In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0069

In re the Marriage of:

Katherine Ann Reichert, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Matthew Alan Born,
Respondent,

County of Dakota,
Intervenor.

Filed August 9, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-15-696

Richard D. Crabb, Hill Crabb, LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant)

Matthew A. Born, Elko New Market, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In this post-dissolution matter, appellant argues that the district court erred by
(1) denying her motion to compel discove ry regarding several financial matters,
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(2) rejecting her request to change the children’s therapy provider, (3) denying her request
for an order directing respondent to reimbur se her for certain ex tracurricular-activity
expenses, (4) refusing to order respondent to authorize release of child-protection records,
and (5) denying her motion for conduct-based attorney fees. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Katherine Reichert (mother) a nd respondent Matthew Born (father) were
married for twelve years and have three minor children, born in 2 006, 2009, and 2012.
Their marriage was dissolved by a dissolution judgment in June 2015. The dissolution
judgment awarded mother and father joint legal and joint physical custody of the children,
subject to a 5-2-2-5 parenting-time schedule.1
Given that both parents are members of th e armed services, the dissolution judgment
reflects an agreement by mother and father that, in the event either parent is deployed, the
parenting time schedule will temporarily cha nge, and child support will correspondingly
increase for the deployed pare nt. The dissolution judgment prospectively addressed an
anticipated three-month deployment for father in the summer of 2015, and it calculated and
ordered his temporary basic child-support obligation for that time period.
Additionally, the dissolution judgment specifies that fa ther will keep the children
on his health-insurance coverage provided through his employer. Regarding the children’s
expenses, mother and father were ordered to share “any agreed upon extracurricular
activity fees, sports fees, sports equipment, school fees, school lunches, school supplies,

1 With a 5-2-2-5 parenting schedule, each parent has two consecutive overnights with
children on weeknights and parents alternate weekends with children.
3
musical lessons,” and other similar expenses, provided the parties agreed to the costs and
activities in advance. For such expenses, th e dissolution judgment requires the parties to
“promptly notify the other parent of the expense.”
In October 2015, the disso lution judgment was amended by stipulation to include a
provision that the children rema in in their current school in Lakeville unless mother and
father agree otherwise in writing, and a provis ion that the parents bring their children to
therapy at Life Development Resources (LDR) in Lakeville.
Since the issuance of the di ssolution judgment, mother and father have had a highly
contentious relationship and ha ve struggled with cooperative co-parenting. They have
appeared before the district court on numer ous occasions and file d voluminous motions,
affidavits, and other documents. 2 The district court has accordingly issued a series of
orders, but we summarize only the most relevant here.
In July 2017, the district court issued an order denying several motions by mother,
including a request that father pay expens es incurred for the ch ildren’s extracurricular
activities in 2016 and 2017. Abou t a year later, in July 2018, the district court issued an
order modifying child support, which sets forth father’s curre nt support obligation. In
January 2020, the district court issued an or der that discussed a pending child-protection

2 The district court’s orders and the record suggest that mother, in particular, has had
persistent difficulty abiding by court orders and cooperatively engaging in co-parenting.
The district court has held mother in contem pt for violating the dissolution judgment and
has ordered mother to complete a psychological evaluation. In one order, the district court
noted that it was “struck by Mo ther’s lack of self-control as exhibited by her constant
interruptions and attacks on Father in a Court setting.”

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case opened in Carver County after school personnel reported concern about the youngest
child’s behavior following an incident with mother. 3 In light of the pending child-
protection matter, the district court ordered that the children remain in father’s care on a
temporary basis and that mother be allowed supervised parenting time.
Shortly thereafter, on Februa ry 7, 2020, the district c ourt issued a detailed order
modifying parenting time 4 and addressing numerous motio ns by mother and father.
Relevant here, the order denied mother’s re quest for modification of child support and
parental income for determinin g child support calculations (P ICS) retroactive to 2015.
Mother’s modification request was based on allegations that father had misrepresented and
concealed his military income for the past four years. The district court addressed these
allegations, evaluated the evidence in the record on father’s military income for 2015-2018,
and determined that the allegations were without merit.
In April, May, and June of 2020, mothe r, representing herself, filed another series
of motions with hundreds of pages of affidav its and exhibits attached. Her April motion
requested that the district court compel father to disclose certain financial documents, as
she repeated her allegations that father ha d engaged in “ongoing fraud and intentional
misrepresentation.” Her May and June motions requested that father be held in contempt

