Hiscox Insurance Company,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-0761

Court of Appeals Hudson, J.
Dissenting as to Part I, Chutich,
Glen Edin of Edinburgh Association, McKeig, Moore, III, JJ.

Respondent, Chutich, J.
Dissenting as to Part II, Hudson, J.
vs. Gildea, C.J., Thissen, J.

Hiscox Insurance Company, Filed June 28, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts
Appellant.

________________________

Alexander M. Jadin, Timothy D. Johnson, Ross M. Hussey, Smith Jadin Johnson, PLLC,
Bloomington, Minnesota, for respondent.

Christopher L. Goodman, Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, L.L.P., Saint Paul, Minnesota,
for appellant.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 5.04(a) requires the summons and
complaint to be filed within 1 year of the commencement of the action.
2. Plaintiff complied with Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 5.04(a) when it
filed its summons and complaint as an exh ibit to the district court in a n ancillary motion
pertaining to the same action.
Affirmed.
2
O P I N I O N & D I S S E N T1
HUDSON, Justice.
This case involves interpreting what it means to file an “action” under Minn. R. Civ.
P. 5.04(a), which provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny action that is not filed with the court
within one year of commencement against any party is deemed dismissed with
prejudice . . . .” In this dispute involving an insurance coverage c laim, respondent Glen
Edin of Edinburgh Association (Glen Edin) served appellant Hiscox Insurance Company
(Hiscox) with a summons and complaint in June 2019. Glen Edin did not file the summons
and complaint with the district court at that time. However, in October 2019, Glen Edin
filed a copy of the summons and complaint as an exhibit to an affidavit included with a
memorandum in support of its motion for an appointment of a neutral umpire for appraisal.
In January 2020, Hiscox filed its answer to the original complaint with the district
court. Glen Edin did not file its summons and complaint as a standalone document until
March 2021, more than 1 year after it had served Hiscox with the summons and complaint.
Subsequently, the district court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice
under Rule 5.04(a), holding that Glen Edin had failed to satisfy Rule 5.04(a) because Glen
Edin’s complaint was not filed within 1 year of service. And the district court denied Glen
Edin’s subsequent motion to vacate the judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a).
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the term “action” in Rule 5.04(a)
included Hiscox’s answer filed with the district court in January 2020. Because Hiscox’s

1 Part I of this opinion is the opinion of the court on the filing requirement of
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 5.04(a).
3
answer was filed within 1 year of G len Edin serving the summons and complaint on
Hiscox, the court of appeals concluded that the dictates of Rule 5.04(a) had been met.
We conclude that filing an “action” under Rule 5.04(a) refers to filing the summons
and complaint, see Part I infra at 6–12. We further conclude Glen Edin satisfied Rule
5.04(a) when, in October 2019, it filed a copy of the summons and complaint as an exhibit
in an ancillary motion pertaining to the same action , see Part II of the opinion of Justice
Chutich, infra at 27–30. We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals, but on
different grounds.
FACTS
During a storm on June 11, 2017, Glen Edin’s property suffered hail damage. Glen
Edin submitted a claim with its insurer, Hiscox, related to this damage. On August 14,
2017, the property was inspected, and the inspector determined that although the property
had sustained exterior damage, there had been no hail damage to the roofs. At that time,
inspectors hired by Glen Edin agreed that the roofs had not been damaged by the hail.
Hiscox accordingly made several payments to Glen Edin for damage caused by the storm.
In early 2019, Glen Edin learned from a contractor hired to perform unrelated
maintenance that the roofs had suffered hail damage as well. Glen Edin then hired an
insurance adjusting firm, who agreed with the contractor and concluded that the property’s
roofs had suffered hail damage during the June 2017 storm beyond what had been initially
covered by Hiscox. Glen Edin notified Hiscox of the additional loss and demanded an
appraisal under Glen Edin’s insurance policy. Hiscox disputed the new damage amount.
4
On June 11, 2019, Glen Edin served Hiscox with a summons and complaint,
alleging breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment. However, Glen Edin did
not file the summons and complaint with the district court at that time. The parties then
began the appraisal process by each appointing their own appraiser. Under the appraisal
process, a neutral umpire, agreed upon by each party’s appraiser, was needed to complete
the three-person appraisal panel. The appraisers were unable to agree on an umpire.
On October 22, 2019, Glen Edin filed with the district court and served on Hiscox
a motion for an appointment of a neutral umpire for appraisal. In a memorandum in support
of that motion, Glen Edin provided a copy of its summons and complaint as an exhibit to
an affidavit included with the memorandum. In December 2019, the district court issued
an order appointing a neutral umpire and entered final judgment on the matter.
On January 30, 2020, Hiscox filed with the district court its answer to Glen Edin’s
complaint, using the same case number that was given to Glen Edin’s previous motion to
appoint an umpire. The answer contained denials, stated affirmative defenses, and
requested an award of costs, disbursements, and attorney fees.
Throughout 2020 and early 2021, the parties conducted discovery and worked
toward an appraisal hearing, which was sch eduled for March 23, 2021. However, o n
February 26, 2021, Hiscox notified Glen Edin that because its complaint had not been filed
within 1 year of commencing its action, the case was automatically dismissed under Minn.
R. Civ. P. 5.04(a). Glen Edin respo nded by filing the summons and complaint with the
district court on March 3, 2021. Glen Edin also responded that Hiscox had filed its answer
and that there had been motion practice for the case.
5
The parties filed letters with the district court addressing whether the case should be
deemed dismissed subject to Rule 5.04(a). Following an informal hearing, the district court
issued an order dismissing the case with prejudice, holding that Glen Edin had failed to
satisfy Rule 5.04(a) because Glen Edin’s complaint was not filed within 1 year of service.
Glen Edin filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. After
receiving formal briefing and holding a hearing on the issue, the district court filed an order
applying a Finden analysis to the facts of Glen Edin’s case.2 The district court found that
Glen Edin had a debatably meritorious claim and that the parties generally agreed that Glen
Edin acted with due diligence. It also concluded that Hiscox would suffer some prejudice,
though it was unclear if that prejudice would be substantial. The district court concluded,
however, that Glen Edin failed to meet the second Finden prong, which requires that Glen
Edin have a reasonable excuse for its failure to comply with the 1 -year filing requirement
under Rule 5.04(a). The district court therefore denied Glen Edin’s motion.
Glen Edin appealed, arguing that the filing requirement under Rule 5.04(a) had been
met because Hiscox’s answer had been filed within 1 year of commencement. See Glen
Edin of Edinburgh Ass’n v. Hiscox Ins. Co., 973 N.W.2d 654, 655–56 (Minn. App. 2022).
Alternatively, Glen Edin argued that the district court erred by denying relief under Rule

