In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1653

In the Marriage of:

Katherine Ann Reichert, f/k/a Katherine Ann Born, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Matthew Alan Born,
Respondent,

County of Carver,
Intervenor.

Filed May 19, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-FA-22-193

Shirlene Perrin, Perrin Law Office, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Matthew A. Born, Elko New Market, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Schmidt ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant-mother Katherine Ann Reichert argues the district court abused its
discretion when it denied her motion to modify custody without an evidentiary hearing.
2
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that mother failed to allege
a prima facie case to modify custody, we affirm.
FACTS
Reichert and respondent-father Matthew Alan Born were married in 2003. They
have three children together. Reichert and Born filed their stipulated dissolution agreement
in 2015, in which they agreed to joint legal and joint physical custody of their children.
About four months later, the first motion to modify the agreement was filed, which led to
years of litigation. 1 The last custody dispute ended with the district court denying both
parties’ motions for temporary sole legal and temporary sole physical custody.
In January 2024, their youngest child handed a teacher a concerning note related to
the child’s mental health. After this incident, Reichert and Born disagreed about the child’s
care. Reichert filed a motion to: modify custody by awarding her sole physical and legal
custody, order Born to stop using child protection services as a tool for harassment, and
modify child support. Alternatively, Reichert sought to change the parenting schedule.
Reichert filed an affidavit in support of her motion. Reichert also filed a motion asking
that Born be found in contempt for failing to obey a prior judgment.
Born opposed Reichert’s motions. He also cross-motioned to request modification
of the parenting schedule and a judgment to enforce payment from an earlier order.

1 As this court noted in a prior appeal involving these parties: “Since the issuance of the
dissolution judgment, mother and father have had a highly contentious relationship and
have struggled with cooperative co-parenting. They have appeared before the district court
on numerous occasions and filed voluminous motions, affidavits, and other documents.”
Reichert v. Born, No. A21-0069, 2021 WL 3478425, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 9, 2021).
3
The district court held a non-evidentiary hearing on the motions. The court denied
Reichert’s custody and parenting time modification and contempt motions but granted
Reichert’s motion for an order requiring that neither party shall use Child Protection
Services to harass each other. The district court denied Born’s motion. Reichert appeals.2
DECISION
A district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to modify custody if
the movant “ makes a prima facie case for modification.” Goldman v. Greenwood,
748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008). The district court ruled that Reichert’s allegations
supporting her motion to modify custody repeated her prior allegations or were too general
to allow the court to modify custody. Accordingly, the court ruled Reichert failed to allege
a prima facie case to modify custody and denied her motion without an evidentiary hearing.
We use a three-part process to review a district court’s decision to deny, without an
evidentiary hearing, a motion to modify custody:
First, we review de novo whether the district court properly
treated the allegations in the moving party’s affidavits as true,
disregarded the contrary allegations in the nonmoving party’s
affidavits, and considered only the explanatory allegations in
the nonmoving party’s affidavits. Second, we review for an
abuse of discretion the district court’s determination as to the
existence of a prima facie case for the modification or
restriction. Finally, we review de novo whether the district
court properly determined the need for an evidentiary hearing.

2 Born did not appeal the denial of his motion.
4
Boland v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. App. 2011). 3 Reichert challenges the
district court’s ruling that she failed to allege a prima facie case to modify custody.
A movant makes a prima facie case for relief “by alleging facts that, if true, would
provide sufficient grounds for modification.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 507
(Minn. 2022); see also Tousignant v. St. Louis County, 615 N.W.2d 53, 59 (Minn. 2000)
(noting a prima facie case is “one that prevails in the absence of evidence invalidating it”)
(quotation omitted)). The allegations necessary to allege a prima facie case for relief
depends on the relief the movant seeks. See Braylock v. Jesson, 819 N.W.2d 585, 590 n.2
(Minn. 2012) (noting that “prima facie case” is a term of art that “does not always carry
the same meaning in every context[,]” but “may vary depending on the nature of the
proceedings, the type of action involved, and the stage of the litigation”). But whatever
relief is sought, a prima facie case is not alleged if the allegations are merely conclusory,
“too vague to support a finding,” or not “supported by any specific, credible evidence.”
Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted).
Reichert based her motion to modify custody on allegations that the child was
endangered because Born engaged in parental alienation. A prima facie case for an
endangerment-based modification of custody requires the movant to allege:

3 Citing Griese v. Kamp, Reichert argues the standard of review for the prima facie showing
is de novo. 666 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2003).
Reichert is incorrect. I n Griese, we applied a de novo standard because the district court
did not treat the allegations in the moving party’s affidavit as true—i.e., Griese addressed
the first step in the review process recited in Boland. Id. at 407. Our review of a district
court’s determination as to whether the moving party alleged a prima facie case to modify
custody—i.e., the second step in the process recited in Boland—remains whether the court
abused its discretion. Boland, 800 N.W.2d at 185.
5
(1) circumstances have changed involving the child or
custodial parent; (2) the modification would be in the best
interests of the child; (3) the child’s physical or emotional
health or emotional development is endangered by his or her
present environment; and (4) that harm associated with the
proposed change in custody would be outweighed by the
benefits of the change.

