Terrance James Bowers, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0649

Terrance James Bowers, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 13, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-15-2769

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Kristen E. Swanson, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief as
untimely, arguing that the interests -of-justice exception applies to his case. Because
appellant provides no explanation for the untimeliness of his petition, we affirm the
dismissal.
FACTS
In January 2017, appellant Terrance Bowers was convicted of first -degree
possession of a controlled substance ; in March 2017, he was sentenced to 98 months in
prison. In June 2017, he filed a direct appeal, but in October 2017 he requested a stay of
that appeal so he could pursue postconviction relief. On November 2, 2017, as a result of
his petition for postconviction relief, appellant was resentenced to 78 m onths, and on
November 30, 2017, he voluntarily dismissed his appeal.
More than three years later, in December 2020, appellant filed a second petition for
postconviction relief, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
Without reaching the merits of appellant’s petition, the district court summarily dismissed
it as untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1)(2020) (providing that a defendant
who does not pursue a direct appeal must file a petition for postconviction relief within two
years of the entry of judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence). Appellant does
not dispute that his petition was untimely under the statute, but argues that the interests-of-
justice exception should apply.

DECISION
The denia l of a postconviction petition is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 621 -22 (Minn. 2015). A claim that is untimely under
the statute of limitations may be summarily denied. Id. at 622. But a court may hear an
untimely petition if it is satisfied that the petition is not frivolous and that hearing it would
be in the interests of justice. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2020) ; see also Hooper
v. State , 888 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Minn. 2016) (holding that an interests -of-justice claim
“must relate to an injustice that delayed the filing of the petition, not to the substantive
merit of the petition”); Sanchez v. State , 816 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Minn. 2012) (same).
Appellant has offered neither the district court nor this court any explanation of his delay
in filing his petition.
Appellant argues first that the interests -of-justice exception should apply because
he has had no review of his criminal conviction and is entitled to one review under Article
1, section 6, of the Min nesota Constitution. See Barnes v. State , 768 N.W.2d 359, 364
(Minn. 2009). But the entitlement to review of a criminal conviction is not an entitlement
to review at any time a defendant chooses: a defendant has only two years to assert that
right. Oth erwise Minn. Stat § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2020), would be meaningless, and “a
statute should be interpreted, whenever possible, to give effect to all of its provisions; no
word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant .” Cnty. of
Hennepin by Freeman v. 6131 Colfax Lane, Minneapolis , 907 N.W.2d 257, 260 (Minn.
App. 2018) (quotation omitted). Appellant chose not to pursue a timely review of his
conviction when he withdrew his appeal.
Appellant argues further that, because his claim has not previously been raised in
either a direct appeal or a postconviction petition, it is not dismissible under State v.
Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (holding that neither claims raised in a direct
appeal from a conviction nor claims known but not raised will be considered in a
subsequent petition for postconviction relief). But Knaffla is irrelevant because appellant’s
claim has not previously been addressed.
Finally, appellant relies on State v. Carlton, 816 N.W.2d 590, 607 (Minn. 2012) for
the five Gassler factors considered when applying the interests-of-justice exception:
(1)Whether the claim has substantive merit; (2) whether the
defendant deliberately and inexcusably failed to raise the issue
on direct appeal; (3) whether the party alleging error is at fault
for that error and the degree of fault assigned to the party
defending the alleged error, (4) whether some fundamental
unfairness to th e defendant needs to be addressed; and (5)
whether application of the interests -of-justice analysis is
necessary to protect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.

Id. at 608 (citing State v. Gassler , 787 N.W.2d 575, 586 -87 (Minn. 2010)). Appellant
claims that he satisfie s the second factor: he did not “deliberately and inexcusably fail to
raise the issue on appeal” because he voluntarily dismissed his appeal and has had no
review of his conviction. But appellant admits he deliberately chose not to pursue the issue
on direct appeal, and he has offered no excuse for doing so.
As to the third factor, appellant says he “is not at fault for the state’s lack of
sufficient evidence.” But Carlton concluded that “The third . . . f actor. . . also weighs
against [the petitioner], because he bases his interests -of-justice argument on lack of
appellate review in his case. This error is attributable to [him,] not to the State, because it
was [he] who failed to follow through with eithe r a direct appeal or timely postconviction
petition.” Id. at 609. The same is true here.
As to the fourth and fifth factors, the supreme court rejected the arguments of the
petitioner in Carlton that:
it is fundamentally unfair for a defendant convicted of first -
degree murder not to receive appellate review, and that the
integrity of the judi cial system depends upon review of
convictions involving life imprisonment . . . . [W]hen a
defendant convicted of first -degree murder has not received
appellate review of his conviction, the case constitutes the type
of extraordinary circumstances that wa rrant application of the
interests-of-justice exception.
But our fairness inquiry under the interests -of-justice
analysis has often involved looking to whether the party had an
opportunity to correct any potential unfairness. Here, [the
petitioner] had an opportunity to seek review of his underlying
claims and failed to do so multiple times. Additionally,
nothing in [his] petition suggests that the integrity of the
judicial system will be harmed if his claim is not reviewed.
[He] does not allege miscond uct or flagrant disregard for
judicial process. Rather, . . . [his] claims involve two
discretionary decisions on probable cause and evidentiary
issues. Given the extraordinary nature of the interests of justice
exception, and the fac t that [he] has faile d to allege facts to
show that application of the exception to his case is necessary
to prevent unfairness, these fourth and fifth Gassler factors do
not require us to hear Carlton’s petition.

Id. at 610 (citations omitted). Like the petitioner in Carlton, appellant had an opportunity
to seek review of his underlying claim and has presented no support for his assertions that
“it is fundamentally unfair to allow [his] conviction to stand on insufficient evidence” and
“due to the nature of [his] claim, failing to remedy it undermines the integrity of the judicial
proceedings.” If a first-degree murder conviction and a possible life sentence were not a
sufficient basis to invoke the interests -of-justice exception in Carlton, appellant’s drug
offense and 78 -month prison sentence are not sufficient to do so here. The interests-of-
justice exception does not apply to appellant’s case.
Affirmed.