State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0875

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Carlos Antonio Banegas Rodriguez,
Appellant.

Filed May 23, 2022
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Pope County District Court
File No. 61-CR-20-341

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Neil Nelson, Pope County Attorney, Glenwood, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
The state charged appellant Carlos Antoni o Banegas Rodriguez with first-degree
criminal sexual conduct for abus ing his 13-year-old daughter. 1 Appellant moved for a
mistrial following the failure of interpreters to relay a portion of daughter’s testimony to
appellant, who speaks Spanish. The district c ourt denied the mistrial motion. Appellant
also sought to cross-examine his daughter—the lead witness—regarding her immigration
status, but the district court ruled that tes timony inadmissible. Because the interpretation
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt an d the district court properly limited the
immigration testimony, we affirm.
FACTS
In August 2020, daughter, a 13-year-old child, reported that she was sexually abused
by her father, appellant. The state charged a ppellant with criminal sexual conduct in the
first degree (position of authority).2
Before trial, appellant moved to allow cr oss-examination of daughter regarding her
immigration status. The mo tion alleged that daughter’s testimony was biased and
fabricated because of the “opportunity to apply for special immigration asylum visa status
as victims of domestic and/or physical/sexual abuse,” particularly the opportunity to apply
for asylum. When asked by the district court for proof of daughter’s awareness of such an

1 The state refers to appellant’s last name as Banegas Rodriguez, but he often goes only by
Banegas. We refer to him as appellant.
2 Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(b) (2020).
3
immigration benefit, appellant’s counsel replied that appellant’s subjective belief was the
sole foundation for the motion.
The district court stated that the “prejudi ce would be significa nt” if daughter was
asked about her immigration status, but that there would be “some probative value” if
appellant could elicit te stimony that suggested a motive to fabricate the allegations. The
district court then ruled that appellant coul d voir dire (outside of the jury’s presence)
daughter about her knowledge of the alleged immigration benefits.
During the voir dire, daughter testified that she told a social worker that she was
concerned about reporting appellant’s assaults due to her mother’s lack of citizenship. And
daughter stated to the social worker that she worried th at she and her mother would be
removed to Honduras if she spoke up. She denied any recollection of speaking to an
immigration attorney in Minnesota but admitt ed to speaking to so meone in Texas when
she first arrived in the United States. And she testified that the Texas attorney told her she
could get asylum in the United States if she was a victim of abuse. But daughter confirmed
that she knew she had to have been assaulted in her home county—not the United States—
to receive asylum. The district court then asked “Did anyone ever tell you that you could
get asylum in the United States for abuse that you suffered in the United States?” Daughter
responded “No.” Following that exchange, th e district court rule d that any testimony
before a jury regarding daughter’s immigra tion status was inadmissible under Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 403 as being highly prej udicial and possessing “very small probative
value.”
4
Following voir dire, the jury re-entered the courtroom and the state began its direct
examination of daughter. Because appellant speaks Spanish and daughter is bilingual, two
translators were used for trial—one to transl ate the attorneys’ questions and the other to
translate the witnesses’ answers. While dau ghter gave most of her answers in English
during her direct testimony, she answered six questions in Spanish. The interpreters began
interpreting her answers into English once she started to switch between languages. This
continued for several minutes. But midway through the direct examination of daughter,
the district court stopped the proceedings and asked if the translators were still interpreting
the answers into Spanish for appellant. The interpreters, in a sidebar with the district court
and counsel, acknowledged that they had ceased interpreting for appellant to concentrate
on translating daughter’s answers for the jury. When asked if he understood the testimony
he missed, appellant said he did not understand most of it.
After dismissing the jury to discuss possi ble solutions for the error, appellant moved
for a mistrial, claiming that the criminal complaint had to be dismissed with prejudice. The
district court denied the motion and offered two possible remedies: (1) have an interpreter
orally translate to appellant from a recording of daughter’s testimony or (2) prepare a
written transcript of the testimony for appellant to read. The roughly 30-minute recording
was readily available, while the written transcri pt could take several days, so the district
court ordered the interpreters to translate daughter’s recorded oral testimony for appellant
before resuming the direct examination of daughter. They immediately did so. Then, after
a short lunch break, daughter’s direct examin ation continued. There was no interruption
of appellant’s cross-examination of daughter.
5
During daughter’s testimo ny, she explained that on Au gust 20, 2020, she was at
home with her two younger sib lings. As she walked to the bathroom to take a shower,
appellant pulled her into his bedroom and bega n to touch her. Eventually, he vaginally
penetrated her, which she said “hurt [her] a lot.” Daughter did not tell anyone because
appellant threatened to “do something” to her mother or aunt if she did. Five days later she
was again babysitting her younge r siblings. When appellant came home, he went into
daughter’s bedroom and tried to remove her clothes. Daughter testified that she scratched
appellant defensively in an attempt to escape but was unable to do so. Appellant again
tried to remove her clothes and touched her. Daughter told her aunt about the assaults later
that evening, who reported them to law enforcement. On cross-examination, daughter was
asked a series of questions to clarify whether or not she clos ed her eyes and turned away
during the alleged assault.
Following daughter’s testimo ny, the responding office r took the stand. He
described the call to appellant’s home on August 25, after which he arrested appellant. The
officer noted a scratch on appellant’s arm while at the police station.
The jury found appellant guilty. The district court sentenced appellant to the
presumed sentence of 144 months plus ten years of conditional release.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The translation error is reviewed as a trial error and it was harmless.

