Michael Olson, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0426

Michael Olson,
Relator,

vs.

Schneiderman’s Furniture Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed December 13, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 40661985-3

Howard L. Bolter, Bolter Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator)

Schneiderman’s Furniture Inc., Meadowlands, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Relator Michael Olson challenges the decision of the unemployment law judge
(ULJ) that he is ineligible for unemployment benefits becau se he quit his job without a
good reason caused by his employer. We affirm.
FACTS
Olson was a full-time sales manager w ith Schneiderman’s Furniture Inc.
(Schneiderman’s). Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, he began working from home in
March 2020. His remote job responsibilities were to “maintain communication and updates
for existing customers that had already purchased [furniture], to facilitate and . . . schedule
garage-drop delivery when merchandise was re ceived and landed, [and] to monitor and
facilitate sales for e-commerce vi a a chat system.” In earl y April 2020, Sc hneiderman’s
noted that Olson was not adequately comple ting his remote tasks and addressed these
concerns with him. Olson responded that he had a good-faith basis for refusing to facilitate
certain customer exchanges: he was concerned about compliance with statewide COVID-
19 laws and his personal liability for potential violations.
Olson’s concerns were further exacerbated by an “April Fools” themed email that a
warehouse manager sent to office staff around the same time. The email showed multiple
warehouse staff standing shoulder-to-shoulder without personal protective equipment. In
an apparent reference to the governor’s emergency executive order, which required
Minnesotans to stay at home, the body of the email read, “Working from ‘home base’
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today. Unloaded 400 pieces of furniture with the crew. Does this count?” See Emerg.
Exec. Order No. 20-20, Directing Minnesotans to Stay at Home (Mar. 25, 2020).
In mid-April 2020, a customer sought to return a couch and used the online chat
function to request a pickup. Olson refused to assist the customer based on his belief that
doing so would violate another executive order issued to address the pandemic. See Emerg.
Exec. Order No. 20-33, Extending Stay at Home Order and Temporary Closure of Bars,
Restaurants, and Other Places of Public Accommodation (Apr. 8, 2020). Ultimately,
another employee facilitated the customer’s request.
Olson notified human resources (HR) of his concerns about the April Fools email
and “other actions and commen ts by management.” HR a nd management assured Olson
that, despite lapses in judgment by indivi dual employees, the company was addressing
issues as they arose and following statewide COVID-19 safety protocols.
Nonetheless, Olson stopped performing his job duties on April 17, 2020. On
April 21 and 22, 2020 , Olson notified the Minnesota Oc cupational Safety and Health
Administration (MnOSHA), the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), and
the State Critical Sectors hotline of his conc erns. Then, he emailed the store manager
stating that he would “not ta ke part in current company practices” until representatives
from MnOSHA, the BCA, and the Minnesota Department of Public Safety determined that
Schneiderman’s was fully complying with the stay-at-home order.
Olson received an email response from MnOSHA confirming that some of the
company’s activities were permissible under the order as “minimum basic operations.” But
the Critical Sectors hotline responded that pick ing up furniture return s—an activity that
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Schneiderman’s continued, a nd that Olson was asked to facilitate via the online chat
system—was not allowed under the order.
In late April, the governor issued anot her executive order, which provided new
guidance to businesses. See Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-40, Allowing Workers in Certain
Non-Critical Sectors to Re turn to Safe Workplaces (Apr. 24, 2020). Under that order,
Schneiderman’s qualified as a non-critical ex empt business and was permitted to resume
certain in-person activities. The company plan ned to reopen stores to customers with
appointments on May 1, 2020.
On April 27, 2020, Olson’s store manager emailed him. The email ordered him to
resume his remote work by the end of the day or the company would presume that he had
voluntarily resigned. Olson wa s also given the option of re turning to in-person work on
May 1, 2020, or taking a 30-day unpaid leave. Olson responded that he was not quitting,
but that he “refused to facilitate and support illegal activities.” He did not return to his
online work or report to the store on May 1, 2020.
Olson applied for and initially receive d unemployment benefits. But an
administrative clerk at the Minnesota De partment of Employment and Economic
Development (DEED) issued a determination of ineligibility, concl uding that Olson had
quit his position for personal reasons and therefore was in eligible for unemployment
benefits.
Olson appealed the determination and had an evidentiary hearing before a ULJ. The
ULJ determined that Olson ha d quit his position and, in any event, “any error made by
