A21-0847 Precedential Reversed and remanded Processed

In the Matter of V & J Farm, LLC and the Commissioner of North Fork Crow River Watershed District, Acting as Drainage Authority for Stearns County.

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed April 18, 2022

The holding in the court’s own words

We conclude that th e distinct purpose of subdivision 2(a) is to identify which representative of a drainage au thority should be serv ed with a notice of appeal from an order determining benefits or damages.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Opinion text

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0847

In the Matter of V & J Farm, LLC
and the Commissioner of North Fork Crow River Watershed District,
Acting as Drainage Authority for Stearns County.

Filed April 18, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-20-7123

Ryan R. Simatic, Biersdorf & Associates, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant
V & J Farm, LLC)

Gerald W. Von Korff, John C. Kolb, Rinke Noonan, Ltd., St. Cl oud, Minnesota (for
respondent North Fork Crow River Watershed District)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.

SYLLABUS
To perfect an appeal and i nvoke the jurisdiction of a district court in an action
initiated pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 103E. 091, subd. 2 (2020), a party who appeals the
amount of benefits or damages in a drainage proceeding must file a notice of appeal with
the auditor within 30 days after the challenged order is filed and must serve notice of the
appeal to the auditor. Servi ce of the notice of the appeal to the auditor need not occur
within 30 days after the challenged order is filed.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant-landowner challenges the dist rict court’s summary-judgment dismissal
of landowner’s appeal of respondent-watershed district’s order redetermining benefits and
damages for a drainage system. Landowner ar gues the district court erred in concluding
that the 30-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal in Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2(b),
applies to the service requirement in subdivision 2(a). Because the plain language of Minn.
Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2(a), does not require service on the auditor within 30 days, and
service was effected, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
Appellant V & J Farm, LLC, owns land in Stearns County that benefits from the
operation of Stearns County Ditch 37. Re spondent North Fork Cr ow River Watershed
District acts as the drainage authority for Stearns County Ditch 37. On February 19, 2020,
the watershed district issued an order approving a redetermination of benefits and damages
for Stearns County Ditch 37. On March 16, 2020, V&J Farm mailed a notice of appeal of
the watershed district’s redetermination order to the Stearns County Auditor, who received
it on March 18.
On April 7, 2020, the watershed district’s attorney contacted V&J Farm’s attorney,
asserting that “simply mailing the notice of appeal to the auditor does not constitute service
or process consistent with the rules.” On October 16, V&J Farm’s notice of appeal was
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filed in district court. After obtaining new counsel, V&J Farm personally served the notice
of appeal on the county auditor on October 23, 2020.
The watershed district file d a motion for summary judgment contending that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because personal service of the
notice of appeal was not effect ed within 30 days of the February 19, 2020 order. The
district court granted the watershed district ’s motion for summary judgment. V&J Farm
appeals.
ISSUES
I. Is Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2, “inconsistent or in conflict” with Minn. R. Civ.
P. 4.03 rendering the civil rules of procedure inapplicable pursuant to Minn. R. Civ.
P. 81.01?

II. When an aggrieved party appeals a decisi on of a drainage authority pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2, must notice of the appeal be served to the county
auditor within 30 days after the drainage authority’s filing of the challenged order?

ANALYSIS
We review a district court’s decisi on on a motion for summary judgment de novo.
Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010).
The effectiveness of service of process is a question of law that we review de novo .
Roehrdanz v. Brill , 682 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn. 2004). Whether a district court has
subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Cnty. of Washington v.
City of Oak Park Heights, 818 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 2012). “When a party seeks review
of a municipal decision, the reviewing court ha s subject matter jurisdiction, provided that
the party challenging the decision timely seeks relief in the proper manner and forum.” Id.
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Before we analyze the speci fic issues in this appeal involving a ditch proceeding,
we provide an overview of key provisions of chapter 103E. We then consider the district
court’s determination that Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03 applies to th e type of service required.
Finally, we determine whether the required service was effected.
Chapter 103E, entitled “Drainage,” is part of a larger group of chapters, 103A-114B,
broadly titled “Water.” Related to the issu es on appeal, chapters 103A through 103G
“constitute the water law of this state and may be cited as th e ‘Water Law.’” Minn. Stat
§ 103A.001 (2020).
A “‘[d]rainage system’ means a system of di tch or tile, or both, to drain property,
including laterals, improvements, and improvements of outlets, established and constructed
by a drainage authority.” 1 Minn. Stat § 103E.005, subd. 12 (2020). A “‘[d]rainage
authority’ means the board or jo int county drainage authority having jurisdiction over a
drainage system or project.” Minn. Stat . § 103E.005, subd. 9 (2020). Chapter 103E
broadly provides mechanisms to establish, im prove, repair, and assess drainage systems.
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 103E.212 (establishing new drainage systems), .215 (improving
drainage systems), .315 (assessing benefits and damages), .351 (redetermining benefits and
damages), .701 (repairing drainage systems) (2020).