First, appellant argues that the la pse in translation during daughter’s
testimony violated his constitutional rights, in pa rticular his right to confrontation. This
6
alleged violation, he claims, amounts to struct ural error (as opposed to trial error) that
requires us to reverse the conviction and gran t a new trial without an evaluation of its
impact on the verdict. We review this question of constitutional law de novo.
State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 139 (Minn. 2009). To do so, we first address whether the
lapse in translation should be reviewed as stru ctural error or trial error, and then turn to
whether that error was harmless.
Structural error or trial error?
There are two types of error: tr ial error and structural error. State v. Kuhlmann ,
806 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Minn. 2011). Generally , most errors are trial errors, which are
reviewed under the harmless-error standard to determine the need for a reversal and a new
trial. State v. Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 25-26 (Minn. 2013).
In contrast, structural errors are “defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism.”
Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d at 851 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10
(1991)). These errors are rare and automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial. Id.
Examples of structural errors in clude denial of a public trial, Waller v. Georgia ,
467 U.S. 39 (1984); absence of an impartial judge, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927);
denial of counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); failure to dismiss a biased
juror, State v. Logan, 535 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 1995); a conflict of interest in representation
throughout the entire proceeding, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); and absence
of counsel from an arraignment proceeding that affected an entire trial because defenses
not asserted were irretrievably lost, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
7
With this distinction in mind, we turn to Minnesota’s statutes governing interpreters
in court proceedings. It is th e policy of the state that the constitutional rights of persons
“disabled in communication cannot be fully protected unless qualified interpreters are
available to assist them in legal proceedings .” Minn. Stat. § 611. 30 (2020). Minnesota
Statutes sections 611.30-.34 (2020) “provide a procedur e for the appointment of
interpreters to avoid injustice and to assist persons disabled in communication in their own
defense.” Id. We have held that these statutes establish that “entitlement to an interpreter
depends not merely on whethe r the individual suffers a disability, but on whether
a . . . language barrier prevents that person from fully understanding the proceedings.”
State v. Kail, 760 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Minn. App. 2009).
We conclude that the lapse in interpretation here should not be viewed as structural
error for four reasons. First, Minnesota caselaw is clear that errors in translation are trial
errors. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stat ed that the right to an interpreter in
Minnesota is not a constitutional right but instead a statutory right. State v. Sanchez-Diaz,
683 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 2004) (explaining requirements for a “qualified interpreter”
under the sections 611.30-34 in challenge to uncertified interpreter). As it is not our role
to weigh in where the supreme court has spok en, we will not create a constitutional right
to an interpreter here. Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987) (“[T]he
task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or th e legislature, but it does not
fall to this court.”), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987). Our re fusal to do so is reinforced
by Minnesota cases about analog ous errors, particularly th ose involving a defendant’s
partial absence from trial. In such cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently
8
recognized that any erro r in continuing a trial while a defe ndant is partially absent is not
structural error, but instead is a trial error subject to the harmless-error standard. See, e.g.,
State v. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d 243, 251 (Minn. 2010); State v. Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667,
681 (Minn. 2003); State v. Sessions, 621 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Minn. 2001); State v. Hudspeth,
535 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Minn. 1995).
Second, even if we were to find that a la pse in translation (as opposed to the right
to an interpreter) is a constitutional error, the alleged constitutiona l error would be a
violation of the Confrontatio n Clause. But it is well set tled that “violations of the
Confrontation Clause are subject to [a harmless-error] analysis.” State v. Courtney, 696
N.W.2d 73, 79 (Minn. 2005).
Third, federal law supports our conclusion. It views interpretation and translation
errors through the lens of harmless error. 3 See, e.g. , Mendoza v. United States ,
755 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Gomez , 908 F.2d 809, 811 (11th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 443 (2d Cir. 1986).
Finally, while we are mindful of the concerns of a defendant not understanding trial
proceedings due to a language barrier, the lapse in translation here was a far cry from the
errors that are typically viewed as structural error. See Watkins, 840 N.W.2d at 25 (listing
examples of structural error). Because the e rror here was promptly remedied and did not

