Christopher Paul Mattson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1540

Christopher Paul Mattson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 21, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-17-2555

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Fi rst Assistant Co unty Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying his petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that the district court erred by refusing to allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant contends that the factual basis for his guilty plea to the
crime of failing to appear for court was not accurate. Because the factual basis was not
sufficient to support the plea, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
This case arises from appellant Christop her Paul Mattson’s absence from district
court on two dates in 2017. On October 31 , 2017, Mattson did not appear for a pretrial
hearing that was scheduled to address matters in four felony cases against him. The district
court continued the hearing until November 2, 2017. When Mattson did not appear for the
second hearing, the district court issued a wa rrant for his arrest. Mattson was arrested in
December 2017, approximately one month later. The state charged Mattson with felony
failure to appear in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.49, subd. 1(a) (2016).
In June 2018, Mattson pleaded guilty to the charge. At the plea hearing, Mattson
provided a factual basis for most elements of the offense by personally admitting to the
elements. Specifically, in response to qu estions from the district court, Mattson
acknowledged that he had previously been charged with a felony, that a district court judge
had informed him that he was required to make all future court appearances in that case,
and that he had known that failing to appear could result in a warrant for his arrest or new
criminal charges. Mattson also acknowledged the complaint’s allegation that he did not

3
appear for court on October 31, 2017, and agreed that he did not appear on November 2,
2017.
With respect to the intent element of th e offense—that he “intentionally fail[ed] to
appear when required”—Matts on did not provide a factua l basis by admitting to the
element. See Minn. Stat. § 609.49, subd. 1(a). Instead, pursuant to the parties’ agreement,
he entered an Alford plea1 whereby he maintained his innocence with regard to that element
but agreed that there was a substantial likelihood that, if the case proceeded to trial, a jury
would find that certain evidence identified by the state was sufficient to prove the element.
To establish the Alford plea on the intent element, th e prosecutor began by reminding
Mattson of a previous trial that Mattson had for a prior failure-t o-appear charge. In that
case, Mattson was found guilty via a bench trial of failing to appear for court on April 18
and 20, 2017. State v. Mattson , No. A18-0952, 2 019 WL 1233556, at *1 (Minn. App.
Mar. 18, 2019). The prosecutor next stated that “the evidence the [s]tate would present in
this file would be similar to th e evidence in that file.” Th e prosecutor then asserted that
the state would have offered the following evid ence in this case: the complaints filed
against Mattson with respect to his underlying charges, which put Mattson on notice that
failing to appear was a crime; the order fo r conditional or unconditional release, which
required Mattson generally to appear for co urt; the court minutes from October 31 and
November 2, 2017, showing th at Mattson did not appear on those dates; and testimony
from the police officer who arrested Mattson, showing that Mattson was arrested on his

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 168 (1970).

4
outstanding warrant in December 2017. In response to a question from the prosecutor,
Mattson agreed that there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would convict him based
on that evidence.
The district court determined that Ma ttson’s guilty plea was supported by sufficient
evidence and accepted the plea. The court sentenced Matts on to prison fo r one year and
one day but stayed execution of the sentence and placed Mattson on probation for four
years.
Mattson petitioned for postconvic tion relief, requesting that the district court vacate
his failure-to-appear conviction and allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. In his petition
and a supporting memorandum, Mattson argued that his guilty plea was invalid because he
did not admit, nor did the evidence establish, th at his failure to appear was intentional.
Specifically, Mattson contended that the factual basis for his plea was insufficient because
it did not establish: (1) that he had actual knowledge of his court dates on October 31 and
November 2, 2017; (2) that he had specific inte nt not to appear; (3) that he, alternatively,
had general intent not to appear; and (4) that he had engaged in a volitional act or omission
that caused him not to appear. He further argued that his plea was invalid because this
court had subsequently reversed his prior co nviction for failing to appear for court in
April 2017 due to insufficient evid ence of the intent element. See Mattson , 2019 WL
1233556, at *2-3 (concluding that the circum stantial evidence was insufficient to support
Mattson’s conviction because the state did not introduce any evidence that Mattson
received notice of his April 2017 court dates).

