In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Justin Lee Staaf.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0594

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Justin Lee Staaf.

Filed September 7, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-PR-21-3147

Daniel J. Sagstetter, Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A., Shakopee, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Jody Kieser Kisting, Assistant
County Attorneys, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Susan Dredge, Bloomington, Minnesota ( guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his civil commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm
due to a mental illness and the district court’s authorization of the involuntary
administration of neuroleptic medication to treat that mental illness. Although the record
could support a determination that appellant posed a risk of harm due to a mental illness,
the district court’s findings are inadequate to support commitment and the involuntary
administration of neuroleptic medication on that ground. We therefore reverse and remand.
FACTS
In February 2021, respondent Scott County petitioned to civilly commit a ppellant
Justin L ee Staaf as both mentally ill and chemically dependent and for authorization to
administer neuroleptic medication to treat Staaf. According to the petition, the police
brought Staaf to an emergency room after his family called 911 due to concerns about his
mental health and safety. Staaf had questioned whether his parents were his actual parents,
made statements to his ex -girlfriend that he would be “the serial killer you’ve always
wanted me to be,” and believed that someone was watching him from his neighbor’s
window. He had access to firearms and had asked his brother for ammunition. Staaf also
had a history of methamphetamine use.
A court -appointed examiner reviewed the relevant documents and interviewed
Staaf. During the interview, Staaf described his history of substance abuse. He first used
methamphetamine as a teenager and had resumed using it about six years earlier. In that
time, he used methamphetamine “about two weeks in a month,” and his most recent use
occurred six days before he was hospitalized. Despite his drug use, Staaf denied that he
was physically dependent on drugs or that drugs had altered his perceptions. He believed
that he merely needed the rapy, and not treatment, for mental health and substance abuse.
The examiner prepared a report, diagnosing Staaf with stimulant
(methamphetamine) use disorder, substance (methamphetamine) induced psychotic
disorder, cannabis use disorder, opiate use disorder, and alcohol use disorder (in
remission). He opined that Staa f was chemically dependent and posed a risk of harm due
to a mental illness. At the commitment hearing, the examiner explained his opinion that
Staaf had a mental illness. He testified that Staaf’s impairment was not solely due to his
dependence on drugs because Staaf continued to exhibit symptoms of psychosis caused by
methamphetamine for weeks after he had stopped using the drug.
Staaf testified at the commitment hearing. He believed that he did not have a mental
illness because he had never been di agnosed with one. He argued that he needed to
complete a “bunch of tests” at the hospital before he could be diagnosed with a mental
illness. Staaf also discussed his current refusal to take neuroleptic medication. He initially
took the medication voluntarily based on a doctor’s advice, but he stopped doing so based
on his concerns about potential side effects. He also declined to take neuroleptic
medication because he did not believe that he had a mental illness.
The district court issued an order ci villy committing Staaf as chemically dependent
and as a person who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness. The district court also
ordered the involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication to Staaf. Staaf appeals.
DECISION
I.
On appeal from a district court’s order of commitment, we review whether the
district court complied with the statute and whether its findings of fact support the
commitment. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the district court’s decision and do not set aside findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
Under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act (the Act), a district court may
civilly commit a person if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person poses
a risk of harm due to a mental illness. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2020). A person
poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness if he
has an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric
disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory
that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize
reality, or to reason or understand, that is manifested by
instances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perception s
and who, due to this impairment, poses a substantial likelihood
of physical harm to self or others.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17a(a) (2020). A substantial likelihood of physical harm may
be shown by “a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others.” Id., subd.
17a(a)(3). A person does not pose a risk of harm due to a mental illness if his impairment
is solely due to “brief periods of intoxication caused by alcohol, drugs, or other mind -
altering substances” or “dependence upon or addiction to any alcohol, drugs, or other mind-
altering substances.” Id., subd. 17a(b)(3)-(4) (2020).
A district court may also civilly commit a person if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the person is chemically dependent. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a). A
person is chemically dependent if he is
(a) determined as being incapable of self -management or
management of personal affairs by reason of the habitual and
excessive use of alcohol, drugs, or other mind -altering
substances; and (b) whose recent conduct as a result of habitual
and excessive use of alcohol, drugs, or other mind -altering
substances poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to
self or others as demonstrated by (i) a recent attempt or threat
to physically harm self or others, (ii) evidence of recent serious
physical problems, or (iii) a failure to obtain necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or medical care.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 2 (2020).
The district court committed Staaf both as a person who poses a risk of harm due to
a mental illness and as a chemically dependent person. Staaf does not challenge his
commitment as chemically dependent. But he contends that the district court’s findings
are inadequate to support his commitment based on mental illness. Staaf argues that he has
never been diagnosed with a mental illness and that the district court failed to identify any
mental illness supporting its orders.
The district court found that
[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that [Staaf] is a person
who p oses a risk of harm due to a mental illness and is
chemically dependent with a diagnostic impression of
Stimulant Use Disorder, Substance Induced Psychotic
Disorder, Cannabis Use Disorder, Opiate Use Disorder, and
Alcohol Use Disorder in remission and the mental illness
grossly impairs his judgment and that is manifested by grossly
disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions and who, due to this
impairment and chemical dependency , poses a substantial
likelihood of physical harm to self or others .

