Andrew Will Alexander, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0213

Andrew Will Alexander, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 27, 2021
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-18045

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that th e postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily
denying his postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty plea because he received
ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel did not inform him of the possibility of
2
collaterally challeng ing a prior implied -consent license revocation for enha ncement
purposes. Appellant also argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2013, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Andrew Will Alexander
with driving while impaired (DWI), driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) over
0.08 within two hours, and careless driving. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, arguing that the police unconstitutionally expanded the scope of the stop and that
the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. The district court denied appellant’s motion
to suppress, determining that the stop and expansion of the stop were constitutional. On
the day of the trial, the state requested a continuance, which the district court denied. The
district court dismissed the case without prejudice , and the state did not file new charges.
Appellant never challenged the implied -consent license revocation (first qualified prior -
impaired-driving incident) based on the same conduct underlying the criminal charge.
Appellant received another implied -consent license revocation in 2017, with an
accompanying criminal case (82 -CR-17-4571) (sec ond qualified prior -impaired-driving
incident) that was pending at the time of this current offense. In January 2018, the district
court convicted appellant of a gross misdemeanor DWI (07-CR-16-3241) (third qualified
prior-impaired-driving incident) arisi ng from a n incident different than the second prior
qualified incident.
In July 2018, a police officer arrested appellant for suspicion of driving under the
influence after observing signs of intoxication and appellant failing a preliminary breath
test. A subsequent breath test at the police station revealed a BAC of 0.11. The state
3
charged appellant with one count of felony DWI (current offense) based on the three
qualified prior-impaired-driving incidents within ten years. The complaint noted the
dismissal of the 2013 DWI charge but identified the three qualified prior-impaired-driving
incidents.
At appellant’s first appearance for the current offense , his counsel noted that “at
least one of the prior DWI’s [sic] was dismissed, but [appellant] did not challenge the
implied consent, and so therefore ended up having an implied consent on his record that is
now being used to enhance this case. But given the di smissal, that may have been [] able
to have been dismissed.”
On September 10, 2018, appellant waived his trial rights and pleaded guilty to the
current offense. At the hearing, appellant stated on the record that his mind was clear, “no
one coerced” him, and that he understood “[e]very little bit” of the proceedings. Appellant
also stated on the record that the 2013 implied -consent license revocation for operating a
vehicle with a BAC over 0.08 was correct and that the qualified prior-impaired-driving
incidents were all within ten years of the current offense. The district court then imposed
a 36 -month sentence, which represents a downward duration al departure from the 54 -
month presumptive sentence.
On September 3, 2020, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, requesting
to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant argued solely that his counsel provided him
ineffective assistance by not informing him that he could have collaterally challenged the
state’s use of his first qualified prior-impaired-driving incident. He also requ ested an
evidentiary hearing. On December 22, 2020, the district court denied appellant’s petition
4
without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that his collateral -challenge claim was
meritless and that therefore his counsel’s performance was not ineffective. This appeal
follows.
DECISION
I. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s
postconviction request to withdraw his guilty plea.