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The district court denied Mattson’s petitio n. The court found that there was a
sufficient factual basis in the record to s upport a finding that Ma ttson had knowledge of
his October 31 and November 2, 2017 court dates and intentionally failed to appear. The
court reasoned that Mattson had been advised on several occasions that failing to appear
for court was a crime and that his repeated fa ilures to appear for c ourt in April, October,
and November 2017, along with the fact that the warrant for his arrest was outstanding for
a month, either showed his intent not to appear or provided a basis for the court to infer his
intent. The district court also noted that Mattson never claimed lack of notice at the plea
hearing and emphasized that Mattson specif ically acknowledged that the evidence was
sufficient to convict him. The court further rejected Mattson’s contention that the reversal
of his prior failure-to-appear conviction had any bearing on the present case, in part because
this case involves a guilty plea rather than a jury trial.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Mattson challenges the district court’s denial of his postconviction petition to
withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea at any time, even after
sentencing, if “withdrawal is necessary to co rrect a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 15.05, subd. 1. A ma nifest injustice occurs if a plea is not valid. State v. Boecker ,
893 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Minn. 20 17). “To be constitutionally va lid, a guilty plea must be
accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. (quotation omitted). Determining the validity of

6
a guilty plea presents a question of law that we review de novo. Barrow v. State ,
862 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 2015).2
Mattson challenges only the accuracy of his plea. The accuracy requirement is
meant “to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could
be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251
(Minn. 1983). For a guilty plea to be accurate, a proper factual basis must be established
for each element of the offense. State v. Jones, 921 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. App. 2018),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019). Typically, a factual basis is laid by “asking the
defendant to express in his own words what happened.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852,
859 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
In an Alford plea, however, the defendant pleads guilty despite maintaining his
innocence and admits that the st ate has sufficient evidence to convict him of the offense.
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007) (citing Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, 91 S. Ct.
at 168). An “adequate factual basis” for an Alford plea requires “two related components:
[1] a strong factual basis and [2] the defendant’s acknowledgement that the evidence would
be sufficient for a jury to find the de fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

2 The state contends that we should review the validity of Mattson’s plea under the plain
error standard rather than the de novo standard. The state a sserts that plain error is the
appropriate standard of review because Mattson “did nothing to preserve a challenge to the
factual basis for his guilty plea .” But the prevailing law in Minnesota is that appellate
courts apply the de novo standard to review the validity of guilty pleas. State v. Mikulak,
903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017) (“The validity of a guilty plea . . . is a question of law,
which we review de novo.”). And the case law makes no distinction between “preserved”
and “unpreserved” errors. The state has not persuaded us to deviate from the de novo
standard in this case.

7
Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12-13 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21,
2009). The accuracy requirement for an Alford plea is satisfied when “[t]he strong factual
basis and the defendant’s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction
provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability
that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.”3 Theis,
742 N.W.2d at 649. The supreme court has emphasized that a “strong factual basis” is
necessary for an Alford plea “because of the inherent c onflict in pleading guilty while
maintaining innocence.” Id. at 648-49.
Here, Mattson entered a guilty plea to felony failure to appear in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.49, subd. 1(a). Subdivision 1(a) provides:
A person charged with . . . a felony and released from
custody . . . who intentionally fails to appear when required
after having been notified that a failure to appear for a court
appearance is a criminal offense, or after having been released
on an order or condition that th e releasee personally appear
when required with respect to the charge or conviction, is
guilty of a crime for failure to appear . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 609.49, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). An essential element of this offense is
that the defendant intentionally failed to app ear for the court appearance as required.
See 10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 24.21 (2020). Mattson argues that his plea was
not accurate with regard to this element of the offense because the plea record lacks an

3 Mattson contends that the factual basis for his guilty plea must establish his guilt “beyond
a reasonable doubt.” This argument ignores the supreme court’s clear directive that an
Alford plea is accurate when th ere is a “strong probability” that a jury would find the
defendant guilty of the charge. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 (emphasis omitted). The district
court applied the appropriate standard in this case.