3 Another order banned mother from the childre n’s school due to threatening behavior
towards staff.

4 The district court modified parenting time such that father has the children during the
school week, and mother has them from 6:00 p.m. on Fridays until 7:00 p.m. on Sundays.
The district court found this modification to be in the best interests of the children,
primarily because mother had struggled to get them to school on Mondays, which resulted
in a report of educational neglect to child protection services.
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for allegedly violating numerous provisions of the dissolutio n judgment and other court
orders throughout the past several years.
The parties appeared for a hearing on July 8, 2020. At the beginning of the hearing,
the district court struck all of mother’s pending motions, stating:
At this time, the Court is striking all of those motions from the
calendar. They are improperly be fore the Court, they are an
abuse of process, and quite frankly, they are abusive to [father].
All of those motions have already been decided on the merits,
including the motions for alleged contempt and the motions to
compel.

The district court commented that mother had inappropriate ly filed over 800 documents
and, as a result, ordered that any new motions filed by mother must not exceed two pages,
with supporting affidavits not to exceed seven pa ges. The district court also ordered that
mother not file any motions concerning matters already decided.
Mother then retained new counsel and filed several more motions in August 2020.
Specifically, mother requested that the district court (1) amend its July 8, 2020 order to
compel father to answer her discovery requests, to compel father to enroll the children in
Family Innovations therapy, an d to compel father to reim burse her for extracurricular-
activity expenses incurred over the last four years; (2) order father to place the children on
his health insurance pursuant to the dissolution judgment; (3) order father to sign an
authorization for the release of various child-protection documents; and (4) order father to
pay her attorney fees.
Father filed several responsive motions, in cluding requests that the district court
(1) order mutual exchange of income docu mentation from the previous year (2019);
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(2) compel mother’s co operation in changing the children’s health and dental insurance
back to his plan, as mother had unilaterally changed their coverage; and (3) order that
counseling for the children continue at LDR in Lakeville, scheduled by father.
The district court held a hearing on th ese motions in September 2020. Several
months later, the district court issued an order denying all of mother’s motions, except her
request that the children be placed back on father’s health insurance, which father had also
requested.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother raises five issues on appeal. She asserts that “[t]he primary issue is [the]
District Court’s refusal to compel [father] to comply with [her] formal discovery requests.”
The other four issues concern th e district court’s refusal to order the following: that the
children be enrolled in therapy at Family Innovations, that father reimburse mother for
extracurricular expenses, that father sign an authorization “for the release of the safety plan
issue[d] . . . by Carver County Child Protection Services,” and that father pay mother “her
total attorney’s fees that she has incurred to date.”
At the outset, we must clarify that “[t]he function of the court of appeals is limited
to identifying errors and then correcting them.” Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210
(Minn. 1988); see Nelson v. Schlener , 859 N.W.2d 288, 294 (Minn. 2015). “[E]rror is
never presumed[, and] . . . the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon
it.” Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944); see Braith v. Fischer, 632
N.W.2d 716, 724 (Minn. App. 2001) (applying this concept in a family-law appeal), review
7
denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be
ignored). “It is not w ithin the province of appe llate courts to determine issues of fact on
appeal.” Fontaine v. Steen, 759 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Thus, we “neither reconcile conflicting eviden ce nor decide issues of witness credibility,
which are exclusively the province of the factfinder.” Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512,
514 (Minn. App. 2004). With these principl es in mind, we assess each of mother’s
arguments under the applicable standards of appellate review.
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying mother’s motion to
compel discovery regarding several financial matters.

District courts have broad discretion to grant or deny discovery requests and will
not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Shetka v. Kueppers, Kueppers, Von
Feldt & Salmen , 454 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. 1990); Gunnufson v. Onan Corp. , 450
N.W.2d 179, 181 (Minn. App. 1990). A district court abus es its discretion if it makes
findings of fact that are not supported by th e record, misapplies the law, or resolves the
matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on the record. Dobrin v. Dobrin,
569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
Rule 26.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provides the scope of
discovery for civil cases. Under the rule, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(b). Rule 37. 01(b) allows a party seeking
8
discovery to move the district court for an order compelling a discovery response and
appropriate sanctions.5
In her April 2020 motion, and again in her August 2020 motion for reconsideration
of the July 8, 2020 order, mother requested that father be ordere d to disclose certain
financial documents that she had formally requested from him. Specifically, she requested
that father disclose his federal and state income tax returns for tax years 2015 to 2018, his
retirement account withdrawals from January 1, 2015, to May 1, 2019, and documentation
of any additional income received from 2015 to 2019. She also requested that he disclose
his military Leave and Earning statements ( LES statements) from January 1, 2015, to
June 30, 2015, and his military Point and Credit Accounting Reporting System (PCARS)
report.
The district court denied mother’s mo tion to compel discovery, noting that the
motions rehash mother’s “perennial claim” that father has “perpetrated fraud upon the
Court regarding his 2015 to 2019 income and deployment.” Explaining that “[t]he issues
surrounding [father’s] income from 2015 to 2019 were addressed and ruled on by this Court

