Clarence Walker, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0806

Clarence Walker,
Relator,

vs.

Knutson Counseling & Seminars, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed January 3, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 41022735-3

Clarence Walker, New London, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Knutson Counseling & Seminars, Inc., Willmar, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presid ing Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge that he is ineligible
for unemployment benefits because he quit his job and no statutory exception applies. We
affirm.
FACTS
Relator Clarence Walker resigned from his job with respondent Knutson Counseling
and Seminars (the employer). Relator applied for unemp loyment benefits through
respondent Department of Employment and Economic De velopment (DEED). Both
relator and the employer submitted unemployment insurance information to DEED which
described why relator resigned from employ ment. DEED determined that relator
voluntarily retired from his em ployment; and sinc e continuing suitable work was still
available to him, he was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Relator appealed DEED’s
determination of ineligibility. The matter proceeded to a hearing before an unemployment-
law judge (ULJ). We first su mmarize the facts based on th e testimony presented at the
hearing about the circumstances of relator’s resignation. Then we analyze the ULJ’s
determinations after the hearing.
Relator worked as a part-time therapist for the employer from February 15, 2018 to
April 3, 2020. Relator typically worked Tuesdays and Thursday s for about 16 hours a
week. In March 2020, relator became increasingly concerned about COVID-19 exposure
in the workplace because he suffers from several medical conditions that would make him
particularly susceptible to h ealth complications if exposed to the virus. On March 26,
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relator spoke with the employer about his health concer ns and asked about the option to
conduct telehealth counseling sessions. The employer told re lator that he could not offer
online or telehealth counseling sessions unde r the employer’s licensing provisions. The
employer informed relator that it did not kn ow what options would be available in the
future, but at the time, the employer still expected relator to report in person to work.
The parties dispute what happened foll owing the conversation on March 26.
Relator’s supervisor testified that during the March 26 conversation, she told relator that
he was eligible to take a leave of absence due to COVID-19 like one of his coworkers had
chosen to do. The supervisor testified that later the same day, relator accepted the offer to
take a leave of absence effective immediately. But relator testified that after learning that
telehealth services were not an option for him, he took the week of March 26 to April 3 to
consider what would be best for his health. Relator stated that the employer did not offer
a leave of absence, and he did not ask for one.
On April 3, relator delivered a letter of resignation to the employer effective
immediately. The letter stated that rela tor was concerned about potential harm from
COVID-19. Relator told the ULJ that “the COVID-19 epidemic fo rced [his] hand, and
[his] quit was involuntary.” The employer a ccepted relator’s resignation. Several weeks
later the employer’s licensing agency allowed the employer to begin providing telehealth
services.
Following the hearing, the ULJ issued findings of fact and a decision, determining
that relator was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. The ULJ noted the
conflicting testimony between relator and his supervisor and found “[the supervisor’s]
4
more direct and detailed testimony regarding these conversations, which was supported by
evidence showing that [relator] did not work after March 26, 2020, to be more likely than
[relator’s] less responsive testimony to the contrary.”
The ULJ noted that an applicant who quits empl oyment is ineligible for
unemployment benefits unless an exception applies. The ULJ considered two exceptions:
a quit for medical necessity and a quit for a good reason caused by the employer. The ULJ
determined that the medical-necessity ex ception did not apply because the employer
offered relator a reasonable accommodation before relator quit. The ULJ also determined
that the good-reason-caused-by -employer exception did not apply because the employer
did not treat relator adversely and a reasona ble worker would not be compelled to quit
employment. The determination led to an overpayment of more than $3,000.
Relator requested reconsideration, argui ng that he did not choose to retire but
instead needed to resign because of potential exposure to COVID-19. The ULJ issued its
order affirming the ineligibility determination. 1 The ULJ again found that the original
determination was factually and legally correct.
Relator appeals by certiorari.
DECISION
Relator challenges the ULJ’s determinati on that relator is not eligible for
unemployment benefits because he does not me et the quit exceptions under Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1(1), (7) (2020). This court reviews the ULJ’s factual findings in the light

