortgage, taxes, and maintenance of the
parties’ home.

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1-year statutory time limitation as she waited nearly 6 years to challenge the final
dissolution judgment.
Notwithstanding the express statutory limits on reopening a dissolution judgment,
the court concludes that the district court had the power to divide an omitted asset—an
asset not specifically mentioned in the dissolution judgment. The court’s conclusion
circumvents the statutory jurisdiction limits. We have long held that the jurisdiction of the
district court in dissolution matters is “purely statutory.” Kienlen v. Kienlen, 34 N.W.2d
351, 354 (Minn. 1948) (emphasis added). A district court has “wide discretion” in
dissolution matters but only “for those matters within its jurisdiction.” Oldewurtel v.
Redding, 421 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1988) (emphasis added). We have stressed that the
jurisdiction of the district court “does not extend beyond the powers actually delegated to
the court by statute.” Kienlen, 34 N.W.2d at 354; see, e.g., McCarthy v. McCarthy,
196 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Minn. 1972) (holding that where a dissolution judgment “does not
specifically reserve jurisdiction of the issue of alimony for determination at a later date, no
such jurisdiction can later be claimed”).
The decision of the court thus implica tes constitutional separation-of-powers
concerns. See Minn. Const. art. III, § 1. We have observed that section 518.145,
subdivision 2, “was carefully crafted by the legislature to provide limited areas of relief to
those seeking vacation of judgment and decrees.” Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522 n.3. We do
not have the power to extend the statutory jurisdiction of the district court beyond those
limited areas of relief. Cf. Minn. Brewing Co. v. Egan & Sons Co., 574 N.W.2d 54, 62
(Minn. 1998) (“Creating a new right that is not within the language of [a statutory]

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scheme . . . is not within the province of this court. That role is fulfilled solely by the
legislature.”).
The court claims its judicial expansion of the jurisdictional time limits is really not
an expansion at all because section 518.145, subdivision 2, does not apply to “omitted
marital property.” Omitted marital property, the court claims, is governed by Minnesota
Statutes section 518.58 (2020), which has no explicit statutory time limit. But the court
proceeds from a false premise—namely, that because Graham’s retirement account was
not listed in the parties’ stipulation, it was an omitted asset that the dissolution court did
not consider or divide in accordance with section 518.58. This false premise permeates the
court’s jurisdictional analysis—indeed the entire opinion —even though the record directly
contradicts the court’s position. The record is clear that the dissolution court thoroughly
considered the disposition of the retirement assets and specifically awarded them to
Graham, concluding that this disposition was an equitable division of the marital assets.
Thus, the dissolution court fulfilled its duties under section 518.58.
I agree that the dissolution court had the power and the duty to scrutinize the parties’
stipulation for fairness while it had jurisdiction over the dissolution matter, and the
dissolution court did so. But once the dissolution judgment became final and the time for
reopening the judgment had passed, “the need for finality” takes on “central importance.”
Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522. We recently observed that “[s]ection 518.145 preserves the
important principles of judicial finality and certainty by requiring that a motion for relief
must be made ‘within a reasonable time,’ and, in any event, ‘not more than one year after
the judgment and decree . . . .’ ” Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 266 (Minn. 2022)

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(quoting Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2). The court’s creation here of an unrestrained
judicial carve-out from the express statutory limitations on jurisdiction upsets the
constitutional balance between the legislative and judicial branches and undermines
well-settled rights and expectations.
II.
Our prior decisions— until today— have recognized and respected the statutory
jurisdiction limits in dissolution matters. The court relies heavily on our decision in
Maranda v. Maranda, for the proposition that the district court has an obligation to ensure
a fair distribution of property in a dissolution matter. 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn. 1989).
The court, however, ignores our discussion of jurisdiction in Maranda. After noting that
the Legislature had recently “provide[d] a mechanism” in Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2,
for reopening a dissolution judgment, we made clear that future motions “should be
brought” under the statute. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d at 164 n.1.
Subsequently, in Shirk v. Shirk, a case that involved a stipulated dissolution
judgment, we reaffirmed that the “sole relief” from a final dissolution judgment “lies in
meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.” 561 N.W.2d at 522. We held
that “circumstances meeting the requirements of Minnesota Statute[s] section 518.145,
subd. 2 must be demonstrated in order to obtain relief from a judgment and decree of
dissolution.” Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 523. We stated that courts should not vacate
dissolution judgments “to address inadequacies and unfairness” unless the circumstances

