State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0126

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Donald Anthony Jackson,
Appellant.

Filed November 8, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-20-1146

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Pete Orput , Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
SYLLABUS
In the context of a speedy -trial analysis, n either the state nor the defendant is
responsible for the delay in bringing a defendant to trial when that delay is solely due to
public-safety concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for felony violation of a domestic -abuse
no-contact order, arguing that the commencement of his jury trial 77 days after he
demanded a speedy trial violated the Sixth Amendment t o the United States Constitution.
Because the district court delayed commencing the trial solely because of the COVID -19
pandemic, was prohibited from conducting jury trials by order of the Chief Justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, and could not have safely conducted a jury trial at an earlier
date, we conclude that no constitutional violation occurred and affirm the conviction.
FACTS
On March 12, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Donald
Anthony Jackson with violation of a domestic -abuse no -contact order. The complaint
contained allegations that Jackson violated the order four days earlier when he sent
threatening text messages to the protected party. Jackson was arrested the following day
and remained in custody throughout the proceedings.
On March 20, in response to the COVID -19 pandemic, the Chief Justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court issued an order that prohibited the commencement of new jury
trials. Continuing Operations of the Courts of the State of Minnesota Under a Statewide
Peacetime Declaration of Emergency , No. ADM20 -8001 (Minn. Mar. 20, 2020). The
Chief Justice extended this jury-trial-suspension order through July 6, except for a limited
number of pilot programs. Order Governing the Operations of the Minnesota Judicial
Branch Under Emergency Executive Order Nos. 20 -53, 20-56, No. ADM20-8001 (Minn.
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May 15, 2020). The Minnesota Judicial Council then allowed district courts to resume jury
trials upon the submission and approval of plans to safely conduct jury trials.1 Minnesota
Judicial Branch COVID-19 Preparation Plan, Minn. Jud. Council (May 15, 2020); June
16, 2020, Judicial Council Meeting Minutes, Minn. Jud. Council (June 25, 2020).
Jackson invoked his right to a speedy trial at his May 18 omnibus hearing. The
district court scheduled an initial trial date of July 6 , 49 days after the entry of the
speedy-trial demand. When the parties appeared on July 6, the district court had not yet
received approval to restart jury trials and therefore found good cause to delay Jackson’s
trial to August 3, 77 days after the initial speedy-trial demand. The district court explained
that it anticipated that it would be approved to restart jury trials by August 3.
The jury trial did in fact commence on August 3 and took place over two days. The
jury found Jackson guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 33-months’
imprisonment. Jackson appeals.
ISSUE
Was Jackson’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial violated?

ANALYSIS
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides an accused “the
right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. am end. VI; see also Minn. Const. art. 1,

1 The Minnesota Judicial Council has the authority to promulgate administrative policies
across the Minnesota judicial branch. See In re Establishing Judicial Council , No.
ADM-04-8003 (Minn. Dec. 10, 2004) (order). The judicial branch has the authority to
ensure the performance of basic judicial functions. See Clerk of Court’s Comp. for Lyon
Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty. Comm’rs, 241 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. 1976).
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§ 6. “Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a constitutional question
subject to de novo review.” State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017).
“[T]he central question we must answer when assessing a Sixth Amendment speedy
trial claim is this: Did the State bring the accused to trial quickly enough so as not to
endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protects?” State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d
230, 244 (Minn. 2021) . “While the speedy trial right protects the individual interests of
the accused, the speed with which an accused must be brought to trial must be considered
with regard to the practical administration of justice.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Criminal
prosecutions are designed to move at a deliberate pace to protect the rights of the accused
and to ensure the ability of society to protect itself by allowing for thorough and prepared
prosecutions; whether a trial is prompt enough must be assessed in light of both interests.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional
analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
522 (1972). “Accordingly, whether delay in completi ng a prosecution amounts to an
unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends on the circumstances.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d
at 244 (quotation omitted).
In determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated,
Minnesota courts apply the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker. State v. Windish,
590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). The four factors are:
(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his
right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
None of these factors are dispositive ; “[r]ather, they are related factors and must be
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considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” State v. Taylor,
869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). “ This balancing test
allows the court to accommodate the sometimes competing interests between the orderly
prosecution of crimes that is fair to both sides and the prompt resoluti on of the case by
trial.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 245.
This is not a check -the-box, prescriptive analysis; rather, we
assess how the factors interact with each other in a difficult and
sensitive balancing process to answer the essential question of
whether the State brought the accused to trial quickly enough
to avoid endangering the values that the right to a speedy trial
protects.