1 “Public drainage systems that are located totally within one county (and not within an
established watershed district) are administ ered by the county board of commissioners.
Joint county ditches are systems located in two or more counties. Judicial ditches are public
drainage systems established through court order. . . .” Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency, Minnesota Public Drainage Manual: Overview (Oct. 26, 2016, 7:52 PM),
https://drainage.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/A._Overview.
5
When a drainage authority has approved a petition for a drainage project following
a preliminary hearing, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 103E.261, subd. 5 (2020), and an order for
a detailed survey of the proposed drainage project is made, pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 103E.265 (2020), the drainage authority “s hall, by order, appoint viewers consisting of
three disinterested residents of the state qualified to assess benefits and damages.” Minn.
Stat. § 103E.305, subd. 1 (2020). “Benefits ” are assessed to those landowners who are
beneficially affected by the drainage project. See Minn. Stat. § 103E.315, subds. 6, 7. The
assignment of benefits is based on various criteria resulting from the project including, “an
increase in the current market value of property,” “an incr ease in the potential for
agricultural production,” or “an increased valu e of the property as a result of a potential
different land use.” Id., subd. 5. “Damages” are paid to a landowner to compensate for,
among other reasons, loss of crops or diminished farm value resulting from the ditch
project. Id., subd. 8.
As it applies to this appeal, chapter 103E also authorizes a drainage authority to
redetermine the benefits and damages “[i]f th e drainage authority determines that the
benefits or damages of record determined in a drainage proc eeding do not reflect
reasonable present-day land values or that the benefited or damaged areas have changed.”
Minn. Stat. § 103E.351, subd. 1(a). The same procedure required to determine benefits
and damages when a new ditch pr oject is established, including the appointment of three
viewers, is required to redetermine benefits and damages. Id., subd. 2(a).

6
Procedural Background
V&J farm sought to challenge the waters hed district’s order redetermining the
benefits of Stearns County Ditch 37 to the district court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 103E.091,
subd. 2, which provides:
(a) A person who appeals the am ount of benefits or damages
may include benefits and damages affecting property not owned by
the appellant. Notice of the appeal must be served to the auditor and
to the owner or occupant of propert y included in the appeal or to the
attorney representing the property owner in the proceedings.

(b) The appellant must file a notice of appeal with the auditor
within 30 days after the order to be appealed is filed. The notice must
state the particular benefits or damages appealed and the basis for the
appeal. Within 30 days after the notice is filed, the auditor must file
the original notice with the court administrator of the district court.

(Emphasis added).
The parties disagree about the meaning of the service requirement in Minn. Stat.
§ 103E.091, subd. 2(a). The district court concluded that persona l service is required
pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03 and In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472, 477
(Minn. 2013). The district court next concl uded that the 30-day timeframe in Minn. Stat.
§ 103E.091, subd. 2(b), requiring filing of a notice of ap peal with the county auditor,
applies to the service of the county auditor provided in subdivision 2(a). The district court
summarized that, because V&J Farms provided the “notice of” appeal to the county auditor
by filing the notice of appeal pursuant to su bdivision 2(b) within 30 days but did not
personally serve the auditor within 30 days, th e appeal was not perfected, and the district
court lacked jurisdiction.