Staaf argu es that the “impairment cited to support the commitment was derived
solely from [his] dependence upon or addi ction to drugs or mind-altering substances” and
that “[s]uch impairment is expressly excluded from the statutory definit ion” that must be
satisfied for a mental -illness commitment. Staaf further argues that the record lacks
evidence that he has an organic disorder of the brain or substantial psychiatric disorder
separate from that resulting from his substance abuse. Staaf therefore asserts that the Act
expressly forecloses his commitment based on mental illness. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02,
subd. 17a(b)(3)-(4).
The county responds that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that
Staaf’s impairment was not caused solely by his drug use and that the “evidence established
several mental illnesses.” For example, t he county relies on the court -appointed
examiner’s opinion that Staaf’s impairment was not solely due to his dependence on drugs
because Staaf continued to exhibit symptoms of psychosis for weeks after he stopped using
methamphetamine. The county also relies on information regarding Staaf’s mental health
that was contained in a prepetition screening report. Thus, the county argues that the record
supports a conclusion that Staaf had a mental illness , separate from his chemical
dependency. But the county essentially concedes that the district court’s findings do not
address th e evidence on which the county relies or otherwise explain its conclusion that
Staaf was mentally ill—as defined in the Act —in addition to chemically dependent.
If the district court orders civil commitment, “the findings of fact and conclusions
of law shall specifically state the proposed patient’s conduct which is a basis for
determining that each of the requisites for commitment is met.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09,
subd. 2(a) (2020). The district court must also “identify less restrictive alternatives
considered and rejected by the court and the reasons for rejecting each alternative.” Id.,
subd. 2(b) (2020). We have explained the importance of th ose statutory requirements as
follows: “The drafters of the Commitment Act clearly intended to require specificity in
the findings of the [district] courts, and we have often stressed the need for findings on
each of the statutory requisites with a clear recitation of the evidence relied up on in
reaching the court’s conclusions.” In re Danielson, 398 N.W.2d 32, 37 (Minn. App. 1986).
In Danielson, this court concluded that the findings were “ wholly inadequate to support
commitment, although the evidence amply support [ed] a determination tha t [the patient
was] a mentally ill person in need of treatment.” Id. Accordingly, we remanded the case
for the district court to “make findings as required by the statute .” Id.
Here, the district court made specific findings regarding Staaf’s conduct that was
the basis for its determination that Staaf was both men tally ill and chemically depende nt.
The district court noted that the court -appointed examiner reported that Sta af had been
“experiencing bizarre and paranoid delusions and al tered pe rceptions” and had
“experienced suicidal ideation shortly before his hospitalization.” But the district court did
not make any finding s that Sta af’s paranoid delusions , altered perceptions, and suicidal
ideation were caused by mental illness as opposed to chemical dependency , even though
Staaf’s counsel emphasized the different standards for commitments based on mental
illness and chemical dependency . Moreover, even though the county emphasized the
testimony of the court-appointed examiner that Staaf displayed symptoms of mental illness
long after his most recent use of drugs , the district court did not address that evidence in
its commitment order or otherwise make findings explaining its determination that Staaf
had a mental illness as defined in the Act . See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17a(a)
(describing “an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric disorder of
thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory”).
Given that Sta af highlighted the distinct statutory standards for commitm ent as
mentally ill and commitment as chemically dependent and the court-appointed examiner’s
diagnosis of substance-induced psychotic disorder , it was necessary for the district court
to make findings that adequately explained its determination that Staaf’s condition satisfied
the statutory requirements for commitment as mentally ill. Indeed, such findings were
crucial given that Sta af particip ated in the proceedings and vigorously contested the
assertion that he was mentally ill. See In re Civil Commitment of Breault, 942 N.W.2d 368,
379 n.12 (Minn. App. 2020) ( noting that “in cases where the patient participates in the
proceedings, we expect the district court to make more robust findings”). The district
court’s findings simply do not address this crucial, disputed issue.
The district court’s findings also do not adequately address less -restrictive
alternatives to commitment. The Act require s the district court to list “ less restrictive
alternatives considered and rejected by the court and the reasons for rejecting each
alternative.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2 (b). “This court will examine a commitment
order for compliance with [the Act] , including the making of required findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and an evaluation of less restrictive alternatives considered and
rejected.” Danielson, 398 N.W.2d at 36 (quotation omitted). “The consideration of less
restrictive alternatives is a matter of great significance. ” Id. at 37 (quotation omitted) .
Thus, in Danielson, this court reversed and remanded in part because the findings in that
case summarily stated that there was no less-restrictive alternative to commitment, without
listing the alternatives the district court had considered or its reasons for rejecting them.
Id.
Here, the district court found that “[l]ess restrictive alternatives were rejected as
inappropriate in that they do not meet [Staaf’s] needs.” Like the district court in Danielson,
the district court did not list the alternatives it had considered. Given the statutory
requirement of findings regarding less -restrictive alternative s, as well as the judiciary’s
enforcement of th at requirement, the d istrict court’s findings regarding less -restrictive
alternatives are inadequate.
In sum, we find ourselves in a situation similar to that in Danielson: although the
record could perhaps support Staaf’s commitment as mentally ill, the district court failed
to make findings adequate to support such a commitment.
II.
Neuroleptic medication may be administered to patients who are civilly committed.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 1 (2020). When a patien t refuses to consent to treatment
with neuroleptic medication, then the treatment facility generally may administer
neuroleptic medication only by a court order. Id., subd. 8(a) (2020). The district court may
authorize the treatment facility to involuntarily administer neuroleptic medication to the
patient if the court finds that the patient lacks capacity to decide whether to take neuroleptic
medication. Id., subd. 8(e) (2020). When reviewing a district court’s order to administer
neuroleptic medication, we review the district court’s findings for clear error and view the
record in the light most favorable to those findings. Breault, 942 N.W.2d at 378.
Staaf c ontends that the district court erred by ordering the involuntary
administration of neuroleptic medication because the record establish es neither the need
for such medication nor that he lacks capacity to make the medication decision for himself.
We have already concluded that the district court’s findings are inadequate to
support Sta af’s commitment as mentally ill. We recognize that the Act authorizes the
administration of neuroleptic medication to patients “subject to civil commitment,” without
distinguishing between different types of civil commitments. Minn. Stat. § 253B.092,
subd. 1. Indeed, the relevant statute previously authorized the administration of neuroleptic
medication only when the patient was civilly committed under particular provisions —for
example, when the patient was mentally ill, but not when the patient was chemically
dependent —but the Minnesota Legislature recently el iminated those distinctions. 2020
Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, art. 6, § 53, at 1045.
Under the terms of the current Act, Staaf could be subject to an order for involuntary
administration of neuroleptic medication based on his commitment as chemica lly
dependent, which he does not challenge. However, the district court’s findings supporting
the involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication focus on Staaf’s purported mental
illness. For example, the district court found that Sta af’s “mental i llness ha[d] not
sufficiently responde d to efforts in the use of other less intrusive forms of treatment” and
that “[t]he quality and extent of [Sta af’s] mental illness substantially impairs [his] ability
to determine whether neuroleptic medication is nece ssary or desirable.” The district court
also found that Sta af had “not previously had any inpatient mental health treatment.” The
district court did not make findings explaining why Sta af’s chemical dependency justified
an order for involuntary administr ation of neuroleptic medication.
In sum, although the district court could have relied on Staaf’s chemical dependency
as a basis to order the involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication, its findings
indicate that it did not do so. Instead, the district court relied on its determination that Staaf
was mentally ill—a determination that is not adequately supported by the district court’s
findings. Thus, the district court’ s mental -illness determination cannot support Sta af’s
commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness or the district
court’s order for neuroleptic medication.
Conclusion
This court is not a fact -finding court. See State v. Colvin , 645 N.W.2d 449, 453
(Minn. 2002) (stating that “[a]ppellate courts have no . . . business finding facts”); Stiff v.
Associated Sewing Supply Co. , 436 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn. 1989) ( providing that “an
appellate court ’s limited scope of review circumscribes additional fact finding by it”).
Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently reiterated that principle in the context of a
civil commitment case, stating:
We have repeatedly stated that clear -error review does not
permit an appellate court to weigh the evidence as if trying the
matter de novo. Neither d oes it permit an appellate court to
engage in fact -finding anew, even if the court would find the
facts to be different if it determined them in the first instance.
Nor should an appellate court reconcile conflicting evidence.