2 The Finden test—discussed further below —evaluates whether an attorney’s or
party’s neglect is excusable with regards to providing relief from judgment. The test has
four prongs: (1) whether a movant has a debatably meritorious claim; (2) whether there
was a reasonable excuse for the movant’s failure or neglect to act; (3) whether the movant
acted with due diligence after learning of the error or omission; and (4) whether no
substantial prejudice will result to the nonmoving party if relief is granted. See Finden v.
Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964). The moving party must satisfy each prong to
be granted relief. Id.
6
60.02. Id. at 656 n.3. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the “action” was filed
under Rule 5.04(a) wh en Hiscox filed its answer. Id. at 657. Because Hiscox’s answer
was filed within 1 year of commencement, the court of appeals held that the requirements
of Rule 5.04(a) had been met. Id.
We granted Hiscox’s petition for review on whether filing an answer satisfies Rule
5.04(a)’s requirement that an “action” be filed within 1 year of commencement.
ANALYSIS
We apply a de novo standard of review when interpreting the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure. Gams v. Houghton , 884 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Minn. 2016). “When
interpreting court rules, we look first to the plain language” of the rule. Id. (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the language of a rule is plain and
unambiguous, we follow the rule’s plain language.” Id. “A rule is ambiguous only if the
language of the rule is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id.
I.3
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 5.04(a) provides that “[a]ny action that is not
filed with the court within one year of commencement against any party is deemed
dismissed with prejudice against all parties unless the partie s within that year sign a
stipulation to extend the filing period.” 4 The parties do not dispute that the action was

3 This part represents the opinion of the court with respect to the filing requirement
of Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 5.04(a).

4 There was no stipulation to exte nd the filing period in this case, and therefore that
portion of Rule 5.04(a) is immaterial to our analysis.
7
commenced on June 11, 2019, the date on which Glen Edin served Hiscox with its
summons and complaint. Therefore, the only question is whether the “action” was “filed
with the court within one year” of June 11, 2019.
A.
Glen Edin advances a broad definition of what it means to file an “action” under
Rule 5.04(a). Glen Edin observes that the term “action” in Rule 5.04(a) is no t explicitly
limited to a complaint or any pleading by a plaintiff. Instead, Glen Edin points to the
general definition of “action” in Minn. Stat. § 645.45(2) (2022) as “any proceeding in any
court of this state.” Glen Edin notes that we have previously considered this definition, in
conjunction with dictionary definitions of “proceeding,” to determine that “a ‘proceeding’
encompasses the entire lawsuit and is broader than any single act in a lawsuit.” Ellis v.
Doe, 924 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Minn. 2019). Glen Edin thus surmises that filing an “action”
under Rule 5.04(a) includes filing not just a summons and complaint, but also filing other
documents such as an answer.
We believe that Glen Edin’s approach would interpret Rule 5.04(a) in a vacuum and
ignore the surrounding text and context of the rule. We do not interpret the rules of civil
procedure “in isolation but read them in light of one another, interpreting them according
to their purpose.” Mingen v. Mingen, 679 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 2004).
Glen Edin ignores that under Rule 5.04(a), not only does an “action” need to be
“filed,” but it also needs to be “commence[d].” In that vein, Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01 provides
that a civil “action” is “commenced” upon the service of a summons. Additionally, Minn.
R. Civ. P. 3.02 requires a copy of the complaint to be served with the summons. We have
8
recognized that for purposes of commencing an action under Rule 3, the summons and
complaint go together as the operative documents to be served. See Meeker v. IDS Prop.
Cas. Ins. Co., 862 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Minn. 2015). Therefore, reading Rule 5.04(a) “in light
of” Rule 3, it would be inconsistent to hold that the object of commencement— per Rule 3,
a summons and complaint —is not also the object to be filed under Rule 5.04(a). See
Mingen, 679 N.W.2d at 727.5
If this language were not clear enough, Rule 3.01 references Rule 5.04 as the rule
containing its “ filing requirements.” To put a finer point on it, the rule governing the
summons (Rule 3.01) explicitly states that its “filing requirements” are found in Rule 5.04.
And this case asks us what must be filed under Rule 5.04. Putting two and two together,
the “action” that must be filed under Rule 5.04(a) is plainly the summons (and complaint,
per Rule 3.02).6

5 We recognize that the parties argued whether a complaint must be filed within 1 year
of commencement, not whether a summons and complaint must be filed. But we must be
precise with our holding. See State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990)
(explaining that our responsibility to “decide cases in accordance with law” is not “diluted
by counsel’s . . . failure to specify issues.”). We have recognized that for purposes of
commencing a civil action, the summons and complaint are two parts of a whole. See
Meeker, 862 N.W.2d at 47 (explaining that under “the ordinary rules of civil
procedure . . . an action is commenced when the summons and complaint are served”). The
relationship between Rules 3.01 and 3.02 confirms this observation. Therefore, it is more
accurate to say that under Rule 5.04(a), filing the “action” requires filing the summons and
complaint.