Id. (quotation omitted).
A. Length of the Delay
We begin by considering the length of the delay. Jackson argues that presumptive
prejudice occurred because more than 60 days elapsed between the date that he pleaded
not guilty and he entered his speedy -trial demand and the date that his trial commenced .
“A defendant must be tried as soon as possible after entry of a plea oth er than guilty. . . .
[T]he trial must start within 60 days unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). The supreme court has interpreted this rule “to mean that
delays beyond the 60-day limit simply raise the presumption that a violation has occurred
and require the trial court to conduct a further inquiry to determine if there has been a
violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.” State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 513
(Minn. 1989). “We determine whether good cause exists for a later trial date under Rule
11.09 by applying the Barker factors.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 246 (quotation omitted).
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Jackson correctly notes that 77 days elapsed between the date that he demanded a
speedy trial and the commencement of his trial. But the “threshold conclusion that a delay
is presumptively prejudicial does not end our consideration of the length of the delay in the
weighing of the Barker factors.” Id. at 250. We instead consider the reasons for the delay,
noting that “a longer delay may be justified if there are good reasons for the delay.” Id.
B. Reason for the Delay
We next consider who bears responsibility for the delay. The parties agree that the
delay in this case i s solely attributable to the COVID -19 pandemic. They also agree that
Jackson’s trial commenced on the earliest possible date that the district court was
authorized by the Judicial Council to resume jury trials with adequate safety precautions
for all participants, including jurors.
Jackson argues that the state is responsible for the delay because the Chief Justice
prohibited the commencement of jury trials until the adoption and approval of adequate
safety precautions. We disagree. “[I]f there is good cause for the delay —for instance, a
key witness of the State is unavoidably unavailable or the government takes a good faith,
well-supported appeal from a pretrial ruling—the delay will not be held against the State.”
Id. at 251. Here, the circumstances of the pandemic in July 2020 rendered a trial unsafe
and did not reflect a deliberate attempt by the state to hamper the defense. Jackson’s 77-day
wait after invoking his speedy -trial demand was unavoidable. Accordingly, we hold that
neither Jackson nor the state are responsible for the delay in commencing the trial when
that delay occurred solely because of public -safety concerns due to the COVID -19
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pandemic and when the district court was prohibited from holding a jury trial by order of
the Chief Justice.
Indeed, the district court specifically found that good cause existed to delay
Jackson’s trial because the district court “couldn’t have a trial if [it] wanted to” due to the
COVID-19 pandemic and concerns about the ability to conduct a safe jury tri al. Other
jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion: “‘The Court’s current and continued
inability to hold trials in a way that does not put the public, the parties, court staff and
counsel at serious risk’ is a good -faith and reasonable justificati on for the delay in this
matter.” State v. Rodriguez, No. 1811005093, 2021 WL 1221461, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct.
Mar. 30, 2021) (quoting United States v. Smith, 494 F. Supp. 3d 772, 781 (E.D. Cal. 2020)).
Accordingly, the short delay in commencing Jackson’ s trial pending the
implementation and approval of adequate COVID -19 safety measures to protect the
participants and the public is not attributable to either party.
C. Assertion of the Speedy-Trial Right
We next consider the nature of the assertion of the speedy-trial right. Although a
“defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in
determining whether the defendant was deprived of the right,” the inquiry “is necessarily
contextual.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 2 52 (quotation omitted). Minnesota courts consider
“other signals in the case to assess whether a demand for a speedy trial is serious,” id., and
consider “the frequency and force of a demand,” which is likely to reflect the “seriousness
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and extent of the prejudice which has resulted” from an alleged violation , Friberg, 435
N.W.2d at 515.
Here, Jackson asserted his demand for a speedy trial simultaneous with his entry of
his not -guilty plea. When Jackson appeared for trial 49 days later, his counsel note d
Jackson’s previous entry of a speedy-trial demand, asked for a change in release conditions,
and requested the district court to set a jury-trial date. The state asked the district court to
find the existence of good cause to extend the trial date “in v iew of the pandemic, which
not only makes trial at this time impractical, it make s it in violation of the Order of the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who has said that trials shall not proceed at this time,
other than in the pilot counties. ” The state argued that “a trial simply cannot occur right
now due to these unusual circumstances.” Jackson’s counsel did not object to such a
finding or otherwise respond to the state’s request or argument. From the bench, the district
court found good cause to delay the trial:
I am going to make a finding that, as the specific articulations
by [counsel], they are all true. We couldn’t have a trial if we
wanted to have a trial today, or Mr. Jackson demanded that he
have a trial today. Also, it’s true that our cou rt is not one of
the pilot projects. We don’t have the ability to try a case until
we’re certified that we’re “COVID -Ready” for social
distancing and for protection of jurors and citizens. We have
not received that protection or that certification yet. . . . So I
am going to find there’s good cause.