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meet “the statutory requirements.” Id. at 522–23 (distinguishing Maranda).2 We also
stressed that the statutory time limitations “must be observed.” Id. at 522. The district
court did not err by following that direction here.
The court acknowledges that “[o]ur holding in Shirk was that section 518.145
provides the sole relief for reopening a decree.” The court suggests, however, that
“dividing what has not yet been divided is not the same as reopening a dissolution decree
under section 518.145.” But Barbara labeled her motion as a motion to reopen the
dissolution judgment “to account for marital retirement and investment assets” in existence

2 The court claims that because section 518.58 requires district courts to divide
marital property justly and equitably, the court of appeals’ interpretation of Shirk reading
section 518.145 to “foreclose district courts from dividing undivided assets” creates an
“irreconcilable conflict between two provisions of the dissolution chapter.” No such
conflict exists. One provision, section 518.58, expresses an overarching principle that a
district court is responsible for ensuring a fair and equitable distribution. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.58, subd. 1 (“the court shall make a just and equitable division of the marital property
of the parties without regard to marital misconduct, after making findings regarding the
division of the property”). The other, section 518.145, provides the vehicle by which that
principle is achieved, declaring that a dissolution decree is “final when entered, subject to
the right of appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 1. Only on a motion and “upon terms as
are just,” such that a party meets the specific requirements listed in the statute, may a court
relieve a party from the decree. Id., subd. 2. This principle, that section 518.145 sets forth
specific circumstances that must be present to permit a party to be relieved of the terms of
a judgment and decree, and the time limitations that must be observed, was reaffirmed in
our decision in Shirk. See 561 N.W.2d at 522 (clarifying that when a judgment and decree
is entered based upon a stipulation, “the stipulation is merged into the judgment and decree
and the stipulation cannot thereafter be the target of attack by a party seeking relief from
the judgment and decree” because “[t]he sole relief from the judgment and decree lies in
meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2”). Thus, these two provisions
work together to ensure that the division of marital property is indeed fair and equitable,
while also satisfying the need for finality in dissolution proceedings.

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at the time of the parties’ marriage.3 Using the court’s analytical framework, not only were
the retirement assets “in the box,” Barbara herself put them there. Thus, the district court
necessarily would have to reopen the (box) dissolution judgment to award Barbara an
interest in Graham’s retirement accounts. Any interest that Barbara had in Graham’s
retirement accounts arose solely by virtue of their marriage and her status as his spouse.
The court does not explain how the district court can award Barbara an interest in her
former spouse’s retirement account after their marriage has been dissolved without
reopening the dissolution decree.
The retirement accounts are not an asset like real estate in which each party retained
an interest even after the dissolution of the marriage. The cases the majority relies on—
Searles v. Searles , 420 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. 1988), and Steele v. Steele, 304 N.W.2d 34
(Minn. 1981) —both involved real estate and the need to resolve disputes over the
ownership of real property. Notably, in Searles, we simply held that Minnesota had “in
rem jurisdiction over Minnesota land” in a partition action “to determine title and
ownership to the land.” 420 N.W.2d at 584. We clarified, however, that Minnesota would
not have “jurisdiction to decide terms of [a] marriage dissolution apparently left unresolved

3 Alternatively, Barbara moved to enforce or clarify the dissolution judgment,
requesting an equal division of Graham’s retirement accounts. The district court denied
Barbara’s request, finding that the parties had intended to keep their own retirement
accounts. Deferring to the district court’s credibility determinations, the court of appeals
concluded that the district court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion “by concluding
that the parties intentionally omitted their retirement accounts” from the documents they
submitted in the dissolution action. Pooley v. Pooley, No. A20-1250, 2021 WL 2910246,
at *4 (Minn. App. July 12, 2021). The court concludes that “there was no dissolution
decree on that issue for the district court to enforce or clarify” because the retirement
accounts were omitted assets.