6 The principle that we read the rules of civil procedure “in light of one another” does
not mean that we look to every single instance where the word “action” is used in the rules.
The dissent cites numerous rules where the word “action” is used, but critically, none of
those rules involve the “filing” of an “action.” The dissent’s interpretation of Rule 5.04(a)
would effectively read the significance of the word “filed” out of the rule, which we cannot

9
Glen Edin observes that Rule 5.04(b) uses the term “complaint,” and contends that
the drafters of Rule 5.04(a) were aware of the difference between “complaint” and “action”
and deliberately chose the latter, broader option. It is true that “ when different words are
used in the same context, we assume that the words have different meanings .” Dereje v.
State, 837 N.W.2d 714, 720 (Minn. 2013). But this canon of interpretation “readily yields
to context,” State v. Thompson , 950 N.W.2d 65, 70 (Minn. 2020) (citation omi tted), and
here, we believe the use of “complaint” in Rule 5.04(b) actually supports Hiscox’s position.
Rule 5.04(b) states that “[a]ll documents after the complaint required to be served
upon a party . . . shall be filed with the court within a reasonable time after service . . . .”
Rule 5.04(b) therefore assumes that the complaint is the first document to be filed with the
court, and all other documents (such as an answer) are filed “after the complaint.” See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(b). Rule 5.04(b) therefore confirms, rather than undermines, the
conclusion that the complaint (and summons, per Rule 3.01) is the “action” that must be
filed and from which all other case documents temporally follow.
7

do. See T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Const., LLC , 773 N.W.2d 783, 788 n.5
(Minn. 2009) (explaining that we read and interpret a rule “to give effect to all of its
provisions”) (citation omitted). The word “filed” in Rule 5.04(a) is important because it
connects Rule 5.04(a) to Rules 3.01 and 3.02, which govern the summons a nd complaint.
The dissent cannot demonstrate the same interplay between Rule 5.04(a) and the rules that
it cites.
7 As the dissent points out, of course we could have explicitly used the phrase
“summons and complaint” instead of “action” in Rule 5.04(a). But just because we did not
use the magic words “summons and complaint” in Rule 5.04(a) does not foreclose
interpreting filing the “action” to mean filing the “summons and complaint.” As we have
explained, there is ample textual evidence in the rules —specifically, in Rules 3.01, 3.02,
and 5.04(b)—that supports our interpretation. While the dissent engages in speculation
about what we did not write, we believe what we did write draws a path to our reading of
Rule 5.04(a).
10
B.
This understanding of Rule 5.04(a) as requiring the filing of the summons and
complaint comports with our case law. In Gams, the plaintiff failed to file the “action”
within the time period required by Rule 5.04(a). See Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 615. While we
did not explicitly say so— perhaps because it was self-evident— we plainly considered the
term “action” in Rule 5.04(a) to mean the summons and complaint. For example, we
explained that because the plaintiff had “commenced the present action . . . by service of a
summons and complaint,” the plaintiff had until a certain date “to file his action with the
court.” Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 615 –16. We did not say that the defendant could have
alternatively filed an answer to comply with Rule 5.04(a). Rather, the s ole avenue we
identified to comply with Rule 5.04(a) was activity by the plaintiff, which consist ed of
filing the summons and complaint. Additionally, perhaps presciently, we noted that by
2014, the plaintiff was “on notice of the consequences for failing to file his complaint”
under Rule 5.04(a). Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 619 (emphasis added). Gams thus suggests that
we contemplated the term “action” in Rule 5.04(a) to mean the complaint (and the
summons, per Rule 3.01).8
Glen Edin alternatively relies on two court of appeals cases, but those cases offer
Glen Edin no refuge. First, Glen Edin claims that the court of appeals in MCHS Red Wing

8 Both parties exhaustively discuss the relevance of our decision in Ellis to this case.
But we interpret the rules of civil procedure “in light of one another,” Mingen, 679 N.W.2d
at 727, not in light of an unrelated rent-escrow statute like the one at iss ue in Ellis . We
therefore do not find the discussion of the term “action” in Ellis—which arose in a different
interpretative context—to be dispositive as to the meaning of “action” in Rule 5.04(a).
11
v. Converse, 961 N.W.2d 780 (Minn. App. 2021), held that serving an answer commences
an action under Rule 5.04(a), an d therefore filing the answer must also satisfy the
requirement of filing the action. But the issue in MCHS Red Wing was whether an action
had been “commenced” when there had been insufficient service of process. See
961 N.W.2d at 783 –84. Here, there is no assertion that Glen Edin ineffectively served
Hiscox with its summons and complaint, so the analysis in MCHS Red Wing is not
instructive to our analysis.
Second, Glen Edin argues that the court of appeals has squarely held that filing an
answer satisfi es the requirements of Rule 5.04(a). See Sorchaga v. Ride Auto, LLC ,
893 N.W.2d 360, 367 n.1 (Minn. App. 2017), aff’d on other grounds , 909 N.W.2d 550
(Minn. 2018). We agree that Sorchaga lends support to Glen Edin’s position, and the court
of appeals rightfully felt bound by the precedential holding in Sorchaga. But we are not
bound by the court of appeals’ holding, see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dynamic Air,
Inc., 702 N.W.2d 237, 245 (Minn. 2005), and we therefore expressly reject Sorchaga’s
conclusion that filing an answer can constitute filing the “action” under Rule 5.04(a).9

