Alison Margaret Perry, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0031

Alison Margaret Perry,
Respondent,

vs.

Douglas Perry, et al.,
Appellants,

Expert Sheet Metal, Inc., et al.,
Defendants.

Filed November 22, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-19-180

Kenneth M. Wasche, Kenneth M. Wasche, P.C., Blaine, Minnesota (for respondent)

Erik F. Hansen, Elizabeth M. Cadem, Kirk A. Tisher, Burns & Hansen, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Smith, Trac y M., Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge;
and Hooten, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
The stipulated 2010 judg ment dissolving the marriage of Douglas and Alison
Margaret Perry purported to equally divide, among other things, an interest in certain real
property purportedly owned by their then-exi sting family business, Expert Sheet Metal.
2
Title to the real property, however, was actually in Expert Mechanical, a defunct business
solely owned by Douglas Perry that was not addressed by the dissolution judgment. Expert
Mechanical was never formally wound up, and, at the time of the marital dissolution, all
of its assets were being used by Expert Sheet Metal. Afte r the dissolution, Expert Sheet
Metal also ceased operating but, like Expert Mechanical, it was never formally wound up.
In 2019, respondent Alison Margaret Perry filed this separate action seeking to
accomplish the property division attempted by the dissolution judgment. The district court
found that the dissolution judg ment mistakenly identified the owner of the property as
Expert Sheet Metal; found that appellant Douglas Perry1 had treated Expert Mechanical as
his alter ego; and ruled that, by means of an outside reverse pierce of Expert Mechanical’s
corporate veil, even though Expert Mech anical was not a party to the dissolution
proceeding, the dissolution court 2 had properly treated the pr operty as owned by Expert
Sheet Metal. As a result, the district court directed (a) Douglas, on behalf of Expert
Mechanical, to convey the property to Expert Sheet Metal; (b) the formal liquidation of
Expert Sheet Metal; and (c) the division of Expert Sheet Metal’s net proceeds. On the
unique and peculiar facts of this matter, we affirm.

1 Because they share the same last name, we refer to Douglas and A lison Perry by their
first names throughout the rest of this opinion.

2 For clarity, we refer to the district court that entered the dissolu tion judgment as the
“dissolution court” to distinguish it from the district court in the present action.
3
DECISION
We initially note that we cannot read the stipulated dissolution judgment in any way
other than to equally divide the value of the real property at issue. That said, appellants
(Douglas, Expert Mechanical, and the estate of Douglas’s mother 3) make a number of
arguments challenging the district court’s deci sion, including, primarily, that the district
court erred in using an outside, reverse piercing of the corporate veil of Expert Mechanical
to deem the real property at issue to be owned by Expert Sheet Metal.
Generally, to obtain relief on appeal, an appe llant must show that the district court
erred, that the appellant was prejudiced by that error, and that the prejudice to the appealing
party was substantial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored);
Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008) (applying rule 61 in a family
appeal); Hesse v. Hesse , 778 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that appellate
courts ignore prejudicial error when the prejudice is de minimis); see also Katz v. Katz ,
408 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1987) (noting that appellate courts will not reverse a district
court if it reached an affirmable result for the wrong reasons). Here, even if we assume that
the district court erred in applying an outsi de, reverse piercing of Expert Mechanical’s
corporate veil, we conclude that, on this peculiar record, any error is harmless because, no
matter which business owned the property, Alison is entitled to the same interest.

3 Douglas asserted that his deceased mother had an interest in Expert Mechanical, but she
did not appear on Expert Mechanical’s articles of incorporation, and the district court found
that neither Douglas’s deceased mother nor her estate owned the asserted interest.
4
The district court ruled that Expert Sh eet Metal owned the property. Thus, the
district court’s decision was, essentially, a vehicle for implementing the property division
to which Douglas and Alison s tipulated in the 2010 judgment dissolving their marriage.
Accordingly, if we affirm the district court, Alison will receive the interest awarded her in
dissolution judgment. If Douglas is correct, however, and the property was not transferred
to Expert Sheet Metal, the property remained in Expert Mechanical. Expert Mechanical
was not a party to the dissolution proceedi ng, and a district c ourt “lacks personal
jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” Danielson
v. Danielson, 721 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Min n. App. 2006). In this scenario, Douglas claims
that he is entitled to the property because (a ) it is owned by Expert Mechanical, (b) he is
the sole shareholder of Expert Mechanical , and (c) Expert Mechanical purchased the
property before the parties’ marriage.
On this record, we reject Douglas’s argument.4
First, “increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one
or both spouses during their marriage . . . is marital.” Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 650
(Minn. 2008) (quoting Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987)). Thus, any

4 The stipulated dissolution judgment states that Expert Sheet Metal “owns or has an
interest in” the real estate at issue and th at Douglas and Alison “are equally awarded this
property as one of the assets of the busine ss.” Thus, Douglas’s asse rtion in the current
action that, in the dissolution proceeding, the parties did not (attempt to) equally divide the
property is both a fiction and an attempt—nunc pro tunc—to significantly alter the property
division to which he and Alis on stipulated in the judgment dissolving their marriage. Cf.
Erickson v. Erickson, 452 N.W.2d 253, 255-56 (Minn. App. 1990) (noting that dissolution
courts cannot implement or enforce a dissolution judgment in a manner that alters the terms
of that judgment or otherwise alters the parties’ substantive rights).