5 Additionally, Minnesota Statutes section 518A.28(b) (2020) provides that when a child-
support order is in effect, a party may requir e the other party to pr oduce a copy of “the
[other] party’s complete federal tax returns for the preceding year that were filed with the
Internal Revenue Service” or, “if the [other] party’s federal tax returns have not been filed
for that year,” the party’s 1099 form, W-2 form, or K-1 form. “A request under this
paragraph may not be made more than once every two years, in the absence of good cause.”
Minn. Stat. § 518A.28(b). But mother never invoked this statute in her pursuit of father’s
tax returns. Father, on the other hand, in voked section 518A.28(b) in his August 2020
responsive motions to request that the distri ct court order mutual exchange of income
documentation from 2019, and the district court granted his request.

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in its February 7, 2019, order,” the district court concluded that no relevant issue or claim
was pending that would support granting mother’s discovery requests.
On appeal, mother essen tially argues that the distri ct court erred because the
requests were relevant to proving that fa ther has committed “chronic fraud upon the
Court.”6 She seems to concede that her discovery requests were not related to any pending
claim or issue, such as a motion to modify child support or parenting time. Instead, she
argues that, because the district court previously rejected her allegations of fraud for “lack
of evidence,” the district court should have then perm itted her to obtain additional
evidence.7
Mother’s arguments are without merit. She previously made the same fraud
allegations when she requested retroactive modification of father’s basic child support and

6 In discussing her allegations of “chronic fr aud,” mother brings up disputes that were
addressed by the district court in previous orders and that are not properly before this court
on appeal. For instance, she be lieves father owes her money to repair water damage to
their marital homestead and that the dissolution property settlement ought to be reopened.
The district court addressed the water-damage issue in its February 7, 2020 order, holding
that the water damage occurred and was known to the parties prior to the dissolution and
was specifically addressed in the dissolution judgment, and th at mother’s reimbursement
request was a request for improper modification of the dissolution judgment.

7 Mother cites Mathias v. Mathias, 365 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Minn. App. 1985), to support
her proposition, but that case is distinguishable. There, th e parent requesting discovery
had sought modification of a child-support or der based on specific statutory grounds.
Mathias, 365 N.W.2d at 296. Following the district court’s denial of the discovery request,
we held that the parent was entitled to “reasonable discovery” of specific financial records
before a motion hearing, because “[a]n opposite result would effectively nullify motions
for modified support and maintenance beca use the movant would be unable to obtain
information necessary to meet statutory requirements.” Id. at 297. Here, there was no
motion for child-support modification pending, and there were significant questions as to
whether the discovery mother requested was reas onable, especially in light of the district
court’s previous rulings.
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PICS calculations, and the dist rict court addressed the allegations its February 7, 2020
order and rejected her modification request. In doing so, the district court examined the
evidence in the record on fath er’s military income for 2 015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 and
determined that mother had not alleged or pointed to any anything suggesting fraud. And
as father notes, the parties ex changed substantial income info rmation prior to the district
court’s July 27, 2018 order modifying child support, including father’s 2015 income tax
return, 2016 and 2017 W-2 forms, and recent LES statements.
Regarding the military LES statements mo ther now requests, these statements are
for a period of time largely preceding the disso lution (January 1, 2015, to June 30, 2015).
Mother asserts that father represented that his military income was $925 per month in June
2015, but that an LES stat ement from November 2015 showed a year-to-date average
monthly income of $3,750.76. But the reco rd shows that father’s military service and
upcoming 2015 deployment were a topic of substantial discussion and negotiation prior to
the dissolution, where both parties were repr esented by counsel, as reflected in the
dissolution judgment. The dissolution judgment specifically contemplates that father’s
military income was about to rise substantially to around $9,233 per month. Thus, as the
district court determined, mother’s assertions about the difference between father’s June
2015 military income and his November 2015 LES report in no way suggest a
misrepresentation or concealme nt by father that would entitle mother to pursue a fraud
claim as the basis for obtaining additional discovery.
Regarding the PCARS report, mother asserts that “this information is relevant to a
determination of [father’s] military duties.” She does not explain, though, how the report
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is relevant to any pending claim or defense in this matter. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(b).
And father represents that the PCARS report pertains to retirement calculations and points
for duties performed, which are irrelevant to the case because the dissolution judgment
does not include any division of military pensions. We discer n no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s decision to deny mother’s request for the PCARS report.
As for the retirement-account withdrawal requests, mother asserts that “this
evidence will possibly prove that [father] had withdrawn $32,000 from his IRA in
contemplation of the parties’ dissolution” and “goes directly to the issue of reopening the
property settlement.” But mother did not bring a motion to reopen the property settlement,
and nothing suggests that she could do so now. “A decree of dissolution of marriage or of
legal separation is final when entered, subj ect to the right of appeal.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.145, subd. 1 (2020). Wh ile a court may relieve a party of a marital-dissolution
judgment and decree under certain circumstances, including a “fraud upon the court,” id.,
subd. 2 (2020), mother has not sufficiently alleged that such fraud occurred here. 8 See
Maranda v. Maranda , 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn. 1989) (holding that a fraud on the
court as “an intentional course of material misrepresentation or non-disclosure, having the
result of misleading the court and opposing counsel and making the property settlement

