Jerrmaine Winston Knowles, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0363

Jerrmaine Winston Knowles, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 27, 2022
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-13-10054

Jerrmaine Winston Knowles, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying his postconviction petition
to withdraw his guilty plea after determining his petition was untimely and procedurally
barred. Appellant argues that the district court erred because no time limit applies to
2
motions for guilty-plea withdrawal . Alternatively, if his motion is governed by the
postconviction-petition statute, Knowles claims his petition satisfies two exceptions to the
two-year deadline. Because appellant’s motion is an untimely postconviction petition and
neither of the two asserted exceptions apply to Knowles’s petition, we affirm.
FACTS
On December 31, 2013, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jerrmaine
Winston Knowles with identity theft under Minn. Stat. § 609.527 subds. 2, 3(5) (2012)
(eight or more victims). At a plea hearing, the district court heard the parties’ arguments
and testimony in support of Knowles’s Alford plea
1 and scheduled sentencing. Knowles
moved for a downward dispositional departure and contended that if the departure was not
granted, he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Knowles did not appear at the
hearing at which his motion was to be heard, and the district court issued a warrant for
Knowles’s arrest. Knowles was arrested nearly two years later.
At an August 2016 hearing on Knowles’s motion to withdraw his plea, the district
court determined the plea was “ knowing, voluntary, intelligent, and supported by an
adequate factual basis” and denied the motion. At a later hearing, the district court accepted
the plea and imposed a sentence of 108 months in prison. In February 2017, the district
court ordered Knowles to pay $11,000 in restitution to 11 victims.

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (holding that a court may
constitutionally accept a defendant’s guilty plea even though the defendant maintains their
innocence).
3
Knowles appealed, challenging the validity of his plea, his criminal- history score,
and the restitution award, among other issues. State v. Knowles, No. A17-0004, 2017 WL
6273124, at * 2-6 (Minn. App. Dec. 11, 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2018). This
court affirmed, determining that Knowles’s Alford plea was valid and that the district court
did not err in calculating his criminal-history score or in awarding restitution. Id. at *3-7.
In December 2021, Knowles again moved to withdraw his plea. The state argued
that Knowles’s motion was an untimely postconviction petition and , alternatively, was
procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976). The district
court determined that Knowles’s motion was a postconviction petition that was “time
barred and procedurally invalid” because his “claims were, or could have been, addressed
in his direct appeal, and no exception to the time bar applie[d].”
Knowles appeals.2
DECISION
We review the denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. Colbert
v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. 2015). In doing so, we review legal issues de novo
and factual findings for clear error. Id. The postconviction court “abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

2 Knowles submitted an untimely reply brief along with a motion to accept the late brief,
which this court granted. Knowles v. State, No. A22-0363 (Minn. App. Sept. 29, 2022)
(order). This matter was submitted to this court for decision on October 3, 2022. Id.
4
Knowles raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether his plea was invalid because it
was not “accurate ” or “intelligent”; (2) whether his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel; and (3) whether the district court lacked jurisdiction to accept his
plea. The state argues Knowles’s postconviction petition is untimely and procedurally
barred. Because the timeliness of Knowles’s postconviction petition is dispositive, we
address this issue first and need not decide whether Knowles’s claims are also procedurally
barred under Knaffla.
Minnesota law permits persons convicted of a crime to seek postconviction relief
when they claim, among other things, that the conviction violates their “rights under the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1)
(2020). Petitioners must file postconviction petitions within two years of their conviction
or sentence, or of their direct appeal’s final disposition, whichever is later. Id., subd. 4(a)
(2020).
The district court determined Knowles’s petition was untimely because more than
two years had elapsed since his direct appeal’s disposition became final. The supreme court
denied review of Knowles’s first appeal on February 28, 2018. And that disposition became
final 90 days later on May 29, 2018. See Moua v. State, 778 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 2010)
(holding that a disposition was final 90 days after entry of judgment). Two years after the
final disposition in Knowles’s direct appeal was May 29, 2020. Knowles filed the motion
giving rise to this appeal on December 14, 2021. Thus, Knowles’s motion was untimely
under the postconviction statute.
5
Knowles first argues he filed a motion for plea withdrawal under Minn. R. Crim. P.
15.05, subd. 1, which, he contends, does not have a time limit, and he appears to imply that
the two-year postconviction deadline does not apply to his claims. Knowles’s brief to this
court cites no legal authority for this contention, so we decline to consider it. Nelson v.
State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 859 n.2 (Minn. 2016) (declining to consider a postconviction claim
“lacking supporting argument or authority unless prejudicial error appears obvious upon
inspection of the record”).3
Alternatively, Knowles contends his motion is timely as a postconviction petition
under two exceptions to the two-year time limit. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2020)
(providing five exceptions to the postconviction-petition time limit ). We address these
exceptions in turn.
First, Knowles relies on subdivision 4(b)(2), which allows review of postconviction
claims asserting newly discovered evidence “that could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence” within the two-year time limit and “is not for impeachment
purposes.” Knowles argues that in presenting the factual basis for his Alford plea, the state
summarized anticipated testimony by S.L., who, Knowles claims, was later convicted of
identity theft. Even if we assume evidence of S .L.’s conviction was neither known nor
could have been ascertained until after Knowles’s direct appeal, the purported new

3 We also note that no prejudicial error is obvious. While Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd.
1, allows a motion to withdraw a plea “at any time” to correct a manifest injustice,
Knowles’s manifest-injustice claim was raised and decided in Knowles’s first appeal,
Knowles, 2017 WL 6273124, at *3. Thus, it is Knaffla-barred. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741
(holding that claims raised on direct appeal, or claims that were known or should have been
known but were not raised on direct appeal, are procedurally barred).
6
evidence merely challenges S.L.’s credibility. We therefore reject Knowles’s claim to this
exception because S.L.’s conviction was rel evant only for impeachment purposes. Id.,
subd. 4(b)(2).
Second, Knowles relies on subdivision 4(b)(3), which permits review of
postconviction claims asserting a new interpretation of constitutional law by the United
States Supreme Court or a Minnesota appellate court when the interpretation is
retroactively applicable to the petitioner. Knowles relies on Mattson v. State, No.
A20-1540, 2021 WL 2528457 (Minn. App. June 21, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24,
2021). Knowles argues that Mattson held that an Alford plea cannot be supported by
circumstantial evidence. We disagree, in part because Mattson is nonprecedential and ,
therefore, not a binding interpretation of law . Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c)
(“Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions are not binding authority . . . .”).
Knowles also incorrectly analyzes the Mattson opinion, where this court reversed
the district court after determining that the factual basis for Mattson’s Alford plea was
insufficient. Mattson, 2021 WL 2528457, at *5. Although this court noted that the
circumstantial evidence could not support Mattson’s conviction, our opinion does not state
that circumstantial evidence cannot support an Alford plea. Id. at *2 (citing State v.
Mattson, No. A18-0952, 2019 WL 1233556, at *2-3 (Minn. App. Mar. 18, 2019)). Instead,
this court emphasized that “a ‘strong factual basis’ is necessary for an Alford plea.” Id. at
*3 (quoting State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007)). This same standard was
cited to and applied by this court in Knowles’s direct appeal. Knowles, 2017 WL 6273124,
at *2. Thus, we reject Knowles’s claim that the new-interpretation-of-law exception applies
7
to his late petition because no applicable new rule on circumstantial evidence was
announced in Mattson.
Because we conclude that Knowles’s motion is an untimely postconviction petition,
we need not determine whether Knowles’s claims are also procedurally barred under
Knaffla.
Affirmed.