9 Citing Rhein v. Rhein , 69 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1955), Hiscox argues that filing an
answer containing a counterclaim would satisfy the requirements of Rule 5.04(a). Hiscox
further contends that its answer seeking costs, disbursements, and attorney fees was not a
counterclaim because the answer did not seek “affir mative relief.” This argument is
curious, given that Glen Edin itself does not assert that the court of appeals’ decision should
be affirmed under this justification. Glen Edin has exclusively and steadfastly argued that
any filed answer satisfies the dictates of Rule 5.04(a). Because Glen Edin has not advanced
the argument that the court of appeals’ decision should be upheld because Hiscox’s answer
contained a counterclaim, we do not consider it. We further decline to opine whether filing
an answer with a counterclaim satisfies the 1-year filing requirement of Rule 5.04(a).
12
Finally, we acknowledge that the rules of civil procedure “reflect a preference that
actions be determined on the merits,” Patterson v. Wu Fam. Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 867
(Minn. 2000), and that “the rules are to be liberally construed so as to serve the interests of
justice and so as to discourage reliance on technicalities and form,” Larson v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 314 , 233 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1975). But we also have a policy of
interpreting provisions regarding “the commencement of an action to provide a single,
uniform course of procedure that applies alike to all civil actions.” Cox v. Mid-Minn. Mut.
Ins. Co., 909 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 2018) (citation omitted). Adopting Glen Edin’s
broader definition of “action” would allow a party to file any number of documents to
satisfy Rule 5.04(a)— not only an answer, but potentially a motion, letter, or exhibit.10 Glen
Edin’s exception to the rule would then swallow the rule itself, erasing the summons and
complaint as the operative documents initiating a civil action in district court. The resulting
logistical tangles of district court judges and administrators sorting out st ray answers,
motions, and letters would undermine Rule 5.04(a )’s goal of facilitating effective case
management and our goal of providing a “uniform course of procedure” for commencing
an action, Cox, 909 N.W.2d at 545 (citation omitted).

10 The dissent purports to cabin its holding to allowing a filed answer or motion to
dismiss under Rule 5.04(a). But why stop at those two documents? If an answer or a
motion to dis miss suffices to satisfy Rule 5.04(a), why not a different motion, letter, or
exhibit? The dissent does not say. In fact, the dissent’s logic would seemingly permit the
filing of any document that “alerts the court that a civil case is underway that requires the
court’s attention.” It is difficult to imagine how this broad standard would not permit the
filing of any motion, letter, or exhibit. Nor does the dissent explain how its approach would
promote our policy in providing a “single, uniform course o f procedure that applies alike
to all civil actions.” Cox, 909 N.W.2d at 545 (citation omitted).

13
In sum, we conclude that filing an “action” under Rule 5.04(a) refers to filing the
summons and complaint.
II.11
Although a majority of the court concludes that Rule 5.04(a) requires the filing of a
summons and complaint with the district court within 1 year of comme ncement of the
action, a different majority of the court subsequently holds that Glen Edin satisfied that
rule here. Because I believe the latter holding undermines the text and policy objectives of
Rule 5.04(a), I respectfully dissent from that conclusion.
Glen Edin concedes that it did not file the summons and complaint as a standalone
document within 1 year of the commencement of the action. However, Glen Edin observes
that in a memorandum in support of its motion for an appointment of a neutral umpire for
appraisal, it provided a copy of its summons and complaint as an exhibit to an affidavit
included with the memorandum. Because this memorandum was filed in October 2019—
4 months after commencement of the action —Glen Edin argues that it satisfied Rule
5.04(a)’s 1-year filing requirement. In further support of its contention, Glen Edin points
to Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(c), which provides that a filing should not be rejected “solely
because it is not presented in proper form as required by these rules or any local rules or
practices.”
I am not convinced. As a threshold matter, Rule 5.04(c) appears to be inapplicable
because Glen Edin’s filing was not rejected. Insofar as Glen Edin relies on our general

11 This part represents the dissenting opinion of Justice Hudson with respect to the
application of Rule 5.04(a) to the facts of this case.
14
principle that “we are to liberally construe pleadings in favor of the pleader,” Walsh v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 607 n.3 (Minn. 2014), Glen Edin would stretch this principle
too far. Glen Edin’s summons and complaint were tucked away in an exhibit to an affidavit
included with a memorandum for a motion for an appointment of a neutral umpire for
appraisal. That motion concerned a matter ancillary to the underlying substantive dispute
contained in the complaint: determining the amount Glen Edin was owed under the
insurance policy.
Liberal construction does not require an unreasonable construction, and here, it
would be unreasonable to conclude that Glen Edin satisfied Rule 5.04(a) by filing its
summons and complaint as an exhibit to an affidavit to a memorandu m in support of a
motion ancillary to the dispute contained in the complaint.
Nevertheless, the court holds that the text of Rule 5.04(a) does not require the
summons and complaint to be filed as a standalone document. But the text of Rule 5.04(a)
contemplates that the “action” filed is the same dispute contained in the summons and
complaint. Here, as the court concedes, the summons and complaint were not filed in a
proceeding to determine the amount Glen Edin was owed under the insurance policy—that
is, the substantive dispute contained in the complaint. Rather, the summons and complaint
were filed in an “ancillary motion pertaining to the same action”; specifically, a proceeding
for an appointment of a neutral umpire for appraisal. The text of Rule 5.04(a) surely does
not allow the filing requirement to be met by filing the summons and complaint in an
entirely different proceeding than the one underlying the summons and complaint. But by
15
allowing the summons and complaint here to be filed in a proceeding “pertaining to the
same action,” the court muddies the plain filing requirements established by Rule 5.04(a).
The court also suggests that the policy objective of judicial economy is sa tisfied
here because Glen Edin placed the summons and complaint in the hands of the district court
for the purposes of case management, which kept the case moving along. But under the
court’s reasoning, a plaintiff could file thousands of pages of exhibits (or any document for
that matter), and as long as the summons and complaint are tucked somewhere in that
deluge of paper, the dictates of Rule 5.04(a) are met. I cannot see how enlisting district
courts in scavenger hunts for summonses and complaints in the record advances the
efficient use of judicial resources or promotes a “single, uniform course of procedure that
applies alike to all civil actions.” Cox, 909 N.W.2d at 545 (citation omitted).
I would therefore conclude that because Glen Edin did not file its summons and
complaint as a standalone document until March 3, 2021 — more than 20 months after
commencement of the action on June 11, 2019—it did not satisfy the requirements of Rule
5.04(a).
III.
12
Having concluded that Glen Edin did not satisfy the dictates of Rule 5.04(a), I would
next evaluate whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Glen Edin’s
motion for relief from judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. “The decisio n whether
relief is warranted under Rule 60.02 is committed to the sound discretion of the district