8 Although a motion to reopen a judgment for ordinary fraud must be brought within one
year of the judgment, no such limit applies to motions to reopen for a “fraud upon the
court.” Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (provi ding that the subdivis ion does not limit the
court’s power to set aside a judg ment for a fraud upon the court); see also Doering v.
Doering, 629 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Mi nn. App. 2001) (holding that ordinary fraud is the
proper standard for motions brought within one year of the judgment), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 11, 2001).
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grossly unfair”). Accordingly, she has not shown that the district court abused its discretion
by refusing to order that father produce a ll of his retirement account withdrawals from
January 1, 2015, to May 1, 2019.
In sum, the district court correctly held that mother failed to show how her discovery
requests were relevant to any claim or defense and proportiona l to the needs of the case.
See Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(b). Thus, mother has shown neither error by the district court
nor resulting prejudice to her re garding her discovery requests, and we affirm the district
court on this point. See Waters, 13 N.W.2d at 464-65.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in denying mother’s motion to
change the location of the children’s therapy provider.

Next, mother challenges the district c ourt’s denial of her motion to enroll the
children in therapy at Family Innovations. The district court awarded the parties joint legal
custody, meaning that they have “equal righ ts and responsibilities” regarding the child’s
medical care. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (2020). Generally, questions of child
custody are discretionary with the district court. See Christensen v. Healey, 913 N.W.2d
437, 443 (Minn. 2018) (noting that “a distri ct court has broad discretion in determining
custody and parenting time”); Novak v. Novak, 446 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. App. 1989)
(noting that “the law makes no distinction between general determinations of custody and
resolution of specific issu es of custodial care”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989). As
noted, a district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that are not supported
by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to
logic and the facts on record. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d at 202. Here , mother argues that the
13
district court based its decision on several erroneous factual findings, specifically, that the
children had been attending therapy at LDR, that the children had developed strong
relationships with their counselors, and that mother’s request for a change in location was
based solely on her convenience.
“Appellate courts set aside a district court’s findings of fact only if clearly
erroneous, giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness
credibility.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Mi nn. 2008). “Findings of
fact are clearly erroneous where an appellate court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The dissolution judgment, as amended by s tipulation of the parties, specifies that
the children are to attend therapy at LDR in La keville. Mother requested that the therapy
location change to Family Innovations in Eden Prairie and, for support, submitted her own
affidavit representing that father had “unilaterally canceled” several appointments at LDR.
Father submitted a responsive affidavit stating that no changes in circumstances supported
changing the children’s therapy from LDR, that the children had developed strong
relationships with their counselors, and that LDR’s close proximity to the children’s school
provides necessary scheduling flexibility. Father communicated that he was working to
continue therapy at LDR despite recent hurdles , specifically, that mother had unilaterally
removed the children from his healthcare cove rage and that mother had attempted to
transfer therapy to Family Innovations. He attached to his af fidavit correspondence
between him and mother that generally supported his account.
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In examining the competing affidavits, the district court necessarily made credibility
determinations. “[Appellate courts] defer to the district court’s credibility determinations
as to conflicting affidavits.” Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Minn. App. 2016).
Further, as previously noted, appellate courts “neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor
decide issues of witness credibility, which are exclusively the province of the factfinder.”
Gada, 684 N.W.2d at 514. Here, the district court’s findings that mother challenges on
appeal are supported by the evidence in the record, including father’s sworn statements and
attached correspondence with mother. An d on appeal, mother makes only conclusory
allegations of error, without citations to the record or to caselaw. See Ganguli v. Univ. of
Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (declining to address allegations
unsupported by legal analysis or citation). Ultimately, she has not shown clear error by the
district court in regards to its therapy-related findings, see Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284,
and we see no reversible error in the district court’s refusal to alter the therapy arrangement
provided for in the dissolution judgment.
III. The district court did not abuse its dis cretion by denying mother’s request that
father reimburse her for certain extracurricular-activity expenses.