5
increase in the value of the pr operty occurring during the marriage that is attributable to
the efforts of Douglas and Alis on was marital property. To th e extent the increase in the
value of the property was not divided between the parties in the stipulated dissolution
judgment, that marital property is divisible as “omitted property.” See Searles v. Searles,
420 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1988) (stating that “where a decree makes no division of any
real estate and, indeed, make s no mention of real estate, it would seem the matter of
ownership rights remains to be determined” (footnote omitted)); Neubauer v. Neubauer ,
433 N.W.2d 456, 461 n.1 (Minn. App. 1988) (stating th at pension benefits omitted from
the property division in an otherwise fina l dissolution judgment could be divided as
“omitted property”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 1989); Brink v. Brink, 396 N.W.2d 95, 97
(Minn. App. 1986) (stating that “[w]e are aware of no legal theory under which a party to
a dissolution who unintentionally omits an asset from a property division is considered to
have abandoned his or her rights to that asset”).5 And the dissolution judgment is clear that
the property would be equally divided between Douglas and Alison.6

5 Here, the stipulated dissolution judgment me ntioned the property at issue and purported
to award Douglas and Alison equal interests therein. Thus, the omission here was not from
the judgment but, because of the misidentifi cation of the owner of the property, from the
division of property in the judgment.

6 A recent nonprecedential opinion of this court suggests that the legislature’s enactment
of what is now Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2020), casts doubt on a district court’s ability
to apportion “omitted property” without satisfaction of that statute. See Pooley v. Pooley,
No. A20-1250, 2021 WL 2910246, at *5 (Minn. App. July 12, 2021), rev. granted (Minn.
Sept. 21, 2021). As a nonprecedential opinion, Pooley is not binding. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Additionally, the supreme court accepted review of Pooley. Further,
we believe Pooley is factually distinguishable from the current appeal. Pooley involved
assets intentionally omitted from that dissolution judgment. Id. at *1-2. Here, however, the
6
Second, to the extent Douglas asserts th at he had a nonmarital interest in the
property, when both marital and nonmarital interests exist in th e same asset, “the
nonmarital asset may lose [its nonmarital] status unless the party [claiming the nonmarital
interest] can trace [the nonmarital interest] to a nonmarital source.” Swick v. Swick , 467
N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn. App. 1991) (citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1991).
Here, not only does the stipul ated dissolution judgment lack any reference to the specific
facts necessary to trace an a lleged nonmarital interest in the property, but Douglas and
Alison agreed to divide the property equally. And even if Douglas could trace the existence
of a nonmarital interest, the stipulated dissolution judgment lacks any identification of the
facts necessary to identify the extent of that nonmarital interest. See, e.g., Antone v. Antone,
645 N.W.2d 96, 101-02 (Minn. 2002) (addressi ng how to determine the extent of marital
and nonmarital interests in the same asset). Thus, because the existence and extent of any
nonmarital interest Douglas could claim was insufficiently identifi ed, that nonmarital
interest would be treated as a marital interest and divided as omitted (marital) property.
Third, to the extent Doug las, in the current proceed ing, claims that Expert
Mechanical had an interest in the propert y apart from his and Alison’s marital and
nonmarital interests, he is functionally asserti ng that there was an extramarital interest in
the property. Cf. Danielson, 721 N.W.2d at 339-40 (addressi ng a district court’s options
for addressing situations when a nonparty to a dissolution proceeding has or may have an
interest in an asset in which there is a marital interest, including possible use of the “omitted

stipulated dissolution judgment attempted to divide the property at issue. Under these
circumstances, we are reluctant to follow Pooley’s analysis.
7
property” analysis). Douglas, however, asked the dissolution court to enter judgment on a
stipulation in which he agreed that “[t]he parties [to the dissolution] are equally awarded
this property as one of the assets of the [Expert Sheet Metal].” And, he agreed as part of
the stipulated judgment to make and execut e any documents necessary to implement the
stipulated division of property. Thus, Douglas—the sole shareholder of Expert
Mechanical—either (a) affirmatively waived Expert Mechanical’s separate interest in the
property; or (b) forfeited that interest in the property by failing to assert it in the dissolution
process. See Weitzel v. State, 883 N.W.2d 553, 554 n.1 (Minn. 2016) (distinguishing waiver
from forfeiture). A waiver could have been th e result of negotiating the stipulation. A
waiver could also have been a recognition that then-existing Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 2
(2010), would have allowed the dissolution court, if the disso lution had been litigated, to
award Alison up to half of his nonmarital property. And a forfeiture would have resulted if
Douglas simply made a mistake that he asked neither the dissolution court nor this court to
correct after judgment was entered. The tim e to appeal the 2010 stipulated dissolution
judgment has long since expired. Generally, to appeal a judgment, a party must do so within
60 days of its entry. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd . 1. While there are certain
exceptions to that 60-day appeal period, none of those except ions would render the
stipulated 2010 dissolution judgment appealable now. See id., subd. 2 (listing reasons to
extend the generally applicable appeal time). Further, caselaw is clea r: “Even though the
decision of the trial court in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an appealable order
it is still final after the tim e for appeal has expired.” Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co. , 147
N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. 1966); see Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 626, 631 (Minn. App.
8
2006) (applying this aspect of Dieseth in family law appeal), rev. denied (Minn. May 16,
2006). Thus, whatever the reason for any relinquishment of Ex pert Mechanical’s interest
in the property, the time to alter or correct that relinquishment has expired and it could not
be altered by the district court in this proceeding.
Under these circumstances, whatever the na ture of the original ownership of the
property at issue—marital, Douglas’s nonmar ital, Expert Mechanical’s extramarital, or
some combination thereof—Alison is entitled to the interest awarded her in the dissolution
judgment. As a result, any error by the district court in its an alysis of that ownership was
harmless.
Affirmed.