12 This part represents the dissenting opinion of Justice Hudson with respect to the
district court’s decision to deny Glen Edin relief under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a).
16
court and is based upon all the surrounding circumstances of each case.” Cole v. Wutzke ,
884 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. 2016). Our appellate inquiry is limite d to determining
whether the district court committed a “clear abuse of discretion.” See Gams, 884 N.W.2d
at 620 (citations omitted).
Rule 60.02(a) allows a district court to relieve a party from final judgment for
“[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” including from a dismissal under
Rule 5.04(a). See Gams , 884 N.W.2d at 617–18. Relief is warranted where the movant
satisfies four requirements: (1) a debatably meritorious claim; (2) a reasonable excuse for
the movant’s failure or neglect to act; (3) that the movant “acted with due diligence” after
learning of the error or omission; and (4) that “no substantial prejudice will result to the
other party.” Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491–92 (Minn. 1988) (quoting
Finden v. Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964)).
In denying Glen Edin’s motion for relief from judgment, the district court properly
identified the Finden test as the appropriate legal framework to apply and proceeded to
analyze each prong of the Finden test. The district court concluded that Glen Edin had
demonstrated a “debatably meritorious claim” and that it had “acted with due diligence”
after learning of its error. The district court also noted that there would be prejudice to
Hiscox if the motion for relief from judgment was granted, but it could not conclude that
the prejudice would be “substantial.”
However, the district court found that Glen Edin had failed to satisfy the second
prong of the Finden test: a reasonable excuse for the movant’s neglect. While
acknowledging that a faultless client should not be punished for an attorney’s mistake, the
17
district court observed that it “is not sufficient to say that whenever an attorney makes a
mistake and the client is not at fault, the court must make up for that mistake and order
relief,” explaining that if that were the case, nea rly every represented client would be
entitled to relief under Rule 60.02. Rather, the district court concluded that Glen Edin’s
interpretation of Rule 5.04(a) was not reasonable because Glen Edin’s argument hinged on
believing the case was open and activ e for 14 months after the district court explicitly
entered final judgment in November 2019. The district court also noted that Glen Edin did
not file its complaint until 14 months after final judgment was entered, and only after
Hiscox sought dismissal under Rule 5.04(a).
This case is a far cry from circumstances where we have found an abuse of
discretion by the district court. Unlike cases like Cole and Charson, this is not a case where
the district court failed to consider each of the four Finden prongs. See Cole, 884 N.W.2d
at 639; Charson, 419 N.W.2d at 491. Nor is this a case like Gams, where the district court’s
reasoning was limited to a “conclusory statement.” Gams , 884 N.W.2d at 621. Instead,
the district court did exactly what it was suppose d to do: “ma[k]e findings of fact based
upon conflicting evidence and appl[y] the correct Finden analysis to those findings.”
Roehrdanz v. Brill, 682 N.W.2d 626, 632 (Minn. 2004). Although I may have decided the
matter differently, that is not reason enough to reverse the district court. I would therefore
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Glen Edin’s motion
for relief from judgment.
* * *
18
In sum, based on the court’s holding that Rule 5.04(a) requires the summons and
complaint to be filed within 1 year of the commencement of the action, I would reverse the
decision of the court of appeals that this requirement was satisfied and further hold that the
district court properly denied Glen Edin’s motion for relief from judgment under Minn. R.
Civ. P. 60.02.

19
O P I N I O N & D I S S E N T13
CHUTICH, Justice.
I respectfully dissent from the court’s holding that Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 5.04(a) requires the summons and complaint —as opposed to the defendant’s
answer or motion to dismiss—to be filed within 1 year of the commencement of the action.
But accepting that as the court’s hold ing, we further hold that Glen Edin complied with
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 5.04(a) when it filed its summons and complaint as an
exhibit to the district court in an ancillary motion pertaining to the same action. I address
each writing in turn.
I.
14
I respectfully dissent as to the court’s holding that Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 5.04(a) requires the summons and complaint to be filed within 1 year of the
commencement of the action. I do so because I believe that Rule 5.04(a), which requires
an “action” to be filed within 1 year of its commencement to avoid the severe consequence
of dismissal with prejudice, may be satisfied by the filing of a defendant’s answer and not
merely by the filing of a plaintiff’s complaint. I reach this conclusion based upon the plain
language of the rule, the use and meaning of the term “action” in other R ules of C ivil

13 Part II of this opinion is the opinion of the court with respect to whether Glen Edin
filed its complaint properly under Rule 5.04(a) here. I also concur with the overview and
statement of facts in Justice Hudson’s opinion.