Mother requested that the district court or der father to reimburse her for “his share
of the children’s extracurricular activities.” Payment for a child’s extracurricular activities
is in the nature of child support. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 4 (2020) (defining “basic
support” to include expenses related to the child’s care); cf. McNulty v. McNulty , 495
N.W.2d 471, 473 (Minn. App. 1993) (affirming the district court’s decision that significant
expenses for a child’s extracurricular activities can support an upward deviation from the
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presumptively-appropriate guideline support obligation), review denied (Minn. Apr. 12,
1993). A district court’s decisions regarding child support are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009). And a district court abuses its
discretion if it makes findings of fact that are not supported by the record, misapplies the
law, or resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record.
Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d at 202. Here, mother argue s that the district court’s “findings
regarding this issue are wholly unsupported by the record.” Again, this court reviews the
district court’s factual findings for clear error. Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284.
The dissolution judgment provides that mo ther and father are to share “any agreed
upon extracurricular ac tivity fees, sports fees, sports equipment, school fees, school
lunches, school supplies, musical lessons,” and other such expenses. It limits the parties’
obligations, though, to “those costs and activi ties to which they consent in advance,” and
directs that any party who incurs expenses “s hall promptly notify the other parent of the
expense.”
It is not clear to us from the record what specific expenses mother seeks; she asserted
in her May motion that father had violated the dissolution judgment “spanning 2016-2019,
for not reimbursing his 50% cost share to [mother] for agreed u pon extracurricular
activities (music, sports, swim lessons).” In her attached affidavit, she referenced several
activities, such as floor hockey in 2017, mu sic lessons in 2016 to 2017, and swimming
lessons in 2018 to 2019, and asserted father agreed to these activities beforehand or
implicitly agreed by bringing the children to them. In her subsequent motion for
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reconsideration, she attached an affidavit specifying that she was requesting $1,194.50 for
the 2016 to 2017 music lessons, 2017 floor hockey, and 2018 to 2019 swimming lessons.
The district court denied mother’s reque sts because they were untimely and were
not supported by the record. The district court also observed that mother failed to note the
specific amount of each expense, which child it pertained to, and whether father agreed in
advance to the expense.
Mother has not demonstrated that the dist rict court abused its discretion by denying
her request for extracurricular-activity fees. As the district court explained, mother’s
requests lacked specificity. Moreover, her requests primarily regarded reimbursement for
activities that occurred in 2016 to 2017, and the district c ourt previously addressed and
denied a motion that she brough t for the same extracurricular-a ctivity expenses in a July
2017 order.9 The district court’s conclusion that mother’s renewed expense requests were
untimely is well supported by the record. And again, on appeal, mother makes only
conclusory allegations of error with out any citations to the record. See Ganguli , 512
N.W.2d at 919 n.1. She has met neither her burden of showing error by the district court
nor prejudice arising from any alleged error regarding the expense-reimbursement requests.
See Waters, 13 N.W.2d at 464-65.

9 It appears that a key point of contention in 2016 and 2017 was th at mother enrolled the
children in activities in Chaska when their school was in Lakeville, and father wanted them
enrolled in activities in th eir own school district. The dist rict court addressed this in its
July 2017 order, instructing that the children’s after-school activities take place in Lakeville
unless otherwise agreed to in writing by both mother and father.
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IV. The district court properly declined to order father to authorize release of
certain child-protection records.