3 Appellant contends that the Confronta tion Clause requires a contemporaneous and
continuous interpretation. However, he cite s only to a handful of federal cases that
interpret the Court Interpreters Act, 28 USC § 1827 (2018), which governs federal court
proceedings, not state proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Osuna, 189 F.3d 1289, 1291-93 (10th Cir. 1999).
9
“affect the entire trial from beginning to e nd,” we review it under the harmless-error
standard. Id.
In sum, this error is not structural and should not receive an automatic reversal.
Harmless Error
Having determined that the lapse in interpretation was not structural error, we next
consider whether the lapse was harmless.
Constitutional error is not reversible when the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
4 State v. Cannady, 727 N.W.2d 403, 409 (Minn. 2007). In reviewing whether the
verdict was unattributable to the error, we exam ine the nature of the error in light of the
entire record, includin g the evidence of th e defendant’s guilt. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d at
80. Defendants have a due-process right to a fair trial and a defendant “is entitled to a new
trial if the errors, when take n cumulatively, had the effect of denying [a defendant] a fair
trial.” State v. Keeton, 589 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Minn. 1998).
When considering whether the error here ha d the effect of denyi ng a fair trial, we
are further guided by Minnes ota Supreme Court decisions involving challenges to the
accuracy of an interpretation on appeal. In State v. Montalvo, the supreme court held that
an appellant has the burden of proving that the interpretation was “inadequate.”
324 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. 1982). And in State v. Her, this court stated that de minimis

4 For trial errors that do no t involve a defendant’s constitu tional rights there is a lower
threshold in which a new trial may only be ordered if the error substantially influenced the
verdict. State v. Sanders , 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn. 2009). But we do not need to
decide whether the error implicated appellant’s constitutional rights if the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lee, 929 N.W.2d 432, 440 (Minn. 2019).
10
errors do not satisfy an appe llant’s burden in the absence of “tangible prejudice.”
510 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1994).
Here, only a portion of the direct exam ination was affected by the lack of
interpretation, and appellant makes no claim that this error affected any of the testimony
heard by the jury. The district court, recognizing the error before the parties or appellant,
promptly excused the jury and sought input fro m the parties for a fair resolution. Crucial
to the consideration of his ability to particip ate in the trial and confront the witness,
appellant was not impaired or limited in his ability to cro ss-examine daughter. Indeed,
appellant raises no argument that he was impeded in cross-examination. And the
interpretation of daughter’s direct testimony, although delayed, was accurate.
Additionally, the evidence against appella nt was strong. The only elements
necessary for first-degree criminal sexual conduct are a 13-year-old victim who is sexually
penetrated by someone more than 48 months older. Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(b).
Daughter, a 13-year-old child, clearly descri bed the sexual assault against her from her
father. And although corroboration is not required, the responding officer corroborated the
scratch daughter gave appellant during the assault. Accordingly, we conclude that the lapse
in translation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not have any effect on the
jury’s verdict.
Still appellant contends that the district court’s solution did not restore his ability to
judge the witness’s nonverbal cues simultaneously with her direct testimony. But as
emphasized above, the error occurred during the middle of direct testimony. His ability to
11
cross-examine daughter was not affected. And appellant does not point to any caselaw or
rule establishing a constitutional protection for seeing simultaneous nonverbal cues.
In sum, the error of a lapse in translation is not a structural error, and here the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. The district court properly ruled th at appellant could not cross-examine
daughter about a possible immigration motive for reporting him.