14 This part represents the dissenting opinion of Justice Chutich with respect to
whether filing an “action” under Rule 5.04(a) is limited to the summons and complaint, or
if the defendant’s answer can satisfy the filing requirement as well.
20
Procedure, and our precedent regarding the liberal construction of the rules so as to decide
cases on the merits and to serve the interests of justice.
The 2013 amendment to Rule 5.04(a) altered “a long-standing Minnesota practice
that permitted a party to commence an action simply by service of the summons upon the
defendant.” Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Minn. 2016). Before this change,
“[f]iling the case with the district court was not required.” Id. This type of practice is
“colloquially referred to as hip -pocket service.” MCHS Red Wing v. Converse ,
961 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn. App. 2021).
The amendment to Ru le 5.04(a) served two objectives. First, it was intended to
preserve the benefits of hip-pocket service: allowing informal dispute resolution before a
case was filed. MCHS Red Wing, 961 N.W.2d at 784 (citing Recommendations of the
Minnesota Supreme Court Civil Justice Reform Task Force , No. ADM10-8051, at 21–22
(Minn. Dec. 23, 2011) (“ Task Force Recommendations ”)); id. at 785. The 2013
amendment allows parties one year to litigate, resolve issues, or settle the entire matter
“without taking up court resources.” Id. at 784 (quoting Task Force Recommendations at
21). Keeping these disputes out of the public eye after service but before filing may also
encourage parties with confidentiality concerns to reach agreement more readily. See Task
Force Recommendations at 21.
Second, the amendment was intended to help address issues created by hip -pocket
service. By mandating a filing requirement, the amended rule ensures that the courts are
able to be involved in case management before a case grows too stale. MCHS Red Wing ,
961 N.W.2d at 785 (citing Task Force Recommendations at 22). Judicial case management
21
helps prevent the costs, delays, and difficulties that come with trying to resolve a matter
efficiently and effectively after it has lingered outside the judicial system. Id. (citing Task
Force Recommendations at 21–22).
Overall, the changes to Rule 5.04(a) aimed to find a happy medium that “facilitate[s]
informal dispute resolution before a case is filed while also facilitating effective case
management, penalizing plaintiffs who serve defendants and then take no further action,
and achievin g prompt resolution of disputes. ” MCHS Red Wing , 961 N.W.2d at 785.
Further, the plain language of the r ule only establishes a deadline for filing an “action.”
We have yet to address what qualifies as an “action” under Rule 5.04(a). The rule states
in relevant part: “Any action that is not filed with the court within one year of
commencement against any party is deemed dismissed with prejudice against all
parties . . . .” Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(a).
“We generally interpret words and phrases according to their common and ordinary
meaning, but we interpret technical words and phrases according to their special, technical
meaning.” State v. Schouweiler , 887 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 2016). Here, “action” is a
technical word with a specialized meaning in the court system. For example, in In re
Skyline Materials, Ltd., we looked to Black’s Law Dictionary to define “action,”
stating: “A ‘civil action’ under the Rules of Civil Procedure is a judicial proceeding .”
835 N.W.2d 472, 476 (Minn. 2013) (emphasis added) (citing Action , Black’s Law
Dictionary 32 (9th ed. 2009). We have defined “proceeding,” in turn, to “encompass[] the
entire lawsuit”; it “is broader than any single act in a lawsuit.” Ellis v. Doe , 924 N.W.2d
258, 263 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted). And although not binding on our interpretation
22
of a Rule of Civil Procedure, it is surely relevant to that task that the Minnesota Legislature
has defined an “action” as “any proceeding in any court of this state.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.45(2) (2022). It follows that a broader interpretation of “action” under Rule 5.04(a)
to include more than the “single act” of filing a complaint is consistent with our precedent
and with legislative thought.
Further, if we had intended, when we amended Rule 5.04(a), to specify that only the
filing of a summons and complaint satisfies the rule’s requirement that an “action” be filed
with the court, we could have easily used the terms “plaintiff” and “summons and
complaint” in the rule instead of the word “action.” It follows that the rationale that nothing
in the text of Rule 5.04(a) suggests that filing the summons and complaint must be in
standalone form also fits with the rationale that nothing in the text of the rule suggests that
only the summons and complaint satisfies the filing requirement.
For instance, the rule does not specify the plaintiff as the actor required to file a
pleading. Instead, the rule is phrased in a passive voice with no specific actor
identified:
15 “[a]ny action that is not filed with the court . . . .” And no single act in the
lawsuit is identified as the “action” that satisfies the filing require ment. If the court had
meant that only the summons and complaint met the filing requirement, it would have been
easy to say so: “A summons and complaint that is not filed by the plaintiff with the court

15 I have raised this argument before, noting that the Supreme Court has held “the use
of a passive voice can signal ‘agnosticism’ about who does the action because the passive
form ‘focuses on an event that occurs without respect to a specific actor.’ ” Avis Budget
Car Rental LLC v. County of Hennepin, 937 N.W.2d 446, 456 (Minn. 2020) (Chutich, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572–73
(2009)). I believe my reasoning in Avis applies here as well.
23
within one year of commencement against any party is deemed dismissed with prejudice
against all parties . . . .” See Buzzell v. Walz , 974 N.W.2d 256, 265 (Minn. 2022)
(observing, when interpreting a statute, that if the Legislature had intended a statute to
mean what the party suggested it meant, “the Legislature would have taken a much more
direct path to do so.”).
Notably, Hiscox cites to cases and court rules in several other jurisdictions that have
required a complaint to be filed to avoid dismissal of the action. Those authorities actually
undermine the court’s conclusion that only the summons and complaint suffice to meet the
filing requirement of Rule 5.04(a), because the rules in those jurisdictions specifically state
that a complaint is required. See, e.g., Colo. Cty. Ct. R. Civ. P. 303 (a) (“The complaint
must be filed within 14 days of the service of the summons and not less than 7 days in
advance of the return date. If the complaint is not timely filed, the service of the summons
shall be deemed ineffective and void without notice.” (emphasis added)) ; Vt. R. Civ. P.
3(a) (“When an action is commenced by service, the complaint must be filed with the court
within 21 days after the completion of service upon the first defendant served. If service
is not timely made or the complaint is not timely filed , the action may be dismissed on
motion[.]” (emphasis added)) ; Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 3 (a) (“[A] civil action is
commenced by service of a copy of a summons together with a copy of a complaint . . . or
by filing a complaint. Upon written demand by any other party, the plaintiff instituting the
action shall pay the filing fee and file the summons and complaint within 14 days after
service of the demand or the service shall be void.” (emphasis added)). By contrast, when
we amended Rule 5.04(a), we required the filing of the “action”—not the “complaint.”
24
This plain and more expansive reading of the word “action” in the filing requirement
is bolstered by the use and meaning of the term “action” throughout the rest of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. As the court notes, it is well-established that we do not read the Rules
of Civil Procedure “in isolation but read them in light of o ne another, interpreting them
according to their purpose.” Mingen v. Mingen, 679 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 2004)
(citation omitted).
Applying this principle, I observe first that a different section of Rule 5.04 —
subdivision (b)16—does use the word “complaint.” The use of “complaint” in subdivision
(b) and “action” in subdivision (a) suggests that the drafters of the court rule were well
aware of the different meanings of the two words and purposefully chose the latter, broader
term “action” for the filing requirement.
17 “[W]hen different words are used in the same
context, we assume that the words have different meanings.” Dereje v. State, 837 N.W.2d
714, 720 (Minn. 2013).