Schneiderman [sic] in following Covid-19 gui delines was not so adverse that it would
5
compel the average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed.” Thus, the ULJ
concluded that Olson was ine ligible to receive unemploymen t benefits. Olson requested
reconsideration of the decision, and on rec onsideration, the ULJ affirmed the previous
determination of ineligibility.
Olson appeals.
DECISION
When reviewing the decision of the ULJ, this court may affirm the decision, remand
it for further proceedings, or reverse or modify it if the substantial rights of the relator have
been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are “(1) in
violation of constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the department; (3) made upon unlawful proc edure; (4) affected by other error of law;
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).
Olson argues that the UL J erred in determining that he is ineligible for
unemployment benefits because he quit his job without a good reason caused by his
employer. We view “the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the decision,
giving deference to the credibility determinations made by the ULJ. In doing so, we will
not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when th e evidence substantially sustains them.”
Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc. , 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. Ap p. 2006) (citations omitted).
But we apply de novo review “to the ULJ’s interpretation of the unemployment statutes
and to the ultimate question whether an app licant is eligible to receive unemployment
benefits.” Menyweather v. Fedtech, Inc., 872 N.W.2d 543, 545 (Minn. App. 2015).
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As an initial matter, Olson contends that he did not quit his position, but, instead,
was discharged by his employer. Under Minnesota law, “[a] discharge from employment
occurs when any words or actions by an em ployer would lead a reasonable employee to
believe that the employer will no longer allo w the employee to work for the employer in
any capacity.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, su bd. 5(a) (2020). Conversely, an employee
voluntarily quits when he exercises his free-will to leave or stop working. Anson v. Fisher
Amusement Corp., 93 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 1958). “Whether an employee has been
discharged or voluntarily quit is a questio n of fact subject to our deference.” Stassen v.
Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC, 814 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Minn. App. 2012).
The ULJ found that, “[while] there is evidence showing that Olson and his manager
argued over whether he quit or was discharged or may be eligible for an unpaid leave after
April 27, 2020, the evidence shows that Olson made the decision to end the employment
at the time the employment ende d on April 27, 2020,” and that this decision was a quit.
The evidence substantially sust ains the ULJ’s finding that Olson quit. Olson stopped
working on April 17, 2020. His manager told him that a refusal to resume his remote work
by April 27, 2020, would be deemed a vol untary resignation. An d he never resumed
working. We accordingly reject Olson’s argument that he was discharged.
Olson next argues that the ULJ erred in concluding that he quit without a good
reason caused by his employer. He contends that his employer’s unsafe practices, which
endangered employees a nd potentially subjected him to criminal liability under the
governor’s orders, compelled him to quit his employment.
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Whether an applicant had a good reason to quit caused by the employer is a legal
question, which this court reviews de novo. Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr. , 614
N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000). An employee who voluntarily quits employment is
ineligible for unemployment be nefits unless “the applicant quit the employment because
of a good reason caused by the employer.” Mi nn. Stat. § 268.095, su bd. 1(1) (2020). A
good reason caused by the employer is a reas on “(1) that is directly related to the
employment and for which the employer is respons ible; (2) that is adverse to the worker;
and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed
rather than remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(a)(1)-(3) (2020). “To compel” is
“to cause or bring about by force, threats, or overwhelming pressure.” Werner v. Med. Pros.
LLC, 782 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 321 (9th
ed. 2009)), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010).
The standard is an objective, reasonable- person standard, considering the conduct
of an ordinarily prudent person. Id. It assumes that the wo rker is “average” and not
“supersensitive.” Nichols v. Reliant Eng’g & Mfg ., 720 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Minn. App.
2006). And the circumstances causing an employee to quit with good cause must be “real,
not imaginary, substantial not trifling, and reasonable, not whimsical;” the reason for the
quit must be compelling and necessitous. Ferguson v. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 247 N.W.2d
895, 900 n.5 (Minn. 1976) (quotation omitted). The statutory analysis “must be applied to
the specific facts of each case.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(b) (2020).1