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I.
Appellate courts review the “constructi on and application of the Minnesota Rules
of Civil Procedure de novo.” Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn.
2008). Pursuant to the rules of civil pro cedure, drainage proceedings are “special
proceedings” to which the civil rules do not apply if they are “inconsistent or in conflict.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(a) App. A.
The watershed district argues that the district court appropriately relied on Skyline
by concluding that rule 4.03 applies becaus e no “contradictory provision” excludes the
application of the rules of civil procedure. V&J Farm argues that, because a conflict
regarding the service requirements exists betw een Minn. Stat. § 103E .091 and rule 4.03,
and drainage proceedings are listed as special proceedings in the appendix to rule 81, this
court “must consider the statutory language” and the “context of how the statute[] create[s]
the procedural framework.”
We therefore consider whether Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2, is inconsistent or
conflicts with the service requirements of Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03. The relevant provisions
of rule 4.03(e) specify who must be served when serving a public corporation: “To the chair
of the county board or to the county auditor of a defendant county” or “To any member of the
board or other governing body of a defendant public board or public body not hereinabove
enumerated.” Because Minn. Stat. § 10 3E.091, subd. 2(a), provide s that the “[n]otice of
the appeal must be served to the auditor,” it is inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions
8
of rule 4.03(e) specifying whom to serve. 2 Accordingly, service on the auditor—not the
individuals specified in rule 4.03(e)—is required to appe al a redetermination order
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2, and invoke jurisdiction.
In Skyline, the supreme court concluded that an appeal pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 394.27, subd. 9, from a county variance decision “invoked, for the first time, the
jurisdiction of the courts.” 835 N.W.2d at 476 . The supreme court therefore held that an
appeal to district court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9, commenced a new civil
action pursuant to rule 3.01 and was subject to the service requirements of rule 4.03. Id. at
476-77; Schulz v. Town of Duluth , 936 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Minn. 2019) (observing that in
Skyline, the court “said that ‘statu tory provisions for service of notice must be strictly
followed in order for a court to acquire jurisdiction,’ and held that a party must follow the
service requirements of Rule 4.03 to perfect an appeal under Minnesota Statutes section
394.27 (2018)” (quoting Skyline, 835 N.W.2d at 477)); see also Doerr v. Warner , 76
N.W.2d 505
, 511 (Minn. 1956) (“As a general rule a civil action is commenced, and the
court thereby acquires jurisdiction, when pe rsonal service upon the defendant is actually
made as prescribed by statute or rule.”).
Unlike the statute here, the appeal statute in Skyline did not specify how to file the
notice of appeal or whom to serve. It provided, in relevant part: “All decisions by the board
of adjustment . . . shall be final except that any aggrieved person . . . shall have the right to

2 We need not resolve whether rule 4.03(e )(1) or 4.03(e)(5) app lies to service on the
watershed district under these circumstance s because both conflict with Minn. Stat.
§ 103E.091, subd. 2.
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appeal within 30 days, after receipt of notice of the decision, to the district court.” Minn.
Stat. § 394.27, subd. 9 (2012 ). The specific question in Skyline was whether appellants
had served the notice of appeal on the correct representative of the county decision-maker,
which turned on whether Minn. R. Ci v. P. 4.03 or 5.02 applied. Skyline, 835 N.W.2d at
474. Because the variance appeal commenced a new civ il action, the supreme court
concluded that rule 4.03 determined service requirements. Id. at 476.
Rule 4.03 identifies proper methods of service of a “summons,” defined in Skyline
as “any document that commences a civil action.” Id. at 475. As described above, the rule
specifies to whom a summons shall be delivered under various circumstances. See Minn.
R. Civ. P. 4.03.
However, the rules of civil procedure “do not govern pleadings, practice and
procedure in the statutory and other proceedings listed in Appendix A insofar as they are
inconsistent with or in conflict with the rule s.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(a). Drainage
proceedings are a “special proceeding” listed in Appendix A to which conflicting rules of
civil procedure do not apply. Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(a) App. A.
Therefore, we must interpret the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2,
rather than rule 4.03, to determine the proper procedure to serve an appeal of an order of a
drainage authority which redetermines benefits and damages of a drainage project.
II.
V&J Farm argues that the district court erred in concluding that the 30-day deadline
to file notice in Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2(b), applies to the service requirement in
Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2(a). Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that
10
appellate courts review de novo. Engfer v. Gen. Dynamics Advanced Info. Sys., Inc., 869
N.W.2d 295
, 300 (Minn. 2015). “The goal of statutory interpretation ‘is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature.’” Svihel Vegetable Farm, Inc. v. Dept. of Empl’t
and Econ. Dev., 929 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Minn. Stat § 645.16 (2018)).
If the language of the statute is clear, we a pply the plain language of the statute. Engfer,
869 N.W.2d at 300. “[W]ords and phrases are construed according to . . . their common
and approved usage . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020); see also Rodriguez v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 931 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 2019). If the plain language of the
statute is open to multiple reasonable interpretations, the statute is ambiguous and the court
“may apply canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity.” State v. Thonesavanh, 904
N.W.2d 432
, 435 (Minn. 2017). Neither party claims ambiguity in the language of Minn.
Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2. We agree that the subdivision is unambiguous.
Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2, is separa ted into two subparts containing distinct
requirements. Subdivision 2(a) requires, in relevant part, that “[n]otice of the appeal must
be served to the auditor.” It includes no timeframe in its dir ective. The language of this
subpart describes the person upon whom service is to be made—the auditor.
Subdivision 2(b) requires that “[t]he appellant must file a notice of appeal with the
auditor within 30 days after the order to be appealed is filed.” The auditor, in turn, “must
file the original notice with the court administrator of the district court” within 30 days of
the filing of the notice.3 Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2(b). The language of this subpart