16 Rule 5.04(b) states in relevant part: “All documents after the complaint required to
be served up on a party . . . shall be filed with the court within a reasonable time after
service, except disclosures under Rule 26, expert disclosures and reports, depositions upon
oral examination and interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and
answers and responses thereto shall not be filed unless authorized by court order or rule .”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(b).

17 Subdivision (b) instructs a party that documents that are “required to be served upon
a party” must be filed with the court “ within a reasonable time after service” and
completely excepts from the filing requirement certain disclosures and discovery. Minn.
R. Civ. P. 5.04(b). The reference to “ [a]ll documents after the complaint” identifies
documents other than the complaint that are required to be served upon a party and when
they must be served; because a summons and a complaint commence civil litigation,
Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01, 3.02, a complaint is the first document served. But nothing about
subdivision (b) requires the complaint to be the first document filed in an action.
25
In addition, when the term “action” is used elsewhere in the Rules of Civil
Procedure, it appears to mean something more akin to “case,” “lawsuit,” “proceeding,” or
“course of litigation,” much like how we defined the term in Ellis and in Skyline Materials.
For example, the phrase “in which the action is pending” is commonly used throughout the
rules to refer to a case in its entirety —which includes, but also encompasses more than,
merely the summons and complaint. See, e.g., Minn. R. Civ. P. 28.01 (“depositions shall
be taken . . . before a person appointed by the c ourt in which the action is pending”);
Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(a) (“[a]n application for an order to a party shall be made to the
court in which the action is pending”); Minn. R. Civ. P. 17.02 (“[a] party who is an infant
or is incompetent and is not so rep resented shall be represented by a guardian ad litem
appointed by the court in which the action is pending”).
Moreover, in other rules, the term “action” is used in a context that clearly
encompasses all the proceedings. For example, Rule 35.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
refers to “any stage of an action.” Likewise, Rule 37.02(b)(3) refers to a possible discovery
sanction as “dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof.”18 And Rule 41.01(b)
states that if a counterclaim has been pleaded, an “action shall not be dismissed against the
defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim may remain pending for independent
adjudication”—suggesting that, without such a proviso, dismissal of the “action” would
entail dismissal of the counterclaim as well. Accordingly, interpreting the term “action” in

18 Notably, Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 37.02(b) also refers separately to
“claims” and “defenses,” further suggesting that “action” must mean something more than
a particular claim or defense in a suit.
26
Rule 5.04(a) in the context of the term’s meaning in other rules of civil procedure leads me
to conclude that it does not make sense to limit the meaning o f “action” only to the
summons and complaint.
Nor do I believe that Rule 3.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs
commencement of a civil action, sheds much light on the specifics of the filing requirement
in Rule 5.04(a). Commencement of the a ction and filing of the action are two separate
processes, defined in two separate rules. It is true that Rule 3.01 references Rule 5.04 —
but by my reading, that reference simply acts as a signal to prospective parties that a filing
requirement exists and that they should review Rule 5.04 for the filing particulars. The
reference does not state that only the summons and complaint can satisfy Rule 5.04(a)’s
filing requirement.
Finally, as also acknowledged by the court , our precedent unequivocally instructs
us that “the rules are to be liberally construed so as to serve the interests of justice and so
as to discourage reliance on technicalities and form.” Larson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 314,
233 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1975). The R ules of Civil Procedure “reflect a preference
that actions be determined on the merits.” Patterson v. Wu Fam. Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863,
867 (Minn. 2000). These principles counsel us against interpreting “action” as meaning
the filing of only a summons and complaint, when other acts, such as a defendant’s filed
answer, can satisfy the filing requirement and alleviate the harsh result of a dismissal with
prejudice on a technicality.
Given the plain language of the rule, the use and broad meaning of the word “action”
in other Rules of Civil Procedure, and our clear preference to decide a matter on the merits,
27
I would hold that the filing of an answer by a defendant within 1 year of service of the
summons and complaint satisfies the filing requirem ent of Rule 5.04( a). A filed answer
within that time period shows that the defendant is on notice of the action and implicitly
recognizes the jurisdiction of the court. An answer filed in that first year, before a
complaint is filed, also suggests that the defendant is intent on moving the case along and
avoiding the costs of extended litigation.
Importantly, a filed answer within 1 year of service of the summons gives the court
notice of an active civil action and allows it to become involved in the supe rvision and
management of the case in a timely way . Here, Hiscox’s answer provided that notice to
the court, informing the court of the existence of litigation, the identity of the parties, and
the general nature of the suit, and allowed the court to begi n management of the case. In
sum, interpreting “action” to include an answer achieves the 2013 amendment’s goals of
allowing the parties a year-long opportunity for informal dispute resolution after service of
a complaint while also encouraging effective case management if a defendant chooses to
file an answer during that year.
My interpretation of the rule does not allow for its requirements to be met by simply
any filing —a letter, for example —by any party. Instead, I would rule that the filing
requirement is met only when the defendant files an answer ( or a motion to dismiss ) that
alerts the court that a civil case is underway that requires the court’s attention. Here,
Hiscox’s filed answer fits that bill.
Finally, an interpretation that recognizes a de fendant’s answer as satisfying the
filing requirement provides clear guidance to the parties. Plaintiffs are informed that they
28
must file their complaint within the 1-year period or risk having their case dismissed with
prejudice if no answer is filed within that period. Similarly, defendants are on notice that
if they choose to file an answer within a year after service of the complaint, but before its
filing, they have waived any possibility of a dismissal under Rule 5.04(a). Defendants who
are concerned that the filing of an answer will excuse a plaintiff’s non -compliance with
Rule 5.04(a) can simply wait out the filing deadline before invoking the rule. The practical
implications of this interpretation are reasonable and workable. Most importantly, our
court’s goal of serving the interests of justice by deciding cases on their merits will be
furthered by recognizing that a defendant’s answer can satisfy the filing requirement of
Rule 5.04(a).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the court ’s reasoning that only the
summons and complaint can satisfy Rule 5.04(a)’s filing requirement.
II.
19
In this action, Glen Edin served Hiscox with a summons and complaint in 2019, but
Glen Edin did not file those documents with the district court— on their own— until March
2021, more than 1 year later. Applying our holding that Rule 5.04(a) requires the summons
and complaint to be filed within 1 year of the commencement of the action, the dissent20
believes that filing an “action” under Rule 5.04(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil

19 This part represents the opinion of the court regarding whether Glen Edin filed its
complaint properly under Rule 5.04(a) here.