1 For the first time on appeal, Olson argues that we should depart from the statutory
standard for determining whether an empl oyee quit for a good reason caused by an
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The reason why an individual quit employme nt is a fact question for the ULJ to
determine. See Beyer v. Heavy Duty Air, Inc. , 393 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn. App. 1986)
(reviewing determination of reason employee quit as a question of fact). Here, the ULJ
determined that the “evidence show[ed] that Olson quit because he felt the employer was
engaging in illegal activities and he could be he ld responsible for thes e violations.” We
defer to this factual finding as we are required to do.
Notwithstanding Olson’s belief that Schnei derman’s was not complying with the
governor’s orders, the ULJ’s factual findings—which are well founded on the record—do
not establish that he was subjected to adve rse conditions that would have compelled an
average reasonable worker to quit. First, Olson was not adversely affected by the perceived

employer. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (2 020). Olson notes that a March 16,
2020 executive order suspended “strict compliance” with Chapter 268. See Emerg. Exec.
Order No. 20-05, Providing Immediate Relief to Em ployers & Unemployed Workers
During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (March 16, 2020). He contends that the
suspension of strict compliance requires us to apply a “liberal”—yet undefined—standard
in determining whether he had a good reason to quit his job. Because Olson did not present
this argument to the ULJ, it is forfeited. See Thiele v. Stitch, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.
1988) (“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows
were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation
omitted)). But even if we were to consider the argument in the interests of justice, see
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (“The appellate courts may . . . take any . . . action as the
interest of justice may require.”), we would not apply a different standard here. As DEED
points out, in addressing the exception to ineligibility for quitting because of a good reason
caused by the employer, a subsequent executiv e order specifically incorporated the
standard provided by section 268.095, subdivision 3(a). See Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-
54, Protecting Workers from Unsafe Working Conditions and Retaliation During the
COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (May 13, 2020) (stating “any worker who quits their
employment because the employer has failed to correct an adverse work condition related
to the pandemic which would compel an averag e, reasonable worker to quit . . . shall not
lose unemployment insurance benefits eligibility under existing law and Executive Order
20-05”).
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violations. Until he quit, Olson was work ing at home. His personal safety was not
impacted. Although he was concerned that Schneiderman ’s would not have a COVID
preparedness plan in place by the time he was required to report to work on May 1, 2020,
he quit his job several days befo re that date. In any event, an HR representative testified
at the hearing before the UL J that she, the company owner, and the general manager of
retail stores did “everything that we could th ink of to make it a safer environment.” And
the evidence showed that a preparedness plan was in place by the end of the day on May 1
or very shortly thereafter. Olson also expre ssed concern that his work would expose him
to criminal liability. But Schneiderman’s did not require him to do anythi ng unlawful.
After Olson learned that accepting furniture re turns potentially violated the governor’s
initial order, he was not required to participate in any retu rns. Moreover, the ULJ found
that Olson was never required to facilitate unlawful activity by ordering his employees to
commit violations.
Second, Olson was not subj ected to any conditions that would have compelled an
average reasonable worker to quit. As noted , his personal safety was not in jeopardy and
he was not exposed to criminal liability. And Schneiderman’s was responsive to Olson’s
concerns about potential violations of the g overnor’s order. For example, HR responded
to Olson when he complained about the warehouse photo and assured him that management
had addressed the situation. Olson was und erstandably concerned about the pandemic.
But his reaction—refusing to work until “it is confirmed and doc umented by OSHA, the
BCA, and the State of Minnesota DPS that we are not in violation of the Stay-At-Home
order and [the] safety of our employees can be assured by a third party” and ultimately
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quitting—was disproportionate. An average r easonable worker would not have been
compelled to quit under the circ umstances. We therefore conclude that Olson’s decision
to quit was not based on a good reason caused by his employer.
Affirmed.