3 No party argues, and the district court did not conclude, that the district court lacks
jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not filed with the district court within 30 days
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directs a two-step process of when, where, and by whom, the notice of appeal must be filed.
Based on the plain language of the two subparts of subdivision 2, we agree with V&J Farm
that the district court erred in concluding that the 30-day limit on filing in subdivision 2(b)
applies to the service requirement in subdivision 2(a).
“Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.16; see also Shire v. Rosemount , Inc., 875 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. 2016).
“When the Legislature uses limiting or modifyin g language in one part of a statute, but
omits it in another, we regard that omission as intentional and will not add those same
words of limitation or modification to parts of the statute where they were not used.”
General Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue , 931 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Minn. 2019); see also
Seagate Tech, LLC v. W. Digit. Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 759 (Minn. 2014).
The legislature’s choice to separate serv ice requirements in subdivision 2(a) from
filing requirements in subdivis ion 2(b) demonstrates the legi slature’s determination that
service and filing are separate functions. An d the inclusion of a 30-day limit in the filing
subpart, but not in the service subpart, must be honored. See State v. Jorgenson , 946
N.W.2d 596, 607 (Minn. 2020) (“[E]very st atutory word has me aning and none is
surplusage.”). Based on the plain language us ed, the legislature required a 30-day limit
only for the filing requirement of subdivision 2(b). We cannot add words to a statute that
“the legislature has either purposely omitted or inadvertently overlooked.” Hayden v. City
of Minneapolis, 937 N.W.2d 790, 796 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 14,

of the filing of the notice of appeal with the auditor. See Minn. Stat. § 103E.091,
subd. 2(b).
12
2020) (quoting Christiansen v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents, 733 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn.
App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007)).
Our conclusion that the 30-day limit for th e filing requirement in subdivision 2(b),
does not apply to the service requirement in subdivision 2(a), is further supported by an
examination of a related statutory appeal provision. The legislature imposed a 30-day limit
on serving notice to the auditor for a different type of drainage appeal. Minn. Stat.
§ 103E.095 (2020) provides for an appeal to district court from an order establishing or
refusing to establish a drainage project. It states, “[t]he appellant must serve notice of the
appeal to the auditor within 30 days after the order is f iled.” Minn. Stat. § 103E.095,
subd. 1.4
In sum, the plain language of subdivision 2 plainly sepa rates into two parts, each
with a distinct purpose. We conclude that th e distinct purpose of subdivision 2(a) is to
identify which representative of a drainage au thority should be serv ed with a notice of
appeal from an order determining benefits or damages. The distinct purpose of subdivision
2(b) is to direct that the notice of appeal be filed with the auditor within 30 days after the
challenged order is filed by the drainage authority.
Because V&J Farm filed its notice of the appeal with the aud itor within 30 days,
and served the notice of appeal on the aud itor, V&J Farm satisfied the requirements of
Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2, to perfect its appeal.

4 Although the absence of an express filing requirement in Minn. Stat. § 103E.095 is a
difference from the arguably duplicative fili ng and service requirements in Minn. Stat.
§ 103E.091, this difference does not alter the plain language of the service requirements in
each statute.
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DECISION
A party appealing an order redetermining benefits or damages pursuant to Minn.
Stat § 103E.091, subd. 2, must file the notice of appeal with the auditor within 30 days of
the challenged order and must serve the notice of appeal to the auditor. Because appellant
filed the notice of appeal within 30 days and served the auditor personally, it satisfied the
requirement of Minn. Stat. § 103E.091, subd. 2(a)-(b), to perfect its appeal and commence
a new civil action. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment
and dismissal of the appeal and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.