1 The ULJ reissued his decision to reflect the eviden ce that relator did work after March
26, 2020. The correction did not change the outcome of the decision.
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most favorable to the decision. Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc. , 888 N.W.2d 452, 460
(Minn. 2016). When reviewing the ULJ’s deci sion, this court may affirm the decision or
remand for further proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020). Alternatively,
we may reverse or modify the ULJ’s decision when the relator has been prejudiced because
the decision, among other things, is not suppor ted by substantial evid ence in the record.
Id., subd. 7(d)(5). Whether the ULJ’s findings show that the applicant meets a statutory
exception to ineligibility for quitting employment is a question of la w, which this court
reviews de novo. See Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn.
App. 2000) (applying de novo review to determine whether applicant met exception for a
quit for good reason caused by employer).
I. The ULJ did not err by de termining that relator di d not meet the medical-
necessity exception.
Relator first contends that he meets th e medical-necessity exception and so he
challenges the ULJ’s determina tion that he was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Relator maintains that the employer did not offer him a leave of absence as an
accommodation. An applican t who voluntarily quits empl oyment is disqualified from
receiving unemployment benefits unless “the applicant’s serious illness or injury made it
medically necessary that the ap plicant quit.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(7). This
exception only applies, however, if the applicant informs th e employer of the medical
problem, requests an accommodation, and no reasonable accommodation is made. Id.
Here, the ULJ determined that relator did not meet the medical-necessity exception
because the employer offered relator a reasonable accommodation in the form of an unpaid
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leave of absence until the employer’s licensi ng agency approved telehealth counseling. 2
The ULJ noted that the parties provided conf licting testimony but fo und the supervisor’s
testimony to be more persuasive and supported by evidence. Because this is an issue of
credibility, this court must defer to the judgment of the ULJ. Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless
Servs., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 525, 527 (Minn. App. 2007) (“This court will defer to [a ULJ’s]
credibility determinations . . . that are supported by substantial evidence.”) (syllabus by the
court); Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 345 (Minn. App. 2006) (“Credibility
determinations are the exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed on appeal.”).
The record supports the ULJ’s finding that the employer offered relator an unpaid
leave of absence. Relator’s supervisor tes tified that she offered him a leave of absence
because of COVID-19 and that relator accepted the offer e ffective immediately. The
supervisor testified that relator did not work his scheduled shifts over the week of March
26 through April 2 because he was on a leave of absence. During that week, relator called
his supervisor and informed her of his intent to resign due to concerns of COVID-19.
Relator then returned to work on April 3 to complete remaining office work and submit his
formal letter of resignation. The record ther efore supports the finding that the employer
offered relator a reasonable accommodation and relator decided to quit anyway. Thus, the

2 On appeal, relator does not argue that an unpaid leave of absence would not have been a
reasonable accommodation for him until the co mpany learned more about options for
telehealth. Instead, relator argues that an unpaid leave of absence was never offered to
him. We therefore do not address whether an unpaid leave of absence is a reasonable
accommodation.
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ULJ did not err by dete rmining that relator did not satis fy all the requirements of the
medical-necessity exception.
II. The ULJ did not err by determining that relator did not meet the exception for
a quit for a good reason caused by the employer.
Relator also argues that the ULJ erred by de termining that relator did not meet the
exception for a quit because of a good reason caused by th e employer under Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1(1). To satis fy this exception, the applic ant’s reason for quitting must
be one that: (1) is directly related to the employment and for which the employer is
responsible, (2) is adverse to the worker, an d (3) would compel an average, reasonable
worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remain in the employment. Id., subd. 3
(2020). “To compel” is “to cause or bring about by force, threat s, or overwhelming
pressure.” Werner v. Med. Pros. LLC, 782 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 321 (9th ed. 2009)), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010). The
standard is an objective, reasonable-person standard. Id. It applies “to the average man or
woman, and not to the supersensitive.” Nichols v. Reliant Eng’g & Mfg., 720 N.W.2d 590,
597 (Minn. App. 2006).
Relator contends that he meets this ex ception because continuing his employment
would have threatened his physical health an d wellbeing. The ULJ found that the record
did not “support a finding that the average, reasonable worker would be compelled to quit
and become unemployed given [the employer’s] treatment of [relator]. [Relator] quit
without a good reason caused by the employer.”
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The record supports the ULJ’ s determination that relato r did not sati sfy the good-
reason-caused-by-employer exception. Th e employer did not cause unsafe working
conditions because of COVID-19. And the re cord shows that the employer was actively
working toward telehealth options that would offer relator accommodations to avoid direct
contact with patients. There is no record evid ence that supports relator’s contention that
the employer compelled or forced relator to work in unsafe and unsuitable conditions.
Instead, the record reveals that the employer actively offered relator a leave of absence and
was working to provide a safer work environment for all its employees. Thus, relator failed
to show that he quit for a good reason caused by the employer.
For these reasons, the ULJ did not err by de termining that relator was not entitled
to unemployment benefits because he qu it his employment and no statutory exception
applies.
Affirmed.