8
adequate factual basis to establish that he intentionally failed to appear in court on the days
in question. Because Mattson entered an Alford plea with respect to this element, the
heightened Alford standard applies to our review of his argument.
To act “intentionally,” a defendant must “have knowledge of those facts which are
necessary to make the actor’s conduct crimin al and which are set forth after the word
‘intentionally’” in the applicab le statute. Minn. Stat. § 60 9.02, subd. 9(3) (2016). The
statute in question here provides that a defendant is guilty of felony failure to appear if he,
in relevant part, “intentionally fails to ap pear when required.” Minn. Stat. § 609.49,
subd. 1(a). Applying the above standard to this statutory language indicates that the
defendant must have knowledge of “when” he was “required” to appear in court.
Accordingly, a showing that Mattson had notice of the specific court dates is a prerequisite
to the failure-to-appear offense with which Mattson was charged. We conclude that the
record in this case does not establish that Mattson had such notice.
At the plea hearing, the prosecutor specified that if the case were to go to trial, the
state would have produced th e following evidence to prove that Mattson intentionally
failed to appear for court: the complaints filed against Mattson, which put Mattson on
notice that failing to appear was a crime; the order for conditional or unconditional release,
which required Mattson generally to appear for court; court minutes showing that Mattson
failed to appear for court on October 31 and November 2, 2017; and testimony indicating
that Mattson was arrested on his outstanding warrant in December 2017. Based on this
evidence, it may be reasonabl e to infer that Mattson had general knowledge that he was
required to appear for court in the fall of 201 7. And Mattson’s past actions of failing to

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appear in April 2017, along with the length of time during which he was on warrant status,
make it less likely that Mattson’s failures to a ppear were accidental. But the standard for
reviewing the sufficiency of an Alford plea is relatively high: there needs to be a “ strong
probability” that a jury would find that Ma ttson intentionally failed to appear when
required. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. The evidence, as described by the prosecutor at the
plea hearing, fails to meet that standard. None of the evidence identified by the prosecutor
and discussed with Mattson at the plea hearing included the dates (October 31 or
November 2) that Mattson was required to a ppear. Similarly, none of the evidence
supports a reasonable inference that Mattson actually knew the specific dates on which he
was required to appear. Based on the evidence that the state assert ed it would rely on if
the case were to proceed to trial, we conclude that there is not a strong probability that a
jury would find that Mattson intentionally failed to appear for court.
We are not persuaded otherwise by argum ents raised by th e state to counter
Mattson’s assertion that his plea was inaccurate. First, the state argues that we should infer
that Mattson had notice of his court dates be cause Mattson was represented by counsel at
the plea hearing and Mattson did no t claim at that time that he lacked such notice. The
state’s argument is unconvincing. To establish an adequate factual basis for an Alford plea,
two requirements must be satisfied: (1) a stro ng factual basis, and (2) the defendant’s
acknowledgement that the evid ence would be sufficient for a jury to convict him of the
offense. Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12-13. Mattson’s lack of objection at the plea hearing
regarding the intent element is related to the latter requirement—his acknowledgement that
the identified evidence would be sufficient to convict him. Even where that requirement

10
is met, a defendant’s plea mu st still be supported by a strong factual basis sufficient to
provide the district court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong
probability that the defendant would be convicted. Id. As discussed above, the factual
basis was insufficient to support Mattson’s conviction. Missing wa s any evidence that
Mattson had actual notice of the October 31 a nd November 2 court dates. The state did
not identify any evidence that would support an inference that such notice was provided to
Mattson, either directly or indirectly through his counsel. The factual basis on the intent
element was not adequate to support his plea.
The state next argues that we should uphold the validity of Mattson’s plea because
criminal convictions carry a “presumption of regularity” and Mattson did not present any
new evidence regarding the validity of the plea with his postconviction petition. See, e.g.,
Hooper v. State, 888 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Minn. 2016) (“A petition for postconviction relief
is a collateral attack on a conviction that ca rries a presumption of regularity.” (quotation
omitted)). The state maintains that “the silent record as to whethe r [Mattson] had actual
notice” of his court dates should weigh ag ainst Mattson’s argument that his plea was
invalid. Again, we are not convinced.
It is true that “a defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.”
Boecker, 893 N.W.2d at 350 (quotation omitted). But, as discussed above, the record from
the plea hearing is sufficient by itself to show that the strong-factual-basis standard was
not met in this case. Mattson did not need to provide any additional evidence to the district
court along with his postconviction petition to meet his burden. The plea hearing transcript
speaks for itself. And, contrary to the state’s assertion, the “silence” in the record as to

11
whether Mattson had notice of his court dates shows that the factual basis for Mattson’s
plea failed to establish a key element of the offense: whether Mattson intentionally failed
to appear for court when required. Ma ttson met his burden in the postconviction
proceeding to show that the factual basis of his plea was insufficient.
In sum, we conclude that the factual basis for Mattson’s plea was insufficient and
therefore his plea was not accurate. Accordi ngly, we reverse and remand for the district
court to permit Mattson to withdraw his guilty plea.
Reversed and remanded.