Next, mother argues that the district cour t erred by denying her request that father
authorize release of certain child-protection records—specifically, a safety plan from May
2020. She argues that the district court’s “review of this issue is flawed, in that [the district
court] has not reviewed the matter at all.”
Contrary to mother’s assertion of erro r, the district court did review the issue
regarding the child-protection records. The di strict court found that the Carver County
child-protection case, which it had discussed in previous orders, was opened in response to
an allegation of educational neglect against mo ther after she failed to bring the youngest
child to school. The district court also found that Carver County closed the file “due to the
family being open to Scott C ounty Child Protection and findi ng the issues Mother raised
were best addressed in Family Court.” In closing the case, Carver County mentioned a
“safety plan,” but the district court conclu ded mother had not shown a basis to compel
father to release any information not already available to mother because mother provided
“no information based on [the youngest child’s] behavior or best in terest to support a
change of custody motion.”
The record supports the district court’s findings about the origin and the closure of
the Carver County child-protection matter. In a May 2020 letter to father, Carver County
Health and Human Services stated that it was closing the case and mentioned that “a safety
plan was made.” Father wrote back to the county requesting clarification about any “safety
plan” on file, and indicated he intended to share that information with mother. The county
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replied that “a formal safe ty plan was not written up as a separate document, however
safety was addressed through ongoing discussions.”
On appeal, mother reiterate s that the “safety plan issu ed against [father] in May
2020 is the very evidence that [mother] needs in order to establish a basis for a change of
custody motion.” But the record shows that no formal safety plan was issued and, as the
district court found, mother points to no evidence, such as changes in the children’s
behavior, that would support a change-of-cus tody motion. Accordin gly, mother has not
shown error by the district court regarding the records-authorization request.
V. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying mother’s request for
conduct-based attorney fees.

Finally, mother argues that the district court erred by failing to award her “all
attorney’s fees that she ha s incurred for the duration of this case,” under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.14, subd. 1 (2020), which she represents total $173,076.06.
Section 518.14, subdivision 1, provides that “Nothing in this section . . . precludes
the court from awarding, in its discretion, additional fees, costs, and disbursements against
a party who unreasonably contribut es to the length or expense of the proceeding.” The
fees provided for in this section are typically referred to as “conduct-based fees.” Madden
v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 702 (Minn. App. 2019).10 The party seeking conduct-based
fees has the burden to show that the othe r party unreasonably in creased the length or

10 Neither party addresses whether section 518.14 provides a substantive basis for an award
of conduct-based attorney fees. In the abse nce of briefing on the subject, we assume
without deciding that the statute provides a proper basis for such an award. See Madden,
923 N.W.2d at 702 (assuming without deciding the same matter).
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expense of the proceeding. Baertsch v. Baertsch, 886 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Minn. App. 2016).
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision whether to award conduct-based fees for
an abuse of discretion. See Sharp v. Bilbro , 614 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. App. 2000),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000). As noted above, a district court abuses its discretion
if it makes findings of fact that are not sup ported by the record, mi sapplies the law, or
resolves the matter in a manner that is c ontrary to logic and the facts on record. Dobrin,
569 N.W.2d at 202.
Mother supports her request for conduct-ba sed attorney fees with her allegation that
father has engaged in “fraudulent behavior” fo r “five-plus years.” The district court
quickly dismissed this request in its order, stating that mother is the party who has
continued to move the court to determine matters already decided or that are irrelevant, and
that there is no basis to award her conduct-based attorney fees.
Mother argues that the district court ab used its discretion because when a record
appears to support a co nduct-based fee award, a district court cannot deny a motion for
attorney fees without making specific findings; she points to Kronick v. Kronick in support
of her position. 482 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Minn. App. 1992) (concluding the district court
erred by failing to make proper findings in de nying requested attorney fees). Here, the
district court did not make specific findings in regards to the fee request beyond noting that
mother’s fraud allegations had already been decided in anot her order, and that “mother
continues to [move] the Court on matters th at have been determined already or are
irrelevant.”
20
Even so, the district court incorporat ed its earlier February 7, 2019 order by
reference, and that order addresses mother’s fraud allegations in detail and finds them
meritless. Given that mother’s basis for th e attorney-fees request was the same fraud
allegation that the court had previously reject ed, we discern no error by the district court
in denying her request without issuing more specific findings. Mother has not shown that
the district court abused its discretion by declining to award conduct-based attorney fees.
Affirmed.