Next, appellant contends that the district court improperly denied him the ability to
cross-examine daughter about her alleged immigration motive to fabricate the allegations
of assault against him.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abus e of discretion.
State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). The appellant bears the burden of proving
that evidence was improperly excluded and that it resulted in prejudice. State v. Ness,
707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006).
Our review of the district court’s evid entiary ruling begins by identifying the
applicable rules of evidence. Generally, al l evidence must meet th reshold questions of
relevance and prejudice to be admitted. Minn. R. Evid. 403. Relevant evidence tends to
make the existence of any fact of consequen ce more or less probable and is admissible.
Minn. R. Evid. 401. Evidence of bias of a witness is admissible to attack the credibility of
a witness. Minn. R. Evid. 616. We recognize however that “not everything tends to show
bias,” including evidence that is “so attenuated as to be unconvincing.”
State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 1995 ). And the district court may
exclude any evidence, although relevant, for which the danger of unfair prejudice or
12
misleading the jury substantially outweighs its probative value. Minn. R. Evid. 403. The
proponent of prejudicial testimony has the burden to provide additional evidence or proffer
contradicting testimony to overcome rule 403. State v. Brown , 739 N.W.2d 716, 720
(Minn. 2007) (affirming limitation of cross- examination because th e proponent of the
evidence made no offer of proof establishing relevancy).
Turning next to caselaw, we are guided by the Minnesota Supreme Court decision
to uphold the exclusion of ev idence in a similar case invol ving a witness’s immigration
status. In State v. Larson, the defendant sought to attack the credibility of a witness on the
ground that he was “an illegal immigrant” a nd exchanged testimony against Larson for a
favorable removal hearing. 787 N.W.2d 592, 598-99 (Minn. 2010). But the record did not
establish that the witness’s testimony was give n in consideration for any leniency in his
removal hearing or a lack of charges against him. Id. The supreme court concluded the
testimony was properly excluded because its prejudicial nature su bstantially outweighed
its probative value. Id.
Similarly here, a defense inquiry about the immigration status of daughter before a
jury would clearly be prejudic ial, but there could be some probative value in the alleged
bias of daughter. Based on the guidance of Larson, the defense would have to elicit
testimony about the alleged motive to clear the high bar of rule 403. Id. Appellant did not
do so. There was no testimon y during the voir dire of da ughter that she had applied for
asylum or a U-Visa or that she intended to do so.5 Daughter testified that she was unaware

5 Appellant claims on appeal that daughter might have been eligible for a U-Visa. But this
is the first time he has made this argument. In district court he argued only about her
13
of any possible immigration benefits of reporting appellant because the incident took place
in the United States and not her home country, making it unlikely that her testimony was a
product of bias and, further, making her i mmigration status nonprobative. In sum,
appellant did not meet his burd en to show daughter knew a bout any immigration benefit,
and the district cour t did not abuse its discretion when it limited cross-examination to
exclude evidence of daughter’s immigration status.
To convince us otherwise, appellant cites to Davis v. Alaska to argue that a witness’s
motivations are “always relevant.” 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (quotation omitted). But as
explained above, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that this general rule has
limits, clarifying that “not everything tends to show bias, and courts may exclude evidence
that is only marginally useful for this purpose.” Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 640-41
(affirming district court’s decision to limit cross-examination and exclude extrinsic
evidence). Appellant’s argument is not persuasive.
Appellant also contends that daughter does not need to have subjectively known that
her allegation of sexual assault could provide an immigration benefit and that so long as
she may have been eligible for a benefit, her testimony is sufficiently probative to outweigh
any prejudice under rule 403. Th is assertion runs headlong into Larson, which requires
some evidence of the connecti on between the alleged bias a nd the prejudicial testimony
before the testimony may be heard before a jury . 787 N.W.2d at 598-99. And in light of
Larson, we note that here the re cord did not establish that when daughter—through her

possible asylum eligibility. This is not an argument proper for our review. Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
14
aunt—contacted authorities she was aware of any path to citizenship that could be gained
by reporting the assault. Appellant fails to connect daughter to any possible immigration
benefit regardless of her knowledge of those benefits.
In sum, the district court did no t abuse its discretion when it limited
cross-examination to exclude evidence of daughter’s immigration status.
Affirmed.