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by a court that did have jurisdiction.” Id. Steele also is distinguishable because the parties
there raised the property issue in a direct appeal of the dissolution judgment. See
304 N.W.2d at 34–35. We recently noted that “Minnesota law generally precludes parties
from reopening marital judgments and decrees after they exhaust their appellate remedies.”
Bender, 971 N.W.2d at 262 (emphasis added). The parties in Steele had not exhausted
their appellate remedies, unlike Barbara, who brought her motion almost 6 years after the
dissolution judgment became final. In any event, the Legislature enacted the jurisdictional
limits in Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2, after our decisions in Searles and Steele. Act of
Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 668, § 11, 1988 Minn. Laws 1007, 1011–12 (codified as amended at
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2). And we have never cited either decision in any opinion
until now.
Even assuming the court is correct that the dissolution court never made an equitable
division of the retirement assets, the court’s conclusion that the district court may now
decide what was left previously undecided also conflicts with our case law holding that a
district court does not have jurisdiction to amend an incomplete dissolution judgment. For
example, when a dissolution judgment makes no provision for spousal maintenance, the
district court “lacks jurisdiction to amend the original decree.” McCarthy, 196 N.W.2d at
308 (holding that “where the decree of divorce is silent as to alimony or fails properly to
designate alimony as required by statute, the trial court cannot thereafter modify the decree
to award alimony”). In other words, “there can be no modification of something that never
existed.” Eckert v. Eckert, 216 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Minn. 1974). Similarly, the district court

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lacks jurisdiction here to amend the original dissolution judgment, which Barbara
acknowledges is “silent” as to retirement accounts.
Further, as previously noted, the disposition of the retirement accounts was not left
“undecided.” Contrary to the court’s claim, the dissolution court carefully considered the
disposition of the retirement accounts and plainly awarded them to Graham. The district
court specifically found that Graham took on certain obligations as part of their agreement
that each party would keep their own retirement accounts and concluded that this was an
equitable division of the marital estate. While the court maintains that dividing the
retirement accounts now “could not affect the parties’ substantive rights,” the district court
found that Graham would not have agreed to take on additional obligations “if he was also
dividing half of his retirement.” The district court explicitly determined that dividing his
retirement accounts now would change his substantive rights and provide Barbara with a
“windfall.” 4
In sum, allowing a party to obtain relief at any time from a stipulated dissolution
judgment—even 6 years later—increases the potential for “ ‘uncertainty, chaos, and
confusion,’ ” which we have repeatedly warned against in dissolution matters. Ryan v.

4 Contrary to the court, I am not “troubled by the district court’s decision to make
significant credibility determinations based on affidavit submissions.” The district court’s
12-page order was thorough and carefully analyzed the parties’ positions on the division
of the retirement assets. Critically, Barbara and Graham were both present at the May 20,
2020 hearing, along with their respective counsel. And counsel were afforded and in fact
provided oral argument. Thus, the district court did not rely solely on the parties’ affidavits.
And as the district court noted, a default hearing was held on June 20, 2014, before the
dissolution court judge. Graham appeared; Barbara did not. Had she appeared, “she could
have stated on the record what her intentions were with regard to the retirement.”

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Ryan, 193 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Minn. 1971) (citation omitted), quoted in Shirk, 561 N.W.2d
at 522. The majority has effectively overruled our holding in Shirk and destabilized the
finality and reliability of dissolution judgments.
III.
Finally, assuming that Barbara’s motion was not time-barred and that the district
court had jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 518.145 to grant relief, the court makes its own
factual findings and second-guesses the district court’s exercise of discretion. We will not
reverse a district court’s decision to “withhold relief under section 518.145” absent “an
abuse of discretion.” Bender, 971 N.W.2d at 262; see also Ryan, 193 N.W.2d at 298
(“[T]he vacation of stipulations is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial
court.”).
The district court found credible Graham’s claim that “he was keeping his own
retirement accounts as part of the overall property settlement.” The district court
acknowledged that this settlement “was not an equal division, but the parties worked
together to divide their assets and negotiated for [Graham] to take on far more in expenses
than he ever would have been allocated if the Court divided the marital estate by keeping
his retirement accounts.” The district court also determined that there was “a full and
equitable division of the marital estate” and the dissolution judgment “remains equitable
now.” Notwithstanding our deferential standard of review, the court finds that the parties’
interests in the retirement accounts were “undetermined” and rules that “Barbara is entitled
to the equitable division of the retirement accounts.”

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Because we are not free to substitute our judgment for that of the district court, I
reject the court’s decision to order, what is in effect, equitable relief. At the very least, it
is the function of the district court, not this court, to balance the equities and “determine
whether the equitable remedy is appropriate.” Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos
Settlement Tr., 912 N.W.2d 652, 660 (Minn. 2018); see Taylor v. Taylor, 329 N.W.2d 795,
798 (Minn. 1983) (“[P]ension benefits are properly to be considered by the trial court in
exercising its discretion in a property division . . . .”).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

GILDEA, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I join the dissent of Justice Hudson.

ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting).
I join the dissent of Justice Hudson.