20 When referencing “the dissent” throughout this section, we refer to Justice Hudson’s
dissenting opinion in Part II of her opinion & dissent.
29
Procedure means the summons and complaint must be filed as standalone documents with
the district court to satisfy Rule 5.04(a). Because Glen Edin failed to do so here, the dissent
would reverse the court of appeals and dismiss the case.
We disagree. We instead hold that, under the specific circumstances here, Glen
Edin did file the summons and complaint and satisfied the Rule 5.04(a) filing requirement
when it filed the documents in district court as part of an exhibit in a n ancillary motion
pertaining to the same action . Consequently, we affirm the decision of the court of
appeals—although on different grounds —and remand the case back to the district court for
further proceedings.21
As previously noted, the 2013 amendment to Rule 5.04(a) balanced the dual goals
of preserving the benefits of hip -pocket service by allowing parties to resolve disputes
outside of the courtroom and the public eye for a time, while still requiring filing with the
court within 1 year so that the district court can manage litigation before the action grows
too stale. See Recommendations of the Minnesota Supreme Court Civil Justice Reform
Task Force, No. ADM10-8051, at 21–22 (Minn. Dec. 23, 2011).
Here, Glen Edin provided a copy of its summons and complaint to the district court
within 1 year of commencing the action , just not as standalone documents. Instead, the
summons and complaint were attached as an exhibit to an affidavit with a memorandum in

21 The court of appeals decided this matter based on its interpretation of Rule 5.04(a )
and concluded that the answer Hiscox filed in January 2020 satisfied the 1-year filing rule.
See Glen Edin of Edinburgh Ass’n v. Hiscox Ins. Co., 973 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Minn. App.
2022). The court of appeals therefore did not reach the alternative argument that Glen Edin
had already filed the complaint as an exhibit to an affidavit.
30
support of Glen Edin’s motion for appointment of a neutral umpire for appraisal. The
dissent believes, however, that this filing does not comply with the requirements of Rule
5.04(a) because the attached documents were “tucked away in an exhi bit to an affidavit
included with a memorandum” that “concerned a matter ancillary to the underlying
substantive dispute.” Supra at 14.
From a best practices standpoint, we certainly agree that the manner of filing the
summons and complaint here was suboptimal. If we were to hold, however, that the
summons and complaint must be filed with the district court separately and independently,
that holding would in effect add a technical fil ing requirement beyond the text of Rule
5.04(a) and undercut the judiciary’s goal of resolving disputes on the merits. Again, our
court has long been clear that the Rules of Civil Procedure “reflect a well-considered policy
to discourage technicalities an d form.” Love v. Anderson, 61 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Minn.
1953); see also Larson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 314 , 233 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1975);
Commandeur LLC v. Howard Hartry, Inc., 724 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Minn. 2006); Minn. R.
Civ. P. 1.
Here, Glen Edin filed the summons and complaint with the district court as an
exhibit to an affidavit in support of a motion ancillary to the substance of the cause of
action in the complaint. Filing the summons and complaint in this manner nonetheless
placed the necessary documents in the hands of the district court for the purposes of case
management and involvement with the case before it grew stale. This manner of filing still
satisfies the policy concerns that justified the 1-year filing requirement of Rule 5.04(a).
31
Moreover, nothing in the text of Rule 5.04(a) suggests that filing the summons and
complaint must be in standalone form; indeed, the rule broadly states only that the action
must be “filed with the court within one year of commencement” without any specific
reference to form. In requiring that a plaintiff file the summons and complaint
independently—despite the undisputed fact that the documents were already in the district
court file and available to the district court—we would be adding a technica l requirement
to the rule that can lead to dismissal with prejudice and would frustrate our longstanding
“preference that actions be determined on the merits.” Patterson v. Wu Fam. Corp. ,
608 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Minn. 2000).
Here, Hiscox was served with the motion and accompanying documents and did not
object to the filing of the complaint as an attachment to an affidavit . Moreover, the court
administrator did not reject the filing of the complaint . On this record, the argument that
Hiscox makes and the dissent would like to adopt would elevate form over substance.
Accordingly, because Glen Edin filed the summons and complaint with the district
court within 1 year of commencing its action against Hiscox, dismissal of the action was
inappropriate here.
22 Even though Glen Edin filed the summons and complaint by
attaching it to an affidavit rather than filing the documents separately, Glen Edin still placed
the necessary documents in the hands of the district court only 4 months after the action
was commenced, apprising the court of the nature of the action and content of the

22 Glen Edin alternatively challenges the district court’s decision to deny its motion to
vacate under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(a). Given that we hold that Glen
Edin properly filed its summons and complaint with the district court under Rule 5.04(a),
we need not address this argument.
32
complaint. Glen Edin’s filing allowed the district court to be involved in case management
before the acti on grew stale. See MCHS Red Wing v. Converse , 961 N.W.2d 780, 785
(Minn. App. 2021). We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals, albeit on
different grounds.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, but we do
so on different grounds.

GILDEA, Chief Justice (dissenting in part).
I join in the opinion and dissent of Justice Hudson.
ANDERSON, Justice.
I join in part I of the opinion of Justice Hudson and part II of the opinion of Justice
Chutich.
McKEIG, Justice (dissenting in part).
I join in the opinion and dissent of Justice Chutich.
THISSEN, Justice (dissenting in part).
I join in the opinion and dissent of Justice Hudson.
MOORE, III, Justice (dissenting in part).
I join in the opinion and dissent of Justice Chutich.