Appellant argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his
postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty plea as unintelligent and involuntary because
his counsel provided ineffective assistance by not informing him that he could collaterally
challenge the state’s use of his first qualified prior-impaired-driving incident. We disagree.
A person is guilty of first-degree felony DWI if that person “commits the violation
within ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents.”
Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2018) ; Minn. Stat. § 169A.20 (2018) (defining DWI
crimes). A “qualified prior i mpaired driving incident” means “prior impaired driving
convictions and prior impaired driving-related losses of license.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.03,
subd. 22 (2018) (emphasis added). This includes implied-consent license revocations. Id.,
subd. 21(a)(1) (2018).
We review a denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Crow v.
State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 2019). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record, or exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Id. (quotation
5
omitted). We review the “postconviction court’ s legal determinations de novo, and its
factual findings for clear error.” Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017).
Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd . 1, a postconviction court must allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. A
manifest injustice exists when a plea is not constitutionally valid because it is not accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A guilty
plea is not voluntary and intelligent if the defendant’s counsel’s advice fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57, 106 S. Ct. 366,
369 (1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064
(1984)). The constitutional validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that this court
reviews de novo. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
Under Strickland, the petitioner must prov e both that (1) his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that , but for the alleged errors of his counsel, he would not have
pleaded guilty. Id.; see State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 1994). If a claim fails
to satisfy the first Strickland requirement, we need not consider the second requirement.
State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017).
“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an
attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney
would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 266 -67
(Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). “[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s
performance was reasonable.” Andersen v. State , 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).
6
“Counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have
legitimately concluded would not prevail.” Wright v. State , 765 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Minn.
2009).
Appellant contends that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness solely because his counsel did not inform him that “he could have
collaterally challenged the state’s use of the implied-consent revocation.” But this
contention lacks merit because ( 1) neither appellant’s petition nor his brief articulate a
previously recognized basis on w hich to collaterally challenge his first implied -consent
revocation and (2) caselaw indicates that his counsel could have legitimately concluded
that collaterally attacking that revocation would not prevail.
Collateral attacks on prior offenses for enhance ment purposes are disfavored
because they “weaken the finality of judgments.” State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798
(Minn. 1988). Accordingly, “a collateral attack will be allowed only in unique cases.” Id.
These “unique cases” have been limited to cons titutional violations. See, e.g. , id.
(considering uncounseled guilty plea); State v. Mellet, 642 N.W.2d 779, 789 (Minn. App.
2002) (considering license revocation obtained after alleged lack of opportunity to consult
counsel), review denied (Minn. July 1 6, 2020); Anderson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 878
N.W.2d 926, 930 (Minn. App. 2016) (noting that fact that Anderson was found mentally
incompetent at time of revocations may constitute unique case in which he may collaterally
attack revocations).
Appellant acknowledges that these “unique cases” in which collateral attacks are
permitted have been “largely limited to uncounseled guilty pleas or some license
7
revocations obtained in violation of the defendant’s limited right to counsel prior to taking
a breath t est” but argues “they have never been expressly limited to that context.” See
Mellet, 642 N.W.2d at 789. Appellant does not argue that his circumstances fit previously
recognized “unique cases ,” but essentially argues that objectively reasonable counsel
would have advised him of the possibility of arguing a new unique case.
Appellant argues that his circumstances could establish a “unique case” because
(1) he had no opportunity to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to su ppress,
finding the stop constitutional; (2) he labored under the mistaken belief that “if he went to
trial on the DWI and won, the implied-consent revocation would also go away;” and (3) his
young age.
First, it is unclear how appellant’s opportunity to appeal a motion to suppress in the
dismissed criminal proceeding would factor into making his case “unique.” Appellant did
not successfully show that his constitutional rights had been violated . A nd the adverse
decision on his motion to suppress in the criminal proceeding did not prevent appellant
from challenging the license revocation in a separate civil proceeding.
Second, even accepting as true appellant’s mistaken belief, it does not explain why
he did not challenge the implied-consent revocation. Accepting his allegation as true, he
mistakenly believed that winning at trial on the criminal charges would make the implied-
consent revocation “go away.” His mistaken belief was not that the implied -consent
revocation would be resolved in his favor if the district court dismissed the criminal case
without prejudice before trial.
8
Third, appellant appears to suggest that Anderson provides support that his young
age could serve as a circumstance making this a “unique case.” 878 N.W.2d at 930. But
in Anderson, the defendant had been found mentally incompetent to stand trial and was
committed as mentally ill during the criminal DWI proceedings. Id. Anderson raised the
issue outside of a collateral attack for enhancement purposes and, consequently, this court
expressed no opinion on the outcome of a future collateral attack. Id. But the facts here,
of a 21-year-old’s misunderstanding of the law, are significantly different from a case in
which the defendant was found mentally incompetent to stand trial for the criminal
proceedings.
Because appellant’s counsel “could have legitimately concluded” that this collateral
attack would not prevail, his performance was not objectively unreasonable. Wright, 765
N.W.2d at 91. And because failure to satisfy either Strickland prong is dispositive, the
postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s petition based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d at 591.
II. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s
petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant also argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying
his petition without an evidentiary hearing , and he requests that we remand for an
evidentiary hearing. “[T]o receive an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant is required to allege facts that, if proven by a
fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the two -prong [Strickland] test.” State
v. Nicks , 831 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). Because appellant
9
cannot meet the Strickland test, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by
denying his request.
Affirmed.