Id. at 291-92 (quotation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) (2024) (allowing the third
element of this test to be satisfied if “the child’s present environment endangers the child’s
physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development and the harm
likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change
to the child”). Further, the movant must allege a “significant” change in circumstances
that has occurred since custody was awarded or last modified. See Geibe v. Geibe,
571 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. App. 1997). Appellate courts review a district court’s ruling
regarding whether a movant alleges a prima facie case to modify custody for an abuse of
discretion. Boland, 800 N.W.2d at 185.
Reichert has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in ruling
that the allegations supporting her current motion had been previously raised or were too
general to require an evidentiary hearing. Reichert contends that her allegations of false
child protection reports, the youngest child’s mental health events, and Born’s refusal to
follow medical advice for that child had not been previously raised to the district court.
The record, however, shows that these issues had been previously raised to the district
court. Reichert also has not shown how her current allegations constitute “significant[ly]”
changed circumstances, as required by Geibe, rather than an allegation of the continuation
of preexisting circumstances. 571 N.W.2d at 778.
6
Reichert also argues that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that her
allegations were too general or conclusory. But Reichert’s current allegations did not
present specific facts to establish a significant degree of danger. Instead, the allegations of
a lack of communication or calling Reichert by her first name (instead of a maternal title)
amount to general co-parenting disagreements. Absent more, Reichert has not shown that
the district court abused its discretion by ruling Reichert’s allegations were too general.
Finally, Reichert contends that the district court improperly relied on Geibe as
requiring a significant degree of danger. In Geibe, a stepmother 4 sought custody of the
child of her deceased husband’s former marriage, alleging the child’s birth mother kept the
child from her paternal relatives, verbally berated the child with insults, and physically
assaulted the child. Id. at 776. The district court dismissed the petition without an
evidentiary hearing because it determined the stepmother failed to state a prima facie case
of endangerment. Id. at 777. In affirming the district court’s dismissal, this court noted
the general standard that: “Endangerment requires a showing of a significant degree of
danger, but the danger may be purely to emotional development.” Id. at 778 ( quotation
and citation omitted). Thus, the district court, here, appropriately relied upon Geibe in
articulating the standard for endangerment.
Reichert attempts to distinguish Geibe, arguing that the emotional harm she alleged
is different from the one incident of alleged abuse in Geibe. But Geibe involved more than

4 Reichert asserts that Geibe is distinguishable because that case involved a stepparent, not
a biological parent. See 571 N.W.2d at 778. But the standard for a prima facie case “is the
same whether the moving party is a parent or non-parent.” Id.
7
one incident and the allegations in Geibe of emotional harm and isolation from relatives,
id. at 176, are comparable to Reichert’s accusations of emotional harm and isolation.
Reichert also cites two cases for the proposition that contradictory, mitigating
affidavits justify an evidentiary hearing. But when reviewing a district court’s
determination that a movant did not make a prima facie case to modify custody, this court
reviews whether the district court “disregarded the contrary allegations in the nonmoving
party’s affidavits, and considered only the explanatory allegations in the nonmoving
party’s affidavits.” Boland, 800 N.W.2d at 185. Thus, to the extent Reichert’s argument
is based on contrary allegations of the nonmoving party, we reject the argument. Moreover,
the two cases that Reichert cites are distinguishable. In one case, this court reversed for an
evidentiary hearing because the district court “already found a change in circumstances and
modification is in the [children’s] best interest.” Harkema v. Harkema, 474 N.W.2d 10,
14 (Minn. App. 1991). In the other case, we reversed for an evidentiary hearing because
the moving parties’ affidavit had allegations that, if true, “establish[ed] a change of
circumstances justifying an evidentiary hearing.” Larson v. Larson, 400 N.W.2d 379, 381-
82 (Minn. App. 1987). That there were conflicting affidavits in each case was not the
reason we reversed and remanded for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. See
id.; Harkema, 474 N.W.2d at 14.
Based on the parties’ history of litigation and the district court’s determination that
Reichert’s affidavit did not establish a change of circumstances, the court did not abuse its
discretion by dismissing Reichert’s motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.