In re Civil Commitment of Kenney, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2021 WL 3641450, at *5 (Minn.
Aug. 18, 2021) (quotations and citations omitted) . To be clear, this court cannot make the
findings necessary to support Staff’s commitment as mentally ill.
However, “[w]hen additio nal findings are necessary to support a [district] court’s
conclusion on a disputed issue, an appellate court, of course, may remand for additional
findings.” Stiff, 436 N.W.2d at 779 . Because the district court’s findings are inadequate
to sustain Staaf’s commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness
and, therefore, to justify the court’s order for involuntary administration of neuroleptic
medication, and because the record could perhaps provide a basis for the necessary
findings, we reverse and remand for the district court to make adequate findings.
We note that Staaf was provisionally discharged to chemical-dependency treatment
in March 2021. That provisional discharge expires on September 11, 2021. On remand,
the district court may choose to take new evidence regarding the current need for Staaf’s
commitment, as well as the current need for involuntary administration of neuroleptic
medication. If the district court concludes tha t commitment continues to be appropriate
based on mental illness, the district court must make findings explaining its conclusion that
Staaf is mentally ill as described in Minnesota Statutes section 253B.02, that is, why Sta af
is a “person who has an orga nic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric disorder
of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory,” as well as findings explaining the
less-restrictive alternatives to commitment that were considered and rejected.
If the district court concludes, on remand, that Sta af is not mentally ill but that the
involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication is nonetheless appropriate based on
Staaf’s commitment as chemically dependent , the district court must make adequate
findings explaining why such administration is appropriate.
Reversed and remanded.