Jackson’s counsel then noted that “ [t]he rule provides that the trial is to happen within 60
days of the demand at the omnibus hearing [and] we’re at Day 49 right now.” Counsel
then stated that “Mr. Jackson does continue to assert his demand for speedy trial.”
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We do not question whether Jackson’s demand for speedy trial was serious —
Jackson asserted his demand throughout the proceedings. But the context of the demand
illustrates that all parties were aware that a safe trial could not occur within the 60 -day
period because of the pandemic and that the earliest possible date to commence Jackson’s
jury trial was August 3. These circumstances weaken the strength of Jackson’s demand
for a speedy trial in our overall balancing.
D. Prejudice Due to the Delay
We next consider whether Jackson was prejudiced by the delay, focusing on three
interests: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 253 (quotation omitted). An impairment of the defense
is the “most serious” of these interests and is typically “suggested by memory loss by
witnesses or witness unavailability.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20 (quotation omitted).
Jackson argues that he was prejudiced by the delay because he suffered anxiety from
oppressive pretrial incarceration during the pandemic. But Jackson concedes that “[i]f a
defendant is already in custody for another offense . . . the first two interests [oppressive
pretrial incarceration and anxiety] are not implicated.” Id.
Here, Jackson was already in custody for other , unrelated offenses. He does not
argue that the delay in commencing his tr ial impaired his defense to the charge. Jackson
therefore fails to assert any cognizable prejudice associated with the delay.
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E. Balancing the Factors
Finally, we conduct “the delicate and sensitive balancing required to answer”
whether the state brought Jackson to trial “quickly enough so as not to endanger the values
that the speedy trial right protects.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 255. The supreme court,
extrapolating from the Barker factors, identified “a series of commonsense questions . . . to
determine whether the values embedded in the speedy trial right were protected.” Id. at
244-45. These questions are:
Who is responsible for the delay? Is the justification for the
delay good or bad? Is the length of the delay consistent with,
and proportionate to, the justification for the delay? Were the
defendant’s interests harmed by the delay itself and did that
harm increase as the delay lengthened? Was the defendant
serious about getting to trial promptly, which is good evidence
that he perceived the delay as harmful?

Id. at 245.
Here, Jackson’s trial did not occur within 60 days following his speedy-trial demand
for one reason: a trial could not occur within that time period. The order of the Chief
Justice and requirements set forth by the Judicial Council recognized that certain safety
protocols must be implemented to conduct a safe trial for all participants, including court
employees, lawyers, witnesses, jurors, and Jackson himself. Jackson’s trial occurred at the
earliest possible date that safety protocols could be put in place, 77 days after he demanded
a speedy trial (or 17 days after the expiration of the 60-day speedy-trial deadline).
Neither Jackson nor the state are responsible for this COVID-19-caused delay. The
delay was justified by the pandemic . The length of the delay is consistent with, and
proportionate to, the justification for the delay. Jackson’s interests were not harmed by the
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17-day delay itself. Any harm to Jackson did not incr ease over the 17 -day period. And
Jackson did not establish any particular harm associated with the delay before the district
court. Accordingly, the 77 -day time frame in bringing Jackson to trial did not endanger
the values that the speedy-trial right protects.2
DECISION
Jackson’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated when his trial
was delayed 17 days beyond the 60 -day speedy -trial window because of public -safety
concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Affirmed.

2 Jackson, in his pro se supplemental brief, primarily asserts the same speedy -trial
argument as counsel, and we do not repeat our analysis of issues related to his speedy-trial
demand.
Jackson also summarily claims in his supplemental brief that his due-process rights
were violated. This argument appears to stem from his inability to afford the bail bond and
his associated pretrial incarceration. This argument is without merit. “The amount of bail
to be fixed in a particular case rests within the discretion of the trial court and its
determination will not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v.
Martin, 743 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). On appeal, Jackson does
not establish any abuse of discretion by the district court , and we discern none. And even
if Jackson had established an abuse of discretion , he did not appeal the order setting the
conditions of his release. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 2(2)(a) . H is due-process
bail-bond argument is now moot. See State v. LeDoux, 770 N.W.2d 504, 510 (Minn. 2009)
(“Generally, issues of bail are considered moot after conviction.”).